Cindy:
I haven’t heard a theodicy for suffering in a determined universe b4 (most involve Free Will Defence); except the Calvinist justification that since God is just, holy, omniscient, God couldn’t in principle do anything wrong, no matter how we judge things. I think, to use your example of God as the artist slowly creating a work, we would have to know if this is a choice of God to create slowly, and indirectly inflicting pain on God’s “unwilling” (I see ur problem having only anthropomorphisms to describe this) raw material or if God is constrained. I understand you arguing for the latter and though we are not in an epistemic position to know the metaphysical necessity of that slow creating involving pain, it is at least conceivable that God could have avoided this, for the more we move away from freedom as being necessary or as the greatest good (or equally good compared to universal happiness), then the less likely the “unwillingness” of the raw material/nothingness (or that with the tendency to “chaos”) is due to any entity but God.
Jesus Christ, however, is an (the) answer: if suffering is unavoidable (or a method of creating that God prefers), then at least God is fair and inflicts it on Himself, though maybe if this creation method is just one of preference, it would be better of God to spare everybody including Godself as Jesus.
I got the .pdf copy of The Inescapable Love of God and will read it this weekend between rounds of shovelling out of the polar vortex .
Johnny:
What do you think of Craig’s retort to Talbott that freedom being only a “fully informed decision” is question-begging, since that would make rejection under any kind of “normal” circumstances impossible (though Talbott is referring to having a fully-informed freedom in the afterlife, where presumably our illusions are shattered, and Craig thinks that afterlife conversions are unBiblical)? Similarly, if knowledge lessens the probability of rejecting the good or right thing, then how do we explain rejection on behalf of people who are by all accounts very knowledgeable (though not absolutely) and good (from a humanitarian standpoint) and reject God? Though this is perhaps a fanciful example, Lucifer (if you believe in his existence), is the most knowledgeable created being and he rejected God. Whether that is Biblical or more an idea of Milton I suppose is an open question. (Craig and Talbott also wrote about “Miltonic” rejection - I can’t remember their full comments).
I think you present a challenging question. “Freedom” certainly involves determinism at some level, or at least rational explicability (i.e. the reason most people don’t do heinous things is because they know they are evil, not b/c they choose to be good on a whim as true indeterminists might have to hold). Craig gave some examples of his notion of freedom, in a recent debate he had with Paul Helm, a Calvinist, and thinks that God’s knowledge of counterfactuals or what we would in any given situation doesn’t preclude our freedom to choose. Craig cites 1 Corinthians 10:13* No testing has overtaken you that is not common to everyone. God is faithful, and he will not let you be tested beyond your strength, but with the testing he will also provide the way out so that you may be able to endure it*.; Helm and Craig debated whether Romans 8:28-30 jived with Molinism or Calvinism, esp. Romans 8:29, how strongly to interpret “foreknew” or προγινώσκω (Strong’s g4267).