[This is a continuation of Section Two, Reason and the First Person. An index with links to all parts of the work as they are posted can be found [url=https://forum.evangelicaluniversalist.com/t/sword-to-the-heart-reason-and-the-first-person/1081/1]here. A more colorful summary of the 125 pages of analysis and discussion so far in this Section, can be found here as the Argument From True Love]
[This series constitutes Chapter 20, “A Serious Problem With This Argument For Theism”.]
One of the key points to my past few chapters is that philosophies can be broken down into two mutually exclusive categories–atheisms, and not-atheisms–and that if one of those general branches requires a contradiction of the Golden Presumption, then it should be deducted from the option list. Using this strategy, I pared off atheism, leaving the branches of ‘not-atheism’ for further scrutiny.
However, there is a potential problem looming: would the same tactic also deduct not-atheisms from the option list?
Does the proposition of an ultimate Act-er contradict the Golden Presumption? Is it self-consistent to claim that actions of God produce actions of derivative entities such as you and I? (Or, are we derivative entities after all?!)
Everyone, I think, agrees that actions can produce reactions, insofar as they acknowledge the existence of actions at all (which as I argued previously everyone has to at least tacitly, do in regard to at least themselves). But the whole point to the Golden Presumption is that we must presume you and I are not utterly reactive. A conclusion of not-atheism therefore leads to the question of whether it is nonsensical to propose that actions can produce actions.