The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Free Will: Its Essential Nature and Implications

Featured Writers Dr Thomas Talbott
#41

I’m not sure how a Christian is to take the statement by Niebuhr. Was Jesus not really tempted? I think it may be safe to say that temptation alone does not spill over into falleness. It seems there is a state of being which is neither perfected nor fallen but rather something foundational which makes growing into one of these states possible. An innocent, so to speak, or “untried” form of existence may require going through the experience of temptation, I believe.

The question at this point seems, if we define freedom as “the power to act obediently” we must determine whether or not those who sin actually indeed have the power not to. In other words, does a murderer, at the time of his murder (or does any sinner at the time of his sin), actually possess the power to act obediently?

I’m more and more inclined to believe that we must indeed be given “freedom of contrary choice”, but not because this is the only way in which good acts are possible (otherwise, God would be incapable of making free choices, the mother’s love for her child would not be good, etc.) But because this freedom is necessarily connected to becoming an independent consciousness, separate from God. “To be able to do otherwise than good” is simply what it means, I believe, to exist separately from God as a rational being and be able to act. God made us in order to unite us with himself. There must be a “me” and a “God” before there can be an “us.” And this distanced relationship is what makes sin possible (inevitable?). It also, accidentally, makes good acts possible, but that does not mean that for an act to be good it must be free, for that is not the *essential *reason for its existence. I may, for instance, get to school by driving my car, but that doesn’t mean that’s the only way I can get to school. So the primary reason for giving creatures the ability to sin is whatever it is, but it just so happens this also means they have the power of sinning or doing good, too.

The real question I believe hinges on how we account for sin. Because if God could have made us and prevented our sinning (which would seem to follow if we hold that an act can be good without the ability to do otherwise), why would God not just make us with dispositions such that we always had the maximum freedom to act obediently? I believe that is the question we must answer. Since God has obviously not made us like that, why has he not? As I’ve said before, I’m inclined to believe it has something to do with the process of ourselves being first separated, or “ejected” as Lewis said, from God and subsequently being united to him. This process may require freedom to exist and be exercised simply, but not necessarily exercised in a certain way.

#42

Hi Tom:
Thanks for getting this thread off the ground Tom!
Highly anticipated, highly relevant!

Just back from a quick visit to my daughter in College in TN. Actually not too far from Sherman… Wrote this before reading the entire thread… though I hear, possibly, in the responses so far some of what I’m thinking…

Perhaps this is tangential to where you intend to go here, but in the past, in other contexts, we’ve talked about what was going on in the Garden of Eden. And if it even makes sense to read that literally. So, what I’m wondering is this:

Freedom is not really an issue unless and until there are choices. This, or that. Do animals experience choice? (and therefore freedom?) Do they actually process whether they shall eat this clump of grass or that one? Chase down this gazelle or that one? Or is it all instinct; raw impulse and reaction. And complete inability to reflect afterwards on why that specific action was taken; whether it was the “better” one??

Maybe then the dawning of the idea of freedom was also the dawning of enough sentience and self awareness to realize, for the first time, that there even was a choice available! I can actually do this – instead of that!! Not do this, instead of doing it! And with this came – and perhaps with great exhilaration – the sense of autonomy and control and power.

Could this be what Genesis is describing in it’s cryptic stories and language? Further, might this have at least something to do with having the “image of God” within us?

Of course, at this early stage, and in this setting of uncertainty and ambiguity and lack of context and dim knowledge of true cause/effect relationships (ie consequences), it’s easy to imagine such “freedom” leading to some very poor “choices”. (hence, missing the mark; sin??)

The mere fact of the awareness that options exist, that choices can be made, however tells us next to nothing about the quality and wisdom of those choices. For, in these early choices, with so little context and so much ambiguity and uncertainty, “mistakes” were almost certain to be made. Slowly, the idea must have emerged that in fact, some options were “better” than others.

