Prof. Nils Holtug on the Positive Value of Existence

Michael · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

Does this make sense??

ABSTRACT:
In this paper I argue that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) a person. My argument incorporates the comparative claim that existence can be better (or worse) for a person than never existing. Since these claims are highly controversial, I consider and reject a number of objections which threaten them. These objections raise various semantic, logical, metaphysical and value-theoretical issues. I then suggest that there is an important sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to come into existence. Again, I consider and reject some objections. Finally, I briefly consider what the conclusions reached in this paper imply for our moral obligations to possible future people…

I have argued for the Value of Existence View by making the comparative claim that existence can be better (or worse) for a person than non-existence. However, some philosophers suggest that it is incoherent to defend the Value of Existence View in this way. Here are representative observations, made by Derek Parfit and John Broome, respectively:

Causing someone to exist is a special case because the alternative would not have been worse for this person. We may admit that, for this reason, causing someone to exist cannot be better for this person.

At least, it cannot ever be true that it is better for a person that she lives than that she should never have lived at all. If it were better for a person that she lives than that she should never have lived at all, then if she had never lived at all, that would have been worse for her than if she had lived. But if she had never lived at all, there would have been no her for it to be worse for, so it could not have been worse for her.

The argument set out by Parfit and Broome seems to have two premises. According to the first, the judgement that it is better (or worse) to exist than never to exist entails that it is worse (or better) never to exist than to exist. According to the second, it cannot be worse (or better) never to exist. Presumably, the first premise is based on a claim about the logic of “betterness” relation; and presumably, the second premise is based on the following metaphysical principle:

The No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle: An individual cannot have any properties if it does not exist. It is because a person who does not exist cannot have any properties that she cannot be worse (or better) off.

The claim that Parfit and Broome are committed to the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle can be disputed, but their argument is best explained by invoking this principle. After all, what reason could there be for denying that it is worse (or better) never to exist, if not because, in general, a person cannot have properties if she does not exist? This interpretation is also suggested by Broome’s remark that “if she had never lived at all, there would have been no her for it to be worse for, so it could not have been worse for her” (my emphasis). Broome’s point would seem to be that, if a person does not exist, her absence makes it impossible for properties to “stick” to her.

Let us call this argument against the view that existence can be better (worse) than non-existence the “Metaphysical Argument.” Besides being pressed into service by Broome and Parfit, it also seems to be endorsed by David Heyd, who claims it make no sense to regret having been born: For if regret means in this case “being better off not born,” who is the subject of this better state? The answer is that there is no such subject, and hence…such a judgement cannot make sense.

Heyd does not make any explicit claims about the logic of the betterness relation, but he must be assuming that in order for existence to be worse than non-existence, non-existence must be better than existence. If he were not assuming this, the truth of the former claim alone would establish a reason for regret. Also, Heyd seems to invoke the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle when he argues that a person who does not exist cannot be in a state of being better off (for present purposes we can assume that being in such a state is equivalent to having the property of being better off). In this section, I briefly comment on the logic of the betterness relation. In the following section, I shall attempt to show how both premises of the Metaphysical Argument are in fact compatible with my defence of the Value of Existence View.

What logical property, or properties, of the betterness relation ensure that the proposition that existence is better (or worse) than non-existence implies that non-existence is worse (or better) than existence? Such an entailment might be based on the way “better than” and “worse than” are defined.

So consider the following definition:

(1) y is worse than x, if and only if x is better than y.

How will (1) help Broome, Heyd and Parfit? If we substitute non-existence and existence for x and y we get: (2) Existence is worse than non-existence, if and only if non-existence is better than existence. This may seem to establish the entailment our authors require. However, what is needed is not a two-place but a three-place predicate, since the claim at issue is that existence can be better (or worse) for a person than non-existence. So let us consider the following definition:

(3) y is worse for S than x, if and only if x is better for S than y
.
(3) states that if existence is better (or worse) for a person than non-existence, non-existence is worse (or better) for her. And the claim that non-existence is worse (or better) for her seems to violate the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. It seems to ascribe to her the property of being worse (or better) off in a possible world in which she does not exist.
So (3), then, seems to be just what Broome, Heyd and Parfit need.

