I apologize for throwing a lot of new terms at you. I’ll try to slow down! There’s a longstanding debate among philosophers and theologians over libertarian vs compatibilist understandings of freedom. Libertarian freedom is also known as self-determining freedom, or as contra-causal freedom, or as power to the contrary. The idea is that for any given choice you consider, you’re free in the libertarian sense if both choosing and not choosing are possible outcomes given the circumstances.
HSMom: However, I am unconvinced that this was indeed the case. My question to you would be, how could we ever be sure of what kind of freedom Adam and Eve enjoyed before the Fall?
Tom: Well, I think a good place to begin is with what sort of freedom one thinks is required of our “being held accountable for our choices.” We certainly know God holds Adam and Eve accountable. Does that make sense IF it’s also the case that God or other influences outside Adam and Eve determined Adam and Eve’s choices. In other words, were circumstances leading up to their choices such that other outcomes were impossible? Compatibilists tend to say that given all the factors and influences leading up to what actually happens, outcomes/choices other than those that actually happen are impossible. If you draw a timeline from the moment of creation till today that maps out all events and choices, compatibilists will say were the whole thing repeated and God brought about an identical first moment of creation, then it would all unfold EXACTLY as it has.
Libertarians would say things could have turned out differently. Instead of a single line that maps out all the possibilities from the first moment till now, we’d see a wide branching (like tree branches) of all the possibilities, ways things “could have” been but were not, etc. This notion of “could have been” (taken seriously) is required to make sense of the sort of “moral responsibility” or “accountability” that libertarians see in Scripture—Garden of Eden included.
HSMom: Scriptures such as Deuteronomy 32:39 through a real wrench into this kind of thinking, at least for me. But at this point, I can at least concede that libertarian freedom prior to the Fall was possible. Clear as mud probably, huh?
HSMom: It does certainly seem that God himself placed man in a very specific situation in which to force the choice one way or the other (Genesis 2:8-9).
Tom: Yes, certainly. We must determine ourselves with respect to some things. Not choosing isn’t an option. It’s WHICH choice we make that’s the issue.
HSMom: God also gave them a clear command and consequence of disobedience (2:16).
Tom: Right.
HSMom: And because God brought creatures to the man (to see what he would name them), He therefore had complete control of which creatures were in the garden (2:19).
Tom: “God brought the animals…to see what Adam would name them” is a very interesting statement, don’t you think? What do you think it implies about Adam’s freedom in naming the animals and God’s involvement in determining Adam’s naming of the animals?
HSMom: I suppose I would then deduce that God purposely placed the serpent in the garden…
Tom: Well, however Satan got there, you’re point is taken. God purposely placed humankind in circumstances he knew were already infected with an evil presence.
HSMom: …and I can’t imagine that God was unaware of the serpent’s craftiness, and its desire to deceive God’s people.
Tom: Certainly not.
HSMom: So even if Adam and Eve were perfectly free to choose obedience, their ultimate choice was certainly not uninfluenced. I suppose this fits in with my present understanding of libertarian freedom.
Tom: Right. Libertarian freedom isn’t freedom for all influences. No libertarian thinks that. All our choices are influenced by a great many things, some of the influences we’re aware of and some we’re unaware of. All libertarians say is that ‘given all the factors, all the influences that bear upon some choice, we’re free in the libertarian sense when/if both choosing X and not choosing X are possible (i.e., within our power to actualize or achieve) outcomes.
I’ve resisted trying to place myself explicitly in a specific category re: libertarian vs compatibilist but I think I’m far more libertarian in reality. It appeals to me in part because it also recognizes and accepts that there are a great many things that play very significant roles in forming and influencing how one choses. However I’m not sure how the libertarian answers the charge that one can simply not know the full and true degree to which he IS being influenced. Even his self perception that he is acting against all the influences that have formed his choice may in fact be part of his semi-delusional world. Which is to say “how on earth can one possibly know for sure that he really IS free?”
There really is a tension that must be faced when dealing with the question of freedom; the tension between moral responsibility and determinism…
It seems very clear that we really do have a moral responsibility in our choices. And this implies the need to face consequences, the reality of an ability to act counter to all those factors trying to “determine” our choice, and so on.
HOWEVER…
It also seems clear that in a real sense we really are sinners by nature. There seems a general insistence that no one escapes that reality; ie “all have sinned" and so on. I can no more walk away from my sinful nature any more than I can walk away from being dependent on Oxygen to survive. I see this as a huge deterministic influence.
So there is the tension between this obvious deterministic influence against the fact of my own moral responsibility. It’s almost as if one simply must have one foot in the libertarian camp and the other in some sort of compatibilistic camp. Reflecting of course ones need to resolve the tension between moral responsibility and the “determinism” of sin (which is what I hear in Romans 11:32 for example… “God has shut up all in disobedience so that He may show mercy to all…”)
Yeah, that’s all I meant; sorry for not being clearer, Tom!
Ok, so the following is some stuff I wrote in another thread back in December, but I think it’s pretty relevant to the present discussion (it’s slightly modified from the original):
When I went through my “free will theology” phase after rejecting Calvinism (and prior to embracing universalism), I always thought I was missing something whenever I would read an author give some sort of defense of libertarian freedom. For instance, in his book Most Moved Mover, the late Clark Pinnock wrote (p. 127),
But my question is, why does a person choose one reason over another when “making one of the reasons one’s own”? According to Pinnock, the answer to this question cannot be because of any given factor or influence. If there is any “because” in the answer, it can only be, “because one chooses it.”
According to the LFW position, two people could, hypothetically, share the same exact motives and have the same exact influences operating on them when faced with the same exact decision, and yet they could still use their “contra-causal freedom” to make two completely different decisions. Is there any reasonable explanation that could be given for why two different decisions could be reached in this hypothetical situation? I can’t think of one. To say that a person has the “power of contrary choice” means that, given the same exact influences operating on them, and the same exact motives being present, a person could have made a different choice than the one that was made. But what, other than a purely random event, could possibly account for a different outcome resulting?
Jerry Walls (who contributed to Universal Salvation? The Current Debate) writes in Why I Am Not A Calvinist (p. 103):
But why does a person weight one factor more or less than another factor when trying to reach a decision? When “sifting through the factors,” why would Walls decide that one factor means more to him than another if they have no “pre-assigned weight”? According to his view, Walls might answer, “Because I chose to weight this factor more than the others.” But in response one might ask, “But why did you choose to weight one factor more than the others?” And I believe the only answer Walls could give in response to this question exposes the incoherence of the LFW view: “I chose to because I chose to.” While all the various influences are “sufficient causes,” a choice is not made because of any one influence or combination of influences. They “enable” the agent to make a choice, but they do not cause the choice that is made. If the choice was genuinely “free” in the libertarian sense, then the agent could have made a different choice than the one that was made. And the only possible “explanation” that could be given for such a hypothetical change in outcomes is simply that the agent chose differently - which is no rational explanation at all.
In his book Making Sense of Your Freedom, James W. Felt writes (p. 81):
That Felt calls such an answer to the question of why decisions are made “perplexing” is a great understatement. It’s not only perplexing, it’s unintelligible and completely unreasonable. Imagine a teenager asking her mother, “Why did Dad leave you?” According to Felt, a “perfectly adequate” answer to this question would be, “Your dad. He alone is the explanation.” But what does this mean? According to the LFW view, it means “he chose to because he chose to, and there is no further explanation.”
Now, we all agree that, as a result of Paul’s encounter with the risen Christ on the road to Damascus, he became a changed man. Instead of continuing in hard-hearted rebellion against Christ, he became joyfully submitted to him. But according to the LFW view, if Paul’s decision to submit to Christ was “free,” then it would mean that he could have chosen otherwise (as quoted before, Pinnock states that “libertarian freedom recognizes the power of contrary choice. One acts freely in a situation if, and only if, one could have done otherwise.”). This means that, in an identical state of affairs and with all things being equal (i.e., with the same exact influences being present and operating on Paul), a different outcome could have resulted. So how would a proponent of LFW explain and account for such a change in outcomes? If nothing new enters into the equation immediately prior to Paul’s decision, how would this theoretical change in outcomes not be completely arbitrary and random?
