The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Best argument

Theology Philosophical
#61

Hi Allan,

It’s not ‘doubt’ that is fatal to either argument per se. It’s about arguing one’s case consistently and with intellectual integrity. The debate over God is a debate over whether or not God is a metaphysical possibility—i.e., whether ‘God exists necessarily’ or ‘God does not exist necessarily’ is true.

Give our limited knowledge and faulty reasoning, any of us could be wrong, right? We all admit we are less than omniscient and so might be wrong in our belief that ‘God exists necessarily’ is true (or that ‘God does not exist necessarily’ is true). What Hartshorne is forcing atheists to do is argue the ONLY possible case for atheism, viz., that ‘God does not exist, necessarily’, that is, that God is impossible, that no such being can possibly exist; and to the extent one doubts this, i.e., to the extent that one grants that God is a real possibility, one must grant that God in fact exists because those are the only options.

It’s either:

(A): “a necessarily existing God is a metaphysical possibility”

Or

(B) “a necessarily existing God is a metaphysical impossibility.”

Atheists have to argue (B) to be atheists. It’s the only credible and honest atheisitc position there is. They cannot say “Well, sure, there’s nothing logically or metaphysically impossible about God’s existence. But so what? God does not in fact exist” (because there is evil or whatever the atheist wants to offer as reasons for his unbelief), for to argue this way is self-contradictory. To argue the *metaphysical possibility *of some *necessary being *is to argue for that being’s actual existence. The only way a particular ‘necessary being’ can be said to not exist is if it is said to not exist necessarily. And to not exist necessarily is to be ‘impossible’. A ‘necessary being’ can’t ‘not exist’ contingently. See?

Just make sure you keep ‘epistemic’ possibility separate from ‘metaphysical’ possibility.

Tom

#62

Hi Tom,

So in your view, the best argument for Theism is an argument for agnosticism?

#63

Not at all, Michael.

What am I missing?

Tom

#64

Agnostics argue that given what we know, it’s impossible to adjudicate the competing evidence for and against the possibility of a necessarily existing God. How can THAT be an argument in favor of concluding that there IS such a God (for theism)?

Tom

#65

I don’t know.

The “possibility” of a “necessarily” existing God just seems a little confussing, and it’s hard for me to follow your logic.

#66

We’re talking about metaphysical posibility. I might ask you if you think it’s “possible” that God commit suicide. You might say, “Of course not. That’s not ‘possible’.” Here you mean it’s metaphysically not possible. There are possible states of affairs (states of affairs that can obtain) and impossible states of affairs (states of affairs that cannot obtain).

What we’re saying is that God’s NECESSARY existence is either a “possible state of affairs” or an “impossible state of affairs.” Atheism is the belief that God does not in fact exist, and Hartshorne (and others) rightly respond that the only way God doesn’t exist is if his existence is IMPOSSIBLE (metaphsyically). The atheist must offer reasons for thinking the existence of God is not a possible state of affiars, that God’s existence is, strictly speaking, inconceivable. If the atheist cannot do that, or if he actually agrees that the ‘necessary existence of God’ is not an impossible state of affairs, then he has to agree that God actually does exist. To say that ‘Necessary X’ is metaphysically possible is to say X exists and exists necessarily.

Consider the options:

http://dl.dropbox.com/u/24889042/Existence.jpg

With respect to theism and atheism, it’s either box 1 or 2. Nobody is debating a contingently existing (or non-existing) God. We’re talking about whether or not a necessarily existing God is a possible state of affairs. If it is possible, then he exists. If it’s not possible, he doesn’t exist. Atheists have to argue that a necessarily existing personal being (God) is an impossible state of affairs. Good luck on that one.

So, Hartshorne’s ontological argument argues as follows:

(1) If God exists, he must exist necessarily, if God does not exist his existence is impossible.
(2) Therefore, God is either necessary or impossible.
(3) God can be conceived without contradiction.
(4) Therefore, God is not impossible.
(5) Since God is not impossible he must be necessary.
(6) Since god is necessary he must exist.

Tom

#67

This looks a lot like a verbal sleight of hand. Here is my attempt at a refutation:

If there is no God, then there is no God that possesses any attributes, including the attribute of necessity. And if there is no God, then there is nothing to put into one of those four quadrants.