That there were, in fact, sets of choices which logically lead to either obliteration or to peace and continued prosperity and even existence, simply was not apprehended at this early stage. Can we then conceptualize the bible as God’s story of the slow, arduous, painstaking journey of teaching us A) the nature of freedom and B) how to more wisely embrace it? That thrill and exhilaration of the discovery and awareness of our own autonomy and freedom being tempered and made wiser and more informed, by the wise shepherd, teacher, Father… Over time and with great patience and compassion.

Therefore, to the extent my musing resembles reality, I might suggest that typical Arminian understandings of freedom remain mired (stuck) in the earlier conceptions and realizations of freedom in their emphasis on our fascination with the autonomy we’ve been given. (To see real time demonstrations of this just watch any 2 year old interact with his world! Thrill of autonomy; lack of awareness and insight into cause/effect and consequences… Also, no grasp of what is in his own self interest)

Meanwhile, Universalists have moved forward to an understanding (not bragging, just observing here) which comprehends that freedom is not a static concept but one which grows. Freedom is not all-or-nothing. Thus Universalists are not so much concerned that there be a choice, or that we can “choose” between them, but rather, there must also be some inclusion of the idea of discernment between what is actually good for us (ie in our true self interest – like God’s interest in us) and what is not.

So in summary, I’m thinking that the typical Arminian/Calvinist dichotomy between sovereignty and freedom is “stuck” on the freedom side for Arminians. This is a reflection of the exhilaration of newfound autonomy that has not yet grown to consider, let alone comprehend, which choices are in our best interest and which aren’t. (Obviously, it would be rather poor form to present, to the Arminian, that his view represents more primitive, immature thinking which needs to grow to embrace other factors… But I can say it here I hope…)

Now, if we build this idea properly, I think we shall lose the idea of one or the other – either sovereignty, or freedom; as if they are in tension. Rather, it becomes more like Sovereignty, THEREFORE freedom.

Example:
What father would give his young son a classic muscle car (500+ HP, screaming fast, ready to impress the girls!!) before FIRST making him eat his vegetables so he grows legs long enough to actually reach the pedals; waiting till he’s of the age where his reflexes and hand-eye coordination are more in line with the cars capabilities; teaching him the rules of the road so he knows how he must behave around other drivers; let him start out practicing on a vehicle of less power, so as to learn the basics; teaching the son just how quickly he can get into trouble with so much power under the hood – ie respect the power inherent in the car.

Well, Freedom is like a muscle car!

Thus, ironically, God retains His sovereignty, because He wouldn’t dream of just thrusting such freedom on us unprepared, (ie He controls both the giving of freedom, and the preparation to handle it) as well as giving to us a much more elevated and complete form of freedom – because we now comprehend it’s actual power and depths and potential. In short, we then become much more fully what God intended us to be when He created us in the first place.

A slightly different way of saying, as other’s have here, that choice must be informed (ie know what’s at stake) as well as rational (ie know what’s in our actually self interest…)

Bobx3

#43

Bobx3,

I think you nailed it. I for one, am totally tracking with you.

#44

I’m really enjoying this thread and would also like to say “Thanks” to Tom for starting and guiding it. :smiley:

So many thought-provoking and thoughtful comments. :smiley: I thought I’d respond to the last few with some thoughts of mine.

I’m not sure it’s that trivial to tell the truth. Both Jesus and Paul describe us as “slaves to sin” as you alluded to. It seems to make sense that if we are freed from sin we would indeed have the “power to act rightly” or “obediently.” If we are indeed free from sin, then choices we make without the potential for a contrary choice, at least seem as if they would be “free.”