Aaron, good questions. I have a few thoughts, and I’ll just share a couple of them for now, and hopefully I can come back to this later. I’m sure Tom (TGB) will have something to say as well.
It seems to me that if you deny LFW, then, if enough “whys” were applied to ANY event, you eventually arrive at a singular event or at most, God’s creative acts, but you can never have events that are not the direct product of this event and the subsequent causal web, stemming back to the beginning. Is that a fair assessment?
I think there are a number of difficulties with this view, most of which we have already discussed or are aware of, and these difficulties are greater than those of alternative views.
Those who affirm LFW are simply putting some of the loci of determination elsewhere, rather than one event or God’s creative acts alone being the only real reason that anything occurs. I’m not sure why this is so problematic? Couldn’t God have created us with the capacity to self-determine in this way? And, if He did, what kind of evidence would we need to believe it?
Human responsibility, points us to the fact that LFW is real. It’s deductive logic. If we agree with the premise, why can’t we deduce from it that we are the one’s who are determining the truth about what we do? If we are not the ones who are determining, what in the world are we being held accountable for???
Yes, I believe God is the ultimate “why” for each and every event. God, and God alone, is the ultimate cause of every effect. It is for this reason that I believe God can declare “the end from the beginning” (Isaiah 46:10). It is also for this reason that God can be said to work “all things according to the counsel of his will” (Eph 1:10). While it may appear so to us, I don’t believe anything truly happens by “chance” in this world (Prov 16:33; 2 Chron 18:33).
The only “difficulties” I’ve seen raised on this thread is that determinism “eliminates personal responsibility,” and that love requires that we be free in a libertarian sense. As far as personal responsibility goes, I believe philosopher David Hume rightly pointed out that what we want is for our character and motives to determine behavior, as opposed to anything random or arbitrary. Thus we should consider determinism to be a necessary condition of responsibility. It is not the “power of contrary choice” that makes us responsible beings; it is simply our capacity to make choices that are governed by motives and desires. It is the motive and desire behind the action which makes a person guilty or praiseworthy, and which makes them deserving of punishment or reward.
As far as love requiring LFW, I believe LFW would actually reduce our choice to love others to what is akin to a random coin toss. If love cannot exist without the power of contrary choice, then it would mean that, with the exact same influences and desires that were present when I decided I would propose to my wife, Chrissy, I could have decided that I wouldn’t propose to her at all. But what could possibly explain such a different outcome if everything just prior to my decision was the same? How and why would I have chosen otherwise, given the influences and desires that were present at the time? What would have brought about the different outcome that LFW requires could have been? If a “contrary choice” is the only thing that could be introduced into the equation to bring about a different outcome, how could such a choice be understood as anything but utterly random?
The concept of “contra-causal freedom” is incoherent and strips human choices of meaning by making them random, incomprehensible events. A choice that is “free” in the libertarian sense is a random break in an otherwise reasonable and comprehensible causal chain. So I can’t help but see LFW as being highly problematic and incoherent: youtube.com/watch?v=joanVUoXY0s
On the other hand, I don’t see how the idea that every event is ultimately caused by God and thus happens for an objective reason is problematic at all, especially for a universalist like myself who believes that God is good and that the motive behind everything he has caused to take place is entirely benevolent, and thus consistent with the best interests of all rational beings.
No, “human responsibility” points us to the fact that our moral actions are directly governed by motives and desires. Moreover, I don’t believe any person except God is fully and ultimately responsible for anything they do. Nor do I believe that God punishes and rewards us as if we are fully and ultimately responsible for what we do. Our responsibility is merely relative and not absolute, and we are treated by God accordingly.
By “the premise” do you mean your assertion that “human responsibility points us to the fact that LFW is real?” If that’s what you mean, then I deny the premise, as would (I’m assuming) all compatibilists and hard determinists.
Kiki, Aaron,
Thanks! Great interchange on this classic challenge of the nature of the human will. You both represent classic sides of this debate well. I´ve earlier confessed that I remain mystified by the conundrums of combining valid insights that appear to come from your two differing points of view. And even if I could do justice to it, I´m on the road in Argentina with little internet access
Aaron, though I ardently disagree with you on this, and will try to argue with force, I will remain respectful in tone, as you have been. So much is lost in mere text that what is intended to be a healthy discussion can devolve into misunderstanding or worse, disrespect. No matter how forceful I attempt to argue a point, it’s not, in any way, personal. That’s just an FYI/disclaimer! All your dialog on this forum (that I have read) is always very perceptive and respectful and I appreciate that about you… (from the distance of cyberspace!).
Ok, by “premise,” I mean, “humans are responsible.” Clearly you reject this premise…
Aaron: “…I don’t believe any person except God is fully and ultimately responsible for anything they do.”
Aaron: “I believe philosopher David Hume rightly pointed out that what we want is for our character and motives to determine behavior, as opposed to anything random or arbitrary.”
kkj: But, of course, in a deterministic world, even our character and motives are not something that we self-dispose into, but are rather (like everything else) only a product of antecedent factors. If you apply your own “why” approach to Hume’s point, it loses its luster. Why does any character or motives exists? For the same reason everything else does! God determines it.
Aaron: “…Thus we should consider determinism to be a necessary condition of responsibility.”
kkj: On the contrary, determinism eliminates any meaningful way of accounting for responsibility, aside from divine responsibility, as you have pointed out already.
Aaron: “It is the motive and desire behind the action which makes a person guilty or praiseworthy, and which makes them deserving of punishment or reward.”
kkj: But you haven’t gone far enough back in the causal web and located the ‘real’ reason for EVERY state of affairs, INCLUDING character and motives! Unless this character and these motives are at least, in part, the result of the operation of LFW, then there is no way to talk about “character” or “motives” in any meaningful way, and certainly no way that supports any coherent understanding of human responsibility.
Aaron: “I don’t see how the idea that every event is ultimately caused by God and thus happens for an objective reason is problematic at all, especially for a universalist like myself who believes that God is good and that the motive behind everything he has caused to take place is entirely benevolent, and thus consistent with the best interests of all rational beings.”
kkj: Besides human responsibility and loving relationships, which are HUGE, the origins and presence of evil is another HUGE issue for divine determinism worldview. Without LFW, God is the author of evil. Evil is pure privation of good. It is not ‘lesser good’! It can never contribute positively to some so-called ‘higher good’.
Do you suppose that God has LFW? Was He exercising LFW when He decided not destroy Noah and his family and begin again with them? Or were God’s own decisions also ‘pre-programmed’ by His former decision(s)? Determinism ends up reducing God to a first cause rather than a personal being.
If God has the ability to deliberate over states of affairs and make decisions in a way that is free from determinism, (as we can assume He did prior to creation) why couldn’t He make us in that ‘likeness’? Would it be impossible for God to create that kind of person and that kind of ‘space’ in our world for LFW to exist? I don’t think so, and I don’t think our intuitions about it are false either.
Aaron, I realize that I didn’t back my claims about the nature of evil up with any actual argument. I’m sure you are familiar with them. Your determinism requires you to characterize evil as ultimately contributing to good somehow. So, just as your views exclude LFW they also exclude gratuitous evil.
I don’t know if you have read Greg Boyd’s “God at War” and “Satan and the Problem of Evil” but Greg’s works on this subject are about 80% akin to my own.
Sorry life is so mesmerizing here in Argentina that I didn´t even get your moniker straight . But of course it was simply a mistake of carelessness that God programed into me . Seriously, thanks again for courteously carrying forth your case, as has Aaron.
Although I don’t anticipate either of us changing our positions as a result of this discussion, I am enjoying it! Now, you wrote:
No, I just deny that humans are ultimately responsible for their choices and actions. I believe our responsibility is simply relative, and not absolute. I believe God, being the “first cause” of all that is, is the only one who is ultimately or absolutely responsible for everything that takes place.
Ok, I think it would be profitable to the discussion if we were both more specific about what we mean by “responsibility.”
