Greg has had a huge influence upon me for sure. I think the only difference between Greg and me on this is that where I think that irrevocable solidification into evil is impossible, Greg thinks it is possible. We both say that God pursues people (in hell) so long as they are capable on some level of responding to God. But where I’m inclined to think there will always be some possibility of Godward movement in all sentient beings (and thus always hope), Greg thinks that irrevocable solidification into evil is possible, in which case Greg thinks God would annihilate those hopelessly/irreversibly fixed in an evil orientation. So our differences revolve around the question of whether or not created beings can ever freely dispose into an irreversible orientation to evil. That’s why the annihilation of some remains a part of Greg’s eschatology.
I realize that libertarians have never produced a final, knock-down explanation of LFW that settles all the doubts regarding its being “random” and thus not truly “free” choice at all. The debate goes on and on. Likewise, compatibilists have never produced final, definitive answers to objections brought against them by libertarians. In the end I think we each just find the cummulative case for our view a bit stronger and so we settle into that. Compatibilists find the “random” problem intolerable. They just can’t find a meaningful way to embrance LFW so long as their doubts about its meaningfulness continue. I respect that. Libertarians have equal difficulty embracing compatibilism.
It’s just fascinating! And I honestly don’t know how to bridge the gap.
Paidion,
Do I understand correctly, the thrust of your point to be that the one who lacks knowledge and thus guesses cannot do so from a determined paradigm? For nothing in our past could provide a reason to make a choice. And thus a free guess (choice) must be made? Or better said - how does a determinist account for a random choice?
Paidion:
But is the choice random?
If you had made a random choice, you might flip a coin: heads/left fork; tails/right fork.
But you don’t flip a coin. You have the ability to choose. Your choice is not random, and your choice has not been determined. Your choice is made because of the libertarian free will which you possess in virtue of the fact that God created man in His image, not physically surely, but mentally, the chief parameter being the ability to choose.
I apologize for the delayed response! I’ve had to be selective with discussions in which to be engaged lately due to limited time, and decided I’d focus my attention solely on the “soul sleep” thread for a while (especially after others began contributing to this thread and making some good discussion). I actually didn’t mean to wait this long, however!
You said:
Well I agree that it wasn’t God’s sovereign purpose (and in that sense wasn’t an actual possibility) for human persons to be given perfect characters from the get-go. But I don’t think it wasn’t a possibility because love has to be “freely chosen” in a libertarian sense in order for it to be genuine, and this is what I was trying to argue for in the OP.
But I would argue that, even assuming that God and human beings possess LFW and exercise it on occasion, it is not necessary that the perfectly loving character we will one day possess be gradually attained through the making of libertarian free choices. If God’s love can be considered genuine, then I think it follows that love can be genuine without being freely chosen, regardless of whether one is a “necessary” or “contingent” being. So I just don’t see any reason why the choice to love - whether it’s made in this state of existence or in the future - need be understood as a LFW choice, or as requiring LFW. If God’s love can be genuine without his having to make LFW choices, then whatever process some people may go through during this existence in their acquirement of a loving character, I don’t see why it has to be understood to involve the making of LFW choices.
I think evil (both moral or otherwise) is in some way necessary to God’s redemptive plan for humanity, so it was necessary that we be created with a capacity to sin (and for this capacity to be realized for some), and with mortal natures that can suffer pain. Just as I don’t think death would be a part of this present existence if it wasn’t a part of God’s redemptive plan, so I don’t think people would sin during this present existence if it wasn’t a part of God’s redemptive plan. Because people die and sin, I can’t help but conclude that death and sin have always been a part of God’s redemptive plan. But at some point, I believe sin and evil will have served its purpose and will no longer be needed. It will then cease to be a part of human existence.
My understanding is that people’s having been sinners and having experienced evil at some point during this mortal existence will, in some way, contribute to the “teleological happiness” of all people (even of those who lived and died without sinning, or without consciously experiencing evil), and that God deems the kind of happiness to which an experience of evil has contributed more valuable and worthwhile than any happiness that could be had without such an experience. I believe all human beings could not be as happy as God wants them to be when they have been made perfectly loving in the resurrection state without sin and evil having been a part of the context in which they first came into existence. As to how exactly sin and evil will contribute to the ultimate happiness of all people, I’ve speculated on this elsewhere on the forum, but ultimately I don’t think one has to understand why exactly God has chosen to do something a certain way or bring something about in order to believe and trust that he wouldn’t have done it if it wasn’t consistent with, or didn’t in some way contribute to, our ultimate happiness. I think there is Biblical precedent for the idea that God uses sin and evil to promote human happiness.
