Is compatibilism campatible with the existence of God?

[Michael]

This is from William Lane Craig’s Forum, but (as most universalists are determinists, or compatilibsts who deny libertarian freewill) I think it’s relevant here (and I’d be interested in your responses.)

In the case of God, he has libertarian free will thus he is able to “just choose” an indeterministic option for no other reason than this is what he chose because he decided to choose that particular choice.

If God is good by nature, could He (indeterministically, for no reason) suddenly decide to be evil?

I’ve always been a compatibalist, and I confess I don’t really understand what those who say they believe in libertarian freewill really mean by the term (i.e. free to chose something for no reason, without any predisposition?), but I’ve seen convincing arguments against the concept, and the basic argument is the same one used for the existence of God–i.e. there has to be a cause for an effect.

If you choose chicken over steak, it’s either because you like chicken better than steak, or because you think it’s better for you.

But if you have two plates of chicken at perfectly equal distances from you, you are neither left handed or right handed, left brained or right brained, and there is absolutely no reason for you to choose one over the other (and no higher power to help you out before you starve to death), how could you ever make a choice?

If all things were truly equal, it would seem logical that you would starve to death, with your will caught between two equally good choices.

It’s been said (even by great Theologians like C.S. Lewis) that God can not do the logically impossible (like make a four sided circle, or create an object so heavy even He can’t lift it), so, if we apply that logic to God, how could any of His actions be truly arbitrary and purposeless?

But some things in the universe do seem that way, don’t they?

When I was a kid they said there were nine planets in the solar system, then they said eight, now they say there may be nine again (with a gas giant beyond Pluto), but what difference could it possibly make?

Wouldn’t the choice of eight, or nine, or seven, or ten be purely arbitrary?

And if there are things in the universe that are wholly arbitrary (determined not by God’s nature or purpose), wouldn’t He have to have libertarian freewill to choose between these equally desirable alternatives?

I’m just thinking out loud here, and I would appreciate other thoughts.

Thank you.

I’m sure most of you here are compatibilists, do you have any thoughts on this?

Is it philosophically inconsistent to deny the existence of libertarian freewill without also denying the existence of God?

[Alex_Smith]

If God is good by nature, could He (indeterministically, for no reason) suddenly decide to be evil?

Interesting question - I certainly hope not!

I’ve always been a compatibalist, and I confess I don’t really understand what those who say they believe in libertarian freewill really mean by the term (i.e. free to chose something for no reason, without any predisposition?), but I’ve seen convincing arguments against the concept, and the basic argument is the same one used for the existence of God–i.e. there has to be a cause for an effect.

I view myself as a compatibalist, although I’m sure a Philosopher could easily “beat me up” on this topic as I find “free will vs determinism” complex.

Got to run now but hope to respond more later.

[Michael]

If God is good by nature, could He (indeterministically, for no reason) suddenly decide to be evil?

Interesting question - I certainly hope not!

I’ve always been a compatibalist, and I confess I don’t really understand what those who say they believe in libertarian freewill really mean by the term (i.e. free to chose something for no reason, without any predisposition?), but I’ve seen convincing arguments against the concept, and the basic argument is the same one used for the existence of God–i.e. there has to be a cause for an effect.

I view myself as a compatibalist, although I’m sure a Philosopher could easily “beat me up” on this topic as I find “free will vs determinism” complex.

Got to run now but hope to respond more later.

Thank you Alex.

I’d be very interested in your thoughts here.

Got to run now but hope to respond more later.

Please do.

And please see “Can God Play Dice.”

[Alex_Smith]

If you choose chicken over steak, it’s either because you like chicken better than steak, or because you think it’s better for you.

It would seem to me the only way to make it completely unbiased would be to make decision based on an external random source (e.g. toss a coin), although then we aren’t free but bound by the external source

Thinking out loud, I don’t think there could be a truly external random source for God to make an unbiased decision by… therefore all His decisions must be made according to His internal character.

But if you have two plates of chicken at perfectly equal distances from you, you are neither left handed or right handed, left brained or right brained, and there is absolutely no reason for you to choose one over the other (and no higher power to help you out before you starve to death), how could you ever make a choice?

I think most people would make a pseudo-random choice and just pick one.

If all things were truly equal, it would seem logical that you would starve to death, with your will caught between two equally good choices.

I can imagine that maybe if someone was severely mentally ill, perhaps with severe Autism or anxiety, they might get so stressed/overwhelmed that they might “freeze” in indecision

It’s been said (even by great Theologians like C.S. Lewis) that God can not do the logically impossible (like make a four sided circle, or create an object so heavy even He can’t lift it), so, if we apply that logic to God, how could any of His actions be truly arbitrary and purposeless?

I think I agree with Lewis.

But some things in the universe do seem that way, don’t they?