My understanding of responsibility when discussing moral choices and actions is best expressed in definitions 3 and 4. To me, a person may be considered (to some degree at least) “responsible” for a choice or action if (1) they have the capacity for moral decision-making (which implies the capacity to be governed by motives as opposed to mere brute instinct); and (2) they are the direct personal cause of an action. Understood in this way, I’m not sure how God’s being the ultimate cause of our motives, character and actions would render us irresponsible for our actions. The question of how we acquired a character that led to a certain sinful action, or what all the antecedent causes were that led to the sinful action, are simply not relevant to our being held accountable for our actions. For example, my wife is a schoolteacher, and if one of her students is rude and disrespectful towards her, the student is held accountable for his actions and “written up.” But the question of how the child became the kind of child who is rude and disrespectful toward his teacher is considered irrelevant by my wife, insofar as classroom management goes. All that matters is that, in being rude and disrespectful toward his teacher, the child willingly did what he knew was wrong. What he didn’t do (but which proponents of LFW say he could have done given the same exact circumstances and influences) is irrelevant; all that matters is what he did do, and the motive he had for doing it.
But let’s say the child happened to be a theological determinist like myself and, after being written up by my wife, objected to his being disciplined on the basis that he had to do what he did because God had predetermined it. While he would be correct (and my wife, with her compatibilist leanings, would agree), his complaint would be considered irrelevant to my wife, who, in dispensing rewards and punishments in the classroom for good and bad behaviour, does not - and need not - take into account the antecedent causes which led to the motive for the action (nor does she consider the philosophical/theological question of determinism vs. indeterminism at all relevant to classroom management). The fact that the child’s motives were determined by antecedent causes would make him no less guilty for his wrong action and no less deserving of the negative consequences. The child’s being responsible for his action simply required that he have a capacity for moral decisions (which implies the ability to be governed by motives) and that he was the direct, personal cause of his action. His guilt had to do with the motive behind the action, and not the antecedent causes that led to him having such a motive. He was punished for his wrong behaviour (or, to use the language of Scripture, he was “judged according to his works”) because there was a causal connection recognized by my wife between his motive and his action. But according to LFW, he could only be held accountable for his action if, and only if, he could have chosen otherwise at the time he made his decision to be disrespectful. But if there was no causal connection between his motive and the corresponding action, and a different decision could have been made even with the exact same influences and desires present, then it would make the decision fundamentally irrational and random.
On the contrary, determinism recognizes the causal connection between motive and decision/action which responsibility requires. I believe it is LFW which eliminates any meaningful way of accounting for responsibility, since it requires that there be no causal connection between a person’s motives and the decision that they make. Instead, their decision must be such that, with the same exact motives present, a different decision could have been made, with a different outcome resulting. But if this hypothetical change in outcomes could only be attributed to the agent making a different decision than the one that was made, then it would make the hypothetical decision (and by implication, the actual decision that was made) a necessarily random event with no intelligible explanation. And how such inexplicable randomness can be a prerequisite for human responsibility is beyond me.
But I don’t see why there’s any need or reason to go any further back in the “causal web” when considering whether a person is deserving of punishment or reward for an action; to go any further back than the motive behind the action is to lose sight of human responsibility altogether. It is to begin to shift our perspective from the relative to the absolute. I believe the antecedent causes that are prior to the motive and corresponding action are irrelevant when seeking to determine whether a person is guilty or praiseworthy for the action, and that all that need be taken into account when considering whether a human person should be held responsible for an action is whether or not the person was the direct cause of the action, and, if so, what their motive was.
Also, I think it’s ironic that you speak of the meaningfulness of something, when LFW makes our choices completely meaningless by making them the result of an inexplicable and random event that is necessarily disconnected from any antecedent cause in our personal history. To quote philosopher J.J.C. Smart, “Indeterminism does not confer freedom on us: I would feel that my freedom was impaired if I thought that a quantum mechanical trigger in my brain might cause me to leap into the garden and eat a slug.”
In terms of morality, to do “good” is to intend the best interests or well-being of another. That is, it is to will the happiness of others as an end. “Goodness,” then, is simply benevolence. In contrast, to do “evil” is to intend or will the harm of another as an end - i.e., malevolence. Since God (who is love) necessarily wills the best interests of all rational beings, then he is not evil, but good. Now, for him to be the “author of evil” would mean that he is the ultimate cause of all evil intentions in created beings. You deny that he is. But if it what we intend for evil, God intends for good, then it would mean that evil is subservient to good in terms of the ultimate end that God has in mind. That is, if it is for a benevolent purpose that God wills that human persons intend evil, then God’s being the “author of evil” is not at all problematic.
Consider the story of Joseph and his brothers (Genesis 37). As you know, Joseph was despised by his brothers because their father, Jacob, favored Joseph over his other sons (v. 3) and because of his dreams and the interpretation he gave for them (vv. 5-11). When the time came, they plotted against him and sold him to some traveling Midianite traders, and then deceived Jacob into thinking Joseph had been killed by a beast (vv. 18-33). After Joseph’s brothers come to Egypt, Joseph reveals himself to them and declares, “So then, it was not you who sent me here, but God. He made me father to Pharaoh, lord of his entire household and ruler of all Egypt” (Gen 45:8). When we read this statement in light of what Joseph had previously said in vv. 4-5, we find that Joseph understood his brothers to have been the relative or secondary causes, and God to have been the absolute or primary cause. And then later, after their father Jacob had died, Joseph declares to his brothers, “You intended to harm me, but God intended it for good to accomplish what is now being done, the saving of many lives.” Here we see that not only did Joseph understand YHWH to be the ultimate cause of his being sold into slavery by his envious brothers, but that it was a part of God’s benevolent plan that his brothers (who were ignorant of God’s plan) commit this evil act since it would lead to “the saving of many lives.” Here we see the difference between the absolute and the relative perspective. While Joseph’s brothers were, in one sense, responsible for their sinful deed, and endured the negative consequences of it, their responsibility was only relative, not absolute. It was God who was ultimately responsible for everything that took place.
That’s correct. I don’t believe there are any accidents or random events in life, and only in a relative sense do I think we can we speak of “tragedies”; for God, there are no purposeless events and no evil that God has not intended for good. There is nothing that is outside of the “all things” that God is working “according to the counsel of his will.” Even the vilest act ever committed by sinful man was, from the beginning, a part of God’s benevolent plan to maximize the happiness of all people (Acts 2:22-24; 4:24-28; cf. John 12:32; Phil 2:8-11; Col 1:19-20).
No, I don’t believe that God has LFW, and I don’t think he was exercising LFW when he decided not to destroy Noah and his family and begin again with them. God’s being represented as “regretting” his decision to make man (Gen 6:6) is a literary device with which I’m sure you’re familiar, and should not be understood any more literally than what we read in Gen 2:9, where God is represented as being ignorant of Adam’s location in the garden of Eden. God is described as regretting his decision to create mankind to give emphasis to man’s universal moral plight as well as to the radical and unexpected event that was about to transpire (i.e., the great flood). But if God knows the end from the beginning then he knew how corrupt the earth was going to become in Noah’s day before he even created Adam. God even knew with certainty that Adam was going to sin, for it was he who subjected his human creatures to “futility” (Rom 8:20). And I think even an Open Theist would have to admit the absurdity of thinking that, after Adam and Eve proved themselves incapable of withstanding a single temptation in the Garden of Eden, God would have expected subsequent generations to fare any better under less favourable circumstances.
I don’t see why the two are mutually exclusive. Cannot God be a personal being as well as a first cause? And I would argue that LFW/indeterminism reduces God to an irrational and random influence rather than a personal, rational being that “declares the end from the beginning” and “works all things according to the counsel of his will.”
So do you think that all of God’s choices are free in a libertarian sense, or just some? And when you believe God does exercise his LFW, why do you think he chooses the way he does, when he could have chosen otherwise? For instance, if God’s decision to love us at this and every moment is free in the libertarian sense, then he could choose not to love us, correct? So why doesn’t he?
