All men are green
Socrates is a man
Therefore Socrates is green
That’s a valid argument, logically, even though the first premise is not true.
My sillygism - less the word ‘free’ - is also valid, but suffers under the weight of the multivocal meanings of the words used in the premises.
Tom,
Might-counterfactuals are states of affairs that God knows only as possible, not certain. A “counterfactual” is a term describing a dependent state of affairs that follow an “if this, then this” relationship. An example would be, if I pull the trigger, the gun will fire.
The point made by Boyd, and not totally understood I don’t believe by the position described by Hasker as I understand it, is that although God establishes all the “parameters” of would counterfactuals - he ultimately defines what the “then this” part of the equation will be - he does NOT determine or know what the might counterfactuals will actually be until they are determined by free agents. He knows them only as possibilities. (So I don’t think it possible for God to know ahead of time or logically “before” what Tom Talbott freely does or will do before he freely does it.)
A might counterfactual is simply a state of affairs which possesses true possibility to come about more than one determinate way. Thus the portion of the “if this, then this” equation that is a might counterfactual is the first part that contains the if. So in the example above, the might counterfactual is the freely made choice to pull the trigger and the would counterfactual (what WOULD happen in other words) is the fact the bullet shoots from the gun.
My point then was that God could have established all would counterfactuals (i.e. the “then this” part) such that eternal separation is never itself a consequence of a might counterfactual (true libertarian choice.)
What it means then for one state of affairs “giving rise” to another is simply the same thing as saying that our free choices have determinate consequences. Indeed, it seems to me that unless certain things ARE determined about reality, choice would not be possible. Some kind of determinism is therefore a necessary condition of freedom. So, I am suggesting that all of parameters or consequences which flow forth from free choices (aka, again, might counterfactuals) never actually extend to eternal separation. An all loving God would not do that. But a POSSIBLE would counterfactual from a m-c is an outer darkness experience such that we “irresistibly see” the horror of our sins and therefore compatibilistically repent of them and cling to God (though I don’t think this would complete our perfection, which I think must be worked out through our libertarian freedom positively choosing good.)
Double post - thanks cell phone!
Chris, would you put that in words that we can all benefit from? I think the terminology makes the concept seem more difficult than it really is. I’ve found that to be true of most philosophical arguments. Lord knows I’ve been guilty of it. 
Thank you. It would be a shame for many readers to miss out on what you are trying to say.
The best way I can put what I mean is through examples and definitions. Let me try again.
Our free choices shape events in a deterministic way. If I pull the trigger of a loaded gun and point it at someone’s head, I will (most likely) kill that person. That free decision a) brings about determined state of affairs b). All I mean by “might-counterfactuals” are all those possible states of affairs that involve a free choice - that are really up to me to either bring about or refrain from bringing about. All the consequences of those free choices would be called “would-counterfactuals.” That is, if I freely shoot someone in the head, they would die. These “woulds”, in a very broad sense, are the parameters or “arena” in which our choices take place. God determines them. He does not, however, determine the “mights” because they become true based on what we actually freely do. He knows we may do x or y; and as such both scenarios are potentially true in God’s mind. But neither actually are real until a choice is made.
My point is that God, from all eternity, knew all imaginable “mights”. He knew every possible thing that could happen granting he decided to create under particular circumstances. He knew by creating Angel a in environment b under command c, choice d or e may occur. Granting choice d occurs, God decides to determinately set the world up in such a way that consequence a1 follows. And hence, in that respect, a2 – which is also a possible consequence – does not. Thus, little by little, the entire universe is constantly shedding certain possibilities and making real and actual other ones based on the free choices of rational creatures.
A loving God, however, would never set up the parameters such that a free choice would result in eternal, irreparable harm to any of his creation. So, no matter how bad things can get – and God would of “agreed” to establish the boundaries of every imaginable bad thing – things are never *irreparably *bad. So this really goes back to Tom’s point in the first post: our freedom does not extend to such consequences as eternal Hell.
I really think a huge point is being missed in this thread and this is my attempt to bring it to light. Those who hold to libertarian freedom are not committed to thinking *everything a person *does is made in a libertarianly free context. If I pulled the trigger of a gun pointed at myself and paralyzed myself, I would not longer be “free” to function as I previously did. Similarly, the alcoholic who freely drinks to the point of drunkenness has significantly limited his own freedom to act. I call such states where we act but do not consciously and freely choose to do so “compatibilistic freedom”. The distinction here is that, although the agent while acting “acts in accord with his will or desires” while he acts, he nevertheless does not freely act, since those very desires are determined by other factors. But the point I’m really trying to make is that compatibilistic freedom is itself the result of libertarian free choices very often.