The difficult part for me is this:

If this is true, then acting “rightly” because of an inherited or given character* may not be the same* as acting rightly after being “freed from sin.” If one had never sinned, they can’t be freed from it. Perhaps making the bad and wrong decisions we inevitably do makes the “right” decisions more meaningful (and free) when we finally learn from the consequences of our wrong decisions. :confused: I’m really not sure…

One point worth bringing up here is the idea that the murderer, at the time of his committing the murder, may not have been able to do otherwise (and might be thought because of that not to be culpable), but may have made a series of bad decisions before that time that led him to be in that state which were “free” choices and for which he is indeed culpable. (even if the end result of being a murderer was not anticipated). I’m not saying this is the case, but it must be considered and certainly complicates things.

I like this very much, Chris, and as you know, have much sympathy for this idea… :smiley:

I like this also, Bob. It seems though, that, at least in this life, the freedom people have is often too much for them to handle and their bad choices using that freedom results in considerable pain and anguish. I think, though, in the long run (including post-mortem) this will be true. :wink:

#45

NOTE TO ALL: Now that Bob3 is back, I have to be away for a few days myself in order (a) to do justice to my 50th wedding anniversary, which is Friday, the 28th of March, and (b) to make sure I get my income taxes taken care of on time! But as General Douglas MacArthur famously said when forced to retreat from the Philippines, “I shall return.” I know, that quotation dates me terribly!

Before signing off for a few days, however, I do want to respond quickly to one item in Chrisguy’s latest and very insightful post. He wrote:

That’s a good question, Chris, and the answer may depend upon how one understands the Incarnation. But one thing seems clear. The Greek word peirasmos that our English Bibles typically translate with the English word “tempted” literally means to try, prove, or put to the test, and this word need not carry the same implication of possible moral failure that I was assuming when I used the term “temptation.” The NRSV therefore translates Hebrews 4:15b, correctly I suspect, as follows: “we have one who in every respect has been tested as we are, yet without sin.” Interestingly enough, the same verb is also used of God, the Father, in Hebrews 3:9: Just as Satan is elsewhere said to have put Jesus to the test, so the Hebrew ancestors are here said to have put God himself to the test. In any event, there can be no real temptation in my sense unless genuine moral failure is possible, and genuine moral failure is possible only when one’s nature is unperfected and in that sense “fallen.” I use scare quotes here because, as I see it, a fallen nature is simply an unperfected nature and carries no implication of moral guilt at all. So I tend to agree with Niebuhr’s view that God created Adam (or humankind) in a fallen condition (i.e., with an unperfected nature), which explains why sin (“missing the mark”) was a genuine possibility and in my opinion virtually inevitable. But that’s another story.

Anyway, I’m truly grateful that you and Bob3 have prepared the way so nicely for some things I want to say later. Also, I need to thank you, Kate, for your exceptionally kind comments. If something I have written has been helpful to you (or to anyone else), this is the best kind of news that any author could ever receive. But it is a curious thing. Given the course that my life has taken and the support I have always received from family and friends, it takes no bravery or courage at all–not even in the slightest–to express my deepest convictions about the nature of God and the world. In particular, nothing I have said or written about my evolving convictions over the years has ever posed the slightest threat to my life, my livelihood, or my personal friendships.

My thanks to all who have contributed so much to our discussion here so far.

-Tom

#46

George MacDonald did a sermon on this in his first series: The Temptation in the Wilderness. I started it last night and haven’t finished it, but it seems relevant, in case anyone would like to have a look.

#47

Can we not have a ‘free will’ but also have it be a defective one? Autobiographically, this is true.
I know this has been said, above, in different ways.

#48

Greetings Dr. Talbott,

The opposite side of the coin has not been addressed much. I have alluded to it, by suggesting that if there is no free will, then how can evil doers be held accountable. This question seems to have been ignored (or else if it was addressed, I missed it).

Is it as impossible for a thief, or murderer, or rapist because of the character which they have developed, to cease from being such as it is for a loving mother to murder her child? If so, does it make sense to hold these people morally accountable for what they cannot help doing? We may have to imprison them or execute them in order to prevent them from further offences. But are they morally guilty any more than a bear who mauls a child?

