The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Contradictions: OT V OT

Theology
#89

You have said that before and I have said this before: Your claim is not generally supported in philosophy.

Your claim seems to provide the following syllogism.

Premise 1: If God foreknows that S will do A, then it is a necessary truth that S will do A.

Premise 2: If it is a necessary truth that S will do A, then S is not free in doing A.

Conclusion: If God foreknows that S will do A, then S is not free in doing A.

But premise 1 is false, so the argument fails. Just because God knows a proposition, it does not follow that the proposition is necessarily true. (A necessarily true proposition could not possibly be false). God knows propositions that are contingently true as well. A contingent truth is a proposition that is not necessarily true or necessarily false. It is a true proposition that could have been false. A good example of a contingent truth is the choice of a human agent.

Thus, S is free to do other than A. But if S did other than A, God would have had different information upon which to base His foreknowledge so that He would have known S did other than A.

It’s not that God’s foreknowledge determines choices by humans. It’s that choices by humans determine God’s foreknowledge. That’s why such choices by humans can be free, even if they are foreknown.

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#90

What is a "possible false"hood in premise 1? My naivety is that if it’s already known that A will happen, then it is true that A will be done. You appear to add the word “necessarily” to deny this. I’m not sure this is Paidion’s language, or what you mean by claiming that it still won’t “necessarily” happen or be true.

The idea of knowing with certainty something that remains an optional choice sounds incoherent to me. You add that S could still do B instead, but that then God would have known S would do B. But if the premise is that God does know S will do A, I don’t see how you can insist that B is still 'free’ to happen.

#91

The falsehood is that God’s knowledge of a proposition makes the proposition necessary. A proposition known by God could be contingent.

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#92

[quote=“lancia, post:91, topic:14663, full:true”]

Thanks, I realized that you assert that, but these semantics sound nonsensical to me. If what is known with certainty is that "S will DO A,’ then by definition, that action is necessarily bound to happen.

If that choice and outcome remained “contingent” or optional, then it would be false to premise that God already knows “S will do A.” And if God was able to know in advance that S would freely choose B, the premise then too could not be “God knows S will do A.”

I sense that your actual premise is that even if at the present point in time, God knows one option before me is what will most certainly happen, and that it is not possible for me to make any other choice, that choice can still be defined as ’free.’ That seems an article of faith among some such as compatibilists.

#93

It’s not just what I assert. It’s what flows logically from Paidion’s words, words like “The idea that God (or anyone else) knows (in the absolute sense of ‘knows’) what someone will choose, implies that that someone does not possess the ability to choose” and especially “it would be impossible for Sam to keep his hand down at 11:30 A.M.” These words imply that what is chosen is fixed by what has been foretold. I thus used the term “necessary truth” in premise 1 and 2.

As to the rest of your post, I don’t quite follow. If you would, please write a syllogism, like the one above, that captures what you are saying. Then maybe we can more effectively deal with this issue.

#94

If you know that Texas is a state in Unites States, then it is true that Texas is a state in United States. It could not be otherwise. Ontario is not a state in United States. So it would be impossible to know that Ontario is a state in United States. You cannot know that something is true, if it is false.

If someone could know right now that you will eat an apple tomorrow at 10 A.M. Then it would true that you will eat an apple tomorrow at 10 A.M. It couldn’t be false. Again someone cannot know that something is true when it is false. But you have the free will to refrain from eating at apple tomorrow at 10 A.M. This implies that no one could know that you will eat an apple tomorrow at 10 A.M.

My point was not that God’s knowledge interferes with free will making it impossible for you to choose. That would have the matter entirely backwards. Rather it is that your ability to choose makes it impossible for someone to know what that choice will be in advance. It does not make the impossible possible by affirming that that “someone” is God.

#95

Entirely backwards??? I don’t think so. Here’s what you said above.

“For example, suppose that at 11 A.M. Joe knows that Sam will raise his hand at 11:30 P.M. Then it would be impossible for Sam to keep his hand down at 11:30 A.M.”

As you can see, you clearly said Joe’s foreknowledge interferes with free will making it impossible for Sam to choose.

#96

What I said would be true IF “Joe knows that Sam will raise his hand at 11:30 P.M.” But the fact is that Joe doesn’t know that." For it is impossible for anyone to know what a free-will agent will choose.

However, if it is possible for Joe to know in advance that Sam will raise his hand at 11:30 P.M then it is true that Sam will raise his hand at 11:30 P.M. For if he doesn’t do so, this implies that Joe didn’t know in advance. You can’t have it both ways. Either Joe doesn’t know or Sam cannot raise his hand.

For Joe to know that Sam will raise his hand at 11:30 P.M., and Sam not raising his hand at 11:30 P.M. is a logical contradiction.

#97

But the point is, you first claimed that foreknowledge interferes with free will, making it impossible for Sam to choose freely. And then you said I had it entirely backwards when I repeated what you said.

There you go again.

That’s the issue at hand. Philosophers generally do not agree with the view you express, as I said and referenced.

#98

This discussion reminds me a bit of “is justified true belief knowledge?” Slight tangent, but somewhat related.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/

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#99

Peter Van Inwagen, as tough-minded a philosopher as they come, was asked why he had not written anything about ‘time’. “Too difficult” was his reply.

#100

Nope. I have never claimed that that foreknowledge interferes with free will. My claim was that foreknowledge of what a person will choose is inconsistent with that person’s choice.

