I understand that there will be some theological differences here, I think my view of Jesus’ work and reward is the one with the majority tradition behind it, but the main point is that my view must necessarily be false, and it doesn’t seem to be. The exegesis is there, solid scholars take my view, and it should be admitted that it is possible that the Bible teaches this view of Christ and his work, which would mean that [R] is false, which means that [P] is false.
What’s necessarily true or false is not always necessarily obvious or evident. If UR is true, I’m inclined to believe it follows necessarily from God’s decision to create sentitent beings. But I don’t think God creates necessarily. Nor do I think that if he creates he necessarily creates sentient/moral creatures. He may create a universe of inanimate objects to enjoy for all I know. So in THAT sense the truth of these competing positions (UR vs ECT) is *contingent, not *necessary. But I do think it’s necessarily true that IF God creates sentient beings, their eternal loss is impossible. But THAT we can know this is true may be another thing altogether. Epistemic limitations and ambiguity and competing plausibilities being what they are, we each have to admit we COULD be wrong and the other COULD be right (if enough of each’s supporting argumens are false and there’s enough faulty reasoning going on). It’s possible!
Tom
The argument is buttressed by Christ and Adam. Second, I think the response may turn in on itself. His sui generis nature applies to his taking the punishment on the cross too, which could then serve as an argument for why no mere human person could ever take his own punishment and have it run out, as it were.
No, I mean [P] and [R] are, if true, necessary truths. If I have shown that possibly not-[R], then [R] is false and so [P] is false.
Justice isn’t a matter of balancing books, but of restoring harmony.
Johnny: Daddy, daddy! Sally pulled the wheels of my car!
Father #1: I am a just man. You go and pull the head off her doll, and all will be well.
Father#2: Sally! Come here. Look what you’ve done to your little brother. Give him a hug and a kiss, and I’ll help you fix his car. Either that, or it’s the wooden spoon for your bottom.
Which father was just?
The father of the prodigal son was a just man, but he did not demand repayment. The older son was of the sort who demanded repayment, and he was manifestly unjust. In this light, a hell teeming with souls in everlasting torment would be a failure of God’s justice, a failure of God’s ability to restore harmony, not a demonstration of it.
I do not feed and clothe my children because they deserve it, but because I love them and I love harmony.
Justice is, after all, only LOVE responding to certain creaturely givens.
Tom
DC: …the main point is that my view must necessarily be false, and it doesn’t seem to be. The exegesis is there, solid scholars take my view, and it should be admitted that it is possible that the Bible teaches this view of Christ and his work, which would mean that [R] is false, which means that [P] is false.
Tom: Again, what we’re either right or wrong about is how we’re understanding these claims to necessary truth. So it’s: IF DC is right, then his view is *necessarily true and UR *necessarily false. I agree. What this does is demand that we each be consistent by arguing for the necessity of the truth of our positions, not that our arguments necessarily convince the other.
Tom
All, I appreciate the pushing on the nature of Christ’s work, as this tells me that I need to spend time on this position if I develop the argument in more detail. So, while I disagree with some that Jesus did not merit eternal rewards for finite actions, I appreciate that this isn’t the view of everyone and will need to be spelled out more. If I do develop the argument, my Two Adams objection will need to be developed more anyway.
Here’s a link to a paper by Machen which gets at my Two Adams argument, i.e., the meriting of eternal rewards for finite actions.
Leaving aside Oxy’s original way of putting it (now adjusted by him to the above version)…
While this sort-of leaves room for God to save sinners from sin (thank God!–compared to your original version), I do in fact have problems with it, not first and foremost as a universalist (though that too eventually) but as a trinitarian theist; and to some extent I still would have problems with it even only as a supernaturalistic theist (if I was not also trinitarian.)
(To clarify, my problems as a trinitarian theist are not with DC’s rebuttal, or not yet anyway, but with your commentary on it in the form currently given above.)
1.) Unless you are talking about annihilation (and I know from past experience you are not, unless you’ve changed your mind on this when I wasn’t watching which I suppose is possible), we cannot exist separated from the omnipresent God. The separation from God due to sin, whatever it may mean, cannot mean this, unless supernaturalistic theism (moreso orthodox trinitarian theism) is false.
