Well a Molinist would say - if you beg the question and deny libertarian free will (which Molinism affirms), then no, of course the creature has no power to do otherwise. But, if you grant that that libertarian freedom is real, he really does have the power, himself, to do otherwise, though he may not in fact (that is, in reality) exercise it.
Allan,
Thanks for the response. The mold of my mind makes it difficult for me to grasp some of your points. You tend to be more poetic in expression which, while intriguing, seems to lend itself more to the ambiguity of language than logical precision.
Perhaps you could discuss in what capacity God is responsible for sin, if he:
a) knew certainly it would occur
b) made beings which could not avoid it
c) causes them pain because it
Hi Chris,
Good clarifications! Today, the divide in evaluating our “experience of freedom” is curious. Even most humanistic secularists seem to assume that it is real and is what makes life meaningful. Yet most scientific types see it as too incoherent with the thoughtful knowledge we have, and conclude that it is ultimately an illusion.
We both won’t argue for Molinism as explaining ‘free’ will, think libertarian freedom may not be “intelligible,” and that our “feeling” that we “could do otherwise” may not prove that we have it. Yet we both feel it, and see that if sin is actually inevitable, difficulty remains in understanding our “responsibility” for sin (human vs. divine). You’re inclined to relieve that tension in the meaning of “guilt” by positing the existence of human ability to transcend the normal role of circumstantial cause and effect. And I too am attracted to assuming that there is some kind of ‘freedom’ that makes ‘guilt’ appropriate. But it remains that none of this removes my difficulty with sensing that I have little idea of how to intelligibly expound what such ‘freedom’ is, or explain it as a reality that fits what I observe about how the choices we make are actually arrived at.
Chris,
I’ve been following this thread and thinking much about the idea of why, (as Talbott says):
I agree that we develop to the point where we make at least* some* libertarian free-will decisions and the consequences of these decisions (hopefully) and the work of the Holy Spirit helps us become better people, to develop our character to become more selfless, loving, and creatures who *choose *to do the right thing. The “overcoming” you’ve mentioned before is a key part of this. Creating character like this in an environment of ambiguity and epistemic distance must have some benefit, provide some “good” that simply eliminating the epistemic distance right off the bat would lack?
What might this “good” be if at the reconciliation of all things, at the apokatastasis all epistemic distance is removed? In that situation I think we might agree that it would be impossible to do the wrong thing. Well, here I’m going to speculate and may be way off track but here goes… What if the apokatastasis is simply the end for this world? Perhaps there are other planets or universes with creatures that are not fully reconciled to God? In that case, there could be work for us to do as agents or messengers for God and that work would involve leaving (for awhile) our “home base”, the New Earth, and entering again into a realm of epistemic distance. In this environment, doing the right thing despite epistemic distance would be essential and the training of our earthly lives (and most likely post-mortem) would be invaluable. I think even Christ experienced some epistemic distance during his incarnation, but even when tempted, continued to do the Father’s will. Thinking of post-mortem education or correction always brings to mind George MacDonald and the trials and training characters in his fantasies and fairy-tales go through such as in “The Wise Woman”.
Just some thoughts here and I really hope this doesn’t derail the thread as I’ve enjoyed following it.
Steve
Perhaps Chris, I just have difficulty granting something that is being debated (seems circular). My logic follows Bob’s thoughts here - how would God know what someone is going to choose is in fact the choice is open? Seems open theism solves some of these issues? Out of curiosity, is Craig an open theist? Is open theism compatible with Molinism? I’ve never really thought much about someone holding to both.
The Molinist would say, I imagine, something like this: the choice is “open” only in the sense that it is not determined by God. It is determined entirely by the libertarian will of the creature. However, God, in his infinite knowledge, knows what each free action will be before it occurs. How God knows this is a mystery (this is called the grounding objection.)
The mystery then is thrown back onto God’s knowledge as opposed to his character, in the case of the predetermination of sin.
Craig isn’t an open theist. Open theism would say that God doesn’t know the free acts of creatures until they occur. This has tons of implications, as you can imagine. Without derailing the thread too much I will say quickly that I find too many problems with open theology.
So are we any closer to understanding the truth of the matter? 
I mean, there either is libertarian freedom or there isn’t. One has to be true. And if God exists and if we’re guilty of sin and if he is all powerful and all good and if all this is true, there must be a consistency behind all the apparent contradictions. Granting of course our words, concepts, and the belief in the ability of ourselves to understand reality accurately have any meaning.
At what point are we justified – or even obligated, if we are honest – to say that the whole thing is just an illusion, or byproduct of the social evolution and remnants of a psyche that had certain practical advantages for the herd organisms at one time? My conscience forces me to conclude that this is probably the case unless I can find at least a possible solution.
Perhaps we can still make sin “necessary” and this not do away from its guilt and our further correction. Perhaps for us to be persons independent from God, it was somehow necessary for us to experience an intentionality of our own, apart from him. Perhaps sin – or, more fundamentally, a “my will over against Gods” – is an experience without which there could be no true distinction or separation from God. Perhaps sin simply is that: the true emergence of an “I” over and against God’s “I.”
