The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Essential Qualities of Personhood

I’m reading a very interesting book right now, Michale–

Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity (Andrew Radde-Gallwitz; Oxford U Press, 2009). It addresses much of what we’re talking about. I’ll try to private message about it. Heads up!

Again, I don’t know how you go about maintaining the ‘necessity’ of God’s existence (as a personal triune being) and the ‘contingency’ of the world IF you also claim that the determination to create and relate to the world is a necessary attribute of God.

Do you know any EO profs or pastors? I’d chat this out with them (provided they’re really familiar with the Fathers) and see what you get.

Tom

I’m not commited to the views of the Fathers, and I’m a dogmatic minimalist (if it hasn’t been clearly and unmistakably declared a heresy by an Eccumenical Council, it’s an acceptible Theological opinion), so I’m not really interested in whether my private views would be accepted by any EO professors or Theologians.

(Would they be likely to accept Process Theology?)

Who is “they”?

Tom

I can’t imagine any Orthodox theologian tolerating Process theology as less than heresy. Tom Hopko did his doctoral dissertation (many don’t know this) on Eastern Orthodoxy and process thought. It wasn’t a good review. ;o)

I’m sure you can appreciate how the Orthodox read the Creeds as well, Michael. The Creeds aren’t independent directives that sprang to life in a vacuume. The Fathers’ own independent writings are, as it were, commentary on the Creeds they hammered final form. So while the final forms are what is binding, what those who determined the final form said outside ecumenical gatherings carry tremendous weight and would only be set aside with the greatest of care. True, certain of the Fathers are at times genius (Nyssa for example). At other times they say some (from my point of view) pretty ridiculous things.

I guess my point is that when you see what concern they had for the ontological divide between divine and created being, and for God’s inherent fullness and independence from the world, it makes it hard to read the Creeds apart from this foundation. It’s what informs the Creeds so to speak. If they didn’t explicitly mention, say, divine “self-sufficiency” in so many words, that may be because they had no demand to do so, not on par wih other pressing theological concerns.

Tom

Just another quick thought:

Mike: And perhaps temporal time begins where the atemporal God wills someone other than Himself to love (The Son), to know and return His love (The Holy Spirit), and to share that love with non-God entities (Sophia–you and me.)

Tom: That sure looks like a denial of God’s essential triune nature. In other words, God “becomes” triune when he creates time and the world.

I don’t see how you don’t then end up with either a contingent begetting of the Son (an a contingent trinity) OR a necessary God-World relation. You’re linking the begetting of the Son and the creation of the world/time. If the latter exists contingently (i.e., it comes into being, was not always existing) then so do the Son and the Spirit. But if God is necessarily triune while the world exists contingently, then neither creation nor the determination to create (both are inseparable) can DEFINE God necessarily.

Tom

I believe The Holy Spirit determined the final form of the creeds.

Or it could mean that The Holy Spirit didn’t lead them to include those thoughts.

It would take another Eccumenical Council to decide that.

Maybe I could have worded that better, but even as it stands, I don’t think it would be heretical.

There would still not be a “time” when God wasn’t triune, would there?

Determination was your word.

I prefer “will”–and I don’t agree that creation and the will to create are inseparable.

Creation would involve linear time, sequences of events, and the Triune God relating to His creation.

It would also probably involve reasoning, thinking, remembering, and anticipating.

There are at least some philosophers who consider willing, knowing, and feeling the atemporal qualities of personhood.

If they’re right (and I think they are) the will to create isn’t inseprarable from the act of creating.

Since I believe God is atemporal sans-creation, and temporal in creation, I would separate the will from the act.

As to whether God was triune sans-creation, I don’t know.

Perhaps The Triune God came into existence with time, or perhaps God The Father Almighty willed the presence of The Son, and willed Him to feel His presence (The Holy Spirit) even in His atemporality.

I believe The Holy Spirit determined the final form of the creeds.

Or it could mean that The Holy Spirit didn’t lead them to include those thoughts.

It would take another Eccumenical Council to decide that.

Maybe I could have worded that better, but even as it stands, I don’t think it would be heretical.

There would still not be a “time” when God wasn’t triune, would there?

Determination was your word.

I prefer “will”–and I don’t agree that creation and the will to create are inseparable.

Creation would involve linear time, sequences of events, and the Triune God relating to His creation.