Hmm…that’s a good question, but to me it’s kind of like asking, “How do you understand the relationship between our being raised with an imperishable, glorious, powerful, spiritual nature in the end and our present God-given mortal nature that makes death inevitable now?”
I suppose we couldn’t fully enjoy and appreciate being perfectly loving in the end if God didn’t first bring us into existence in a context where “sin reigns in death.” That is, I think our capacity to enjoy and appreciate being perfectly loving in the future depends (at least in part) on our coming into existence in a world where people aren’t, by nature, perfectly loving. I think the contrast that this “fallen world” provides will contribute to our enjoyment of what God has planned for us in the next state of existence when we will “bear the image of the man of heaven.” As to how exactly our being created with a nature capable of sinning will contribute to each and every individual person’s enjoyment and appreciation of their being perfectly sinless after the resurrection, I’m not entirely sure.
Hopefully my above responses answered - or at least began to answer - your questions above! If not, I don’t think there’s a whole lot more I could say.
But again, if God’s love can be considered genuine, then I don’t think our being loving - whether we’re talking about our present or future existence - requires the freedom to do otherwise. So I don’t think this would account for our capacity to sin. Also, God is personal and morally responsible but he doesn’t have to possess the freedom to do otherwise in order to be either personal or morally responsible, so I’m not sure why our being personal, morally responsible beings requires that we have LFW. The mere fact that we are contingent rather than necessary seems irrelevant to me. Why should being contingent rather than necessary mean that we must have the freedom to do otherwise if we are to be personal, responsible beings as God is?
Thanks for the clarification. I suspected as much, but the fact that Boyd said that we would be “more free” and that this freedom is “the greatest freedom there is” threw me off, since from what I’ve read, libertarians seem to consider compatibilistic freedom a lesser kind of freedom than libertarian freedom.
I guess I found it remarkable that Dr. Boyd would redefine “freedom” to mean something other than the power or ability to do otherwise (which I thought was the kind of freedom that Boyd had in mind when he wrote “love requires freedom”). It seems he redefined “freedom” to basically mean “doing what a perfectly loving character would make it impossible for a person not to do (i.e., love),” which is a completely different kind of “freedom” than the freedom that he thinks love requires, and which is considered so important and (at least indirectly) valuable to libertarians. If love that is not being freely chosen by a human being can still be considered genuine, and a human being who cannot choose not to love is “more free” than they were when they could choose not to love, then this seems to me to undermine the thesis that love requires the freedom to do otherwise. Why would love require the freedom to do otherwise now but not at a future time? If love in heaven will not require the freedom to do otherwise in order for it to be genuine, I don’t see why love on earth should require the freedom to do otherwise in order for it to be genuine.
By “freely participate” I’m assuming you mean making choices that one need not have made (meaning they could’ve and might’ve chosen otherwise). But why would this make their loving character “theirs” in any greater or more meaningful sense than if their character wasn’t “freely chosen” by them but rather something which God created (or re-created) them with? God’s character wasn’t “freely chosen” by him, but this doesn’t make his loving character any less his. Moreover, I’m sure there are at least some aspects of your personhood (perhaps a great many) that you don’t believe you had to “freely participate in” (in the sense of acquire via LFW choices) in order for them to be considered “yours.” So why should our present or future character be any different? If a character that is being maintained through compatibilistic choices can still be considered one’s own, then why can’t a character that has been acquired through compatibilistic choice (either gradually or after only a single choice) be one’s own?
I always look forward to and appreciate your thoughtful responses.
I think our fundamental different is here, where you say:
“If God’s love can be considered genuine, then I think it follows that love can be genuine without being freely chosen, regardless of whether one is a ‘necessary’ or ‘contingent’ being.”
This is where we diverge and our differences surface. I’m not sure how to resolve it. I don’t think it follows from God’s necessary loving nature that he could have created us from the beginning unfailingly loving (i.e., compatibilistically loving). I think it follows from our being finite that we cannot simply be ‘given’ our characters by God. Truly, the rest of the comments on both sides is just a footnote to this fundamental disagreement.