METAPHYSICS

Let us now examine more closely the second premise in the Metaphysical Argument – the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. What exactly is it that this principle rules out regarding the properties of non-existent individuals? Consider what we may call a positive property such as having black hair. This property is instantiated in any object that has black hair. Certainly, the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle rules out that individuals can have positive properties if they do not exist.

Now, according to the Metaphysical Argument, we cannot claim that existence is better (or worse) for a person than non-existence, because this implies that non-existence is worse (or better) for her than existence, and this is ruled out by the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. Let us now re-assess this argument. Consider the following (allegedly dubious) proposition:

P: Non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence.

The question is whether the truth of P can be established without ascribing positive properties to Jeremy in a possible world in which he does not exist. In my main argument, I described different theories of well-being on the basis of which the Value of Existence View can be defended. Each of these theories involves distinctive ontological commitments. Invoking the object account of preferences, I argued that existence is better for Jeremy because he prefers existence to non-existence. And it may now be argued that, for the same reason, non-existence is worse for him. Here, the truth of P is established merely by appeal to a preference Jeremy has in a possible world – the actual world – in which he exists. In this world, then, he has the positive property of having a particular preference. More importantly, the truth of P is established without ascribing any positive properties to Jeremy in a possible world in which he does not exist.

The three other theories of well-being on the basis of which I argued for the Value of Existence View involved a two-step procedure. First, it was pointed out that Jeremy’s life includes a surplus of positive value (preference-satisfactions, positive mental states, or items on an objective list), and that his non-existence involves no such values. Both of these claims are, of course, compatible with the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. It was then pointed out that it seems to be better to have a surplus of positive value than to have no value. Contrariwise, it seems to be worse to have no value than it is to have a surplus of value. This judgement relies only on the nature of positive value and no value. Thus, assuming any of these other theories of well-being, once again, the truth of P is established without presupposing any dubious ontology. It may be objected that I have not yet shown that P is metaphysically innocent. It may be argued that, if P is true, it must be true in virtue of a particular relation that obtains and serves as a truthmaker for P. More precisely, the (triadic) relation x is worse for S than y must obtain between the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, Jeremy, and the state of affairs, Jeremy exists. Now, Jeremy exists and thus the state of affairs,
Jeremy exists, obtains. But the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, does not obtain. So how can the betterness relation obtain, when one of its relata does not?

It seems clear that, in fact, a state need not obtain in order to be an object in a betterness relation. Consider, for instance, the following relation: the state of affairs that the allies win the war is better than the state of affairs that the Nazis win the war
.
A more plausible requirement, then, is that in order for a relation to obtain, its relata must exist. And while the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, does not obtain, it can be sensibly claimed that it exists as an abstract entity. Since all three relata thus exist, we can claim that the triadic relation, Jeremy does not exist is worse for Jeremy than Jeremy exists, obtains.

Therefore, assuming that this relation is indeed the truthmaker for P, P is true.

Nevertheless, perhaps Broome, Heyd and Parfit’s point is not that P cannot be true. Perhaps their point is that it cannot be true if Jeremy does not come into existence. Indeed, this (counterfactual) situation seems to be what Broome aims at in the passage quoted above: “if it were better for a person that she lives than that she should never have lived at all, then if she had never lived at all, that would have been worse for her than if she had lived” (my emphasis). However, (3) does not claim that if existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence, then if Jeremy does not exist, non-existence is worse for him than existence. In order for this to follow, we would have to accept something like:
(4) If x is better (or worse) for S than y, then x is better (or worse) for S than y even if x obtains.
How does (4) challenge my argument for the Value of Existence View? I have argued that existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence. (3) then implies that non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence. And given this implication, (4) implies that even if Jeremy had not existed, nonexistence would be worse for him. But the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle rules out that Jeremy can have any positive properties, including relational ones, if he does not exist. So it would seem that my claim that existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence leads to a contradiction.
However, nothing forces us to accept (4). In fact, assuming the account of the truthmaking relation suggested above, we may have reason to reject
(4), at least in cases in which x implies the non-existence of S.

Consider again P.

Since Jeremy exists, P is true in virtue of the obtaining of the truthmaking relation. But if, instead, we assume that Jeremy does not exist, P does not preserve this truth value for the simple reason that one of the relata, Jeremy, does not exist. Thus, we have a perfectly natural explana-tion of why (4) does not hold in such cases. The metaphysical basis for P is not preserved.