No, I don’t think we can simply assume that, prior to this creation, God made decisions in a way that is free from determinism. I’ve stated elsewhere on this forum that I believe God to be, by necessity, a Creator, and that his nature determines both his moral character and his creative actions. Everything God does is necessary, because he is necessary. I also believe that our world is just one of an infinite number of worlds that God has always been creating for his pleasure, as an expression of his power and love. And just as I don’t think there was a time before God’s sequence of thought began, so I do not think there was ever a time before God began to create; consequently, I do not think there was ever a time when it was “just God.” I believe our universe is just one of an infinite number of universes that God has always been creating out of the fullness of his infinite being (see Rom 11:36), and as a necessary expression of his divine nature.
Also, what you refer to as an “intuition” about LFW is, I think, simply a misinterpretation of one’s subjective experience based on erroneous reasoning.
Aaron, thanks for a thorough response. I’ll try to articulate our difference on responsibility.
def. “chargeable with being the author, cause, or occasion of something” Ok, lets go with that. In determinism, there is the proximate cause of an event and the ultimate or absolute cause of an event. The proximate cause is the cause at ‘ground zero’ of an event and the ultimate cause stands behind the proximate cause as the ‘cause of the cause,’ if you will.
Here is a simplistic analogy to drive the point home: Imagine a pool player with a pool stick in hand striking a cue ball. Event: Cue ball moves. Proximate cause: Stick strikes cue ball. Ultimate cause: Player moves stick.
Now, the difference between you and I on responsibility is not in the definition of it, but in how we are applying it. Assigning “relative responsibility” (as you put it) to the proximate cause is like saying, the pool stick is relatively responsible for the movement of cue ball. There is a sense in which that is true, but not in a sense that makes good use of the concept of responsibility. If, for example, moving cue balls were illegal, convicting the pool stick, rather than the player, in a court of law would be ludicrous. Yes, pool sticks do not have character and motives etc. but this is a mute point because just as the pool stick is completely under the direction of the player, every human (according to determinism) in under the direction of God. Your classroom analogy fails because introducing complexity into the equation changes nothing about the root cause. The complexity of the child’s own character and motives in the situation (pool stick) puts distance between God (the player) and the misbehavior (cue ball), but it actually changes NOTHING about who is responsible for the event! The only cause that bears responsibility for the event is the absolute cause. The relative cause is simply a intermediate between the absolute cause and the event.
Aaron: “The question of how we acquired a character that led to a certain sinful action, or what all the antecedent causes were that led to the sinful action, are simply not relevant to our being held accountable for our actions.”
kkj: There is no question how we acquired a character that led to a certain sinful action. The answer is always the same. God determined it. All the antecedent causes can be summed up in one statement. God determined them. It doesn’t matter HOW it comes about if God has determined all. Accountability is assigned at the root cause. Again, the player, not the pool stick is actually responsible.
Aaron: “…determinism recognizes the causal connection between motive and decision/action which responsibility requires.”
kkj: But does determinism recognize the causal connection between the motive and the MOTIVE’S OWN CAUSE???
Aaron: “But I don’t see why there’s any need or reason to go any further back in the “causal web” when considering whether a person is deserving of punishment or reward for an action”
kkj: You must go back to the root cause of the event to assign responsibility. Why would you punish or reward the pool stick for hitting the cue ball when the player was the reason for the event?
Aaron: “to go any further back than the motive behind the action is to lose sight of human responsibility altogether.”
kkj: Exactly! That’s why determinism is not compatible with human responsibility! And that’s why LFW puts the responsibility on the person, because we don’t have to go all the way back to the determinism of God. Everything does not need to get traced back to the mysterious will of God. The very thing that the determinist view requires. Fine, if you don’t want to think about going back further than the motive behind the action, but that does not change the fact that there always IS the determinism of God behind EVERYTHING.
Aaron: “I think it’s ironic that you speak of the meaningfulness of something, when LFW makes our choices completely meaningless by making them the result of an inexplicable and random event that is necessarily disconnected from any antecedent cause in our personal history.”
kkj: LFW is not disconnected from antecedent conditions. It’s just that antecedent conditions do not constitute the totality of determining power in all events.
philosopher J.J.C. Smart, “Indeterminism does not confer freedom on us: I would feel that my freedom was impaired if I thought that a quantum mechanical trigger in my brain might cause me to leap into the garden and eat a slug.”
kkj: Mr. Smart clearly does not understand the nature of indeterminism. It’s not chaos.
Aaron: “Since God (who is love) necessarily wills the best interests of all rational beings, then he is not evil, but good. Now, for him to be the “author of evil” would mean that he is the ultimate cause of all evil intentions in created beings. You deny that he is.”
kkj: That’s right. I deny that God is the “author of evil.”
Aaron: “But if it what we intend for evil, God intends for good, then it would mean that evil is subservient to good in terms of the ultimate end that God has in mind. That is, if it is for a benevolent purpose that God wills that human persons intend evil, then God’s being the “author of evil” is not at all problematic.”
kkj: Evil is pure privation of good. It cannot contribute directly to well-being. UR doesn’t make this go away. I don’t have the time right now to address this fully. To be continued.
Aaron: “Cannot God be a personal being as well as a first cause?”
kkj: Yes, but not within a deterministic God-world relationship. In a deterministic world there is only first cause and everything that proceeds (deterministically) from that. Personal love relationship requires LFW. If I have been fore-determined to love or not to love, my loving or unloving is a determined response to God and not volitional love in response to revelation of Him. Big difference. Only one is a truly personal response.
Aaron: “…if God’s decision to love us at this and every moment is free in the libertarian sense, then he could choose not to love us, correct? So why doesn’t he?”
I’ll respond to your most recent post when I have a little more time (this is my scheduled weekend to work ). In the meantime, I was wondering if you could respond to what I said in the initial post that actually prompted our discussion (Should we form universalist congregations?), as I don’t see where you’ve done so yet. I’ve also made comments in subsequent posts in which similar objections against LFW have been made, but which you have not really addressed.
Actually, I think much of our difference is in the definition of “responsibility,” which you seem to be redefining in order to suit your argument and philosophical position. Notice that in neither definition of responsibility that I provided (and these are standard, ordinary definitions with no philosophical spin) is there anything said or implied about whether the “cause” of an action must be the ultimate cause or a proximate cause in order for it to be considered “responsible” for an action. In fact, in the very definition that you have chosen to go with, the example given is that of termites being “responsible” for some kind of structural damage. But were the termites the ultimate cause? Of course not; not only did the termites not create themselves (God did), termites don’t even have a rational will that is governed by motives. Yet they may still be considered the “cause” of (and thus be considered “responsible” for) damage done to property. But in reality, they’re actually the proximate cause of the damage, not the ultimate cause of the damage. They’re only doing what their Creator created them to do, and acting in accordance with the laws of nature established by God. And I’m sure the damage to property that is regularly done by termites falls well within the category of “disaster” of which YHWH is said to be the cause in Scripture: “I form the light and create darkness; I bring prosperity and create disaster (lit. “evil”); I, the LORD, do all these things” (Isa 45:7). “Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that good and bad (lit. “evil”) come?” (Lam 3:38). “Does disaster (“evil”) come to a city, unless the LORD has done it?” (Amos 3:6). “Shall we receive good from God, and shall we not receive evil?” (Job 2:10).
The “good use” of the “concept of responsibility” of which you speak is simply the use of it in such a way that fits with and supports your LFW position. So I think you should have said, “There is a sense in which that is true, but not in the sense that is required by my position.” Your very definition of “responsibility” begs the question by necessarily excluding the idea of proximate causes from the very realm of responsibility. But my definition (which is derived from the standard definition I provided) allows for both proximate as well as ultimate causes as being in some sense “responsible” for actions. And while it seems to be critical to your argument, I think it’s erroneous to think that for something or someone to be ultimately responsible for an action, the proximate cause would be absolved of all responsibility. To speak of someone being “ultimately” responsible would seem to imply lesser degrees of responsibility.