So imagine that you told your son he needed to clean his room before you got back from work. After working all day, on the drive home, you think to yourself, “if Johnny HAS cleaned his room, I’ll order us pizza tonight. If he hasn’t, he’ll go to bed without supper.” What I’m saying is whether or not Johnny cleans his room is a “might-counterfactual” that God doesn’t know the reality of until the choice is made. Either pizza or no supper are the potential “would-counterfactuals” that are now connected to – because of my will and choice – Johnny’s choice. Imagine now that actual personalities or states of mind are certain would-counterfactuals brought about by various free choices. The man who continues to lust after women may eventually find himself “out of control”, for instance. Or again, the alcoholic, etc. So imagine God saying, “If Dave continues to do good in the face of this temptation, I will make him such that he is no longer tempted and that his character grows thereby, seeing deeper truths than before and understanding who I am even better. Likewise, if he gives in…etc.”
I do not think we can control our feelings or desires, but we can either approve or disapprove them - we can fight them or we can side with them. The more we do either one, the more we are building a compatibilistic personality. And I also think our free choices impact the compatible character of others. If I mentally abuse my son, no doubt he will have feelings that he does not consciously choose which are bad for him (he may become an embittered, unconfident person.) That does not mean he cannot freely fight these desires - I believe he can. I’m just showing the difference between a conscious and free choice (i.e. something that is volitional and that we do) and things which happen to us. This difference I think is extremely important in any discussion of human freedom.
If I haven’t made myself clear, could you be more specific about what is confusing you?
Thanks Chris; I know it’s a pain having to re-word and restate things, in fact, it’s often harder than the work on the original - and I appreciate the effort. 
You are providing a much-needed ‘grammar’ for Open Theism, it seems to me; you have gone a good distance in providing reasons for considering it, and not dismissing it out-of-hand. OT is one model, among others, that seems to ‘save the appearances’.
One thing - the original free act in your example - pulling the trigger - a “might-counterfactual” : takes place in (in my imagination) a swirling, inconstant, moment-by-moment vortex of ‘would-counterfactuals’ - in other words, choices, whether free or not, do not take place in a vacuum. People are also ‘would-counterfactuals’, aren’t they?
Absolutely! In fact, my belief in the fall necessitates believing that much of our “inbred” nature is a would-counterfactual determined, ultimately, by Adam and Eve’s sin.
But I do believe we were made in order to become like God and Jesus. This requires us to become beings of agape love, which, as you know, is not the same thing as experiencing the “feelings” of love (like the mother who would never dream of harming her child), but rather a self-sacrificial, self-abdication for the good of the other, sort of love. And I believe a necessary prerequisite for this is libertarian freedom, otherwise the whole idea of self abdication loses meaning.
Sorry – I guess my mind just isn’t cut out for this kind of thing. 
I’m not following at all. Probability waves come to mind, but I have to admit I’m lost with all the counterfactuals (whatever those are). Got metaphors? 
Tom, I also want to clarify that I’m working on a model that I suppose is Arminian universalism.
Hi all,
This has nothing to do with Chris’s points (which are very interesting and worthwhile) but I wanted to get back to something Tom said:
This is very intriguing to me, Tom. I suspect I am not entirely understanding this, so I am looking forward to your thoughts on “freedom that pertains to rational agents.” As someone who tries to integrate what we seem to know from science with theology and philosophy and wants to minimize supernatural explanations (though I am by no means a materialist), I’m wondering about how you would perceive genetically determined traits in the following scenario. Say it is shown scientifically that most or all of our “desires, attitudes, beliefs and judgments” are caused by our genetic makeup—that who we are is determined purely by our genetic makeup.
(This is obviously purely hypothetical knowing the influence of environment on who we are.) We do know, however, that which genes we inherit, is** not** determined beyond a certain range. Which chromosome we get from which parent, the way chromosomes recombine and the mutations that occur to occasionally change those genes appear to be fairly random. Is this “randomness” sufficient to say that even** if** “who we are” is purely due to genetics, that it is** not** “the product of sufficient causes that lie in the distant past?”