#49

Hi Paidion, :smiley:
I wonder what your thoughts are on what I said about this upthread?

#50

Remember Maslow’s heirarchy of needs? One of the points of which is, that a more basic need - like those in #1 below, must be met before a person can progress to satisfying other needs. As I read through them, the system makes sense, and I think has a bearing on the free will discussion.

  1. Biological and Physiological needs - air, food, drink, shelter, warmth, sex, sleep, etc.
  2. Safety needs - protection from elements, security, order, law, limits, stability, etc.
  3. Social Needs - Belongingness and Love, - work group, family, affection, relationships, etc.
  4. Esteem needs - self-esteem, achievement, mastery, independence, status, dominance, prestige, managerial responsibility, etc.
  5. Cognitive needs - knowledge, meaning, etc.
  6. Aesthetic needs - appreciation and search for beauty, balance, form, etc.
  7. Self-Actualization needs - realizing personal potential, self-fulfillment, seeking personal growth and peak experiences.
  8. Transcendence needs - helping others to achieve self actualization.

A point that we could discuss: does a person who is struggling with meeting needs in step #1 have the FREE WILL to also make choices in , say, step #4?
This is the point I’ve been laboring to make in upthread posts - it is always a concrete individual making a choice, and the range of freedom of that choice is on a spectrum; it is not a fixed thing.
A person at #1 is certainly free to starve to death; but is also free to steal a loaf of bread for his starving kids. Competing freedoms?

So we all agree that we have a WILL? And the question is about the concept ‘free’? Is that concept - ‘free’ - the word that an Arminian would lock in on?Would that Arminian be satisfied with us agreeing that men have ‘wills’? I suppose not - because their concern is the theological one, not the anthropological one - that is, man must be completely free to accept or reject God. His will might be corrupt in other things, but in this one thing it is whole, or, supposedly, the Arminian scheme falls down.
I’m still thinking about this and hope Tom hurries back after a glorious 50th anniversary. :laughing:

#51

Great point about Maslow’s hierarchy. I didn’t even think about that (and haven’t thought much about it in years) but it certainly has to have some impact. Thanks for bringing that up, Dave!

#52

Hi again Tom – and Happy Anniversary!
(once had a patient tell me he had been married 50 years… to three different women. NO I said; you start over, from scratch, with each woman!)

I do wish to bring up another point here which seems very relevant to all this and which I’m hoping you can include in your upcoming discussion here… But over on the other thread (Love; is it really volitional?) we have been talking about the “will” which surely is commonly thought to be volitional and it’s direction chosen by ourselves and so on. ie That center which directs the self or something like that.

Specifically I would like to point out a really curious and awkward thing that Arminian Free will folks say, which actually makes little logical sense. Here goes:

They say that we, the converted soul, the one who has repented and come to Christ (or which ever phase one uses) must “give up his will” to God; must submit His will to God; we must bare our Cross which means to die to self and surrender our will to God. The implication of course is that our human will must be defective; it must be broken; it is not to be trusted. — And yet just moments earlier that will was entrusted with something so profound and serious as that persons eternal destiny!!

What?? That’s just deeply contradictory! ***If our will is so fallen and contrary to our best interest that it must immediately, upon conversion, be given up, then surely it shouldn’t have been trusted with our eternal salvation in the first place. ***

Anyway, be curious to see what you think of this Tom.

Bobx3

#53

I do not believe determinism (ie the idea that sin was/is “unavoidable”) has addressed the problem of evil at all - why it exists, why an all good all powerful God needs it in his creation, what its existence means regarding God’s character, and whether it destroys our ability to differentiate between good and evil altogether.

If God can irresistibly enlighten people to choose good, why does he not always?

I’m waiting for an answer to this. In particular, one that does not somehow make God metaphysically dependent on evil in some way.