And here is where your analogy fails. What you call a moot point is in fact the very thing that makes people responsible for their actions, and able to be considered praiseworthy or blameworthy. Again, here is the second definition I provided for “responsible” which I felt reflected my understanding of the word: “having a capacity for moral decisions and therefore accountable; capable of rational thought or action.” From this definition we see what makes persons able to be held “responsible” for actions: their capacity for rational thought and moral decisions. And what makes a decision “moral” or “rational?” Answer: the motive behind it. If the motive is wrong and selfish (i.e., sinful) then the decision and corresponding action is blameworthy, and the person is treated accordingly. If the motive is good and virtuous (i.e., righteous) then the decision and corresponding action is praiseworthy, and the person is treated accordingly. It is because a being has a capacity for moral decisions that they may be considered responsible - the question of whether or not they might have decided otherwise if some inexplicable random event in their brain had taken place (which is what LFW amounts to) is irrelevant insofar as their personal responsibility is concerned. But what about the ultimate cause (i.e., God)? Answer: According to my position, both humans AND God are responsible for human action, since both are rational, self-aware beings (i.e., persons) whose moral actions are governed by motives/character. But whereas the human may be either praiseworthy OR blameworthy for their decision/action (since either a vicious or a virtuous motive could be behind it), God (the ultimate cause) can only be praiseworthy for the action, since, being necessarily benevolent, he decreed it for a benevolent purpose which will result in the ultimate happiness of the one who performed it (the proximate cause).
First, the scenario I gave was intended to demonstrate how, in our everyday application of the concept of “responsibility” in social contexts (like a classroom setting), antecedent causes and influences are considered irrelevant when determining whether or not a person who is able to make moral decisions is praiseworthy or blameworthy for an action. It is the motive that is taken into consideration.
Second, it’s true that the complexity “changes nothing about who is responsible for the event.” According to my view, both God and the human are responsible for the event, since both are moral beings capable of moral decisions - God being responsible as the ultimate cause of the action, and the human being responsible as the most proximate cause of the action.
Here we see how you have redefined “responsibility” by necessarily excluding proximate causes from having any responsibility - but of course, you had no choice but to do this (pun intended ), since your position requires it. But the definition of “responsible” that I provided is perfectly consistent with my position that both ultimate and proximate causes may be considered, in some sense, responsible for a given action.
Once again we see how you’ve redefined responsibility to necessarily exclude proximate causes from bearing any kind of responsibility.
Yes, determinism does, in fact, “recognize the causal connection between the motive and the motive’s own cause.” As I’ve said, both God and the human are responsible, and the fact that God is ultimately responsible guarantees that the sinful actions of human beings will ultimately prove to have been decreed for their own benefit, for what man intends for evil, God intends for good.
I wouldn’t, because the pool stick is not a being with the capacity for making decisions governed by good or bad motives.
I don’t at all mind “thinking about going back further than the motive for the action.” I’m not afraid of making God responsible for every human action, because I believe God is benevolent and intends everything for good, even the sinful decisions humans make (such as the decision to have the Son of God crucified). But as long as the human’s responsibility is in view (i.e., the question of whether a human person is praiseworthy or blameworthy for a decision/action), there’s no need to go back to the first, ultimate cause, because the motive of the human is the only thing that matters when determining a human person’s guilt or innocence. You can’t determine whether a person’s action is praiseworthy or blameworthy by going beyond their motive - and that’s all I meant when I said that human responsibility is lost sight of when we “go further back than the motive.”
In other words, we have to throw in some necessary randomness into the causal web - otherwise, determinism might rear its ugly head and rob humans of their ability to love or perform actions for which they can be held responsible! But of course, determinism does no such thing.
As a result of Paul’s encounter with the risen Christ on the road to Damascus, he became a changed man. Instead of continuing in hard-hearted rebellion against Christ, he became joyfully submitted to him. But if Paul’s decision to submit to Christ was “free” in the libertarian sense, then it would mean that he could have chosen otherwise (for “libertarian freedom recognizes the power of contrary choice. One acts freely in a situation if, and only if, one could have done otherwise.”). This means that, in an identical state of affairs and with all things being equal (i.e., with the same exact influences being present and operating on Paul), a different outcome could have resulted. So how would you explain and account for such a change in outcomes, kkj? If nothing new enters into the equation immediately prior to Paul’s decision, how would this theoretical change in outcomes not be completely arbitrary and random? And it’s irrelevant to me whether or not you wish to call the inexplicable event that could actualize such an outcome “arbitrary” or “random.” Call it whatever you want, it will still be the very thing that could cause an otherwise rational man to leap into his garden and eat a slug.
You can deny all you want that God can decree that man sin in order to promote man’s ultimate well-being, but the story of Joseph and his brothers is a prime example of God doing just this. And the crucifixion of Christ was the greatest evil that ever took place in history, and it was decreed by God in order to accomplish the salvation of everyone. Or do you think Jesus’ death was part of God’s “plan B?” Perhaps you do, but I disagree. I believe God declares the end from the beginning, and that Jesus was determined to be put to death by sinful man, and to rise again on the third day as Lord of all, before the world was even created.
I define “person” as “rational, self-aware being.” Since God is a rational, self-aware being as well as the ultimate cause of everything, he is both a personal being as well as a first cause.
How do you define “person?” Let me guess: it’s “a being that possesses LFW.” (just kidding)
It does not at all follow that a loving response that has been predetermined is not volitional. “Volition” means “the act or an instance of making a conscious choice or decision,” or “a conscious choice or decision.” “Volitional” means “with deliberate intention” (youtube.com/watch?v=joanVUoXY0s). As I noted earlier, I believe LFW would actually reduce our choice to love others to what is akin to a random coin toss (with the difference being that the “reason” for mentally “tossing the coin” would also be random!). If love cannot exist without the power of contrary choice, then it would mean that, with the exact same influences and desires that were present when I decided I would propose to my wife, I could have decided that I wouldn’t propose to her at all. But what could possibly explain such a different outcome if everything just prior to my decision was the same? How and why would I have chosen otherwise, given the influences and desires that were present at the time? What would have brought about the different outcome that LFW requires could have been? If a “contrary choice” is the only thing that could be introduced into the equation to bring about a different outcome, how could such a choice be understood as anything but utterly and inexplicably random?
Why do you think God chooses to love us at this very moment rather than not love us? And why do you think God would choose not to love us (because you have to admit the possibility that he could do so at any given moment if his choice to do so is free in a libertarian sense)? Couldn’t God choose not to love us for the same reason that you think we can choose not to love him - i.e., by simply exercising his LFW in a contrary way with no explanation possible other than that the agent simply chose otherwise?
You both seem to “wear the clothing of intellect”… so I hope you shall bear with me as I am not in this grouping. It is nice to be educated, but though most men ARE NOT, and HAVE NOT been so blessed of this mental enrichment, they somehow survive and prosper regardless… I do not intend to put intellectuality down… simply that in entering here… be it known to you that the engaging of intellect shall communicate little to a highschool educated one such as myself.
I have gone to the “school of life” for 65 years though… and oftentimes that school is a much more productive tool than the institutions of man which esteem education as emergent from them.
True education is in hearing the one who created it. And whom is the one which gives ears often times to unlikely sources… as was exemplified by the choosings of the Disciples by CHRIST… He did not go to the synagogue to gain the most educated ones concerning the WORD of God… He instead chose vessels which were mostly EMPTY, and could much more easily be FILLED with what He had to say.
That was nice. And something to which I would like to refer to as I address your “intellectuality” in proximity to your “spiritual understanding” which in the end result, have NOTHING to do with one another. Intellectuality does not equate to SPIRITUAL comprehension, neither does SPIRITUAL comprehension require intellectuality.
The Apostle Paul was a LEARNED man, which “learned” this… others (intellectuals) that are truly wise concerning the pursuit of the WORD, shall follow the same [corrected] pathway he walked.
There is no BIBLICAL proof of this, this is just “opinion” kkj. The word RESPONSIBLE does not appear in Scripture. Accountability does, but even in its appearance it is more a designation of observeable INVENTORY, then something which causes a forthcoming disciplinary reaction from God. He does not need to revisit that which already IS (Rom 1:18)… but for the sake of ALL, He brings the entirety of Humanity to the table of acceptability, and discards that which it commonly produced unacceptably within the course of living in this realm.