2.) As the sinner cannot (by sin or by any other means) escape the presence of the Omnipresence, nor begin to exist apart from the continuing action of God to keep the person in existence, the statement that God cannot have sin in His presence, cannot be simplistically deployed against universalism and/or in favor of Calvinistic or Arminian soteriology. It certainly means God can and will be (and is) doing something about sin so that sin will not continue being in His presence, but as sinners are in God’s omnipresent presence then sin can in fact occur in God’s presence. Moreover, since sinners cannot force God to allow them to sin in God’s presence, sinners (and thus sin) exist in God’s presence by the authority of God Himself–also, in at least some ways, by the power of God Himself, since no sinner can have power to do anything, including sin, unless God grants them the ability and energy to do so.
3.) It is sufficiently clear from even the precepts of supernaturalistic theism (much moreso trinitarian theism) that sinners continue to exist at all, including as sinners, by the freely given grace of God. Sinners (as sinners) abuse this grace (which God authoritatively allows), but that doesn’t change the fact of the grace.
4.) This already directly challenges any notion that the primary relationship of a holy and righteous God, in regard to sinners, is that of God’s offense. On the contrary, the primary relationship (though abused by the sinner) to a holy and righteous God is that of God’s grace. God responds to the abuse of the grace with offense as well as with more grace, but still the primary relationship is that of grace. (For, to quote that fifth chapter of Romans not far from where DC referenced it, “not as the offense is the grace” and again nearby “And not as through one act of sinning is the gratuity; for indeed the judgment is out of one into condemnation, yet the grace is out of many offenses into justice!”
5.) As the offense of man against God does not even compare to the grace of God to man (no moreso than as the grace exceeds the sin hyperexceeds!), then neither is there ground for expecting God to set aside His excessive grace to the sinner so that God shall have only offense instead.
6.) Neither however, as many universalists acknowledge, is there ground for expecting God to set aside His offense at the sin so long as the sin continues. Which fits entirely well with the expectation that God the Holy and Righteous will not forever tolerate the existence of sin; thus not the existence of sinners as sinners. But rather God will act, and is already acting without delay, toward the elimination of the sin. And we can expect Him to keep on doing so until He succeeds and sinners no longer exist in God’s reality.
7.) But to the Omnipresent, our past, and so the past of any sinner, still exists, thus any sinner at all still exists in relation to the Omnipresent, and always will. Even annihilation of the sinner will not change this.
8.) The victory of grace and justice, then, and of righteousness (‘fair-togetherness’ as the Greek puts it), even the righteous justice of God Who is righteousness (and there is the connection to trinitarian theism, as God cannot be righteousness unless God is in Himself a coherent interpersonal relationship of fair-togetherness as the ground of all reality–including the reality of the sinner!) cannot even be satisfied by annihilation of the sinner (which would be the fulfillment of non-fair-togetherness by God our Fair-Togetherness Of Persons toward the sinner, not only the fulfillment of non-fair-togetherness by the sinner, as a sinner, toward God). Much less can that victory be achieved by God choosing to keep sinners as sinners unendingly in existence thus in the presence of the Omnipresent One Who will not tolerate sin in His presence.
9.) The solution is that God the Holy and Righteous acts to bring sinners to righteousness; and persistently so, until victory (however long that may take by our temporal standards); and in regard to all sinners not only in regard to some.
And now, as a trinitarian theist, I reach universalism: first and foremost because I do center my theology on the Holy and Righteous God, and so expect Him to behave as the trinitarian supernatural God (and not as some lesser kind of God or god), even toward sinners.
I do however very strenuously agree that apart from the gracious action of God to fulfill righteousness in and with us, even our lightest sin (acting against the fair-togetherness between persons which, and Who, is the foundation of all reality including our reality as creatures of God) would instantly result in our annihilation out of existence in the presence of the Omnipresent (and thus out of existence altogether). Which is the main reason I have never put stock in the typical universalistic rebuttal about proportionality of punishment to the crime (and expectations thereof).
Having said that, I find the type of theology represented in your comment (even in its modified form that vaguely suggests room for God to save sinners from sin), to be itself vastly much more about the offense to God–thus the supremacy of God’s offense over God’s grace–and so to be more about the person committing the offense than about the God Who is offended by the person into setting aside the grace of His trinitarian action and reality.