Regarding a concern of yours above Paidion, as to why God does not ever (or only very rarely) interfere with freedom. Wouldn’t he have to at some point let the consequences of free will actually occur? Otherwise, if he kept correcting every evil choice - if he kept turning every weapon into a blade of grass, as Lewis said, the moment one went to use it evilly - wouldnt this really just result in a world of no free will?

Now, after much deliberating and thinking hard (again) about the deterministic view, I believe more than ever in an Arminian, synergistic model of sanctification. That’s not to say that there are not times in which we are irresistibly drawn to do good acts (such as the mother who cannot but love her child), but I think it is undeniable that these sort of acts are altogether different in kind from the grand type of acts of self sacrificial love or repentance.

As far as Dr. Talbott’s concern that there must be SOME degree of rationality for free will to exist (citing his delusional example) I whole heatedly agree. I want to be very clear that libertarian freedom does NOT deny an element of rationality present in the moment of moral decision. It is just that the amount of information in the intellect is not such that it determines the will. That means that even the consequences of our moral acts cannot be seen in such a way that they make sin impossible, for that would rob the act of a certain amount of worth if it served “necessity” as Milton says, and not Goodness as such. In other words, there must be enough room to do either good or bad. That’s what makes free will so important, it imparts true agent causation and identity to the creature, without which we merely become an instrumental extension (without any ability AT ALL) of the divine will. But if that’s the case, how do we make sense of our feeling of causation? If we cannot really do anything when it boils down to it, if we really have no power to do otherwise, how are the commands and requests of God intelligible? How do we make sense of warnings, exhortations, advice? How do we make sense of Paul saying “receive not the grace of God in vain”?

Sure, Paul had no choice to believe in Christ on the road to Damascus when he had his vision, but he still evidentially believed he could be lost - “lest I become a cast-away”! The moments where our wills are overwhelmed with grace or are intellects are so clear as to be unable to sin involve us committing acts of a different kind, I believe, than the free will acts required of us to ultimately please God and sanctify out souls and bring us into perfection.

Another thing: it may indeed be that God (nor Jesus) really possess the ability to do otherwise and yet their actions are good, but may this not be due to the sheer fact that their very being is Goodness itself and that they cannot be other than they are? Our beings are not of themselves good. We are contingent. Perhaps the parody here breaks down altogether?

One last thing: how does determinism account for the notions of sin and guilt?

#54

I agree Chris - it’s why I’m fairly adamant about free will being a relative thing; which implies also that determinism is a relative thing. It is the demand that one pole or another be THE answer that leads, IMO, to all the difficulties.

#55

I don’t have to much to add to this discussion, while I do find such discussion interesting I personal always feel God’s sovereignty works beyond our ability to fully comprehend, as does our free will in relation to it. I have some views which shift a little sometimes but I hold them lightly.

But it has made me think of some questions, to be able to think about how our free will and action operates now, and how it will operate then, within creation in it’s human sphere in relation to God’s sovereignty and will, perhaps the first question that should be asked is not what is a free will but what is God’s sovereignty? Often something is affirmed, but then it isn’t really defined, all power and authority are God’s, and they are invested in Jesus, but how is that authority work, what is it’s nature and character and how does the Lord exercise that authority?

It is similar to affirming the Scripture has authority, what is it’s authority, what is founded on and how does it operate? (this is more rhetorical for comparison as that is a topic for another thread). Sometimes we affirm something, but don’t really explore it, but it seems to me that you can’t really talk to much about free will until we understand not just that God is sovereign, but we need to consider how that authority works and is exercised (as much as is possible in any case, as I said I don’t think we can fully understand it, but we might gain some principles at least). Once that can be understood then perhaps concepts of human free will and action might come into clearer relief.

#56

Greetings to all. Before plunging back into our discussion of free will, I want first to assure everyone here that you are quite welcome to call me by my Christian name, which is Tom. In the past I have been known to walk into a classroom on the first day of class, write my name on the board, and then jokingly point out that I don’t set bones and don’t write prescriptions. So I am certainly not a doctor in that sense, and, beyond that, I prefer to think that we are all colleagues here, exploring important theological issues together.