So much for the Metaphysical Argument. Before I move on, note that nothing in my defence of the Value of Existence View in this section hinges on the fact that Jeremy exists. Even if Jeremy had never come into existence, it would still be true that, had he been caused to exist, he may have benefited. Had he been caused to exist the relevant relation would obtain (or so we may assume), and so he would have benefited from coming into existence.

6.THE HARM OF NON-EXISTENCE

I now want to go further. It can benefit (or harm) a person to come into existence; but there is also a sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to come into existence. To see this, let us first consider the (dis-)value of death. Suppose a person dies painlessly but prematurely. Suppose also, for simplicity, that we accept hedonism as our theory of well-being. On this assumption, since her death was a painless one, it did not intrinsically harm her. Finally, suppose that, had this person not died, she would have experienced far more future pleasure than pain. Surely, then, there is a sense in which her death harmed her. Indeed, I suggest that it extrinsically harmed her, where:

(5) x extrinsically harms S if and only if: (a) S would have been intrinsically better off, had x not occurred, and (b) x does not intrinsically harm S.

This person’s death extrinsically harmed her since she would have been intrinsically better off, had she survived (she would have enjoyed future pleasures), and since it did not cause her any pain. In other words, her death harmed her since it deprived her of future benefits. In fact, I believe that this notion of extrinsic harm provides us with the best account of the
badness of death.

Nevertheless, it may be suggested that if we accept an alternative theory of well-being, say, a preference theory, then we do not need a concept of extrinsic harm to explain the badness of death. But this is not so. All plausible theories of well-being will need to appeal to extrinsic harm (I shall argue this in the case of preference theories in the next section). Therefore, extrinsic harm has prudential and moral significance. Now, just as death may extrinsically harm a person, a person may be extrinsically harmed by never coming into existence. After all, had a person’s non-existence not occurred, that is, had he been caused to exist, he may have been intrinsically better off, since he may then have enjoyed various intrinsic benefits (for instance, pleasures). Also, this person’s non-existence does not intrinsically harm him. Therefore, depending on what his life would have been like, he may be extrinsically harmed (or benefited) by not being caused to exist. Note that what makes it true that a person is extrinsically harmed by not coming into existence is the truth of a counterfactual claim about what would be the case if he existed. And as we have seen, if he existed, it may both be true that his existence is better for him and that his non-existence is worse for him. Therefore, once again, there is no dubious metaphysics in the wings here. However, if we claim that a person is harmed by his non-existence, does it then not follow by the principle of existential generalization in classical logic that he must exist? Not necessarily. Thus, “ S is harmed by his non-existence” may be interpreted as meaning “S does not exist and had he existed, his existence would be intrinsically better for him than his non-existence.” Clearly, the latter claim does not legitimate existential generalization; it does not imply that S exists.

people.su.se/~folke/holtug.pdf

watchman1706 · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

zzzzzzzzz

Michael · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

Maybe you find the subject boring because you’ve never bothered to think through the implications of saying that no state of existence can be better (or worse) than non-existence.
**
If you assume a horse ceases to exist at death (as most people assume), it would mean that leaving a horse with a broken leg to suffer for hours or days isn’t really cruel, because that state of existence is no worse than total extinction.**

It would also seem to mean that you’ll never really have any reason to be grateful for being brought into existence, even if you get to heaven, because even that state of existence is no better than non-existence.

And you could never really have any reason to complain if you ended up in eternal torment, because that state of existence would be no worse than non-existence.

Those are the logical consequences of saying that no state of existence can be better (or worse) for than non-existence.

That’s why I found this whole paper, and especially the following, very interesting.

[size=150]I have argued for the Value of Existence View by making the comparative claim that existence can be better (or worse) for a person than non-existence. However, some philosophers suggest that it is incoherent to defend the Value of Existence View in this way.[/size] Here are representative observations, made by Derek Parfit and John Broome, respectively:

Causing someone to exist is a special case because the alternative would not have been worse for this person. We may admit that, for this reason, causing someone to exist cannot be better for this person…The argument set out by Parfit and Broome seems to have two premises. According to the first, the judgement that it is better (or worse) to exist than never to exist entails that it is worse (or better) never to exist than to exist. According to the second, it cannot be worse (or better) never to exist. Presumably, the first premise is based on a claim about the logic of “betterness” relation; and presumably, the second premise is based on the following metaphysical principle:

The No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle: An individual cannot have any properties if it does not exist. It is because a person who does not exist cannot have any properties that she cannot be worse (or better) off.