What I mean is that one must first discover WHY we are “accountable” in order to find REASON for it while remaining able to hold on to the position of GOD’s SOVEREIGNTY… which is clearly and plainly stated in His WORD. He is ALMIGHTY which maintains that ALL MIGHT is His. Any “might” that humans temporarily possess for the purpose of HIS WILL in “Revealing”, is delegated BY Him and FOR Him – Rom 13:1 – Col 1:16 – and finds Divine JUSTIFICATION, because of His DECISION to delegate it where He has – Rom 5:18-20
God clearly notes that HE makes the DISHONORABLE as well as the HONORABLE – Rom 9:21 – and in doing so, still, completely and justifiably, finds FAULT in the DISHONORABLE… for THAT is half of the whole revelation of the knowledge of Good and Evil! We are ALL to gain His vision of what is DISHONOR, in order to gain our own observation of the HONOR that is within Him and given to us!
This is where one’s humility must, and WILL (eventually) come into play. That Judas betrayed CHRIST was NOT of his “choice” even though “he CHOSE to do it”… for it was WRITTEN of him to do what he DID – Psalm 41:9 – and the WORD of God cannot and does NOT, CHANGE – Heb 13:8 – and cannot be BROKEN – John 10:34 – The act of Judas was foreordained, and part of the redemption process, which without it, could not become complete.
The point being that MAN is under the illusion that he is a FREE agent with a WILL that is able to thwart or transcend the WILL of YHVH…
The notion itself is ridiculous, and in embracing it, whether admitted or not, …maintaining that it exists, places the one “embracing” OVER YHVH… How could it possibly be that YOU or I could “thwart” the WILL of an ALMIGHTY Being?
God clearly notes this futile thought, and that it is doomed in its inception – Rom 9:19 – and then explained – Rom 9:20 – but unless one abandons the ego instead of embracing the HUMILITY that is required to gain understanding, then one shall foolishly continue to embrace himSELF, instead of embracing GOD.
It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to observe that GOD is doing (working) ALL things for He says He is – Eph 1:11 – But SELF interrupts the opportunity of gaining comprehension with the (UNBIBLICAL) notion of “free will” on the basis of ones own SELF observation of “choosing”, and unspoken desire to maintain a degree of CONTROL.
To embrace that GOD is IN CONTROL of EVERYTHING, deletes such (control) from the individual, and within that deletion, despenses with the foolish suggestion of – “robothood or puppethood” – which is born upon the lips of the one which scratches and claws in an effort to cling to SELF and its misconcieved “control”… and maintains that we are “puppets” of GOD if HE is IN CONTROL of US… What of JESUS? Was He the “chief puppet”? He never suggested that He was “free” to choose as He pleased! Instead He noted that He could DO NOTHING OF HIMSELF… and when, during His dispair, that DEATH approached, in His humanity which DID NOT KNOW… asked if there might be an alternative way, but immediately followed the question with His desire to COMPLY with the WILL (control) of GOD.
The WILL of GOD shall be done ETERNALLY, so any notion of “free will” is doomed ETERNALLY anyway. The sorrowful thing is, that many while yet in this life, could embrace the TRUTH that “free will” does not, and never has existed… but that would be relinquishing “SELF” into a complete subjection, and humans within that SELFISHNESS, do not so easily submit.
What is actually going on here is NOT “the fall of man” (which God had to “react” to), nor that some “red guy with a pitch fork” is ultimately the one to blame…
It is that GOD DECLARED (by the use of HIS WORD), all that was YET to be DONE, before it was DONE – Isaiah 46:10 – and the WORD which emerges from GOD, shall find manifestation, irregardless of the ones which are manifest within that course, recognizing that it is the WORD of GOD which has the KNOWLEDGE of GOOD and EVIL, that is being REVEALED… via the actions of men in BOTH capacities… Neither of which are emergent of MAN, rather both emergent of the KNOWLEDGE and WILL of YHVH.
Isaiah 45:7 — I …FORM [not “formed”] the LIGHT… and CREATE [not “created”] DARKNESS; I MAKE [not “made”] PEACE and CREATE [not “created”] EVIL… I YHVH …DO… [not “did”] ALL these things… The operative word here is …[size=150]DO[/size]…
This verse is completely in the PRESENT… it is NOT past tense… it is PRESENT TENSE…
When GOD in – Isaiah 45:7 – notes that HE creates DARKNESS and creates EVIL… it is not idle language. Wherever these exist… they ARE CREATED by HIM… If DARKNESS exists in YOU… it has been CREATED by HIM… and only the FORMING of LIGHT in YOU shall change what YOU ARE, which is DARKNESS.
Even though it is majestically simple, …most have, and most WILL, …continue to trip over the obvious… for it does not satisfy the ego’s need to be “in command” of SELF — removing the “control”!
Again, this addresses SELF instead of gaining the REVELATION that the WORD is that which is unfolding in ALL things (which is the manifestation of the single KNOWLEDGE of G & E)… Which is also in its wonderous simplicity, sent to REDEEM that which …IT… sent into CAPTIVITY – Jer 29:14
If you might consider… the WORD was sent out – Isaiah 55:11 – and shall not RETURN void in any capacity. Part of the “sending out” of the WORD was the Creation of that which It was to eventually REDEEM, for the WORD was the primary source element utilized in the Creation of ALL things – Col 1:16 – John 1:3
ALL that is “made” is “made” by the WORD, …this includes ALL the actions of MEN which think themselves the source of those actions.
The “accountability” required by GOD is not a “comeupance” or “righting of the ship”… it is simply GOD [LOVE] setting the record straight by REVELATION (which includes that “accountability”) as to WHAT is acceptable in the living of LIFE and what is NOT.
In revealing this knowledge… JOY emerges to a degree that was not previously KNOWN or experienced in any realm (we have no idea how many realms exist, or what they are)… but we are told that the WORD is being REVEALED concerning GOOD and EVIL… so prior to that “REVELATION”, neither was “known” by any, …being UNREVEALED.
As men in futility argue with one another about “right and wrong”, they remain mired in the pursuit of SELF in doing so. Seeking to exalt over the other in one degree or another. The truth is that NO man is either right or wrong, rather is either REVEALED or VEILED in any given area of the knowledge of GOOD and EVIL.
The one who is embracing the TRUTH shall know that an ALMIGHTY being which is the owner and possesser of ALL POWER – Rom 13:1 – is simply delegating it to men in order to satisfy His divine agenda, which is the REVELATION of a KNOWLEDGE that only HIS HEART and WORD beheld prior to this realm – Gen 3:22
I disagree with this “observation”… for it contends from finite perspective, and attempts to include its (essentially sin based) parameters which are used to define INFINITE (Holy based) agenda. Stating that “character” is devised or emergent of men… rather than of the design of the Divine. Therefore deducing that MISBEHAVIOR is the outward display of a “character” which is amiss… instead of knowing that the DIVINE holds ALL KNOWLEDGE both of “good and evil” and that the definition of BOTH are INSEPARABLE parts of each other.
IOW… Misbehavior is defined by proper behavior… and neither come from the source called MAN. Both are emergent of the KNOWLEDGE of the DIVINE.
“REPONSIBILITY” is where the “BUCK” STOPS! The “BUCK” shall never EVER rest upon FINITE men, which are set in motion within parameters decided and implemented by the DIVINE… This thinking exalts the “clay” in part, as “making” itself. When indeed, the “clay” was set amongst the surroundings and parameters which might affect it… byYHVH God.
For example… a human makes the misjudgment of using an ADDICTIVE drug, and accordingly the user is deemed by observers, to be therefore (due to his misjudgment) “RESPONSIBLE” for that use… To which the following questions can be posed:
(1) What or who made the available elements necessary to produce the drug? YHVH or MEN
(2) Where did the knowledge originate that enabled production of the drug? YHVH or MEN
(3) Who decided that the drug, when applied to the human anatomy would manifest ADDICTION? YHVH or MEN
(4) Who decided the HARMFUL parameters of the ADDICTION? YHVH or MEN
If MEN were the source of the DRUG and the questions above were answered “MEN”… then MEN would or could be “responsible”… However… NONE of the above questions can be answered other than that YHVH God decided these things, and that YHVH is therefore “RESPONSIBLE” for their existence as well as their affectual/applicable “part” in proximity to MAN …WITHIN that EXISTENCE.