If we take the concept brought forth by Lewis and Talbott regarding pain, namely that it may not be possible to perceive the idea of “myself” unless there is some form of pain presented to my consciousness – unless I do possess some desires which are not fulfilled at least in some way – (for then there would be no way to distinguish myself from what is outside myself), I could not have the experience of “this is me.” Perhaps if we take this idea and apply it instead of to a rational, self-conscious being in relation to a physical world, but towards a rational, self-conscious being in relation to another rational, self-conscious being (God), we can make some sense of the idea of sin being “necessary.”
In what sense could I distinguish my will, my intentionality, my self from the will, intentionality, and self of another if there was no opposition or resistance in some way between the two? If the thing presented to me was not simply matter (which would require pain to distinguish from me), but personal, in what sense could I detect it as another person unless it had certain desires contrary to my own? Would I not have to experience such things as an OTHER intent, desire, and will? And to be an other, would those not have to be different?
Perhaps it must be the case that there exists some sort of contrasting clash between wills, without which the understanding of “me” and “you” (or me and God) would not be possible. Perhaps if sin did not occur, the knowledge of myself and God as two distinct rationalities would not stand out and the distinction could not be made.
None of this would imply that, though sin was necessary, we need not be saved from it. On the contrary, what we need to be saved from more than anything is ourselves. Nor need its necessity imply that we are not still guilty (though not “infinitely” so, I would argue) of being in an objectively wrong relation to our creator.
Chris,
This is very well said and a nice expansion of the Lewis and Talbott’s ideas!
Taking this a bit further, could we say that any moral agent would necessarily be brought forth with a will other than God’s as the creature would be otherwise indistinguishable from God? The agent’s desires or actions outside of God’s will would necessarily be sinful. In order to create moral agents with free will, perhaps sin is then inevitable. Sanctification then would be the process of “dying to self” and aquiring the will of God while still being other than God?
Steve
Yes Steve. That’s precisely the idea I’m getting at. The knowledge of good and evil then would be the knowledge of my will and self as it stands over and against – indeed in opposition to – God’s.
Before responding further, here’s an interesting post on Scot McKnight’s site: patheos.com/blogs/jesuscreed … s+Creed%29
Chris,
Yes, I think it’s right (and healthiest) to assume we face ‘real’ choices (that we can engender different outcomes), and ordinarily to regard the commission of sinful acts as “guilt.” Then you rightly ask if a "libertarian’ definition of freedom must be true. Since I continue to see the problems I cited as obstacles to endorsing that definition as the reality, I welcome your exposition of Talbott’s concept of our development as persons which appears to argue that sin can be “necessary” (at least in the sense of being inevitable). Am I understanding correctly that we would then be affirming the same mix, albeit we might still desire more clarity?
Yes Bob, I would agree with you here. So perhaps we have made progress after all.
a) God is fully responsible for evil. He not only knew it would occur, he ensured it did occur.
God created the heavens and the earth. Heaven is up, earth is down. Heaven above is filled with divine light that fails to penetrate the dark waters of the earth below. In Genesis, earth is not a planet, but that part of the created order where the will of God is not yet done. By contrast, heaven is where the will of God is done. Earth is darkness and evil. Heaven is goodness and light. (This is why friendship with the world is enmity with God.)
Since God is good, evil is that dimension where God is not, just as North is that dimension where East is not. Evil is “outer darkness”. God created this dimension by an act of self-removal. But for this decision, evil would not “exist”. Evil is God’s responsibility, “created” in the beginning. In Christ, God takes responsibility and pays the price.
b) God also made beings destined to endure evil for a time. ie. In mercy, God has bound all men to disobedience.
People are good by nature. We inherit Original Virtue, not Original Sin. We find our true origin in God, not in the devil. God loves us because there is something in us worthy of love, namely his own image. God cannot love the unlovable.
God has bound disobedience round our necks like an albatross. We are born of Water (chaos) and Spirit. We all struggle with a shadow-self, an inner demon who wages war against our true self. We long for Christ to free us from this body of death. Until that happy day, we will continue to be a superposition of contradictory, conflicting and mutually exclusive motives and deeds. We will be of two minds. Every thought, choice and deed will be neither good nor evil, but both simultaneously.
This bondage to sin is an act of God’s mercy. Through it, we gain by personal experience the knowledge of good and evil. Not only us, but God himself perfects his knowledge of good and evil through his personal experience in Christ.
c) Pain is the price paid to gain this good thing, the knowledge of good and evil. God rested one day after creating the universe. He rested 3 days after perfecting his knowledge of good and evil on the cross.
A good tree cannot bear bad fruit. Good and evil are mutually exclusive, just as north and east are mutually exclusive. A good person cannot choose to do evil, no more than a north train can travel east. To choose evil is evil, impossible if the person is good.
The knowledge of good and evil is true knowledge. True knowledge is good, and therefore desirable. However, gaining this particular knowledge is painful and costly, both of which are undesirable. God has gained this knowledge in Christ, who personally experienced evil to its depths. By being a man in time, God gained the eternal knowledge of personally experienced evil. (Christ was crucified “before” the foundation of the world.) Without Christ, God’s knowledge of evil would be abstract and empathetic, not experienced and personal. His knowledge would have been imperfect. Through his suffering Christ was “made perfect”.
We are God’s image-bearers. We are good by nature. We also gain the knowledge of good and evil through painful, personal experience.