The claim that Parfit and Broome are committed to the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle can be disputed, but their argument is best explained by invoking this principle. After all, what reason could there be for denying that it is worse (or better) never to exist, if not because, in general, a person cannot have properties if she does not exist? This interpretation is also suggested by Broome’s remark that “if she had never lived at all, there would have been no her for it to be worse for, so it could not have been worse for her” (my emphasis). Broome’s point would seem to be that, if a person does not exist, her absence makes it impossible for properties to “stick” to her.

Let us call this argument against the view that existence can be better (worse) than non-existence the “Metaphysical Argument.” Besides being pressed into service by Broome and Parfit, it also seems to be endorsed by David Heyd, who claims it make no sense to regret having been born: For if regret means in this case “being better off not born,” who is the subject of this better state? The answer is that there is no such subject, and hence…such a judgement cannot make sense.

Heyd does not make any explicit claims about the logic of the betterness relation, but he must be assuming that in order for existence to be worse than non-existence, non-existence must be better than existence. If he were not assuming this, the truth of the former claim alone would establish a reason for regret. Also, Heyd seems to invoke the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle when he argues that a person who does not exist cannot be in a state of being better off (for present purposes we can assume that being in such a state is equivalent to having the property of being better off). In this section, I briefly comment on the logic of the betterness relation. In the following section, I shall attempt to show how both premises of the Metaphysical Argument are in fact compatible with my defence of the Value of Existence View.

What logical property, or properties, of the betterness relation ensure that the proposition that existence is better (or worse) than non-existence implies that non-existence is worse (or better) than existence? Such an entailment might be based on the way “better than” and “worse than” are defined.

So consider the following definition:

(1) y is worse than x, if and only if x is better than y.

How will (1) help Broome, Heyd and Parfit? If we substitute non-existence and existence for x and y we get: (2) Existence is worse than non-existence, if and only if non-existence is better than existence. This may seem to establish the entailment our authors require. However, what is needed is not a two-place but a three-place predicate, since the claim at issue is that existence can be better (or worse) for a person than non-existence. So let us consider the following definition:

(3) y is worse for S than x, if and only if x is better for S than y
.
(3) states that if existence is better (or worse) for a person than non-existence, non-existence is worse (or better) for her. And the claim that non-existence is worse (or better) for her seems to violate the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. It seems to ascribe to her the property of being worse (or better) off in a possible world in which she does not exist.
So (3), then, seems to be just what Broome, Heyd and Parfit need.

METAPHYSICS

Let us now examine more closely the second premise in the Metaphysical Argument – the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. What exactly is it that this principle rules out regarding the properties of non-existent individuals? Consider what we may call a positive property such as having black hair. This property is instantiated in any object that has black hair. Certainly, the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle rules out that individuals can have positive properties if they do not exist.

Now, according to the Metaphysical Argument, we cannot claim that existence is better (or worse) for a person than non-existence, because this implies that non-existence is worse (or better) for her than existence, and this is ruled out by the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. Let us now re-assess this argument. Consider the following (allegedly dubious) proposition:

P: Non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence.

The question is whether the truth of P can be established without ascribing positive properties to Jeremy in a possible world in which he does not exist. In my main argument, I described different theories of well-being on the basis of which the Value of Existence View can be defended. Each of these theories involves distinctive ontological commitments. Invoking the object account of preferences, I argued that existence is better for Jeremy because he prefers existence to non-existence. And it may now be argued that, for the same reason, non-existence is worse for him. Here, the truth of P is established merely by appeal to a preference Jeremy has in a possible world – the actual world – in which he exists. In this world, then, he has the positive property of having a particular preference. More importantly, the truth of P is established without ascribing any positive properties to Jeremy in a possible world in which he does not exist.

