No, I agree some texts imply divine omniscience. Thus, #1 is precisely the alternative I have regularly argued here and in my posted papers. I.e. that many theological debates are explained by the evident reality that the Bible has many texts that reflect & encourage competing views on numerous questions.
I don’t find seeking to read all texts as so coherent as to be saying the same thing to be believable. I see great progression and diversity in its collection of writings.
Interesting. So, you can live with the existence of a contradiction in a key attribute of God as described in the Bible. Correct?
And if you can live with such a contradiction, do you wonder about other important concepts that may also be contradictions that you may not be aware of? I’m thinking about such important concepts as the atonement, the fact that Jesus is God or the son of God, and the existence of life after death.
Further, would you not accept the ontological argument that argues for the existence of God as the maximally great being? I say that because a being that is omniscient but does not know what free-willed agents choose would not be a maximally great being, since it would be less great than a being who was omniscient AND did know what free-willed agents would choose, other things being equal.
Yes! I have no choice but to live with perceptions that appear to be reality, and I’ve often argued here that seeing all Biblical texts as inerrant and homogeneous requires more faith than I have.
No, actually I am quite aware of all three, and my work on this site discusses diverse texts and views of the atonement, Jesus’ deity (cf recent discussion with DaveB), and my OT paper looks at diverse Bible texts on the nature of existence after death.
No, like most philosophers, I find no philosophical proof of God to be airtight. But the ontological made the least sense. I doubt one can by internal logic argue a certain kind of deity must exist.
P.S. Wouldn’t arguing that Jesus of Nazareth is presented as “omniscient” be in tension with his own recorded insistence that he did not know when future events he spoke of would happen?
I don’t know anything about Perfect Being Theism.
The ontological argument has had several revisions. The recent one by Alvin Plantinga as related by William Craig is this one.
It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
Are you implying that God knows all hearts only at a particular time? What is the basis for that thought? For example, consider 1 Chronicles 28:9 “. . . for the LORD searches all hearts, and understands every intent of the thoughts. . . .” What makes you think that this verse says God knows hearts only at that particular moment? It seems to me that the verse states that for any moment, He searches the hearts and understands every intent of the thoughts. But the set of “any” moments is all moments. I don’t see any reason in the verses I presented to limit His knowledge to a particular time.
Interesting that you would say that because I’ve read (can’t think of the reference on the spot) that the concepts of molinism and middle knowledge were precipitated by this verse! So, it’s not anachronistic at all. It spawned and thus preceded that whole field.
Besides that, I wasn’t even appealing to possible worlds, molinism, and middle knowledge. I was simply appealing just to the biblical fact that Jesus predicted what would have happened had the sinful, pagan cities of Tyre and Sidon seen the miracles that the Jewish Bethsaida and Chorazin apparently saw and ignored for the most part. He was so sure of this prediction that he said in the next verse that they (i.e., Tyre and Sidon) will have a more tolerable judgment.
Again, I affirm that God is omniscient. He knows all things that can be known.
However, knowing in advance what a free-will agent will choose cannot be known.
I have given an analogy concerning God’s omnipotence. God can do all things that are possible to do.
But for God to create a stone so large that He cannot lift it, is not possible. Contradictions are not objects of power.
Knowing in advance what a free-will agent will choose is a contradiction. Contradictions are not objects of knowledge.
Making a square circle is logically impossible. God’s omniscience and omnipotence do not allow the logically impossible.
Well, those some who contend that are apparently wrong. There is nothing logically impossible about an omniscient being knowing what a free-willed creature chooses. The logical argument supporting that contention was covered many months ago by me in this forum in a thread (Contradictions Are Not Objects of Power or Knowledge). Those who contend that omniscience does not allow knowing what a free decision is commit what is known as the modal fallacy.
Not all participants here accepted the argument I presented, but it is apparently well accepted by many philosophers.
Not true, according to much philosophical opinion and analysis.
But it’s not impossible for someone not to do something if that something is contingent. That is the definition of contingent. Paidion continues to confuse contingent and necessary.
This is again the argument in syllogism form.
Premise 1: Necessarily, if God foreknows X, then X will happen.
Premise 2: God foreknows X.
Conclusion: Therefore, X will happen.
And X happens in agreement with God’s foreknowledge.
The problem is many people see the “Necessarily” at the start of Premise 1 and think it modifies the consequent “X will happen” and they thus think it means “X must happen.” But “Necessarily” doesn’t modify the consequent; it modifies the entire premise. The contingency “X will happen” is in the consequent and as a result, the contingent “X will happen” is what follows logically in the conclusion, not the necessary “X must happen.”