So let us now try to pick things up where we left them off. Before leaving the discussion a few days ago, I asked this question: “Is there a single and unified conception of freedom according to which (a) we freely sin or freely do something morally wrong only when it is psychologically possible to act otherwise and (b) we are nonetheless freest in our relation to God precisely when it is no longer psychologically possible to sin or to do something morally wrong?” I asked this question because of my conviction that we need to distinguish carefully between a correct and an incorrect claim that the so-called libertarians have made. The correct claim is this: Neither free will nor moral responsibility nor even rational thought itself could exist in a fully deterministic universe in which every event has a sufficient cause. But the incorrect claim is this: We act freely in a given context only when we have the power of contrary choice in that context. I reject this second claim because, as I now see it, some of our freest acts are such that our own desires, attitudes, beliefs, and judgments fully determine them in such a way that, like the loving mother who finds it unthinkable to abandon her beloved baby or the honest banker who likewise finds it unthinkable to accept a bribe, it is no longer psychologically possible to do otherwise.

So just what is this supposedly single and unified conception of freedom? Before proposing my own answer in a subsequent post, I want first to return, briefly, to the admittedly faulty proposal that we entertained previously. “Suppose we identify freedom,” I wrote, “not with the power of contrary choice, but simply with the power to act rightly or, if we think in terms of a theological context, the power to act obediently.” In a book entitled Freedom Within Reason (1990), Susan Wolf defended just such a view, arguing that moral responsibility as well as the freedom that moral responsibility presupposes “depends upon the ability to act in accordance with the True and the Good”; it requires, in other words, that one have the power to do the right thing for the right reasons. But it does not require the psychological possibility that one might in fact act wrongly or fail to do the right thing for the right reasons. I regard this view as a step in the right direction because it implies, correctly in my opinion, an important asymmetry between our freedom with respect to a morally wrong action, which indeed requires the power of contrary choice, and our freedom with respect to a morally right action, which not only does not always require such a power, but is even inconsistent with it in some cases. Such an asymmetry accords perfectly, I believe, with our ordinary ways of thinking about freedom.

That asymmetry also enables a proponent of Wolf’s view to address Paidion’s worry about moral responsibility in the case of those who commit heinous crimes. Paidion wrote:

Your presumed negative answer to your own question, Paidion, seems to me exactly right. If severe brain damage, insanity, or some powerful delusion for which one is not responsible should render it psychologically impossible for someone to refrain from committing murder on some occasion, then that person no more suffers from moral guilt on account of the murder than a bear is morally guilty for having mauled a child. Neither is moral freedom genuinely possible under such conditions. For if moral freedom just is the power to do the right thing for the right reasons, then one commits a murder freely only if one also has the power to do the right thing and thus to refrain from committing the murder—only if, in other words, one has the power of contrary choice. I think you, I, and Wolf are all in perfect accord on this matter. Do you agree?

More controversial, no doubt, is the idea that our freedom with respect to a morally right action need not always require the power of contrary choice. But here I would ask: In what way, if any, would the psychological possibility of acting in utterly irrational ways supposedly enhance the freedom of a rational agent? Might it not instead undermine such freedom altogether? However one might answer such questions, I’m wondering what reactions others here might have, either pro or con, to the following asymmetry: We sin or do something wrong freely only when it is psychologically possible to choose otherwise; but we sometimes do the right thing freely even when it is not psychologically possible to choose otherwise.

Once again, my thanks in advance for your responses.

-Tom

#57

I agree, Tom, but I’m afraid I don’t have a lot to add here. It’s more of an intuitive agreement and I’m not even coming up with any new metaphors or parables. :laughing: I just “know” you’re right about this. I’ll be interested to see how you and others explain it further.

#58

Thanks for the post Tom. I’ll jump right in.