[size=150]The three other theories of well-being on the basis of which I argued for the Value of Existence View involved a two-step procedure. First, it was pointed out that Jeremy’s life includes a surplus of positive value (preference-satisfactions, positive mental states, or items on an objective list), and that his non-existence involves no such values. Both of these claims are, of course, compatible with the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. It was then pointed out that it seems to be better to have a surplus of positive value than to have no value. Contrariwise, it seems to be worse to have no value than it is to have a surplus of value. This judgement relies only on the nature of positive value and no value. Thus, assuming any of these other theories of well-being, once again, the truth of P is established without presupposing any dubious ontology.[/size] It may be objected that I have not yet shown that P is metaphysically innocent. It may be argued that, if P is true, it must be true in virtue of a particular relation that obtains and serves as a truthmaker for P. More precisely, the (triadic) relation x is worse for S than y must obtain between the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, Jeremy, and the state of affairs, Jeremy exists. Now, Jeremy exists and thus the state of affairs, Jeremy exists, obtains. But the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, does not obtain. So how can the betterness relation obtain, when one of its relata does not?

It seems clear that, in fact, a state need not obtain in order to be an object in a betterness relation. Consider, for instance, the following relation: the state of affairs that the allies win the war is better than the state of affairs that the Nazis win the war
.
A more plausible requirement, then, is that in order for a relation to obtain, its relata must exist. And while the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, does not obtain, it can be sensibly claimed that it exists as an abstract entity. Since all three relata thus exist, we can claim that the triadic relation, Jeremy does not exist is worse for Jeremy than Jeremy exists, obtains.

Therefore, assuming that this relation is indeed the truthmaker for P, P is true.

Nevertheless, perhaps Broome, Heyd and Parfit’s point is not that P cannot be true. Perhaps their point is that it cannot be true if Jeremy does not come into existence. Indeed, this (counterfactual) situation seems to be what Broome aims at in the passage quoted above: “if it were better for a person that she lives than that she should never have lived at all, then if she had never lived at all, that would have been worse for her than if she had lived” (my emphasis). However, (3) does not claim that if existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence, then if Jeremy does not exist, non-existence is worse for him than existence. In order for this to follow, we would have to accept something like:
(4) If x is better (or worse) for S than y, then x is better (or worse) for S than y even if x obtains.
How does (4) challenge my argument for the Value of Existence View? I have argued that existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence. (3) then implies that non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence. And given this implication, (4) implies that even if Jeremy had not existed, nonexistence would be worse for him. But the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle rules out that Jeremy can have any positive properties, including relational ones, if he does not exist. So it would seem that my claim that existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence leads to a contradiction.
However, nothing forces us to accept (4). In fact, assuming the account of the truthmaking relation suggested above, we may have reason to reject
(4), at least in cases in which x implies the non-existence of S.

Consider again P.

Since Jeremy exists, P is true in virtue of the obtaining of the truthmaking relation. But if, instead, we assume that Jeremy does not exist, P does not preserve this truth value for the simple reason that one of the relata, Jeremy, does not exist. Thus, we have a perfectly natural explana-tion of why (4) does not hold in such cases. The metaphysical basis for P is not preserved.

So much for the Metaphysical Argument. [size=150]Before I move on, note that nothing in my defense of the Value of Existence View in this section hinges on the fact that Jeremy exists. Even if Jeremy had never come into existence, it would still be true that, had he been caused to exist, he may have benefited. Had he been caused to exist the relevant relation would obtain (or so we may assume), and so he would have benefited from coming into existence.[/size]

people.su.se/~folke/holtug.pdf

watchman1706 · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

You are right. I have never, nor would I ever have those thoughts. It’s a pointless argument. A theoretical exercise. It has no real bearing on my life, nor will it ever. If I already know what is coming, why would I imagine anything else? Why would I put all that effort into it. Rather, I am better to keep my eye on the goal and with everything within me press towards the mark of the high calling that says I already exist, I was created for a purpose and predestined. Do you think you are going to win souls or converts with your argument? Most people won’t even comprehend it. Do you think your existence is in peril?

Michael · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

Actually, I didn’t write that paper, so the thoughts contained therein aren’t mine.

The thoughts were apparently put on paper about ten years before I lost everything I valued here on earth, and began questioning everything I believed.