Yes, they do… I can only imagine it’s because I can’t see the big picture.

[Michael]

Thinking out loud, I don’t think there could be a truly external random source for God to make an unbiased decision by… therefore all His decisions must be made according to His internal character.

So every choice God made/makes in creating and maintaining this universe would have to be grounded in His internal character?

Would that include the precise number of planets in the solar system, whether the sun (as viewed from earth) would rise in the east or the west, the number of continents on earth, the precise continent His Son was born in, etc.?

Would God not have to make all these choices to create the universe we live in?

And if the only way to make a completely unbiased choice would be to make such decisions based on an external random source (e.g. toss a coin), and there couldn’t be any truly external random source for God to make an unbiased decision by (as you said above) would that mean He could never have created the universe we see (a universe having some precise and arbitrary characteristics–or “contingent characteristics,” as some Christian Philosophers would say)?

I think most people would make a pseudo-random choice and just pick one.

What do you mean by “pseudo-random,” and would that kind of choice be available to God?

I think most people would…just pick one…I can imagine that maybe if someone was severely mentally ill, perhaps with severe Autism or anxiety, they might get so stressed/overwhelmed that they might “freeze” in indecision.

People are finite, they experience time linearly, and there thoughts occur in sequence (with the possible exception of some people with severe Autism.)

One way most people (not suffering from severe Autism) could always “just pick one” would be by picking the first option that occurred to them.

But would that option be available to God?

If He’s timeless, and experiences the past, present, and future as “one eternal now,” and sees all the alternatives and options at once (so there is no “first”), could He still “just pick one”?

I’m thinking out loud here too.

I’m trying to figure this out because I’ve been going thru a crisis of faith for a long time (and I want to believe), and my reason sometimes seems like all I have left.

I thank you for your participation in this thread, and I ask you to say more if you can.

[PrototypeAnthroUnit]

Hmmmmmm, I’m intrigued by this one! And not just because I’ve wondered about these kinda things, on and off, for quite a while myself!

I’m gonna do some thinking out loud here too, I guess. When an artist paints a picture, or sculpts a sculpture, or creates some other work of art, the same kinds of questions and concerns can arise. Why did the artist choose to portray their art in the manner they chose? If it’s a sculpture of a person, why did they design it to be as tall as they did? Or in the case of a painting, why did they choose the colors they used?

Insofar as the artist is a rational agent, there will be reasons for all of the choices they made in designing and creating their artwork. Even if the artist is not conscious of the reasons for their decisions, the reasons will be there nevertheless.

Now, if we understand the quality of arbitrariness in decision making as being indicative of a lack of reasoning (I.e. not needing a reason to make a decision) in said decision making, then it seems to me that the concern regarding whether God can make arbitrary decisions is essentially a concern about whether God needs a reason/reasons in order to choose between, say, a six-planet solar system for us vs. a nine-planet solar system (Or any other number of planets, for that matter).

(The reason I’m going with this understanding of “arbitrary” is based on when Michael wrote, regarding the two plates of chicken that are exactly the same, that “there is absolutely no reason for you to choose one over the other”.)

Now, if I’m understanding this properly, then it strikes me that arguing that God doesn’t need a reason (or reasons) to make certain decisions is tantamount to arguing that God is not rational with regards to certain decisions, or perhaps even that He ceases to be a rational agent with regards to such decisions. This doesn’t seem like a legitimate conclusion to me.

So it strikes me that a very relevant concern here is whether there is, or even can be, such a thing as a truly arbitrary decision, either by God or anyone else.

Another very relevant concern is whether or not there are such things as perfectly equal alternatives to choose between. Similar alternatives, I can see that, but perfectly equal alternatives? That might not even be conceptually coherent, when you get right down to it.

For what it’s worth, if you ever find yourself sitting down at a table looking at two equally desirable plates of chicken, my suggestion is: take both!

[Michael]

Now, if I’m understanding this properly, then it strikes me that arguing that God doesn’t need a reason (or reasons) to make certain decisions is tantamount to arguing that God is not rational with regards to certain decisions, or perhaps even that He ceases to be a rational agent with regards to such decisions. This doesn’t seem like a legitimate conclusion to me.

That’s my problem, do you see any solution?

Another very relevant concern is whether or not there are such things as perfectly equal alternatives to choose between. Similar alternatives, I can see that, but perfectly equal alternatives? That might not even be conceptually coherent, when you get right down to it.

Are you saying that a choice between this solar system (with it’s earth, and it’s history) as the center of salvific history, and a solar system with ten planets (and a different “earth,” with a different linguistic history–say multiple alphabets that aren’t all so closely related that they all start with the same apparently arbitrary phonetic sound), might not be the choice between two perfectly equal alternatives that it appears to be?

(And if you are, could you elaborate on that possibility a little?)