I ask why you thought God purposed the world to be as fallen and sinful as it has been. Along with Edwards (and those who follow him on this) you answer:
“My understanding is that people’s having been sinners and having experienced evil at some point during this mortal existence will, in some way, contribute to the ‘teleological happiness’ of all people…and that God deems the kind of happiness to which an experience of evil has contributed more valuable and worthwhile than any happiness that could be had without such an experience. I believe all human beings could not be as happy as God wants them to be when they have been made perfectly loving in the resurrection state without sin and evil having been a part of the context in which they first came into existence. As to how exactly sin and evil will contribute to the ultimate happiness of all people, I’ve speculated on this elsewhere on the forum, but ultimately I don’t think one has to understand why exactly God has chosen to do something a certain way or bring something about in order to believe and trust that he wouldn’t have done it if it wasn’t consistent with, or didn’t in some way contribute to, our ultimate happiness. I think there is Biblical precedent for the idea that God uses sin and evil to promote human happiness.”
This too is a big difference between us. I cannot admit evil as a positive moment in the explication of beauty. Evil, as I understand it, is pure privation of beauty.
Aaron: I guess I found it remarkable that Dr. Boyd would redefine “freedom” to mean something other than the power or ability to do otherwise (which I thought was the kind of freedom that Boyd had in mind when he wrote “love requires freedom”). It seems he redefined “freedom” to basically mean “doing what a perfectly loving character would make it impossible for a person not to do (i.e., love),” which is a completely different kind of “freedom” than the freedom that he thinks love requires…
Tom: Greg’s been consistent on all this. I’m not sure why you’re viewing it as inconsistent of him. Libertarian freedom is power to the contrary. The there’s compatibilistic freedom. God is compatibilistically free with respect to love. We are libertarianly free with respect to love but become compatibilistically free with respect to love. That’s Greg’s view. I don’t see any ‘redefining’ of freedom. When Greg says “love requires freedom” he means OUR choice for love BEGINS with a libertarian exercise of the will with respect to love.
Aaron: But why would this make their loving character “theirs” in any greater or more meaningful sense than if their character wasn’t “freely chosen” by them but rather something which God created (or re-created) them with? God’s character wasn’t “freely chosen” by him, but this doesn’t make his loving character any less his.
Tom: The relevant point is that God’s character was not “given him” or “determined for him” by some being or entity OTHER than Godself (as it WOULD be in our case were God to wholly determine our characters).
Tom, could you explain the difference for some of us what the difference is between Compatibilistic freedom and Libertarian freedom. I’m not sure I understand Greg’s stance - because I don’t think I understand what it means that “God is compatibilistically free”.
Auggy: Tom, could you explain the difference…between Compatibilistic freedom and Libertarian freedom? I’m not sure I understand Greg’s stance - because I don’t think I understand what it means that “God is compatibilistically free."
Tom: Sorry I’m communicating this all so poorly.
Greg’s take on LFW and CFW are the standard definitions. LFW has been described as ‘power to the contrary’, i.e., a person is libertarianly free with respect to some choice if making the choice and not making the choice are both possible with antecedent causes, that is, neither choice is determined by antecedent causes. So libertarians have made much of the notions of ‘genuine alternatives’. Compatibilistic freedom is so named because it describes an understanding of free choice compatible with the absence of such (libertarian) options. God has traditionally been thought to be compatibilistically loving or good. That is, God is not capable of evil, not capable of being other or less than perfectly benevolent. His freedom or capacity for choice and action are limited to benevolent choices. We, however, are capable of evil. Our freedom or capacity for choice and action include both benevolent and non-benevolent choices.
Libertarian choice need not have to do with evil/good. One can be libertarianly free with respect to purchasing car, or mowing the lawn in the morning as opposed to that afternoon. It’s not a ‘moral’ thing necessarily, but I couch it in those terms to highlight the difference. The choice between some perfectly loving action and not performing what is perfectly loving is NOT a libertarian choice to God. God ‘will’ do what is perfectly loving. He’s compatibilistically free. We shall some day become compatibilistically free with respect to good/evil, though we are not that now. But we shall have become so as a result of the proper use of libertarian freedom cooperating with the grace of God to ‘become’ perfectly loving.
It is not obvious to me that being libertarianly free with respect to good/evil is a BETTER form of being than being compatibilistically loving (as God is). When Greg says compatibilistic freedom with respect to good/evil is a better form of freedom than being libertarianly free with respect to good/evil, he’s just saying the obvious (as far as I can see). It really IS better to be free from all capacity for evil. God is that free ‘necessarily’. We must ‘become’ so libertarianly. God can’t just create us finished products from the get-go. So being libertarianly free with respect to good/evil, though necessary to our development of character and perfection, will give way to being compatibilistically loving.