It seems to me these two ideas presented cannot be simultaneously held. For if an agent really does have the “power” of acting in accordance with the true and the good, it follows that he either may or may not act in that accordance. But to not in accordance with the good would be wrong. Therefore, if one truly has the power to do good, he therefore simultaneously must necessarily have the power not to. To be able to do good therefore implies the ability to do bad.

Perhaps I am not clearly understanding you regarding “psychological possibility”, but, from a simply logical standpoint, to be able (as opposed to being determined) to do a, simultaneously implies the ability to do not-a. Let us say a is “a good act”. Is there some difference from “not doing a good act” and doing a wrong act? Is it not wrong to refrain from doing good, if one is able?

Since I hold that libertarian freedom necessarily implies the ability to do otherwise, I answer this quandary by distinguishing between “good acts”. Although the acts of the loving mother (or the perfected saints in heaven) are certainly “good”, they are I think different from those types of acts which “are difficult, yet still right” to do. In other words, some good acts have no contrary motive, if you will, that must be overcome in order to exercise them. The loving mother would never murder her child because, as you said, she would never dream of such a thing. But in a way, that’s just my point. In the long discipline and love of that child, who cannot imagine that even in the best and truest heart there will be a point at which that love which so often “ran on its own steam” dies off and the mother will be faced with the bare choice of satisfying herself or meeting the needs of the child? The child cries and screams for more chocolate, for instance. The mother, fatigued and at her wits end, knows its bad for him but concedes because she wants some peace.

Do you see the distinction I’m drawing? The type of act, I believe, necessary for sin to occur is one in which there is a context of “self vs. other”. If this context is not there, I do not believe sin can occur. However, I do believe good acts - like the mother who is infatuated with love of child so much her thinking of self is obliterated - do not *necessarily *have to take place in this context. When I think about it there are many good acts which the freedom to do otherwise is not present at all: my favorite ice cream, love of art and beauty, “falling in love”, laughing, etc.

What is required then is a different sort of explanation of self sacrificial acts. These acts - while I don’t want to say they are “better” or “worse” than other good acts - are I think certain acts God deems extremely valuable. Indeed it is the whole reason, as far as I can see, that freedom was granted to the creation. God wanted us to relate in a “self vs. him” context such that (some of) our responses to him and others were us actually choosing him ourselves, from our very being and will, rather than being determined by intellect, disposition, heredity, etc.

So, without sounding absurd, I want to suggest that certain acts - such as the loving mother - certain acts in which the will is totally overcome by intellectual illumination or conviction, are not really moral, self-sacrificial acts. This does not mean they are bad! Far from it. But it does mean they are different. An act in which our notion of self is forgotten (and how blessed these moments are!), is an act of a different kind from one in which our self is asserted in our consciousness and becomes an actual live option of choice.

Without derailing the matter too far - I believe it is only this sort of act that could be possible to an innocent, unfallen, sinless being. Neither the realization and identification of the self, nor the desire for it, are sinful. It is the choosing of it over and against God, or “the other” that is, because it is less than perfect love (which is complete abandonment of self in favor of the other - i.e. the cross.)

In short I would say - there are different kinds of good acts. There is laughter and courage and sex and so many more. Some imply the ability to do otherwise, some do not.

#59

Tom, first I want to say that I addressed you, as well as referred to you, as “Dr. Talbott” out of respect. For I do respect you. Your book The Inescapable Love of God has become a classic in arguing the case for the ultimate universal reconcilation of all people to God. The only problem I had with your thought in the book was what appeared to be determinism, or soft determinism, or semi-determinism. I also appreciate the fact that you do not glory in the your title “Dr. Talbott”, or consider yourself superior to others because of your achievements and qualifications, and wish to discuss free will with others on a common level, with the desire to understand more deeply.

