C.S. Lewis - dangerous heretic?

[Sobornost]

Here’s a letter from C.S. Lewis to the philosopher John Beversluis, that again conflicts greatly with Piperian Reformed theology -

Dear Mr. Beversluis,

Yes. On my view one must apply something of the same sort of explanation to, say, the atrocities (and treacheries) of Joshua. I see the grave danger we run by doing so; but the dangers of believing in a God whom we cannot but regard as evil, and then, in mere terrified flattery calling Him “good” and worshiping Him, is still greater danger. The ultimate question is whether the doctrine of the goodness of God or that of the inerrancy of Scriptures is to prevail when they conflict. I think the doctrine of the goodness of God is the more certain of the two. Indeed, only that doctrine renders this worship of Him obligatory or even permissible.

To this some will reply “ah, but we are fallen and don"t recognize good when we see it.” But God Himself does not say that we are as fallen as all that. He constantly, in Scripture, appeals to our conscience: “Why do ye not of yourselves judge what is right?” " “What fault hath my people found in me?” And so on. Socrates" answer to Euthyphro is used in Christian form by Hooker. Things are not good because God commands them; God commands certain things because he sees them to be good. (In other words, the Divine Will is the obedient servant to the Divine Reason.) The opposite view (Ockham"s, Paley"s) leads to an absurdity. If “good” means “what God wills” then to say “God is good” can mean only “God wills what he wills.” Which is equally true of you or me or Judas or Satan.

But of course having said all this, we must apply it with fear and trembling. Some things which seem to us bad may be good. But we must not insult our consciences by trying to feel a thing good when it seems to us totally evil. We can only pray that if there is an invisible goodness hidden in such things, God, in His own good time will enable us to see it. If we need to. For perhaps sometimes God"s answer might be “What is that to thee?” The passage may not be “addressed to our (your or my) condition” at all.

“**Yes. On my view one must apply something of the same sort of explanation to, say, the atrocities (and treacheries) of Joshua. I see the grave danger we run by doing so; but the dangers of believing in a God whom we cannot but regard as evil, and then, in mere terrified flattery calling Him ‘good’ and worshiping Him, is still greater danger. The ultimate question is whether the doctrine of the goodness of God or that of the inerrancy of Scriptures is to prevail when they conflict. I think the doctrine of the goodness of God is the more certain of the two. Indeed, only that doctrine renders this worship of Him obligatory or even permissible.

To this some will reply ‘ah, but we are fallen and don’t recognize good when we see it.’ But God Himself does not say that we are as fallen as all that. He constantly, in Scripture, appeals to our conscience: ‘Why do ye not of yourselves judge what is right?’ — ‘What fault hath my people found in me?’ And so on. Socrates’ answer to Euthyphro is used in Christian form by Hooker. Things are not good because God commands them; God commands certain things because he sees them to be good. (In other words, the Divine Will is the obedient servant to the Divine Reason.) The opposite view (Ockham’s, Paley’s) leads to an absurdity. If ‘good’ means ‘what God wills’ then to say ‘God is good’ can mean only ‘God wills what he wills.’ Which is equally true of you or me or Judas or Satan.”**

[Sobornost]

The Thinking Reed comment son Lewis’ view thus -

I’ve noted before that while Lewis was very much a man of traditional and conservative disposition and views, he would be out of step with a lot of what passes for “conservative” Christianity today. A significant strain of contemporary evangelicalism–particularly Calvinist-influenced, has embraced precisely the doctrine of inerrancy and ethical voluntarism that Lewis is criticizing here.

Closer to home, however, a lot of mainline theology has absorbed the “postmodern” critique of reason, which denies that we can transcend our particular social and cultural situation enough to apprehend any “universal” truths. Lewis, though he recognizes our penchant for partiality and self-deception, would also disagree with this, at least in its extreme form. God has endowed us with the capacity to apprehend the Good and the True. It’s true that in our fallen state, we only apprehend it in a partial and fragmentary way, but we are capable of genuine knowledge. It’s also worth noting that “postmodern” anti-rationnalism doesn’t necessarily have more progressive implications than conservative biblicism. In fact, it may lead to a very similar form of authoritarianism: if “truth” is defined by my tribe, my social group, my church, my political fellow-travelers, etc., how is criticism of the group possible?