Hi Tom:
Sorry I’ve not been able to attend here as closely as I’d like… however this point seems to me both important – and elusive. I’d hate to miss the larger picture just because I fail to grasp just what you are saying here… I do appreciate your patience… this point seems crucial/pivotal so I don’t’ want to just gloss over it….
You said…
… but I’m failing to understand just how “ambiguity and ignorance and indeterminism” are necessary ingredients for contrary choice to be possible. ie how is it that now that we have ambiguity and ignorance we therefore have the power of contrary choice??
Yes, it seems obvious that they are obstacles to freedom; if I don’t really know and understand what the “options” are, how can I conceivably be said to “freely choose” between them?
Which reminds me again (as I think you are trying to get us to see/acknowledge here?) that the “contrary choice” means merely the ability to choose this, or that. ie to choose other than what I chose. But it seems to me that we always use this idea to explain the contrary choice as the “bad” choice, or the “evil” choice, or the “wrong” choice. Except if I’m bound in evil, from that perspective the “contrary choice” would be to choose what is GOOD! or RIGHT! or CORRECT!! And we’ve asserted that this is precisely the thing which we do NOT have the “power” to choose! (again, because of our immersion in ambiguity and ignorance…)
I sense that perhaps I’m close to grasping what you intend to say here… but not sure I’m quite getting it. It seems to me that what you really mean here is that it is the overriding of these metaphysical conditions that makes the power of contrary choice possible – not the conditions themselves…
Help me see what I’m not getting here…
(have not read through the entire segment yet – ie the very summary I requested!!)
Bobx3
Eager to hear from Tom on this, Steve – but I will say that in my own observation, the influence of nature over nurture never fails to astound (and sometimes to dismay) me. It’s just anecdotal of course, but I believe nature is far more powerful than nurture.
Just forget the word counterfactual altogether. It’s confusing and not a very well chosen word to express the meaning behind it. (I probably wouldn’t understand it either if it weren’t for having read Greg Boyd’s discussion for the past few months!)
Do you have children? If so, do you sort of mentally establish consequences for them if they break your rules? In other words, if one of them doesn’t do her chores, do you say to yourself “if she doesn’t do her chores I’m cutting out TV time. If she does, though, we can rent a movie.”
Those consequences you establish are what I think God did before he created the universe. He knew all of the possibilities that could occur. That is, he knew it was possible for your daughter to do her chores or not - or for Satan to fall, tempt Adam and Eve, them to fall, etc. - but he didn’t know what each free person would actually do because they themselves were not there yet.
Now, some of the very consequences - you can call them punishments - of certain actions are I believe certain states of mind. This is the historic Arminian understanding of God “hardening” people. God does indeed harden them, but not for no reason, but rather because their very actions have led to such a consequence. Say you had a son addicted to cocaine. You’d tried time and again to nurture him, protect him, even feed his addiction - to no avail. Would it not be a good idea to perhaps “give him up” to the consequences of his own choices? That is what I mean.
So I think from all eternity, God has known the trillions upon trillions of possible ways his creation could go, all of which are constantly being actualized every moment since he created. Being perfect, he knew, as well, how he would respond. Thus he knew the “consequences” that all free acts would have on his creation. I just see no reason to conclude that he would ever set up a consequence that was irrevocably bad for any of his creation. The perhaps “worst” consequence - or, again, punishment - is I believe the outer darkness. But it is not eternal.
How this ties in to universalism and the problem of evil is a bit beyond the immediate context of this post but I think unavoidable and necessary to address. I do not agree with several universalists (I’m not sure if Tom is among them) who believe that God can himself cause us to be fit for heaven or eternal life. I do think he causes through his consequences - like experiencing the outer darkness - feelings of horror and remorse and a drawing towards him which is compulsive and irresistible, but I do not think we can “end”, so to speak, on such a compulsion before we are perfected. I think such punishments are intended to “set us up” for the next stage in our spiritual perfection, which must necessarily involve an act of absolute free will. Otherwise, the “selves” we are are not really doing much use towards good and being like Jesus (by choosing the other at the expense of self). The highest act we were made for, I believe, which is brought to fullness bit by bit all throughout our lives, is this very act of choosing the other - be it God or neighbor - over and against the self. And I do not believe this sort of act can be caused by God’s irresistible motion within us.