It would also probably involve reasoning, thinking, remembering, and anticipating.

There are at least some philosophers who consider willing, knowing, and feeling the atemporal qualities of personhood.

If they’re right (and I think they are) the will to create isn’t inseprarable from the act of creating.

Since I believe God is atemporal sans-creation, and temporal in creation, I would separate the will from the act.

As to whether God was triune sans-creation, I don’t know.

Perhaps The Triune God came into existence with time, or perhaps God The Father Almighty willed the presence of The Son, and willed Him to feel His presence (The Holy Spirit) even in His atemporality.

Hm, I see. I suppose we’re working with different models of time, as well. Are you of the opinion that the future is yet uncreated, but goes on being created as we move forward in time?

I honestly think this view is completely unsatisfactory, although I’d have to get back to you on how to debate the issue.

Regardless, I think your view works perfectly for God the Son. But not for God the Father, in my opinion. In that case I’d think that the difference between the two would be rather arbitrary, and they become merely two separate individuals rather than two different states of being expressing overarching themes for our very mode of existence and the world we live in.

Stellar: Are you of the opinion that the future is yet uncreated, but goes on being created as we move forward in time?

Tom: Right. I’m a presentist (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-series_and_B-series)

Since I don’t know how to establish or conceive of inter-personal relations between atemporal and temporal persons, I can’t imagine the Father being absolutely timeless/atemporal and the Son as temporal. Their relation is the most deeply personal and loving imaginable.

Tom

One concept I’ve avoided is the concept of what some call “God time,” or metaphysical time.

It could mean different things, and I’ve assumed it would still involve the logical incongruity of an actual infinite (with infinite regression), but would it?

Say our time is a created thing that’s tied to the existence of the physical universe.

Without the physical universe, time would exist only as a measure of change.

The only meaning it had would be experiential.

Even If God experienced a sequence of conscious thoughts, the some total of that experiance would be the only time there was.

Sequencing from one thought to another would be a kind of change, but before the first thought there would be no change–only dead time (or no time.)

There might be an actual infinite, but it wouldn’t be transversable (there’d be nothing beyond that first thought for God to remember, and whatever time there was would be part of God Himself.)

I’m reading an interesting paper on this called God Inside Time And Before Creation, but I’m not sure I understand it.

I’ve given my thoughts on what I think the author is saying here, and I’d be interested in any thoughts others have on his thesis.

I completely 100% agree with that last statement. But the solution is simple. It would be similar to holding more than one child in your lap and doting on them all. We already believe that God can hear and answer the prayers of everyone at once; if all times (from our perspective past, present and future) happen simultaneously for the Father, then it would be no more trouble for Him to have a relationship with our past, present and future selves than it would be for Him to listen to all prayers at once.

In fact, it seems to me that this God is more personal, since He is totally, completely aware of every part of us (including past and future) at the same time that He is dealing with our present selves. Make sense?

I think you may be viewing atemporality as static. In my mind, it’s much more active, because everything’s happening at once.

Then (not to make this post too convoluted, though) the issue comes up: what of cause and effect? How can everything happen at once if one event causes another? My answer is that this is an illusion. Events are connected; however, it is the sovereign God who causes them all by His very existence.

I think that’s the answer to Tom’s question concerning how a God who was/is atemporal sans-creation “got off the dime” and became temporal in creation (if indeed He did, and I think He did.)

I also think Zimmerman may have hit on one or two points in that paper (have you had a chance to look at it?)

I think Zimmerman is saying that there’s a sense in which (physical) time began with creation, but there’s also something like time behind creation (only it’s part of God Himself.)

Try to take a look at it and give me your thoughts when you can (and forgive me if some of my comments seem heretical to you, I’m just trying to sort this out here.)

Became temporal? I think that God is temporal, in the Son.

Hah, I’ve barely had a chance to skim this thread. I only responded to things that caught my eye as I was scrolling through and looked to see if I got any responses every couple days or so. I have a busy life right now, but I’ll try to take a quick look at it.

Interesting, that’s possible! I think it may even be the most satisfactory answer, if I understand it aright.

Heretical? hah. The label “heresy” is for witch-burners. I merely sort out by what’s relevant to a good keeping of the faith in practicing the presence of God. If a belief both doesn’t seem to accord with the truth and doesn’t jive with the Spirit within, I’m going to end up rejecting it. Of course, I have to develop my counter-arguments as well to be able to defend my belief. But I’m definitely not just going by some council.