Hey Tom, I had a thought I wanted to interject here. I’m hoping that it will be helpful to the discussion, but I’m not sure whether it will help with understanding or just reinforce the difference. I think I’m with Aaron in being more in the compatibilistic camp with respect to any sort of “free will” choices. Not that I’m discounting the need at some level for those choices, but it seems to me that God had an idea of who he wanted us to be when he created us, as he created us all for a purpose within his larger scheme of things. I understand your difficulty in “admitting evil as a positive moment in the explication of beauty” as you put it; but I think of it this way: I once heard it said that God is writing a grand story, that includes all of us as participants. We all have roles to play; some of us were created to be protagonists, some antagonists, etc. You can’t really write a good story without all the essential elements of a good story. All stories need protagonists and antagonists, and difficult circumstances to overcome. These are all elements that drive the story forward and make it a good story, as opposed to an exceedingly boring one.
Hence, as I see it, the presence of evil contributes as an essential “plot device” to drive God’s good story forward. It just wouldn’t be the same without it.
I also don’t think that it’s necessary to assume that God completely determines our character (if character is the right word) under the compatibilistic model. We were created with specific purpose, but perhaps some freedom is allowed in our design in how we specifically accomplish that purpose, for example.
Oh, I guess I was thinking there of the need for some [CFW] choices, so I should’ve been clearer on that. I’m not sure I can think of the need to have LFW choices, as a CFW proponent
I think I view CFW as the limited freedom to make choices within a certain pre-determined framework. To use the story analogy; In a play, the actors have some freedom in how they express their characters (how they deliver the lines, how they gesture, where they stand, etc.) but within the framework of still having to play a recognizable pre-determined role in a non-open-ended story.
It sounds like you’re advocating LFW within predetermined possibilities. For example, God leaves open, say, two or three possible choices all of which are equally consistent within a generally determined outcome which he predetermined.
Let’s say God determines that Hitler grow up to be a creep who abuses his people, wreaks havor on Europe, and nearly exterminates the Jews. But within this predetermined “role” Hitler is to play Hitler is in fact libertarianly free to self-determine the unique way this gets worked out. He is to gas 6 million Jews (plus or minus a few hundred thousand). He is to invade all his neighbors (give or take one or two). He is to commit suide (by drinking a lethal liquid or putting a bullet in his brain, or whatever). So you’ve got FIXED GOALS but OPEN ROUTES.
Is this what you’re describing–i.e., libertarian choice within constraints determined by God? Aaron would not agree to this since he’s a strict causal determinst. There is one and only one possible storyline which the entire history of creation may take on every conceivable level. Nothing stands outside this strict causal determination. But if what you say is true, then you and I are closer in principle than you and Aaron, for as a libertarian I have no problems agreeing that libertarian choice is freedom within determined constraints. We would just disagree on what those constraints are, i.e., on which things God has decided to determine and which things he’s left up to us within the constraints of his overarching purposes.
That bit of “wiggle room” a person has to ‘self’-determine within the overarching constraints of God’s purpose would be libertarian freedom, yeah. When God’s predetermined constraints limit our options to a SINGLE course of action, THEN you’re talking compatibilism.
So you’ve got BOTH going on, just as I do. Well, just as ALL libertarians do. No libertarian I know of thinkg EVERY outcome is a libertarian (or indeterminate) one. So it’s just a matter of figuring out where to draw the line…what SORTS of outcomes has God decided to reserve to himself and which has he left to us to determine. Some will draw the line extreeeeemly small, so that God determines 99% of volitional outcomes. Others will want to say God gives us a bit more “say-so” than that.
Melchi: Ah, Ok. I think I would put myself somewhere between compatibilism and the extremely small line you’ve described here.
Tom: This is REALLY important…
WHY do you feel the need to put in any line at all? That is, why feel to posit any “wiggle-room” within constraints that allow for some diversity (to me determined by us) in their fulfillment? If you just went with Aaron’s 100% causal determinism, what would you be losing which you feel is important to you and which you get via affirming SOME LFW? I’m really interested in your answer.
Tom, perhaps I’ve misunderstood you. I don’t think I’ve really grasped Compatibilism and so Mel’s very helpful and I appreciate his input.