Just some thoughts from a guy who doesn’t know the difference between epistemic and metaphysical possibility without the help of Google. :sunglasses:

#68

Boxer: This looks a lot like a verbal sleight of hand. Here is my attempt at a refutation. If there is no God, then there is no God that possesses any attributes, including the attribute of necessity. And if there is no God, then there is nothing to put into one of those four quadrants.

Tom: I love it when people engage this argument. It can be so much fun!

If there is no God, then you’re right, this non-existent God wouldn’t possess any attributes, including necessity. What does not exist cannot possess (or relate, or instantiate, or etc.). Good point.

But the argument as Hartshorne words it doesn’t attribute necessity to the non-existent God. By placing the necessary non-existence of God into quadrant 2 we’re not saying that “necessarily not existing” means ‘necessity’ is ‘possessed by’ some non-existing entity. What we’re saying is that if God doesn’t exist, it’s because the ‘concept’ of *God’s existing *is incompatible with existence and reality as we know it.

Think of ‘necessary non-existence’ in terms of ‘impossibility’. Pick an impossibility, say, the impossibility of my being simultaneously physically present in both NY and Paris. Let’s call this the impossibility of my ‘being in two places at one time’. What we don’t mean by saying this is impossible that I’m actually in both NY and Paris and that both of me each possesses the attribute of ‘being impossible’. That’s nonesense. All we mean is that the state of affairs be considered (i.e, my being simultaneously physically present in both NY and Paris) cannot possibly occur or be an actual state of affairs.

Similarly, to say God’s existence is impossible is not to say God possesses the attribute of ‘being impossible’ (as you point out). But this doesn’t undermine Hartshorne’s argument. Hartshorne isn’t saying that quadrant no. 2 is a place where things that cannot possibly exist all actually possess the attribute of ‘being impossible’. Quadrant 2 is just where we conceptually differentiate between meaningful and meaningless, possible and impossible, conceivable and inconceivable, in terms of existence. Atheists claim God does not in fact exist. Hartshorne argues that if this is the case then it must be the case that God’s existence is impossible. The only way God can be said to not exist is if his existence is impossible.

Tom

#69

Here’s an interesting proposed refutation…

religion-online.org/showarti … title=2339

#70

Thanks Jeff. I’ll try to get around to reading it and get back to you.

At first glance (and only a VERY quick glance), I think his Humean take on causality sinks his ship. If it’s really possible that things can pop into existence uncaused, with no reason or explanation whatsoever, then ‘necessary’ existence is (necessarily, but never mind that!) a meaningless notion. If we can conceive of the kind of ex nihilo coming to be that Craighead’s argument requires (that is, if that sort of coming to be is a metaphysical possibility), then its falsifying possibility (i.e., the possibility of necessary existence) has itself to be a metaphysical impossibility and so a meaningless concept; and I’m not sure you could prove that without assumming it’s true. But I’d like to spend some time with the argument before I go on the record.

Thanks Bro!

Tom

#71

I have a question.

Evolutionarily speaking, or rather speaking in terms of probability (which has much to do with traditional evolutionary theory), can Chance “create” into existence through probability; a thing from the variables necessary for that thing to come into being, without those variables pre-existing already in some fashion or form?

Illustratively; can BOB come into being, without the variables B, and O, or the variables that make up B, and O respectively already existing to be utilised by probability/chance?

IE: can “nothing” [size=80](purest nothing, absolute assured nothing, in which absolutely nothing exists; completest lack of “something”)[/size] bring forth “something”?

Thank you in advance! :slight_smile:

#72

If you ask the author of the rebuttal that Jeff posted, he’d say “Yes, it IS possible that something can come from nothing.” And this is PART of what Hartshorne’s argument turns on–i.e., the meaningfulness or conceivability of “absolute nothingness.” Hartshorne argues that when properly considered, *absolute nothingness *is not strictly speaking a meaningful notion. Given the truth that “something exists” (Hartshorne’s first a priori truth), it follows that the totality of the something that exists includes both something which is necessary and something which is contingent. The ‘necessary’ is the ground for all that exists contingently. But the author of Jeff’s article contends that it’s possible that everything that exists, in its totality, exists ‘contingently’, and that nothing exists necessarily, in which case it’s necessarily the case that nothing exists necessarily…which is strongly counter intuitive at best and self-contradictory at worst. For if all that exists is contingent, then there are no necessary truths. But then what do we do with the truth “There are no necessary truths”? That would be NECESSARILY true if everything was contingent.