Wooooowww, that paper is waaay too technical for me. It hurts my head! :confused:

Also, I had to fix the link in the quote. For some reason there was an equal sign at the end of it.

Sorry, I should have said “is” temporal in creation.

Thank you.

The term is used in the Bible, and in the Eccumenical Councils of the undivided Church (prior to 1058 A.D.), and I don’t think there were any witch trials or burnings in that period.

Also, the leading Protestant reformers were of the opinion that because Jesus said that the Spirit would lead the Church “into all truth,” and that He’d be with the Church “unto the end of the age,” we should at least respect these Councils (which followed the Apostolic example set in the 15th chapter of Acts.)

P.S. Some would say that UR was condemned in 554, but they’d be wrong.

Hi Bros!

Dean Zimmerman is a great guy. Interestingly…he’s an open theist AND an A-theorist presentist. I’m familiar with him just because we linked up at an open theist conference a couple years ago in Boston where John Polkinghorne (another open theist, Anglican priest, and famous physicist). JP, what a brain!

Stellar, as far as I can tell from what you’re describing, you’re a B-theorist. Lots of scientists and philosophers are B-theorists. That’s basically the block theory of time and the universe. An easy way to describe it is to compare it with physical locations. Just as NY, Paris, and Tokyo all exist simultaneously but in different physical locations, so past, present, and future events all exist simultaneously in different temporal locations. So Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon, Hitler’s ascent to control in Germany, and the return of Christ to the world are all EQUALLY and simultaneously actual, not just from God’s point of view, but really, actually. The relations of “earlier than” and “later than” aren’t objective. They only represent subjective points of view. God sees all these events simultaneously because they are in fact, independently of his perception of them, simultaneous. God just views it all where we are only able to view the single moment we’re in.

I think this is philosophically, existentially, and morally problematic. If cause and effect are only illusory, then so is responsibility. But the me of today is held accountable for the me who committed some deed last year. But on the B-theory, these two me’s are REALLY not the same me at all. Personal identity doesn’t PERSIST THROUGH time. There is no abiding identity per se. Each is separate individual reality. What connects them is not “temporal becoming” (there is no such thing for the B-theorist) or “cause/effect.” What connects them is a kind of stream of consciousness that flows through them and gives to each its own “moment” of awareness. So We don’t “become.” Rather, all the several and temporally located me’s each experiences its own spark of awareness.

I don’t think ANY of this works. If I am not the cause of what actions follow me but God is cause of it directly by creation, then you don’t even have secondary causation. You just have straight up occasionalism. God creates the entire timeline from beginning to end–poof–and it’s all equally THERE. Then a stream of awareness runs through it so that each instant enjoys its own individual “moment.” But in that case I’m not causally related to what I did yesterday in any way, or to anything that happened in the past. God is sole and exclusive cause. Events arn’t related sideways to each other.They’re all related (simultaneously) vertically to Gd as direct cause.

Tom

Zimmerman is interesting (and I’d like to better understand what he’s saying), but you’re clearly misrepresenting the views of B-theorists like Agustine, Aquinas, and C.S. Lewis.

If you want to say that God’s reality is the only reality, I think a B-theorist would still say that you and I are the sum total of all our parts (ten years ago, five years ago, yesterday, today, and tomorrow.)

And Lewis would certainly say that whatever God sees me doing ten years ago, whatever He sees me doing today, and whatever He sees me doing tomorrow, is what I choose to do.

Also, how can the person I am tomorrow be entirely divorced from the person I am today (or was ten years age), when the person I am tomorrow will have the memories of my experience today (and ten years ago)?

Your presentation of B-theory ignores our subjective experience of time altogether, and I doubt any B-theorist would actually do that.

I think they’d say that If we view time as a forth demension, we’re not different persons at different points of time, we’re different temporal parts of the same person.

Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa.

You said they laid great stress on God’s "self-sufficiency"and His “independence from creation.”

Is Open Theism related to Process Theology (and does it view those qualities as attributes of God)?

Michael: If you want to say that God’s realit is the only reality, I think a B-theorist would still say that you and I are the sum total of all our parts (ten years ago, five years ago, yesterday, today, and tomorrow.)