FIRST — No offense, kkj… But this statement is a failure to recognize the PURPOSE in the Holy Scriptures… The KNOWLEDGE of GOOD and EVIL is decided by GOD. NOT by MAN.
GOOD is DEFINED to be what it IS, …by its comparison to EVIL… the TWO are part of the SAME KNOWLEDGE – Gen 2:17 – “GOOD” and “EVIL” are NOT 2 separate “knowledges” they are components of the SAME [single] “KNOWLEDGE”.
SECOND — The Scriptures PLAINLY STATE – that God is the “author of EVIL”
Isaiah 45:7 — I form LIGHT and CREATE DARKNESS… I make PEACE and CREATE …EVIL… I YHVH, …DO… all these things.
PART of ALL THINGS (which find their source in the WORD of God – John 1:3 – Col 1:16) – is EVIL… ALL THINGS are emergent of the Creator. NOTHING in existence “created” itself… – although it is your right to dismiss this, it is UNREASONABLE to maintain that there is an existent thing which was NOT created by the Creator… and in dismissing this… you must dismiss the Scriptures which plainly refute such a concept.
THIRD — There are MANY examples of GOD taking the works of EVIL and using it for GOOD!!! The most obvious being the DEATH of CHRIST …which was the most EVIL “work” done by man in the history of man, yet GOD took that “evil” and within its manifestation, provided REDEMPTION for the Human race!
The Scriptures also plainly note that GOD “raised Pharaoh” – Rom 9:17 – to “do” what he did, and that “doing” ended up GLORYFYING Himself BY Pharaoh! How could GOD be a “deliverer” (which in itself is found GLORY), if there were NOTHING from which He might “deliver”?
FIRST — This conclusion is born of UNREASON.
GOD is both FIRST CAUSE …and… a “BEING”… I challenge you to give reason why GOD cannot be BOTH!
SECOND — GOD is a DIVINE entity… He is not and can-not be defined by FINITE parameters… For HE PRECEEDED the FINITE, and is the Creator OF it…
THIRD — Your deduction of “determinism” [IMO] is amiss, in that you as a FINITE have decided what the INFINITE should BE, due to YOUR own FINITE mind’s deduction OF IT, …as opposed to submitting to the TRUTH that your FINITE mind has IMMENSE boundaries (using 1 or 2% or maybe even 3% of your mental capacity) which do NOT CONFINE the INFINITE.
Again, I do not mean disrespect to you or to the lack of Spiritual vision that I percieve in you, so please do not take offense by my words, …but you deduce that the WILL of GOD cannot BE in all things… for you “determine” that your “will” is aside from His, due to your (“LFW chosen”) misbehaviors… or YOU “determine” that YOU must have the right to “choose” Him and His Salvation… Thereby setting HIM aside as GOD, in place of yourSELF.
GOD is making us in the LIKENESS of His IMAGE – Heb 1:3 – His “image” did NOT have or exercise a “free will” at all…
He was ALWAYS about DOING the WILL of YHVH… He is making us “in the LIKENESS and IMAGE” of GOD… then we shall have no other “will” but HIS within our experience. irregardless of the temporal conditions of EVIL which can and do occur in us…
The essence of the MANNER of prayer we are instructed to pray – Luke 11:2 – Matt 6:9 – is coming into agreement that IT IS being done… not that there is a POSSIBILITY of it being done.
WHY? Because, unbeknownst to most… HIS WILL is/has/will be done — ALL along!
It was HIS WILL that Man discover the tree of the “knowledge”, and indulge himself within it, for it was DECLARED BEFORE the Creation, that the Lamb be slain because the WILL of GOD was already set in motion DETERMINING the END —> to the BEGINNING… Which are ONE & the SAME entity – Rev 1:1
Aaron: “Notice that in neither definition of responsibility that I provided (and these are standard, ordinary definitions with no philosophical spin) is there anything said or implied about whether the “cause” of an action must be the ultimate cause or a proximate cause in order for it to be considered “responsible” for an action.”
kkj: Of course the definition of responsibility does not specify this. I’m not arguing that it favors any philosophical position. I’m arguing the difference is between how we are applying the concept of responsibility. You assign responsibility at the proximate cause where character and motives is involved (in the case of compatibilistic ‘free will’ decisions), while I assign the responsibility to the actual determiner because THAT is the source of the character, motives, and whatever other antecedent conditions. So again, same definition: “chargeable with being the author, cause, or occasion of something” different application.
In a determinist God-world relation, it doesn’t matter whether the proximal cause of an event is a pool stick, termite, or human being. God is still determining and therefore responsible for the outcome. Whatever transpires between the moment of determination and the moment of the event is irrelevant for assigning responsibility. Responsibility belongs to the “cause of something.” “Relative cause” is just a domino in the causal web.
I suppose, if you want argue that, technically, the definition of responsibility allows you to apply it at the proximate cause because of it’s lack of specificity about “absolute cause”… ok, but I think this is an irregular use of the concept of responsibility when you bifurcate the loci of determination between relative and absolute, and a use that is suited to your philosophical presuppositions. Agree to disagree on that?
Aaron: “I think it’s erroneous to think that for something or someone to be ultimately responsible for an action, the proximate cause would be absolved of all responsibility.”
kkj: Why don’t you think that ultimate responsibility entails ENTIRE responsibility when the ultimate cause is the ONLY determining cause for the event?
Aaron: “First, the scenario I gave was intended to demonstrate how, in our everyday application of the concept of “responsibility” in social contexts (like a classroom setting), antecedent causes and influences are considered irrelevant when determining whether or not a person who is able to make moral decisions is praiseworthy or blameworthy for an action.”
kkj: What a person evaluating the event esteems relevant or irrelevant based upon their perception of the event is really irrelevant for assigning responsibility.
Aaron: “Second, it’s true that the complexity “changes nothing about who is responsible for the event.” According to my view, both God and the human are responsible for the event, since both are moral beings capable of moral decisions - God being responsible as the ultimate cause of the action, and the human being responsible as the most proximate cause of the action.”
kkj: This cannot be a BOTH/AND situation. It can only be EITHER/OR. EITHER God is responsible OR the human is, not BOTH God AND the human.
(from previous) kkj: LFW is not disconnected from antecedent conditions. It’s just that antecedent conditions do not constitute the totality of determining power in all events.
Aaron: “In other words, we have to throw in some necessary randomness into the causal web…”
kkj: So, going back to your root issue with LFW. You are claiming that only randomness can account for the supposed arbitrary operation of LFW. So, arbitrary, in fact, that it cause someone to “leap in a garden and eat a slug.” I don’t think that determinism and randomness are the only options available to us. I believe we were created to self-determine, and this is not predetermined or totally random. To be continued.
I can’t address “what is personal” and why LFW makes love genuine, right now. I’ll have to come back to that if time allows. Nice chatting with you Aaron.
I assign moral responsibility to every moral cause, whether the cause is ultimate OR proximate. If both God and man are in some sense “chargeable with being the author, cause or occasion of something” then I think it’s perfectly valid to understand both causes as being in some sense “responsible” for the action. Again, this is consistent with the two most relevant definitions of “responsible” that I provided, neither of which specify how many moral agents can be chargeable with being the cause of some moral action. So I think you at least have to admit that the definition I provided allows for more than one moral agent (i.e., a being whose decisions are governed by motives) being considered “responsible” for a given moral action. God would be chargeable as the ultimate cause, and man would be chargeable as the proximate cause.
Moreover, in Scripture (as far as I can tell) it is always for their actions or intentions that human beings are represented as being held responsible by God, and according to which they are judged - not the “antecedent conditions” or causes that led to the action. Whether the action or intention is praiseworthy or blameworthy certainly depends on the motive on which the agent acted, but human beings are not held responsible for the motive itself or any antecedent conditions. Rather, they are held responsible for the action or intention (of which they are the proximate determining cause), which the motive behind the action or intention determines as being praiseworthy or blameworthy.