Is that more clear, or have I muddied it even worse?
The sticking point for me, as regarding LFW, is that, in matters moral, ‘influences’ and ‘causes’ are not given their appropriate weight - in order to safeguard what is, to me at least, the dogmatic assertion that LFW is true.
It is true, I believe, that people are damaged by their sin or the sins of others, and - well, he**, I’ve said this about 17 times on this thread - there is obviously a spectrum of freedom and determinism in human beings. Is it not so?
The only way to deny that, imho, is to construe every human situation in terms of one end of the spectrum or the other. But using our powers of observation, and putting aside our speculation, we can just SEE the relative amounts of ‘free’ and ‘determined’ elements in ourselves and others.
That is as succinct and pithy as I can put it. I don’t believe it needs pages of argumentation. I think it truly is one of those topics that proves out Wittgenstein’s dictum - “Don’t think, LOOK”.
And - might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb 
- personality and temperament probably has more to do with where we stand on this issue than our fine-spun speculation. Mine included.
Thanks, Chris
I think I more or less understand now. So . . . this is approximately what you’ve been saying all along (if I remember right)? That God knows every eventuality that could result from every possible configuration of reality and all the contingent decisions that could ever be made . . . Well, He is infinite after all, and if that’s the way things are, I’m sure He’s up to it. And then to further complicate pretty much everything, maybe there isn’t just one choice being made for every situation (if you give any credence to the wilder fancies amongst the quantum physicists – but perhaps we’d better not go THERE!!!) 
I’m not sure how I feel about God’s foreknowledge concerning what we do/will do/etc. My thoughts aren’t settled on that. Steve pointed out the block universe theory? hypothesis? a couple of weeks ago and I’ve been reading about that. Not sure whether I think it’s right or not, but I do suspect that if it is, the future exists as probability rather than being actualized (I hope that’s a good word for it . . . ) in the material world.
So maybe my guess at “probability waves” wasn’t so very far off after all. But seriously – I think Father most likely doesn’t micro-manage these things; that while perhaps He COULD know, maybe He chooses not to look at our future decisions in order to keep them as free as they can be. I think He’s that good – that He knows He’ll successfully purify all of His children, no matter how big a mess we make of our lives and others’ lives, and that from the ashes of our purification, He’ll call forth beauty. The worse the mess, the more creativity it needs to fix it, the greater glory it will reveal in Him. Still I do try not to muddle things up any worse than I can help. 
Sometimes that’s a tough one though.
Steve, thanks to you, Dave, Bob & others for posing my own questions! Perhaps your hypothetical of genetic determinism could be extended to positing that our “judgments” etc are shaped or caused by some combination of “genetic makeup” and environmental influences. Both these profound and often damaging factors seem random rather than ‘determined’ by someone in the past. Yet, their apparent explanatory power leads many modern folk to see LFW as a leap of faith that doesn’t match what seems to actually produce the resulting attitudes, beliefs & judgments.
Hi All
Bob said:
Do we, though, have to be totally immersed in ambiguity and ignorance to lack the power of choosing a right moral choice?
Assent to the Existence of a contrary choice and the ‘best’ choice (the right moral choice) arrived at by reason, by understanding, by the ability to weigh-up and have a fairly clear picture of the ramifications of each choice, is surely possible, even given being bound in evil (otherwise can we rely on our reason at all)
Isn’t the problem that, yes evil/ sin/ ignorance can confuse, confound us but does not necessarily always totally cloud the beautific vision but due to a ‘wild card’, a self-destructive bent we find ourselves unable to act on what we know to be the write choice?
We must be plucked from the mire, by Another.
Paidion made comment:
It seems to me that if P can refrain from S for some particular period of time, then it is possible for him to refrain from S indefinitely.
This is something Paidion has alluded to before ,I think, and seems perfectly reasonable.
…But I’m not certain of the validity of this reasoning.
There are sins done in ignorance, no guilt attached, due to ignorance but nevertheless full of damaging ramifications, to ourselves and/ or others.
There are those sins that through past poor choices have become instinctive or virtually a reflex behaviour. One might attribute blame from past behaviours but the perpetrator is out of control at the time of the act in question.
Given the example quoted above of P being able to refrain from an addiction to sin S, I would suggest that if P is addicted to said sin S that it’s entirely possible that in many cases the longer he refrain the more he becomes obsessed and dominated by the thought/ desire to the point that he becomes physically or mentally incapable of acting in any reasonable manner
and desist from said sin ie. he becomes compelled - possessed.