In case I wasn’t clear, I was not disagreeing that Christ merited ongoing rewards for temporary actions which were completed; I was only stressing that Christ did so as Christ, and so as God as well as man. (Also that any merit, for reward or for punishment, occurs within the grace of God, whether we are talking about the reward of God the Son for many/all other than Himself as the second Adam or the punishment of the first Adam for many/all other than himself.)
It may be observed that I wasn’t complaining about Adam as the other example. 
Or not yet anyway; the appeal to Adam does bring up the question of whether a sinner has the possibility of choosing as Adam did, under what conditions if so, and if not why (or whether) that would illustrate the principle of any merit of ours as punishment after the fact in different conditions than those vouchsafed to our first human ancestors.
Whatever value that line of thinking may have (or not as the case may be), it doesn’t really contribute to the question of fairness in punishment for sin as formulated in your introduction. It opens a different line of argument against universalism (and not against a defense of universalism, including the defense currently under consideration.)
Hi Jason (I still need to make time to really read and respond to your long-ish post on p.1!),
In response to the above post of yours:
To paragraph one I say: Oh, okay. I’d just add that the the objection seems to focus on the acts done, not the person who does them. All versions of the objection I’ve seen parse it in terms of infinite punishment for finite sin or finite crime.
To paragraph two I say: Gottcha.
To paragraph three I say: I think it does feature into the question more intimately than you seem to, but putting that aside, I’d want to see this sui-generis-defeater (if that’s what it’s taken to be) spelled out more rigorously. [P] and [R] are, if true, necessary truths. Thus it’s not immediately clear—to me at least—that appeal to Jesus’ sui generius status gets around the objection. First, if he does, then [P] or [R] need to be revamped since I have the scope in terms of any S. Second, we need to take these things on a case-by-case basis, since just being sui generis doesn’t automatically mean that Jesus can do anything which is impossible for me to do. Thus: Necessarily, for any S, S cannot draw a square circle. Jesus is included in that (or so say I, Descartes would demur!), and mere appeal to his sui generis nature doesn’t mean he can falsify that necessary truth. Lastly, as I mentioned before, I have the intuition that universalists would still think it unjust for Jesus to spend an eternity in hell if he had sinned once when here on earth. To respond to those universalists by saying, “Well, Jesus is sui generis, so it is perfectly just that he spend an eternity in hell for his 30 second sin” wouldn’t cut it. The issue is proportionality not, if you will, personality . So I guess those are some of my initial thoughts on this sui generis defeater to the argument (N.B. I do believe Jesus to be sui generis!).
DC,
To make sure I understand you, you want to show that the common argument against ECT based on the unjust nature of God’s punishing sinners infinitely on the basis of finite acts/sins, if true, also makes it impossible for God to reward the repentant infinitely on the basis of finite acts. So if it’s possible to participate in an infinite blessing based on a finite act (Christ’s death), then there shouldn’t be any problem with our participating in infinite suffering based on a finite act (our sin).
Is this your argument in a nutshell?
Tom
Can’t sleep.
Hi DC,
I agree that the whole question of the justice of unending punishment for human sins hugely important, for if such punishment can be just, then UR is severely undermined (at least in my case).
DC: [D] It is necessarily unjust for any S to Deserve an infinite X for a finite Y.
Tom: I’d like to think on this a bit, DC. It strikes me as being too—what’s the word?—undefined or broad. But in any event, I don’t think the injustice of ECT requires the truth of D. That is, D’s being false doesn’t undermine the objection that ECT is unjust because no finite sin can warrant unending punishment. It’s not clear to me that if finite sins do not warrant unending punishment that no finite act of any kind can justly entail unending consequences of any kind. The objection that ECT is unjust doesn’t require the truth of D.
If the injustice of ECT does not require the truth of D, then your counter examples, however interesting, don’t really prove anything about the justice/injustice of ECT. It may be the case that some finite choices can justly have certain unending consequences without it’s being the case that sinful finite choices can justly have unending conscious torment as their consequence. Peter may never get to be the big dog in heaven because of some finite screw-up. Or Moses may never get to physically enjoy the Promised Land for striking the rock. I fail to see how the justice of such consequences as these entails the justice of ECT simply because the consequences are in both cases irreversible and follow ‘finite’ choices. Why? Because irrevocable torment is far more consequential than never getting to visit Israel, or not being the big cheese in heaven. Not every consequence that is unending/irrevocable is equally consequential (on an existential level) simply by virtue of being unending.