For what it’s worth, if you ever find yourself sitting down at a table looking at two equally desirable plates of chicken, my suggestion is: take both!

On another forum, someone (I think a non-Christian Theist, or perhaps an agnostic) has suggested that God does always “choose both” (i.e. the multiverse theory), but that doesn’t seem a viable option for a Christian Theist (unless you’re willing to embrace the unorthodox view that the incarnation and atonement are parabolic, or the equally unorthodox view that Christ literally came in the flesh and died multiple times on multiple worlds.)

So it strikes me that a very relevant concern here is whether there is, or even can be, such a thing as a truly arbitrary decision, either by God or anyone else.

Can there be?

You seem to understand my questions and concerns perfectly–do you see any solutions?

Do you have any answers?

[Paidion]

If you choose chicken over steak, it’s either because you like chicken better than steak, or because you think it’s better for you.

Liking chicken better than steak is an influence on you, but not a CAUSE of your choice.
Thinking chicken is better for you is likewise an influence, but not a CAUSE of your choice.

But here’s the heart of the matter. Say you did choose chicken over steak for whatever reason. Could you have chosen steak instead? If your answer is “yes” then you are neither a determinist nor a compatibilist. You believe in libertarian free will.You believe that you yourself are the cause of your action.

Unless we possess libertarian free will, we are not responsible for our actions. For we couldn’t have done otherwise. So where would be the justice in punishing the thief, the murderer, the torturer, etc. etc. etc.?

[Michael]

Unless we possess libertarian free will, we are not responsible for our actions. For we couldn’t have done otherwise. So where would be the justice in punishing the thief, the murderer, the torturer, etc. etc. etc.?

I guess that would depend on whether you see the purpose of punishment as remedial or vindictive.

If it’s remedial, the thief could perhaps learn something by having his possessions taken from him, and the torturer could perhaps learn something from being tortured (and if there’s life after death, the murderer could perhaps learn something by having his mortal life prematurely taken from him by execution.)

If you choose chicken over steak, it’s either because you like chicken better than steak, or because you think it’s better for you.

Liking chicken better than steak is an influence on you, but not a CAUSE of your choice.
Thinking chicken is better for you is likewise an influence, but not a CAUSE of your choice.

But here’s the heart of the matter. Say you did choose chicken over steak for whatever reason. Could you have chosen steak instead?

You mean could you choose steak over chicken while hating the taste of it, believing it was bad for you, proffering chicken, and viewing chicken as the more healthful choice?

I don’t see how a “free” agent could do that unless they had some reason (like winning a bet, or letting someone else have the chicken when there wasn’t enough to go around.)

There’s a reason most universalists are compatibilists who believe in remedial punishment.

If it’s possible for a rational agent to choose steak over chicken while hating the taste of it, believing it’s bad for him, proffering chicken, and viewing chicken as the more healthful choice (in other words, for no reason), wouldn’t it be possible for men and angels to choose sin, and evil, and eternal torment over heaven?

If your answer is “yes” then you are neither a determinist nor a compatibilist. You believe in libertarian free will.You believe that you yourself are the cause of your action.

Not necessarily.

Even if you didn’t like steak, and you didn’t think it was particularly healthful, there could be other reasons for choosing it.

( like trying to please someone you love, or get them to eat,)

But if you say you could choose something for absolutely no reason, than I guess you believe in libertarian freewill.

[Michael]

An interesting comment from the other forum.

When you allow the supernatural anything is possible. God could say, “Let there be a little black box out of which random particles appear.” He wouldn’t need to know the mechanism. There is no mechanism. It’s just his supernatural will. And if he wills it to be random it is random. He knows what comes out just because he sees all time.

Isn’t this basically what he does when he creates souls/libertarian-free-wills? There isn’t a mechanism or formula that determines at the moment of its creation that a particular soul/LFW will be good or bad, is there? Isn’t each LFW a little random decision generator as far as God knows?

The part I have a problem with is “He wouldn’t need to know the mechanism. There is no mechanism. It’s just his supernatural will. And if he wills it to be random it is random.”

That doesn’t make sense to me at the moment, and I posted this reply.

And neither He or the secondary cause (i.e. the little black box) would create the particles, or determine their behavior–they’d just come into existence and start doing things all on their own because God willed it?

Isn’t saying that these particles could come into existence on their own (i.e. just appear out of the little black box), and do things on their own (i.e. behave indeterministically), and (at the same time) saying that this could be so because God wills it a contradiction in terms?

Aren’t you saying both that the mechanism of their existence and behavior is God’s will, and that there is no mechanism?

If I forget about there being no table, and no laws of gravity, or friction, or motion without God, I can imagine Him blindfolding Himself and letting the dice roll, but once I remember that He’s supposed to be the source of all, I tend to come to the conclusion that the dice would do nothing unless He willed them to.