My personal view is that there is merit in the various critiques of “Enlightenment reason,” but at the same time, Christians should be wary of embracing a thorough-going anti-rationalism.

You can find this interesting and perceptive analysis here - thinkingreed.wordpress.com/category/cs-lewis/

[Sobornost]

Gregory of Nissa wrote:

“The Egyptian [Pharaoh] is unjust, and instead of him, his punishment falls upon his newborn child, who on account of his infant age is unable to discern what is good and what is not good … If such a one now pays the penalty of his father’s evil, where is justice? Where is piety? Where is holiness? Where is Ezekiel, who cries … “The son should not suffer for the sin of the father?” How can history so contradict reason?”(from Gregory of Nyssa’s Life of Moses translated by Malherbe and Ferguson pp. 75-76).

Gregory concluded that the text must be allegory that teaches us to destroy temptations. Origen concluded the same about the Canaanite genocides. Whatever we may think about allegorical interpretation (which is more of historical interest than of functional use today IMHO) it is clear that the Church Fathers thought it is fairly easy to recognise when the Scriptures seem to teach something that is wrong (and in this they agree with Lewis)

By way of contrast – if you haven’t already seen it and have a strong stomach see Piper on the Canaanite slaughters -

youtube.com/watch?v=nEYv71ECDBA

Also see Randal Rauser on Piper’s thoughts about the possible damnation of his children

randalrauser.com/2013/12/if-god- … you-agree/

Much thanks to Lotharson for first drawing my attention to the extracts from Lewis and Nyssa

[corpselight]

Piper’s view, while logical, lacks any of the compassion God has for our lot. God knows we are dust, but that’s why He wants to make us anew.

[Sobornost]

Very true James

A note on the source of the C.S. Lewis quotation above –

It comes from John Beversluis’ book C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (pp. 295-6) and a facsimile of the original letter from Lewis dated 3 Julty1963 is given at pp319-20 (Jack Lewis died in November 1963 so the letter is written shortly before his death). The letter is a reply to one from John Beversluis asking for clarification about Jack Lewis’s seeming conversion to the Ockhamist view – that whatever God wills is good even if it seems evil to us – in his late essay ‘The Poison of Subjectivity’ and in his memoir of bereavement ‘A Grief Observed’. In the letter Jack Lewis affirms that he is still a Christian Platonist believing that our imperfect moral intuitions about the Good are a reasonable guide to the will of God who is all Goodness. (One of many reasons why John Piper should pause for thought when attempting to co-opt C.S. Lewis)

For a good discussion of the differences between the Christian Platonist positive view of moral intuitions and the Ockhamist and Five Point Calvinist denial of their validity see

dangerousidea.blogspot.co.uk/200 … -evil.html

One of the contributors is a certain Jason Pratt who argues the Christian Platonist case thus -

I think our moral intuitions hold at least some good; even in the cases mentioned. (Of course, this assumes someone is saying such things in report of their moral intuition, and not for some other reason, such as to be contentious, or to try to get people to permit what they themselves happen to want to do, etc.)

There is a difference between being able to see the good imperfectly, and the good being something completely different from our moral intuitions at all. I have no problem believing that people can make those claims because they are trying to hold to what good they can truly see, even if they are seeing the good imperfectly.

Better for them to do that, than to accept as light what seems to them, not only an appearance but a being of darkness. One of those is a striving with, the other against, the Holy Spirit.

We mustn’t convince people to accept what seems to them to be flat contradictions; much less to accept what seems to them to be evil. If we do, then we’re leading them into sin, even if the new doctrine they’re thus accepting happens to be technically correct; and God will hold us accountable for, in essence, seducing or even raping them. (St. Paul has something to say about this principle, too, in the Epistle to the Galatians.)