It’s really down to will-power and the strength of the addiction (is all sin addictive?)
If sin is a condition of the Heart as Jesus suggests then all the above are ways of describing the symptoms of an underlying disease. The Cure lies outside ourselves and we are like patients discussing their itches and rashes whilst in the Dr’s waiting room.
What I’ve said above of course about inherent weakness, sinful tendency (fallen state) is of course somewhat divergent to where our discussions have been going unless I’m mistaken…
As always I put my thoughts forward with the knowledge that I may be wrong, indeed very likely to be and look forward to more light to emerge from this thread!
Thanks everyone.
S
You may be right about that, Jim. Quite frankly, I have never looked into Irenaeus’ view concerning the nature of angels, either fallen or unfallen. But many do cite the case of angels against my own understanding of creation. Did not God create them instantaneously, I am sometimes asked, as self-aware, language using, fully rational, and morally mature individuals who are from the beginning perfectly fit for intimacy with God? To which I typically reply: Why on earth should anyone believe that? For despite the vast popular mythology surrounding angels, the Bible itself provides no real information on their origin or on how they came into being. I see no biblical requirement, therefore, for the idea that the angels were created instantaneously as fully rational and morally mature agents. For all we are told in the primary sources of the Christian faith, they may have experienced eons of evolution and moral development before they appear on the human scene. And perhaps we too will function as angels (or messengers from God) in some drama in the distant future.
When I wrote this late last night, I also asked, “By the way, Jim, what is your current project? Can you give us a hint?” Then I saw your later post clarifying that. I like it.
-Tom
Amen to that, Dave. Technical terminology can indeed be useful when used carefully and accurately, particularly in the hardest of the hard sciences, such as physics and chemistry. But a careless use of jargon is also the curse of academia, as is pompous writing in general. And philosophers are by no means immune to such temptations, although those in the social sciences tend to be, perhaps, the worst offenders of all. (Okay, that’s a personal bias.) Here is a wonderful quote from the 19th Century British poet Mathew Arnold: “People think that I can teach them style. What stuff it all is. Have something to say and say it as clearly as you can. That is the only secret of style.”
Actually, Cindy, no one as intelligent and articulate as you are will have any trouble understanding the idea of a counterfactual. Just take it step by step. Think of the word “counterfactual” as shorthand for a counterfactual conditional proposition. Now take that apart. A conditional proposition is a proposition of the form: If p then q, where p is known as the antecedent and q as the consequent. Then consider next a conditional proposition in the subjunctive mood with a false antecedent–for example:
§ If it had rained yesterday in Salem, Oregon, Tom Talbott would not have spent most of the day cutting back a tall hedge behind his house.
This subjunctive conditional is counterfactual because its antecedent is false or counter to the facts. It did not in fact rain yesterday in Salem, but was instead a gloriously sunny day. And, of course, in this part of the country, unlike southern California, one is morally obligated to take advantage of such a day and to spend it outdoors. After all, the rain is forecasted to return next week!
-Tom
Tom, I possess and have read a fascinating book called Divine Foreknowledge four views.
Greg Boyd argues the Open-Theism View. Dave Hunt argues the Simple-Foreknowledge View, William Craig argues the Middle-Knowledge View, and Paul Helm argues the Augustinian-Calvinist view. Immediately after the presentation of each view, the other three give responses.
Though I had little difficulty in understanding Boyd, Hunt, and Helm, I was unable to understand Craig’s argument for middle-knowldege. His argument seems to be founded on God’s knowledge of counter-factuals, and he spoke of “true counter-factuals”, a concept which has no meaning for me. Perhaps you can explain that term. The bottom line of Craig’s argument seems to be that God’s knowledge of counter-factuals, implies that He also knows in advance what free-will agents will choose in a way that does not contradict free will. This makes no sense to me.
I would be grateful if you could state Molonism’s argument in a clear and succinct way, which could be understood by persons of average intelligence.
I minored in philosophy at university, and returned for an additional year in which I successfully completed philosophy courses at a post-graduate level, but I just can’t get my mind around Molonism.
Being 76 years of age with a deteriorating brain, perhaps I will still be unable to understand even if you do state the Molinist argument clearly.