DC: But I take [R] to have possible counter examples, that is, these things are up for debate and it seems a contingent exegetical fact whether they turn out to be true, here’s two:
[1] Adam would have deserved everlasting (reward) life had he fulfilled the law in the garden—a finite action.
[2] Jesus endlessly deserves glory, honor, titles (reward) for the finite actions he undertook in his active and passive obedience, also earning everlasting life for his people.
Tom: Here I think we’re just looking at things differently. I would deny [1]. That is, I would never say that Adam would have “deserved” or “earned” everlasting reward had he fulfilled the law in the garden. Had Adam never sinned, it follows that he would have always trusted in God and rested in grace. That is, we don’t begin needing ‘grace’ AFTER we sin. We need it because we’re created and finite. Even unfallen humanity is in need of grace and comes into the enjoyment of infinite blessing through trusting in the love and goodness of God. There’s simply no way for created persons (sinless or sinful) to “deserve” the life of God. There is only recognizing this fact and being grateful for God’s love or failing to recognize it and relating to God on some other failed basis.
Like I mentioned earlier, [2] needs to be carefully approached. I don’t want to say Jesus doesn’t deserve glory and honor for what he did. He does. But this would be as much the case were the actions under consideration a demonstration of an already abiding glory and worth (though the actions precede our recognition of this glory and our bestowal of praise and titles) and not the grounds upon which Christ comes to gain a worth or value not previously possessed. True, he receives a name/title consequent upon his incarnation, but this is different than saying he comes to *deserve a glory and reward.
At the same time (I’m just thinking here), it’s possible to disagree with [2] by arguing that the sufferings of Christ which result in our benefit and his glory are not in fact ‘finite’ acts in the sense we mean when we describe the ‘finitude’ of creaturely acts (good or bad). One could argue that what determines the infinitude or finitude of an act (at least in regard to the context under consideration) is not simply it’s being temporal, but rather the personal nature of the act, or rather the nature of the person performing the act. Maybe this is what Jason is describing about Jesus’ being a ‘one-of-a-kind’ human being. Jesus was a human being, yes. But he wasn’t merely a human being. He is a divine person having this particular human experience. Wouldn’t it be the case that his actions and suffering, being the actions and sufferings of God, participate in the infinitude of God, though they are temporally determined and realized? (I’m just thinking out loud here.)
Thus God essentially brings who/what God is TO his incarnate acts. I’m thinking particularly of Christ’s sufferings which save us. Are these sufferings wholly and without remainder ‘finite’? If not, then no act of Jesus (being the act of God) is finite in precisely the way our acts are finite. This may be related to WHY no finite person’s act can forever and irrevocably, in regard to his/her own existence, silence the effects of an infinite person’s act. It’s not so much that it’s “unjust” to punish finite sins infinitely. It’s more accurate to say that there’s no finite act that can succeed in forever silencing the infinite act of God’s incarnate love. Calling the infinite/irrevocable punishment of a finite act “unjust” is just our way to name the tilt lights going on in our minds when we try to process such punishment. Nothing fits; not justice, not love, not rightness, not holiness, not appropriateness, not proportionality.
It’s late. Now I gotta sleep!
Love the convo.
Tom
Hi all. I’m not ignoring anyone, just making cookies with my toddlers (making videos of them trying to make them, anyhow) and have a some other things to do today. I’ll get back to this later. I the meantime, thanks for all the helpful comments.
This article would make a great topic for discussion in another thread(s) as it is rich in material in several directions. I would love to discuss the “passive/active” obedience of Christ (if there is such a thing) as well as the various views of atonement described here.
By my query in relevence here is on this statement:
I’m curious at to how the author acertains that there is a specific period of time in obeying God’s commandments that would warrant Adam eternal life. How long, pray tell, would that be?