Now since “X will happen” is a contingent proposition, it is possible that Y would have happened instead. But if Y happened instead, God would have foreknown that contingency and thus would have foreknown that Y will happen, as described in the syllogism below, which concludes that Y will happen.
Premise 1: Necessarily, if God foreknows Y, then Y will happen.
Premise 2: God foreknows Y.
Conclusion: Therefore, Y will happen.
Thus, when X is foreknown to happen, X indeed happens, and when Y is foreknown to happen, Y indeed happens. God never foreknows something happening that doesn’t happen.
I could put it the other way around. There are multiple verses that attest to God’s omniscience concerning free choices of humans. The fact that there are different verses that claim both sides of an issue is not an indictment of the modal fallacy. It’s an indictment of the Bible or our comprehension of it.
Yes, and so what? Have I said anything that depends on the logic of middle knowledge? The point on what Jesus said about Tyre and Sidon doesn’t depend on middle knowledge. Middle knowledge depends on what Jesus said about Tyre and Sidon.
There is no “waving a victory flag.” I’m just telling you what philosophical argument makes sense to me, knowing full well that not all people, including philosophers, agree. But at least I have an argument in the form of a valid syllogism, unlike the syllogisms of some critics, and some critics don’t even have them.
And if you want proof, you’re in the wrong forum.
On the first phase, how is what is “possible” determined? On the second, why does it follow that every thing thought ‘possible’ must exist?
I don’t think most philosophers agree this is wrong, and I see nothing logical about knowing a free choice that’s not yet been made.
Holding that some texts oppose omniscience, and others encourage it, I have no axe here. But I don’t see where this verse "states" that God knows intents “for any moment,” particularly not that he knows those intents in moments that haven’t yet occurred. It sounds to me as though God knows thoughts when they are being thought, rather than being a text on his ability to predict all future free choices.
P.S. Wouldn’t arguing that Jesus of Nazareth is presented as “omniscient” be in tension with his own recorded insistence that he did not “know” when future events he spoke of would happen?
Your syllogism importing the label “contingent” for known and certain choices as a way to deny that it’s ‘impossible’ for the person not to do what omniscience knows he will do, sounds like a word game to me, that I do not comprehend. Your conclusion that once God foreknows a choice, it will always happen, seems to concede qaz’s premise that it IS then “impossible” for that person not to do what’s foreknown.
I think you are confusing me with the person who wrote this argument. That would be Alvin Plantinga. I am not a philosopher. But I would guess that if it is not contradictory, it would be possible. So, if there is nothing contradictory about a maximally great being existing, it would be possible.
Well, you left out all of the intervening steps, so no wonder you are confused. If you follow each step, it may become clearer.
I haven’t polled them, so I can’t evaluate your first claim. But I know of several philosophers who see no problem with foreknowing what a free agent chooses. On your second claim, the point isn’t how it can be done. It’s whether any rules of logic are violated if it is done. And as the syllogism shows, no rules are violated.
Well, of course He knows the thoughts when they occur and given that those thoughts occur at any moment when the individual is thinking, then He knows what those thoughts are that occur at those moments.
‘Contradictory’ to what?’ I would think the only thing that must exist is that which is not contradictory to what actually exists. But what is perceived as ‘contradictory’ seems at the heart of the dispute. We disagree are whether it’s contradictory to know for certain a future free choice, on whether a maximally great being has to be able to do this, and whether everything ‘possible’ must exist.
It’s not a game. A contingent event could have been different. A necessary event could not have been different.
If God foreknows a choice, it will happen because the chooser made that choice. That is, it is the chooser’s choice that determines God’s foreknowledge, not the other way around.
Exactly. Thus, knowing what those thoughts are at the moments when the individual is thinking those thoughts, means that future thoughts and intents that at the present moment have not yet occurred, are not something this verse says that God can know. I.e. The reality of those future thoughts does not presently exist as something to be known.
Contradictory means that there is no contradiction in such a thing occurring. There would seem to be no contradiction in a maximally great being occurring.
Attaching a word to the choice, and then asserting that that word means it is still possible that a different choice could be made is precisely a word game. The reality remains that qaz is correct that once God knows or declares a person will make a certain choice, it IS “impossible” that this person can make any other choice.
Again, now you are questioning how this can occur, not whether this can occur.
But to anticipate your next question, it could occur if God’s knowledge of an event is temporally prior to the event (as it must be if this is true foreknowledge) but the event is causally or logically prior to God’s foreknowledge, such that the event determines God’s foreknowledge. Such would be possible in a being who is not limited by time the way we are, not an impossible assumption in a being purportedly responsible for the creation of the universe and as a result in a being who is not limited by the time dimension (since He created it) as we are.