Again, I’ve never argued that God is not “responsible for the outcome.” I simply hold that the proximate cause can be considered in some sense responsible for the outcome as well, since the proximate cause (the human) is just as much a moral agent as the ultimate cause (God). According to the definitions I provided, the only conditions that I believe need to be met in order for an agent to be held responsible for an action is that 1) the agent must be capable of rational, moral decisions (i.e., decisions governed by motives), and 2) the action must be caused by the agent. Both of these conditions are met according to my view.
I’m not sure how applying the same regular definition of responsibility to two moral agents who are deterministically linked by a causal chain makes my use of the concept of responsibility “irregular.” While I fully grant that it’s suited to my philosophical presuppositions, it’s not because I’ve modified the definition of “responsibility” in any way; I’m simply applying them to more than one agent, both of whom I believe to be in some sense the cause of (and thus responsible for) an action. And it’s pretty common to hear about “shared responsibility,” so to apply this concept (or at least something similar to it) to two moral agents who are, in some sense, both determining causes of an action, should not be considered an “irregular” use of the concept of responsibility. But yes, I think it’d be best to simply agree to disagree on this!
Because the ultimate cause isn’t the only determining cause of the event, kkj. Every cause - whether it’s ultimate or proximate - is “determining”; that’s precisely what makes it a “cause.” A cause makes something happen, without which it wouldn’t have happened.
Could you please expound on this? I’m not saying I necessarily disagree, I’m just not entirely sure I understand your point.
Yes, I realize your position demands that this be true, but I don’t see why it needs to be. But again, I guess we’ll just have to agree to disagree.
I’m eagerly awaiting your contribution to the attempts by libertarians at solving the great dilemma of how an action of the will can be understood as neither random nor determined by antecedent causes.
I think the debate over libertarian vs compatibilistic freedom is fascinating in itself, and perhaps especially because great minds—especially Christian theists who love the Lord—line up in support of both views. I also appreciate reading Aaron’s thoughts on why he thinks LFW is a dead end philosophically. The arguments pro and con are pretty well-developed. Overall, I’m unable to embrace a compatibilistic view of the world. It’s simply an existential impossibility for me. I may be wrong. I may be existentially screwed up. But then again, others might be missing it instead. In the end, we’re all looking for that “existential fit” that makes best sense of all the evidence—rational/philosophical, theological, existential, etc., and we all live with a certain measure of cognitive dissonance. Nobody gets the “fit” so right that they don’t have to bail SOME water.
And that’s why I tend less and less to get into long, detailed, debates over ‘freedom’ with folks who are already settled into convictions and views that ‘satisfy’ them. There’s very little to be gained since it’s very difficult to motivate those who are satisfied (regardless of their view).
If somebody finds determinism unsatisfying and they can’t make it work, then I’m happy to point the way to an alternative. If they can’t make open or process theism, or even traditional Arminianism, work for them, then I don’t push things, since life is about finding the right mix, within the broad spectrum of views compatible with historic Christianity, that makes life ‘livable’ and faith and love for God and the world ‘doable’. I think the entirety of being held accountable by God in the eschaton will be about how sincerely and genuinely we were lovers of God and others and how we perceived Christ as the object of our actions. If compatibilists can manage that love and sincerity as determinists (and so it seems they can), then I’m happy for them. If libertarians can do the same (and they can), then I’m happy that genuine faith and love for God and the world are compatible with such diverse views on human freedom.
TV: I’ve resisted trying to place myself explicitly in a specific category re: libertarian vs compatibilist but I think I’m far more libertarian in reality.
Tom: I really do think that’s more the ‘default’ setting for human beings.
TV: It appeals to me in part because it also recognizes and accepts that there are a great many things that play very significant roles in forming and influencing how one chooses. However I’m not sure how the libertarian answers the charge that one can simply not know the full and true degree to which he IS being influenced.
Tom: Nor can the determinist know the full and true degree to which he may be free in the libertarian sense. The most any of us can do is deliberate between options, an act which in itself entails the assumption of genuinely open alternatives. Yes, a determinist can ‘argue’ that it’s possible that only one option is the predetermined route (effectively realized through the very reasoning processes of the deliberative act), but the act of deliberation itself cannot demonstrate this to be the case. Rather, the act itself presupposes an assumption regarding the alternatives–or SO I think. And that’s pretty much where I leave it.
TV: Even his self perception that he is acting against all the influences that have formed his choice may in fact be part of his semi-delusional world.
Tom: One can never act against an influence. That is to say, one can never act in such a way as to escape all influence. Influences aren’t ‘escaped’. They always shape the process.
TV: Which is to say “how on earth can one possibly know for sure that he really IS free?”
Tom: How can one know (if by ‘know’ you mean justified true belief) that one is not libertarianly free? It cuts both ways. “Not knowing” has to count as evidence AGAINST the truth of BOTH the libertarian and the determinist IF it is to count as decisive evidence against either. So I’m not worried about influences working upon me which I may not perceive. I just ‘DO’ life, i.e., reason, deliberate, pray, and ACT within what I DO perceive about myself and the world. No libertarian or determinist can do any differently. The “debates” we get in about what the truth is regarding what we all ‘do’ when we deliberate and choose is—well, I’m not sure what they’re about! Perhaps they’re about nothing more than trying to win people to our view of things, or other related theological claims. I don’t know.
TV: There really is a tension that must be faced when dealing with the question of freedom; the tension between moral responsibility and determinism. It seems very clear that we really do have a moral responsibility in our choices. And this implies the need to face consequences, the reality of an ability to act counter to all those factors trying to “determine” our choice, and so on.
Tom: I agree. But only a libertarian would say such a thing. So you’re pretty much picking one over the other here! Hehe.
TV: However, it also seems clear that in a real sense we really are sinners by nature. There seems a general insistence that no one escapes that reality; ie “all have sinned" and so on. I can no more walk away from my sinful nature any more than I can walk away from being dependent on Oxygen to survive.
Tom: Then what sort of place do you suppose heaven to be if human beings cannot cease from sin because it is their ‘nature’ to sin? Do we rid ourselves of what is ‘human’ about our natures? Do we become something other than human?
Good thoughts, Tom. And for the record: if the only options available to me were either LFW with the possibility that all will eventually be saved, or compatibilism with the certainty that some will undergo ECT, I’d choose the former!
Tom, yep. I think Aaron and I know that neither one is going to convince the other, but I’ve learned some things about determinism through this exchange, and maybe some onlookers have to? I’m not exactly the ideal person to defend the LFW position, I think, but whatever, I try. Thanks for entertaining my banter Aaron.
FREE WILL
those who believe in Eternal Hell emphasize FREE WILL but Free Will only takes us so far. For example:
"But who are you, a human being, to talk back to God? "Shall what is FORMED say to the ONE WHO FORMED IT, ‘Why did you MAKE ME like this?’“Does not the POTTER have the right to MAKE from the same lump of clay one vessel for special occasions and another for common use?…” The potter makes vessels of honor or dishonor.
“for to vanity was the creation MADE SUBJECT – NOT OF ITS OWN WILL, but BECAUSE of HIM who DID SUBJECT it – in hope,” Did we have a choice to be subjected to vanity by default?
“for GOD did SHUT UP together the whole to unbelief, that to the whole He might do kindness.” Did we have a choice to be shut up in disbelief by default?
“‘HE hath BLINDED their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they might not see with the eyes, and understand with the heart, and turn back, and I might heal them;’” Did they have a choice to be blinded or hardened?
“For it is by grace you have been saved, through faith—and this is NOT FROM YOURSELVES, it is the gift of God—not by works, so that no one can boast.” Did we have a choice to have faith? or was it given?
LOL…
. But of course it was simply a mistake of carelessness that God programed into me 
. Seriously, thanks again for courteously carrying forth your case, as has Aaron.
). In the meantime, I was wondering if you could respond to what I said in the initial post that actually prompted our discussion (
