The Evangelical Universalist Forum

JRP's Bite-Sized Metaphysics (Series 215)

Theology Philosophical
#21

I consider atheism thus to be logically deducted from the theory pool. If I take my own rationality seriously (and yours, my reader’s, as well–even if you are an atheist), then whatever ultimate reality is, I will not consider it to have specifically ‘atheistic’ characteristics.

Does this mean atheism is necessarily false? No. I may not in fact be capable of thinking. If I am not capable of thinking, then my deductive removal of atheism falls immediately to the ground, of course! But at the same time, if I am not capable of thinking, then my qualification (in atheism’s favor) concerning this deduction cannot be considered reliable, either.

I have therefore discovered that atheism either is not true, or at best can neither be discovered nor even usefully (appearances notwithstanding) proposed.

I should therefore, for all practical purposes, conclude that some type of ‘not-atheism’ is true.

Notice I have been saying “should therefore conclude”. This is, in some respects, weaker than a ‘must’: logical conclusions do not equate to a necessary behavior on my part. I can act. I can choose to reject this and flatly assert atheism, if I wish. I can pretend that atheism ‘makes sense’, if I wish; and at this point such an action on my part (not necessarily on the part of other people) would be pretending, as I would no longer have certain complex and difficult barriers insulating me and allowing an honest mistake due to miscalculation.

Thus, ‘should’ is the correct word; for it also carries a moral imperative, itself not necessarily binding in the behavioral sense (else it would not be a ‘mere’ ‘should’). Having gotten to this point, I find that I ‘should’ conclude (and by assenting to the conclusion thereby ‘believe’) God exists. (I am not yet saying that I should believe in God; that’s a related matter, regarding personal trust, but I will discuss it later.)

#22

The normal opinion among theologians (and anti-theologians), and among practicing advocates of religion (and anti-religion), has often been that the existence of God cannot be established deductively. In a way–a paradoxical way–I have found that this is both correct and incorrect. God’s existence (and, as I shall demonstrate, a wide range of God’s characteristics) can be deductively established; yet, a loophole does remain.

It is a logical loophole, in the sense of being a ‘formal’ loophole; yet it is also an anti-logical loophole, insofar as a person who takes the loophole either begins to commit cognitive suicide, or begins to deal with reality dishonestly, or perhaps both. At the end of this phase of my positive argument, there is, after all, a step to be willed; a step that can be rejected, although for (literally) no good reason. The path branches here; one side leading to truth and to further truths, the other to (literal) ‘self’-destruction: and in either case, a willful choice precedes the step.

If there is a ‘must’ at this point, then it is the necessity of choice itself, one path or the other. To refuse to choose is the same as taking the path to cognitive suicide, or at best to a self-crippled perception of reality: it would be a refusal to deal with reality as reality is being revealed to be, which is the same as a claim to be able to ignore reality at the preference of our own wishes.

[Footnote: This assumes my argument is formally correct, of course, and that I have properly understood its meanings. I am not, by the way, attempting to sneak a conventional ‘damnation clause’ into my presentation here. All I have said so far, is what I think is common sense: committing cognitive suicide is foolish; and holding a doctrine that requires committing cognitive suicide while shuffling contentions around to avoid that implication, is cheating. (There have been some ‘Christians’ to whose theories I would apply the same principle.) I will have more to say later about ethical implications of such choices.]

Understand: I am not saying anything about ‘religion’ yet, nor anything to do with a personal relationship to this God as a Person. But I have now reached the stage where even discussing such issues becomes a shatteringly practical question: will I continue?

#23

I do not say that a choice either way at this point is irretrievable; I am not talking of other chances I may have to retrace the steps, or to jump from one side to the other. I could still choose to jump to the path of disbelief at any point–and I assure you, there are times when I am strongly tempted to do so. But if I did, I would be doing so in defiance of what I have already concluded about reality. I would not be a true man.

Trying to be true, admittedly involves checking carefully to see if I am perhaps mistaken. But being true also means I am obligated to stay the course as well as I can in deeply painful situations (as I have done); because pain and grief can drive us to think irrationally. For what it is worth, I can therefore respect an oppositional commitment to what you, my reader, think is true; including in the face of a merely emotional doubt (of whatever strength). The question is, why do you disbelieve me–or perhaps why do you think I am mistaken? And, are you checking to be quite sure you are not salting the pizza in your own favor?

But speaking of salting the pizza in one’s own favor: an especially astute reader may see in my argument during the last few chapters, a hole I have so far left untouched. It is a very subtle hole, that I myself discovered while working on this book; but from which, once I discovered it, I learned something new about what I could argue concerning the character of ultimate reality.

I will explore this hole in my next chapter.

Next up: sauces for ganders may strike again, against me this time!]

#24

Note: I’ve started a far more colorful (and, to me at least, emotionally involving) version of the same formal argument here: The Argument From True Love.