So I ask myself how God’s will (or secondary deterministic causes that exist only because of God’s will) could cause the dice to move, and come to rest in a certain position, without God being fully aware of how they would move and where they would come to rest?

Do any of you have any thoughts?

[Paidion]

It never ceases to amaze me that there are people who make choices every day, and who know they could have made a different choice, nevertheless believe that their choices were determined by prior causes and that they couldn’t have done otherwise. To me it seems as ludicrous as a sighted person claiming that all people are blind or a hearing person claiming that all people are deaf.

All of us behave every day as if we could have acted differently from the way we did, in fact, act. Today at Xmas dinner at my daughter’s house, I chose to eat pumpkin pie and ice-cream for desert. I know I could have chosen blueberry pie and ice-cream (which I prefer), but the simple fact is that I wanted to have pumpkin pie. There was no other reason to choose it. It wasn’t a random act. Rather, I myself was the cause of my action. There’s no explanation as to why I chose pumpkin pie except that I wanted to eat it. I would have been glad to have eaten blueberry pie instead, and I know I COULD HAVE done so! The fact that I could have done so is what defines libertarian free will.

[Michael]

I chose to eat pumpkin pie and ice-cream for desert. I know I could have chosen blueberry pie and ice-cream (which I prefer)

Did you prefer blueberry pie at the very moment you asked for pumpkin pie?

Was there enough blueberry pie to go around for your children and grandchildren (or anyone else you knew preferred blueberry)?

but the simple fact is that I wanted to have pumpkin pie

Then you really didn’t prefer blueberry pie at the moment you (wanted, and) asked for pumpkin pie, did you?

Now do you think what you really felt like, asked for, and got came as a total surprise to God?

Do you think your freewill could have just settled on possum pie, or chilled monkey brains for desert, and can you conceive of yourself eating something that completely turned your stomach (to you surprise, God’s surprise, and the complete surprise of anyone who’s ever known you) just because you wanted to (and for no other reason, like a sudden chemical imbalance in your brain, or maybe keeping someone else from having to eat something gross)?

Of course not, because if you did (without having such a reason) you wouldn’t be you, would you?

And whatever you “just want,” or prefer depends on who you are and what you feel like doesn’t it?

You don’t just wake up and decide you feel like a sharp stick in you eye today, and make a freewill choice to stick a sharp object in your eye, do you?

I just got a reply from that poster on The Reasonable Faith Forum, and this is what he said.

Sorry. I should have made it clear. I’m not a theist.

I was pointing out that when one (a theist) can invoke the supernatural one has an answer to any question…

But I should stop building this straw man. It would be preferable to get real theists to respond.

No Theists on William Lane Craig’s forum have responded yet, what are your thoughts here?

Could God just say, “Let there be a little black box out of which random particles appear”?

And would it follow that He wouldn’t need to know the mechanism, because there wouldn’t be any mechanism?

Was C.S. Lewis right in thinking that quantum theorists can’t really mean what they seem to be saying (which he thought was philosophically inane), and really mean (under strict philosophical analysis) no more than that the movements of sub-atomic particles are permanently incalculable to us, not that they are in themselves random and lawless?
**
Could God’s will produce randomness and chaos, and cause particles to act in ways that are ultimately uncaused and unpredictable (even to Him), or is this the philosophical absurdity it appeared to be to Lewis**?
**
How could God design chaos, or cause uncaused** (indeterminate) behavior?

Isn’t that a contradiction in terms?

And if the chaos of quantum theory is undesigned, and the behaviors of sub-atomic particles are uncaused, wouldn’t this quantum flux of undesigned chaos and uncaused action have to be uncreated and co-eternal with God?

And wouldn’t this strike at the very heart of classical Theism (which views God as the one uncaused cause, and the one Independent Fact)?

Wouldn’t we have an uncreated quantum universe filled with independent (sub-atomic) facts?

[auggybendoggy]

Michael, as much as I see free will answering the problem of evil, I have too many difficulties with it. But thanks for the interesting thoughts. I’m reading along and appreciating your questions and your friendly approach.

Thanks.

[jack_dortignac]

To think, that a person could believe that if they can’t figure out the "free will, determinist, compatabalist quandary, then they are free to behave in ways that will ultimately make them very unhappy.

It would be funny if it wasn’t so tragic!

Just be like a child, follow the law to love God above all, and your neighbor as yourself, and all these things will fall into place.

Hint: Jesus showed us how.

Sorry, I know I’m not very philosophical. But I’m having a lot of fun.

On a given day, all things being equal, I would take the chicken, steak, blueberry pie and the pumpkin pie, as long as my deterministic stomach didn’t start to complain.

And if God doesn’t exist, why does He keep talking to me?