(If you look at the acknowledgements on that last page, you’ll see "the article was presented at the Oxford-Copenhagen Summit on Ethics in 1999, and at the International Society for Utilitarian Studies conference in North Carolina in 2000…)

I might never have considered these questions myself, if I hadn’t encountered one of the counter arguments Prof. Holtug addresses (namely, that it couldn’t be any worse for you if you didn’t exist, because there wouldn’t be any you.)

I thought the purpose of this section on philosophy was to discuss philosophy?

And as far as the question of whether any states of existence are better than non-existence having any bearing on your life, that might depend on whether your faith (in God, His existence, His goodness, His plan and purpose) is always as strong as you think it is now.

If you ever find yourself alone in the dark, questioning everything you once believed, the question of whether any state of earthly or heavenly existence could be better than non-existence might take on more practical importance.

I don’t know

Agustine, Anselm, and Aquinas seemed to think they could win souls by arguing that existence is greater than non-existence (that was part of their Cosmological argument in favor of God’s existence), but some might disagree (or even say they were making a category error.)

What I do know is that churchmen have been discussing philosophy since Paul’s sermon on Mars hill, and have considered it right and proper to do so.

The JW’s, the 7th day Adventists, other Sabbatarian groups, and Sunday Adventists have always denied the immortality of the soul, and now even the Church of England favors an annihilationist interpretation of scripture.

Given that view, it’s quite possible for creatures to cease to exist.

And given the view that existence can’t be any better or worse than non-existence, the saved gain nothing, and the lost lose nothing (and I don’t expect that argument to wine many souls, do you?)

But to answer your question directly (if the annihilationists are right, and suicide is a sin) I do think that my existence may have been in peril when I was first hit with the repeated suggestion that existence was really no better or worsethan non-existence.

Anyway, I would like to know what those with an interest in philosophy think of this paper.

Thank you.

Username1 · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

Hi Michael

I’m no philosopher. But it seems to me that you’re trying to ‘get behind’ a concept -ie can non-existence ever be better or worse than existence? - which is intrinsically meaningless.

If I never exist then anything you say about the relative merits of my existence or non-existence is immediately null and void. You simply cannot say anything coherent about ‘me’ at all. If I never exist, there is no ‘me’ - never is, never was, never will be - to talk about. I can’t do the talking. Neither can anybody else. The very concept of ‘me’ is a non-concept. It is meaningless.

I’ve read a number of your posts over the last few months, and you seem to be obsessed with this idea that non-existence may be ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than non-existence. But surely you can see that the very question is totally, utterly meaningless?

I’m very sorry to hear of your troubles. We all have troubles. Yours have clearly been very severe. But the answer - if answer there is (and I doubt there is) - does not lie in obsessively analysing a meaningless concept.

God bless you sir.

Johnny

Michael · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

President Hillary Clinton doesn’t exist, and may never exist.

But President Hillary Clinton could exist, because she could be elected President in 2016.

But I’m sure you’ve heard of abstract entities, haven’t you?

The state of affairs where Mrs. Clinton is elected President in 2016 is one type of abstract entity (and during the next presidential election cycle I suspect Democrats and Republicans will find it meaningful to discuss the properties of that particular abstract entity.)

Merely-possible individuals are another type of abstract entity.

See ou.edu/ouphil/faculty/swoyer/AbstractEntities.pdf

If johnnyparker exists, and there was a time when he didn’t exist, than even at that time (when he didn’t exist) it was possible for him to exist.

He was an abstract entity.

I believe that was the point the author of that paper was making here.

people.su.se/~folke/holtug.pdf

(Parentheses and emphasis mine.)

If you disagree with Prof. Holtug (the author of this paper), could you please show me the logical flaws in his arguments?

Also, could you please answer the following questions for me?

1.) If no state of conscious existence is any better or worse than non-existence, doesn’t it follow that eternal conscious torment is no worse than non-existence?

2.) And wouldn’t there be no logical or moral reason for a materialist (or even for most Christians, who believe that death is total extinction for an animal) to put a suffering animal out of it’s misery?

Every materialist believes that death is oblivion, and most Theists believe it is for a horse, so wouldn’t there be no reason to put a suffering horse out of it’s misery (if misery is no worse than non-existence)?

Getting back to the paper, i particularly liked the surplus of positive value argument.