Tom: She could say it, but could she demonstrate it given her view on time? Most B-theorists end up cheating by dipping into A-type semantics to explain themselves. Can B-theorists really explicate a cause and effect relation between events that are all equally and fully “actual” (just a different temporal locations)? I don’t think so.

Michael: And Lewis would certainly say that whatever God sees me doing ten years ago, whatever He sees me doing today, and whatever He sees me doing tomorrow, is what I choose to do.

Tom: He would, but what does this “explain”? We can all say what we’d like to be the case. But to claim that God sees it and that our choices are our own (I didn’t wanna get onto freedom) is to describe what needs explaining, not to explain anything.

Michael: Also, how can the person I am tomorrow be entirely divorced from the person I am today (or was ten years age), when the person I am tomorrow will have the memories of my experience today (and ten years age)?

Tom: A perfect A-type argument against B-theorists. Seriously. You’re almost quoting A-theorists!

Michael: Your presentation of B-theory ignores our subjective experience of time altogether, and I doubt any B-theorist would actually do that.

Tom: Again, appealing to our intuitions about temporal experience is a common A-type argument against B-theorists. You sound like a brilliant A-theorist friend of mine! B-theorists reject the A-proponent’s attempt to ground our subjective experience in any kind of objective temporal becoming, and in so doing B-theorists ignore (or at least fail to take seriously) our subjective experience of time. The objective world (temporally speaking), B-theorists argue, is NOT the way our experience would lead us to assume.

Michael: If we view time as a forth demension, we’re not different persons at different points of time, we’re different temporal parts of the same person.

Tom: This seems like B-type sophistry. It just renames the problem with the B-theory. In the end it leaves completely unanswered the question of cause and effect. If we’re one person with different temporal parts, what’s the causal relation between the parts that comprise or compose the whole person? Is it one of temporal becoming as the A-theorist would argue or not?

Michael: Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa. You said they laid great stress on God’s “self-sufficiency” and His “independence from creation.”

Tom: Oh, I follow ya. Sorry. Yeah, I’m just into the book. But Athanasius as well, and on and on. I’ll try to get you the link to that book.

Michael: Is Open Theism related to Process Theology (and does it view those qualities as attributes of God)?

Tom: They’re related in that process theologians and open theists are all A-theorist presentists and believe God does not possess eternal knowledge of the entire timeline of creation, like one finished blueprint. But process theism is a purely rationalistic approach, a natural religion. Process folk deny the trinity and posit a necessary God-World relation. The world is God’s “body” so to speak, God is in a state of “process” by which he constantly changes and becomes via the world (as the world does in relation to God). Plus they tend to be anti-supernaturalists. Open theists affirm God’s trinitarian/ontological independence from the world.

Hugs and kisses!
Tom

Our subjective experience of the parts ( which I doubt any B-theorist–and certainly not Augustine, Aqiunas, or Lewis–would deny.)

Instead of arguing here, could you help me understand what Zimmerman is saying in that paper?

Is he saing that God had an infinite past (with infinite regression) before He created the universe, or is he (as I think) saying something else?

If I could understand what he’s saying I might be able to agree with you (or at least with him–maybe with both of you.)

I don’t want to be a heretic, I don’t want to be called a heretic, and I don’t want to question anyone else’s orthodoxy–I just want to understand this.

If you or Zimmerman can help, I’d be very grateful.

Here’s the problem I see.

If the past is infinite, than each present moment that pases adds to it’s age.

But infinity can’t be added to.

I think Zimmeman tried to find a way around this, but I’m not sure I understand him–can you help?

Zimmerman believes in a kind of quasi time before time, and explains this (in layman’s terms) in a short t.v. interview that I found very interesting.

I think it makes some sense–but if “God The Father Almighty” is the maker “of all things, visible and invisible” (and this “quasi time” is unmade) quasi time would have to be part of God Himself.

So God is both personal and impersonal.

(If quasi time is impersonal–but then again, maybe it’s not.

Mabe it’s just whatever thoughts God had before creation.

If they were sequential, there was a kind of quasi time–if they were/are simultaneous, God is timeless sans-creation.)

That makes some sense to me, and I’d be interested in any thoughts anyone might have to offer on the Zimmerman interview.

P.S. Here’s a t.v. interview with Brian Leftow (who believes that God is timeless), but if you compare what he says about “phenominal time” with what Zimmerman says about "quasi time,"I don’t see them as being that far apart.

(Again, any thoughts would be welcome.)