October 05, 2005 7:50 AM

The Christian Platonism in Lewis – particularly in his The Abolition of Man is radically at odds with Neo Calvinism.

[Cole]

God knows we are dust, but that’s why He wants to make us anew

I’m finding out that I’m not dust. My false perceptions and beliefs tell me that sometimes but it’s not true. I’m simply a flawed individual created by God and loved by God.

[Sobornost]

That’s also true Cole (it’s a paradox - the dust bit is about false pride and egocentricity; not about mine or your or Corpselight’s inherent worth). It strikes me that you’ve had too much ‘thou art dust’ in your life without enough ’ remember you are the son of a King’ to counterbalance this:)

[Cole]

Hey Dick!

Yes I have struggled with low self-worth and shame most of my life. It’s why I drank. Alcohol gave me confidence. But it would later backfire and cause more shame and fear.

[Sobornost]

Regarding the Gospel; it is meant to be the best of news - but I think Luther was wise (as he was every now and then) when looking over the Biblical texts to ask ‘Yes but is this the Gospel for me?’ For someone who is living a completely empty self centred life based on exploiting other people and disregarding the needs of their neighbours and gratitude to their Creator, or in using religion and even the gospel to exploit other people and disregard their needs of their neighbours and gratitude to God while professing holiness to this person (or these persons) if will be a shattering thing but ultimately a liberating thing to realise deep down that they are ‘dust’. Someone who is downtrodden, exploited and abused does not need to hear this - and if they hear this from the mouths of the powerful it is a false Gospel. This person (or person) needs to hear that they are a much loved child of God who our loving God wants to be raise up rather than cast down. Most of us most of the time - being a mixture of the oppressed and the oppressed - need to keep both messages in a healthy tension that makes us better people rather than worse.

[Cole]

Hey Dick,

I think it depends on the person. I remember a scripture in proverbs that rings true for me. A soft word turns away wrath. I can remember being in a bar drunk getting all riled up and crazy. A pretty young lady came and sat down beside me and started talking real soft to me. It calmed me down. Now, not everybody would react that way. But I have a tender spot for pretty blonds with soft, kind, spoken words.

[Cole]

Regarding the Gospel; it is meant to be the best of news

Dick,

Does this sound like good news to you?

For to this you have been called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, so that you might follow in his steps. - 1 Peter 2:1

Are we really suppose to imitate Christ to where we are so selfless that we become passive and let people abuse us? According to this passage we are. May I suggest a better way? Take care of and protect yourself.

[Sobornost]

No Christ didn’t just become a passive victim of circumstances and let people abuse him – and neither are we meant to do this. And I don’t believe that taking up our cross means deliberately seeking out abusive situations and the company of people who will abuse us. I think it is possible to derive this set of meanings from the Gospel and from the injunctions to be crucified with Christ (but I think this is not the real meaning – obviously or I wouldn’t be a Christian

But my view - which may be controversial to some here – is that if this is what the Gospel has come to mean for you because of your past experience in life and how the interpretation of the Gospel that you have been given actually confirms all that is destructive in you experience, then… Well you must trust for the moment in the deep witness to your dignity that is within you. Everything else will come clear in its own good time.

[JasonPratt]

While I appreciate the implied compliment, I’m rather doubtful I could be regarded as a Christian Platonist.

Worth noting: that quote from Lewis’ correspondence with Bev? – Lewis is paraphrasing George MacDonald pretty closely throughout. I listened to the sermon he’s alluding to just the other day, though I can’t remember specifically which one it is right now. (Probably the famous one on Justice but not necessarily.)