I’m not sure that it makes sense to say one is libertarianly free withing constraints. To me it’s likes saying, one is free while enslaved. If God has determined that you end up at location A rather then B, then we choosing freely don’t really have an ability to choose to go to B. So I think I’m not getting it. If you say, we’ll he’ll let you choose to go to B (on a temporary basis) well then you’ve left the argument. Now the question would have to be re-framed: Does God determine us to first go to B and then end up at A? If we say, no, because that would violate LFW, then we’ve accomplished nothing to prove the point - it’s begged. If we say, yes, then it’s determinism. I need to hear more why God ONLY determines the ends and not the means, especially in light of the tons of calvinistic scriptures which show God CONTROLLING our behavior and will.
Aug: I’m not sure that it makes sense to say one is libertarianly free within constraints. To me it’s like saying one is free while enslaved.
Tom: Try not to think of constraints in terms of enslavement. It follows that whatever enslaves us constrains us, but it doesn’t follow constrains necessarily enslave us. Constraints can be neutral. For example, one’s ‘nature’ can constrain. You’re not free to breathe under water like a fish, or to fly unaided through the air like a bird. Those are constraints or limitations on the options you’re free to choose between.
Aug: If God has determined that you end up at location A rather then B, then we choosing freely don’t really have an ability to choose to go to B.
Tom: Assuming that LFW is possible (for the sake of argument), all your description requires is that you’re determined to “end up” at A and not B. But you’re free to “go” to B—maybe even spend quite some time there. You just can’t “end up” at B. B can’t be your final destiny. You can only “end up” (whatever that means) at A. That much can be determined. But God might leave it entirely up to you ‘when’ and ‘how’ you get to A. You may be free to take the high road or the low road, the easy way or the way of suffering. The important thing (assuming the coherence and possibility of both compatibilist and libertarian freedom) is that both are possible within the span of a life and regarding different aspects. It just can’t be the case that we’re compatiblistically and libertarianly free with respect to one and the same choice.
Aug: If you say, we’ll he’ll let you choose to go to B (on a temporary basis)…
Tom: As I just did!
Aug: …well then you’ve left the argument. Now the question would have to be re-framed: Does God determine us to first go to B and then end up at A? If we say, no, because that would violate LFW, then we’ve accomplished nothing to prove the point - it’s begged. If we say, yes, then it’s determinism.
Tom: Whether or not God determines all our choices (in which case we’re compatibilistically free all the time about all our choices) is a separate issue from the question of what compatibilistic and libertarian freedom are. In other words, whether or not God exhaustively determines us doesn’t bear on the definition of the terms. I thought we were just discussing the terms for a bit. And as far as the definitions go, it’s perfectly possible for us to be compatibilistically free in some respects and libertarianly free in other. There’s nothing about the ‘definitions’ of CFW and LFW that require that we be ONLY one or the other in EVERY respect. That’s all Melchi and I were getting at.
Aug: I need to hear more why God ONLY determines the ends and not the means, especially in light of the tons of calvinistic scriptures which show God CONTROLLING our behavior and will.
Tom: Right. I wasn’t suggesting with Melchi that God only determines the ends and not the means. I didn’t think that was in view. He and I were just talking about whether one could be partly determined and partly undetermined.
But why do you think it follows from our being finite that our characters cannot be compatibilistically acquired? If the loving character of a finite being in heaven can be maintained by compatibilistic choice, why can’t it be acquired by compatibilistic choice?
I believe evil is a negative moment in the explication of beauty, in that it provides a negative contrast for the full understanding and appreciation of beauty by finite beings. I just don’t think we could fully enjoy and appreciate health (which is surely a good) if there was never any sickness (which is an evil) from which anyone needed to be healed. In my experience at least, a temporary negative experience tends to enhance and make more meaningful whatever positive experience succeeds it. But perhaps these are just two different and conflicting intuitions that we have.
I also think God has always wanted to manifest himself to his finite creatures as a Savior. Evil, I believe, highlights good and allows God to manifest himself more fully to his creatures. To be saved from evil is, I believe, a greater blessing to man than never experiencing evil. There is a joy that comes from being saved from evil - and knowing that one has been saved from evil - that I believe is far superior to the alternative. One could say that being saved from evil is more beautiful than never having to be saved from evil. In fact, I’m not sure how an existence in which there is and never was anything with which to contrast “beauty” could even be considered “beautiful.” I’m not saying that evil has to eternally exist alongside good (as I believe was Edwards’ view), but I do believe that finite beings depend on contrast, and that our existence must at least begin in a context in which evil is a reality.
I don’t see how my point is any less relevant, though. God’s character isn’t any less his just because it’s compatibilistically chosen by himself. Why should our character be any less ours just because it’s compatibilistically chosen by us?