The three other theories of well-being on the basis of which I argued for the Value of Existence View involved a two-step procedure. First, it was pointed out that Jeremy’s life includes a surplus of positive value (preference-satisfactions, positive mental states, or items on an objective list), and that his non-existence involves no such values. Both of these claims are, of course, compatible with the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. It was then pointed out that it seems to be better to have a surplus of positive value than to have no value. Contrariwise, it seems
to be worse to have no value than it is to have a surplus of value. This judgement relies only on the nature of positive value and no value. Thus, assuming any of these other theories of well-being, once again, the truth of P is established without presupposing any dubious ontology.

people.su.se/~folke/holtug.pdf

What did you think of the surplus of positive value argument?

Did you bother to read the paper Johnny?

Username1 · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

Hi Michael

Thanks for your reply. But I’m afraid you’re missing the point.

An abstract entity is one thing. And given that I exist now, and once didn’t, then it is coherent to talk about the possibility of my existence. But had I never existed, it would be incoherent to talk of the possibility of my existence - because there is no ‘me’ to discuss even theoretically. I am not an abstract entity, because I am not an ‘I’ at all. The word has no meaning.

I read some of the paper, and skimmed the rest. As I said before, I think the whole subject of the paper is a meaningless concept. The moment you start trying to compare the relative merits of an individual’s existing or not existing you have voided logic altogether. You cannot apply logic to nonsense, which is what this author is talking.

What I was trying to do was encourage you to stop fretting about a meaningless and useless concept, and get on with the real life you have now. I really hope you can do that.

All the best

Johnny

Michael · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

The point is that as long as you could exist (even if you never did) you would be an abstract entity, and it would not be at all incoherent for God to consider the possibility of your existence.

There is nothing incoherent about that.

Michael · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

P.S. You never answered my two questions.

1.) If no state of conscious existence is any better or worse than non-existence, doesn’t it follow that eternal conscious torment is no worse than non-existence (and that there would be nothing morally objectionable in the idea of God knowingly bringing beings doomed to such a fate into existence)?

2.) And wouldn’t there be no logical or moral reason for a materialist (or even for most Christians, who believe that death is total extinction for an animal) to put a suffering animal out of it’s misery?

Aren’t those the unavoidable consequences of the proposition that no state of existence is any better or worse than non-existence?

Chrisguy90 · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

Michael,

This question requires a distinction I don’t see being made: namely, the difference between my existence as I experience it as a good and my existence as another experiences it as a good.

No one, I don’t think, would say that his conscious experience of existing is “better” than a certain state of existence if his consciousness didn’t exist to begin with. To HIM, he would not know anything at all and so be incapable of valuing one thing over another. But in another persons eyes, surely it makes sense to say that being is better than non being regarding person x?

AllanS · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

Thousands of my children don’t exist, and I don’t miss them at all. Does that make me callous?

Of course, if multiverse theories are correct, then every one of my potential children will exist somewhere. Every possible arrangement of particles will exist. Because God is eternally creative, I think it perfectly sensible to argue that everything that can logically exist, does exist. Except for square circles etc, non-existence is non-existent.

Michael · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

If God is omniscient, every proposition He holds to be true must actually be true, right?

So if God holds it to be true that it would be better for Chris to exist in a conscious state of unending happiness, than to exist in a conscious state of unending exquisite pain, that must actually be true, right?

And I don’t see why you think you’d have to exist, and be consciously aware of that truth to make it so.

If you read the paper (even if you only read the abstract), you should realize that Prof. Nils is saying that merely possible people can be benefited or harmed by being brought into existence, and I’m still not sure why you would disagree with this?

Isn’t that the point?

That it’s better to know things like happiness, love, joy, pleasure, and ecstasy, than it is to know nothing; and that it’s better to know nothing than it is to know only meaningless, purposeless, unending, exquisite pain.

And better not just in the eyes of those of us who are here to see that it’s better, but in the sense of ultimate reality.

Now let’s get back to horses.

Assuming (for the sake of this discussion) that animals can really suffer, and that death is the end for them, are you really saying that it wouldn’t be better for a horse to know nothing, than it would for him to know only exquisite pain?

That no matter how extreme the suffering, or how hopeless the condition, you would be doing the poor animal himself no kindness by putting him out of his misery?

Is that logical?