“The Poison of Subjectivism” is an article in 1943, long before Lewis’ (originally pseudonymous) A Grief Observed, and mainly collects together and repackages Lewis’ chapter on morality from his original edition of Miracles: A Preliminary Study and, more relevantly, his collected Riddle Lecture series on objective morality The Abolition of Man. At the very least it cannot possibly be evidence of Lewis’ supposed turn toward Ockhamism late in his life, because it didn’t occur late in his life, but Dr. B was sort of notorious for not paying sufficient attention to details about what Lewis was actually saying. (A point he himself acknowledged late in his own life when he revised his key work contra-Lewis.)

Also, the text isn’t at all the idea that whatever God decrees is ethically right because God decrees it. Lewis followed Athanasius’ idea, picked up from Origen and prior theologians, that God’s ethicality is supremely inherent in His trinitarian ‘nature’ for want of a better word. THE WHOLE POINT to Lewis’ argument in that article, and in its original source works, is that morality cannot be invented by assertion; and he explicitly says “If we once admit that what God means by good is sheerly different from what we mean by good” (a key corollary possibility of divine command theory, even if a DCT proponent denies this ever actually happens – though many insist it does) “there is no difference left between pure religion and devil worship.”

Lewis goes on immediately in the next paragraph to flatly reject the divine command theory of morality, by means of an application of Socrates’ Euthyphro Dilemma, just as thoroughly (by the same method) as he rejects the idea that God accepts a moral ground which is more fundamental than His own ultimate reality. (Socrates, or Plato using Socrates, wasn’t talking about ethical monotheism but Christians picked up and applied the same argument later, as have opponents to theism for that matter!) His solution to the Euthyphro was to field-goal between the horns (so to speak) by appeal to trinitarian theism.

Unfortunately he only touches vaguely on the solution of a coherent interpersonal relationship being the ground of all reality and thus also, by virtue of those unique properties, the ground of all morality. So instead of a field-goal (in American football terms) it’s more like he ends up punting the ball away in the general direction of the horns of the dilemma. He does in the process appeal to some eastern apophetic theology principles championed (somewhat unfortunately, by my standards, but curiously) by later Patristic universalist fathers like Maximus the Confessor (I suspect Lewis was alluding to one of them directly), but by doing so he cripples the ability of his appeal to answer the problem.

It was largely on the frustrating basis of Lewis approach to the topic, especially exemplified in this very article, that I embarked on my Sword to the Heart project in late 1999, to see how far (or even if) I could synthesize Lewis’ various arguments and approaches, with more detail, into a fully and positively trinitarian theology. I wasn’t sure when I started it could be done, but I figured it wouldn’t hurt to try.

Not only did (and do) I think I succeeded, but precisely by (what I regard as) the success of the attempt I unexpectedly came to believe that if trinitarian theism is true, then Christian universalism must necessarily be true.

Consequently, from my perspective, I can’t help but wonder now if Lewis’ commitment to what he thought was a scripturally and metaphysically hopeless punishment or fate coming to at least some sinners, somehow subconsciously undercut him from proceeding along lines he himself had not only kind of worked out but (from his opening comments on a new edition of Athanasius’ On the Incarnation) recognized that earlier theologians he admired had positively already worked out.

(Not that I want to Bulverize him. )

[JasonPratt]

Also, in AGO, Lewis immediately refutes the concept of divine command morality the moment he brings it up in chapter 2; along the same lines he always refuted it.

[Sobornost]

That’s fascinating Jason! The point about ‘Poison of Subjectivity’ gladly conceded to an expert - it is not a late work by Lewis and clearly does not argue for Ockhamism. And I didn’t really mean to imply that you are a Christian Platonist - that can mean a lot of things including a belief in the pre-existence of souls if we are talking the Cambridge Christian Platonists (something that neither you nor I believe in). I only meant that on other grounds - and importantly on Christocentric grounds - you agree in some sense with Socrates argument in the Euthyphro).