I think that WE OURSELVES are the ultimate cause of every one of our acts. I know that persons being a cause is considered to be an “odd” view of causation in modern philosophy. It may be that “our own desires, attitudes, beliefs, and judgments fully determine” any of our acts since they are aspects of us as PERSONS. But I am not certain that this is the case because a PERSON is more than his “own desires, attitudes, beliefs, and judgments,” is he not? And that “more” could have resulted in an act contrary to that which the person actually carried out.

I don’t think your example of the fact that a loving mother would not kill her child is an argument which defeats the concept of one’s ability to have made a contrary choice to that which he actually made. One must examine the individual act when considering the power of contrary choice. Say the loving mother feeds her child at 12 noon. Does she have the psychological ability to refrain from feeding her child at 12 noon? Consider any act at all. Could the person who held up a store demanding money, have refrained from doing that? Could a person who, in a rage, killed another have refrained from doing that? Could the self-sacrificing person who risked his life to save that of another, have done otherwise?

While I fully accept that a person’s character develops in such a way that he normally would not act contrary to his own desires, attitudes, beliefs, and judgments, there can be circumstances or other influences upon him, and he may choose to do otherwise. For example, a person who normally would never kill another person, might do so in self-defence. On the other hand, a thief holds a gun to a person’s head and demands his money. Pretty strong influence! I think the victim still has the ability to choose not to give the thief his money, though the consequences of his refusal may result in his death.

It is my practice to eat lighter three times a week. Today was one of those days. This morning I had fruit drink which consisted of a blended mixture of blueberries, strawberries, bananas, grape jelly, flax seed, soy powder, and several other ingredients. I planned to have only that for breakfast. But afterward, I felt like eating some protein, and so I had a few almonds and cashews. Could I have refrained from having the almonds and cashews? I think I could have. Am I self-deceived? Was it inevitable that I ate those almonds and cashews?

I cannot but think that if I do not have the free will carry out moral imperatives, then I cannot be blamed for not carrying them out. I see no basis for rewards and punishments if people could not have done other than what they actually did.

#60

Chrisguy,

I wonder if a great deal of what makes it possible to refrain from good acts has to do with fear. Your mention of “perfect love” brought this to mind. God says to me, “Give a certain sum of money to this or that needy person (etc.),” but I hesitate or refrain because I fear that I will not have enough left over to meet my own needs. Perfect love, though, casts out all fear. Two things need to occur for us to be perfected in love, and I suppose this is the order though I’m not certain: First we need to see and know and believe in God’s perfect love – that we can trust Him to save us from any true loss and any true harm. Second, we must be conformed to His image so that we will be willing, for the sake of love, to risk that loss and harm for the joy that is set before us – to do good to the one we love.

Until we’re free from fear in the security of His love for us and our love for others, we aren’t really free to perform the acts of love we may desire to do. We may perform them anyway, in the face of restraining fear, but it is a battle. Maybe we NEED to perform them in order to become free from fear. But at some point I think we WILL perform them joyfully and without fear and that at this point we will no longer even consider NOT performing them – just as the loving mother will not willingly fail to care for her infant. (I’m thinking both of positive and negative beneficial actions here – providing needs and withholding harmful wants, as you mention). I think this has to be a growing thing.

Maybe we’ll never cease being challenged to greater and greater acts of courage for the sake of love, but I do think we’ll grow to a place of great freedom too, in which the things that tempt us now cannot begin to catch on us in our future state. In fact, these things must (I think) become psychologically less and less possible to us as we grow in the freedom to do what is right. Could it be that the genuine freedom to do what’s right even DEPENDS on the shrinking psychological ability to do what’s wrong? As we grow in our knowledge of Him, our psychological ability to do harm (actively or passively) diminishes because of our trust in His perfect love and because of the perfect love that is flourishing and growing in us. Technically yes, one could return to one’s own vomit as a dog (ceremonially unclean) will do, but psychologically one cannot because one is no longer a cowardly and unclean creature capable of such an action.