Chrisguy90 · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

If God were to hold that proposition true, and if he was omniscient, then yes it would have to really be true. But that doesn’t imply that everything imaginable can possibly be true. It may not be possible for God to think the proposition true, in other words. And I don’t believe I’d have to exist to make the thought “If Chris exists in conditions x he will be better off than conditions y.” I would only have to possibly exist, since the statement itself implies nothing about whether or not I actually exist but only, supposing I do, etc.

Perhaps I am missing something in your above quote, but I fail to see the implication you are trying to draw.

“Merely possible people can be benefited or harmed by being brought into existence” seems to put the cart before the horse if you are trying to compare their state of being pre-creation to post-creation from their own subjective viewpoint. But that is an inherent incoherency, in my opinion. I don’t think God compares those two states at all in that way.

I’m not sure how you extrapolated that from me. If I saw an animal in pain and I deemed its suffering had no corrective purpose for its life, I would end its life.

What, if you don’t mind me asking, are you really asking in your example?

Michael · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

What I’m trying to get at is whether you see any states of existence (earthly happiness, heavenly bliss, unending joy in the presence of God, earthly horrors such as Auschwitz, or eternal conscious torment in hell) as objectively better or worse than non-existence?

But why (if no state of existence can be any better or worse than non-existence)?

If that were really true, it would mean that extinguishing the animals life was doing it no service, and letting it go on suffering was doing it no dis-service (because conscious suffering is no worse than non-existence, and non-existence is no better than conscious suffering.)

So (if that were true, and that’s really what you believe) why would you go out of your way to put the suffering animal out of it’s misery, unless it was just to make yourself feel better?

And if you believe that God is the one necessary being, who brought all derivative beings into existence, why do you suppose He would have done that (if no state of existence is any better r worse than non-existence)?

Do you think He just did it to make Himself feel better?

To me, the proposition that no state of existence is better or worse than non-existence argues against the existence of the God proposed by classic Christian Theism, against a loving purpose for creation, and against UR.

So if you believe that no state of conscious existence is any better or worse than non-existence, why would you put a suffering animal out of it’s misery, and why do you suppose God created us?

If I understand you correctly, you disagree with Prof Holtug’s thesis that being brought into existence can be a benefit, so you don’t really see creation as benefiting anyone (except maybe God, who already existed)?

Is that right Chris?

Chrisguy90 · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

I would distinguish. In God’s mind, certain comparative states of existence are far better than others. But comparing it in the creature’s mind who would not exist, I find such a comparison meaningless.

Because of the impact the suffering would have on me, I would imagine.

Well if that’s the case then your criticism would apply to any possible act I could ever do to the animal. A criticism that admits of no exception is a meaningless one. If you try to compare the subjective experience of “non-existence” to “existence” you are comparing two states of affairs that are not parallel, and if you criticism is based on such a comparison, then it is meaningless, regardless of the scenario you apply it to.

I would do it just to make me feel better. That is my point.

As a matter of fact, I don’t believe it possible to do an act for any other reason.

In an anthropomorphic way, yes, I suppose I would agree with that.

Because creating us fulfills a desire which God has, I would imagine.

Michael · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

Than you don’t really believe there is such a thing as unselfish love, do you?

Silly me, I thought it was out of unselfish love that God brought us into existence, and I thought it was this quality of unselfish love that we were meant to learn from a life of sorrow and joy here, and it turns out (given your reasoning about no state of existence being any better or worse than non-existence) that there’s no such thing.

I thought He brought us into existence to enjoy all the good things He knew we could never enjoy if we didn’t exist, but (according to you) He only did it to make Himself feel better.

Is that what you really believe Chris?

Chrisguy90 · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

If God’s being is fulfilled in doing all he can for an “other,” then his desire is simply to express himself in such a way. If it “makes God feel better” to give himself to his creation – to die, maybe, on a cross – then is it not true he is acting in order to make himself feel better and also loving you as much as he can?

Michael · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

But his existence, and ours, is really no better than non-existence?

If He had the choice, He might not be here?

And we’re only here to make Him feel better?

Is that right?

That is what you said, isn’t it?

Chrisguy90 · March 9, 2018, 2:36am

Could you explain how you reasoned that God’s existence is no better than his non-existence?