I found John Beversluis’ book interesting but was not convinced at all that Lewis took a turn towards Ockhamism late in life. The argument seems to be based mainly on some portions of ’ A Grief Observed’ (which I have read) especially where Lewis thinks aloud at one point that perhaps God may be a ‘Cosmic Sadist’ and muses elsewhere that God is perhaps ‘The great iconoclast’ (is this the start of his turn towards ‘negative theology?). Not being a Lewis expert I remember thinking - A Grief Observed’ is not a philosophical theological work as such. It is a unsparingly honest memoir by a devout Christian about the process of grieving and it ends in an affirmative key. SO I guess I lost interest in Beversluis’ argument for that reason.

Hey one thing that does strike me is that rather than being Christian Platonists (in the limited sense outlined above) TULIP Calvinists are certainly Christian Aristotellians in that the rtioanl tool oftaht shapes and even controls their exegesis is the abstract syllogism as set out in Aristotle’s ‘Logic’ (although they would have little interest for example in the Nicomachean Ethics ). I’ve always found this weird - they resemble the medieval scholastics from whom they were meant to be freeing themselves in a big way

[JasonPratt]

That’s fascinating Jason! The point about ‘Poison of Subjectivity’ gladly conceded to an expert - it is not a late work by Lewis and clearly does not argue for Ockhamism. And I didn’t really mean to imply that you are a Christian Platonist - that can mean a lot of things including a belief in the pre-existence of souls if we are talking the Cambridge Christian Platonists (something that neither you nor I believe in). I only meant that on other grounds - and importantly on Christocentric grounds - you agree in some sense with Socrates argument in the Euthyphro).

I agree Socrates had a good and useful point. I don’t agree with Socrates’ (lack of?) resolution to the dilemma, though I can see why he wouldn’t have had the tools to resolve it; and I’m pretty sure I don’t agree with what Plato did with it, partly because I haven’t read Plato enough to have a real opinion about what he did (and more likely didn’t) do with it.

I found John Beversluis’ book interesting but was not convinced at all that Lewis took a turn towards Ockhamism late in life. The argument seems to be based mainly on some portions of ’ A Grief Observed’ (which I have read) especially where Lewis thinks aloud at one point that perhaps God may be a ‘Cosmic Sadist’…

That’s in chapter 1 when he’s just emotionally yelling. When he brings it back in chapter 2 he refutes it on the usual plan.

…and muses elsewhere that God is perhaps ‘The great iconoclast’ (is this the start of his turn towards 'negative theology?).

Not likely. He didn’t go for negative theology in any special way in his few following works, not least of which was his updated 2nd edition to M:aPS. (Though admittedly I still haven’t read one of the most important of his subsequent works, Till We Have Faces. The little I’ve heard about it doesn’t seem particularly apophatic, but…) His appeal to negative theology regarding the implications of the Trinity in the 1942 article (many years earlier) was pretty weird by his standards, and had nothing to do with the iconoclasm comment in AGO.

Not being a Lewis expert I remember thinking - A Grief Observed’ is not a philosophical theological work as such. It is a unsparingly honest memoir by a devout Christian about the process of grieving and it ends in an affirmative key. SO I guess I lost interest in Beversluis’ argument for that reason.

For its length and topic it features a surprising (to me) amount of his usual apologetic work and themes, put into the practical use of defense from the rage and despair of his depression over Joy’s death.

Hey one thing that does strike me is that rather than being Christian Platonists (in the limited sense outlined above) TULIP Calvinists are certainly Christian Aristotellians in that the rtioanl tool oftaht shapes and even controls their exegesis is the abstract syllogism as set out in Aristotle’s ‘Logic’ (although they would have little interest for example in the Nicomachean Ethics ). I’ve always found this weird - they resemble the medieval scholastics from whom they were meant to be freeing themselves in a big way

It isn’t too surprising that they resemble the scholastics, since those follow Thomas, who with his predecessors were big fans of Augustine, and when Calvs want to appeal to any kind of significant continuation of supposed Biblical Calvinism across the Catholic centuries they’re kind of stuck with Auggy.