I was trying to show the impossibility of knowing in advance what a free-will agent will choose. I did that by showing that IF someone knew in advance what a person will choose, then the person does not have the ability to choose. That’s why I said that if someone knows that Sam will raise his hand at 11:30, then Sam will be unable to keep his hand down at 11:30.

Knowing what a free-will agent will choose is a contraction in terms. That’s what I was trying to establish from the beginning.

#101

You said, "For example, suppose that at 11 A.M. Joe knows that Sam will raise his hand at 11:30 P.M. Then it would be impossible for Sam to keep his hand down at 11:30 A.M.” It seems to me that if you say it would be impossible for Sam to keep his hand down at 11:30 A.M. when Joe knows that Sam will raise his hand at 11:30 P.M., then you are saying that Joe’s foreknowledge interferes with Sam’s free will to keep his hand down.

But that’s simply not the common thought in philosophy. This is what the leading theologian/philosopher William Craig has to say about this issue, which he calls a fallacy in modal logic.

Premise 1: Necessarily, if God foreknows X, then X will happen.
Premise 2: God foreknows X.
Conclusion: Therefore, necessarily X will happen.

And if X happens necessarily, that means X is not free.

This is a fallacy, he says, because one cannot deduce from these two premises that necessarily X will happen. All that follows logically from the premises is that X will happen, but not necessarily. It could fail to happen. But if it were to fail to happen, then God would have foreknown something different.

#103

I’ll try my best to explain it. I am not a philosopher, and all of what I have written above and in this post relies upon my relatively amateurish understanding of modal terminology, as used by cited philosophers like William Craig.

As I explained above in my first post, the word necessary, used in philosophy, means a proposition, so described as a necessary truth, cannot be false. Thus, it is impossible for a necessary proposition to be false. This is in contrast to the word contingent, which means a proposition, so described as a contingent truth, can be false.

In the context of the argument made above, the word necessary is required because the issue addressed is whether foreknowledge prevents the expression of free will. We want to know whether foreknowledge must by its presence prevent the expression of free will, not just sometimes, but all of the time. So the word necessary, in one of its forms, is used in the syllogism.

Another way of looking at necessary is in terms of possible worlds, where a possible world is a description of how things might be or might have been. If a proposition is necessary, it exists in all possible worlds. If a proposition is contingent, it exists only in some possible worlds.

If the word necessarily is dropped from the syllogism and not replaced by an equivalent term, then the syllogism would lose its force and precision. We would not be able to demonstrate that foreknowledge must by its presence prevent or not prevent the expression of free will. For example, just saying something will occur is a contingency; it is possible for it not to occur. Saying something necessarily occurs is a certainty; it is impossible for it not to occur.

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#104

I am unfamiliar with this semantic and logic. My perception is that if a claim that something “will occur” were valid, it will not actually follow that it may “not occur.”

More broadly, FWIW, in pursuing a doctorate in theology and in post-grad work since, I took many graduate courses in philosophy. It is a challenging realm, where even insiders constantly debate the meaning of the logic and semantics that each employs. But while others here apparently grasp your case against Paidion, I don’t understand what is persuasive in it.

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#106

FWIW I perceive you insist on holding Paidion to your own interpretation of his original verbiage, when he’s straight out explained to you that this is not his view

You then declare philosophers generally reject his view. That is not my reading of contemporary philosophy. Citing William Lane Craig as evidence, neglects that he is hardly representative of modern philosophers on the nature of the will, much less that even many conservative religious philosophers find many of his arguments fallacious.

#107

I read and related exactly what Paidion said. If you disagree with my interpetation of what he said, then please show how I misinterpreted it.

I did not cite only William Craig. I clearly linked to this respected site in my first post above. You will see in that referenced site that I have simply related what was said there about this syllogism. And that interpretation does agree with William Craig’s interpretation.

By the way, I disagree with some of Craig’s arguments, too, particularly his argument for transworld damnation.

#108

If you choose to use the substitute words, then it seems to me that this is what the syllogism would be.

Premise 1: It must be true that if God foreknows X, then X will happen.
Premise 2: God foreknows X.
Conclusion: Therefore, it must be true that X will happen.

This too has a conclusion that does not follow from the premises, just as does the original that I related above. Apparently, the problem is one cannot properly modify only the consequent “X will happen” with the “it must be true that” if the “it must be true that” originally modified the entire clause “if God foreknows X, then X will happen.”

#109

Thank you for your gracious reply. On 1, my point was that how I (or you) interpret Paidion’s semantics becomes moot after he clarifies that our interpretation is not his view. He is entitled to interpret his view.

On 2, I’ve never seen the religious site you link as reflecting what philosophers “generally” conclude, or as greatly respected among them. I thought each piece on the Stanford site reflected simply the varying views of their individual contributors. I do realize some agree with Craig on this. But I find such appeals to ‘authorities’ that agree with a preferred view are easily provided for every option. For one, it’d be easy to endorse ECT that way.

#110

Yes, he is entitled to interpret his view. But he is not entitled, in responding to me, to interpret a view that is different from the view he described and posted and to which I responded.

Hey, I’m not a philosopher. I must thus appeal to authority to some extent, particularly in using arguments from these authorities. And that’s what I did. By the way, I really have no preferred view on this possible conflict between omniscience and free will. I am totally at the mercy of those who can convince me one way or another. At this point, Craig, Wierenga, and Swartz are the most influential.