Some think this is verbal slight of hand, but a lot of us think there’s metaphysical bedrock underneath it.

Tom

#73

Tom,

It seems to me that this argument is based on the assumption that “exists” is synonymous with “is necessary”, so that #6 is a tautology (i.e., since God “exists” he must exist). Where did we prove that God is necessary? I looked through your previous posts, but couldn’t find where this was proved.

#74

You can also replace the word ‘God’ in the above with the phrase - ‘A first cause’ - (and substitute it for he) no personal being required. My problem with these kinds of arguments is the the jump from God must exist to ipso facto the God I happen to believe in must exist - not anyone else’s God - for example the God of the Deists would fit that statement just as well as Yahweh.

#75

Boxer,

The argument is the ‘modal’ ontological argument, in which ‘contingency’ and ‘necessity’ are modes of ‘existence’. CH is pretty clear on this. So ‘existence’ and ‘necessity’ aren’t equated. Some things exist ‘contingently’. Others ‘necessarily’. But since ‘something’ exists, and since it’s impossible that all that exists exists ‘contingently’, something must exist necessarily. Maybe #1 is throwing you off. There “if God exists he exists necessarily” doesn’t assume that God must exist necessarily because whatever exists, exists necessarily. Rather, it just admits that what we’re debating is God. And a contingently existing God is no God. The only God being debated is one who exists necessarily as the ground and explanation of all else that exists. So ‘contingent’ existence isn’t a possible mode of existence for the particular thing we’re debating. Only ‘necessary’ existence qualifies this sort of being we’re debating. So if God exists, he exists necessarily.

Jeff,

Some do illegitimately assume since something must exist necessarily if anything exists at all (and something obviously does exist, etc.) that their own version of what that something is must be true as well. But that some make this mistake has nothing to do with the argument as it stands.

Yes, whatever exists necessarily is the ground and ultimate explanation for all that exists contingently. I don’t know how to falsify that claim given the argument. I’m not saying CH’s argument gets you the Christian God or the Islamic God or any other group’s God. But it does (barring our finite minds which might be all wrong; but we gotta work with what we’ve got) get you a necessarily existing personal creator, and that’s saying something.

Hartshorne (and others) would have other things to say about whether such a being would be the purely deistic god who winds the clock up and goes to lunch. The arguments for why God shouldn’t be thought of in such terms are admittedly less convincing than the argument that some God exists, but many find them pursuasive. However, I don’t think you can just supply an impersonal first cause as the needed necessary existent. It’s a separate conversation I know, but the first cause needs to be able to explain things like order, rationality, aesthetics, consciousness (that’s a big one), the emergence of personal being, etc. Thing is, once one admits that some such creative-first-cause exists and that this entity does ground the being and emergence of all these diverse features of existing things, wouldn’t it make sense to go with the most plausible explanation of what SORT of being this God must being? Does supposing an impersonal, mindless, unconscious force REALLY explain more than a personal, volitional conscious being?

Tom

#76

I’m probably just not ‘getting it’ but I don’t see it gets a personal creator God - I just see it gets a first cause that exists necessarily - from which the universe (or universes) contingently come into being.

#77

I edited a bit above. But anyhow.

Well, that’s good. So, Jeff, are we agreed upon the existence of some necessarily existing entity responsible for bringing the universe into being (with its order, rationality, emergent consciousness, etc.)? I mean, that’s big.

So you’re granting this?

Tom

#78

My problem is that I just don’t know - because when I read people like Hawking et al saying that there is no need for a first cause I find their explanations and arguments just as convincing. It could be that the only thing that exists of necessity is the start of the universe - for example.

I’m not trying to be willfully obtuse… (honest!) :wink:

#79

Here’s an example of what I mean.

commonsenseatheism.com/wp-conten … gument.pdf

This guy’s critique (as far as I follow it - and that’s sketchy and doesn’t include all the logic stuff with the funny symbols) seems just as likely to be sound as Hartshorn’s seems. I say seems because they are largely beyond my ability to criticise.

#80

Well, my thought presented is basically illustrated as such;

“Can you roll a seven on a pair of dice, that has none of the dots?”

(and maybe even, can you roll a pair of dice if you don’t have a pair of dice to begin with)