That being said, the rational tool of thought that shapes and even controls my exegesis is also the abstract syllogism (so far as I can find to apply it), and I’m doubtful I count much as a Christian Aristotellian. Or even a Thomist.

I feel safe in being counted as a Lewicist, though.

[Sobornost]

Fair points. Jason you are a complete and utter darn Lewisian I think A Grief Observed is a marvellous book

[Sobornost]

Hi Jason -

I have always been bewildered about exactly how syllogisms are used in Calvinist apologetics. Alister McGrath says some really interesting things in his biography of Calvin which clicked with me (and there’s a bit of synchronicity here because as we know he’s now also Lewis’ latest biographer). I’ve summarised what he said on another thread but here is again -

Double predestination theory was first raised in its’ strong form in the ninth century when it was promoted by the Benedictine monk Godescalc of Orbais with relentless logic,- and most ninth century writers reacted with horrified disbelief. The logic of Godescalc – of limited atonement – resurfaces again in Beze.

Calvin himself in his Institutes treats predestination as an incidental aspect of the doctrine of salvation – and is actually suspicious of human reason. It is Calvin’s successor De Beze who systematised the doctrine – who argued that divine decrees are to be derived from scripture as a set of propositions from which divine decrees can be deduced and employed Aristotle’s system of syllogisms to this end (hence the distinctive form of Calvinist apologetics to this day). Beze did this as a survival strategy to put clear water between Calvinism and both Lutheranism and Council of Trent Catholicism (which is understandable, Lutherans and Catholics were doing the same thing in their different ways, but does not make him authoritative for all times and all Christians).

The Armenian Remonstrants who broke away from mainstream Calvinism over the issue of Double Predestination were in influenced more by the logic of Ramus. Ramus started with the particular (the Christ event) and from this drew general principles. Beze’s logic started with general theoretical principles. And this deductive thinking is found today in John Piper and the neo-Cavlinists.

Which I found further clarified by Oliver O’Donovan

The classic doctrine as set out in the Westminster Confession undertakes to speak of God’s eternal purposes independently of the revelation of God in Jesus, on the basis of a concern which is purely one of philosophic theism. The classic doctrine asks; how can an omnipotent and transcendent God live in the same universe with a world of free agents? Its answer cannot pass the test which must be applied to all theological utterances; do they show us the same God that is revealed in Christ? For the God who made the heavens and earth and the bounds of history is no other God than the one who showed himself, as he is, in Jesus. That consideration makes it impossible to believe in any double decree – at any rate, if it is understood as a doctrine of creation. God did not make beings in order to curse them – God’s cruse is upon sin as a sign of goodwill expressed as hostility to all the forces that would unmake it/ hinder it’s completion. But God does not create creatures in order to curse them ‘The Son of God, Jesus Christ, was not Yes and No, but in him it is always Yes’ (2 Cor. 1.19). Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God – and it is the true expression of his Trinitarian existence.

And regarding William of Ockham the beard shaver, whatever his teachings about God and the Good, it seems he was not an Augustinian -

William of Ockham (1287 – 1347), the English Franciscan friar and scholastic philosopher makes a radical statement about salvation for those unbaptised and outside the Church in his Tractus XXII where he says that Pope John XXII taught in error that God could not save any man without the sacrament of baptism. Ockham argues that many have died for the faith and many have been saved through penance without baptism by water. In antiquity, men were saved without baptism by water, fire or blood, just as children are saved now, which indicates that God’s hand and His power cannot be limited. Ockham and his scholastic followers known as the ‘Moderni’ seem to have given intellectual scope for a flourishing debate on inclusivism and even universalism among some Christians in late fourteenth and early fifteenth century England (see Janet Coleman, ‘Piers Plowman and the Moderni’, p. 123)

[Cole]

Hey Dick,

I don’t think Lewis was a heretic. I’ve read his argument from beauty to God and I can definitely relate to his experience. I think he knew what he was talking about.

[Sobornost]

Neither do I think he was a heretic Cole