But as a corollary to the present discussion, I think this whole matter of punishment/reward hinges on the purpose of God’s intent in setting up the situation in the Garden in the first place. Prior to the Fall, God proclaimed everything He created as “good’”, but only after Man was created was it “very good”. This tells me that Man has the highest intrinsic value of everything that God made. The crown of His glory. Man made in the image of God. Which means Man was different from every other creature God made. And that is what the set-up was about.
But the test wasn’t about keeping the Law. It was about how Adam’s relationship with the Creator would work out. The choice to obey God, in not eating of the Forbidden Tree, was not the ONLY choice Adam had. There was also the matter of the Tree of Life, which would had given Him eternal life had Adam chose that first (see Gen 3:22). The Tree of Life is, of course, the Life (or Spirit) of God, which would later appear as the Life of Christ in the Spirit which would dwell in Man after Jesus died and rose again. Would Adam partake of the Life of God before he sinned?
Adam could not keep up obeying God even in his pre-fallen state, if he didn’t eat the Tree of Life.
Insofar as this matter of punishment/reward, the scenerio as presented in the OP would only make sense if Christ was not in the equation…at all. That is, God will punish man’s unforgiven sins in proportion to the sin. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. David sinned against God by having Uriah killed. Hence God took away his new born son from the adulterous relationship. Perfect justice done. The question is, what would have happened if David died before seeing that justice done? Would he have had to endure ECT? If that is the case, it would have been better to have lived to see his earthly punishment meted out as it was instead. Therefore, I would argue that any justice done beyond death would have to equal the actual justice done while living.
But to talk about salvation being a reward is nonsense. Salvation is something that God grants us gracefully. It is the Life of God given to us so that we can obey God. Instead any treasure we store up in heaven will reap eternal benefits, but not infinite benefits. For example, the man with 10 talents was made ruler over many things and given the one talent of the man who hid it. While the man with 4 talents was made ruler over a few things.
Hi all,
So in Jason Pratt’s Tue May 24, 2011 2:45 pm post on p.1 of this thread, he makes a helpful comment about a needed clarification with [P] & c, so I can amend [P] to:
[P*] Necessarily, for all S, S does not deserve an “infinite” punishment for a “finite” sin.
Infinite here just means “endless duration,” not “actual infinity.” Now, apply the changes to [P], mutatis mutandis, to [R] and [D].
Secondly, he makes a helpful distinction between the time of the punishment and the source of the punishment, and remarks that the assumption that [P*], as understood temporally, doesn’t seem to stand, and neither does it if we consider “infinite” to refer to the source of the punishment, the latter being rather obvious.
So Jason graciously concedes at least the basics of my argument. Of course, that doesn’t affect his universalism in the slightest, as he never rested his universalism on [P*] alone, or [P*] conjoined with other arguments. So if I used my argument to undercut Jason’s universalism, I’d be committing something like the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi.
Another issue has crept up, though, and that is in regard to my Two Adam’s Argument (TAA). Some are unwilling to concede that those cases defeat [P*] and [R], or, [R*] after the appropriate changes, which I’ll assume we’ll all make to the argument from here on, so I will refer to [R*] from now on.
The first thing to note is that, since [P*] and [R*] are, if true, necessarily true, then all I need is for TAA to be possible. To claim that TAA is impossible because it contradicts [P*] etc. is to beg the question. If the only response is to claim that my interpretation of the cases of Adams is that it just must be wrong since [P*] etc. is true, I can of course dig in my heels and say that they show that [P*] etc. can’t be true. As they say, one man’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. And as Wittgenstein said, “At this stage, we can only point finger at each other and yell, ‘Heretic!’”. So, it seems to me that to defeat my argument one must show that my interpretation of the two Adams (which is a long-standing, respected interpretation of their commission and work) is impossible, a hard task indeed. So I have something like:
[R**] Possibly, Jesus deserves “infinite” Rewards for “finite” actions.
Now, I do happen to believe that my interpretation is correct, and maybe that’d be an interesting and worth while discussion to have, but as far as I can tell, if it is admitted that my interpretation is possibly true, then [P*] is false.
At least one issue brought up — by TGB in his Tue May 24, 2011 11:45 pm post — is that we would have always needed grace, fallen or not. Well, maybe, maybe not. All I need is a maybe not. However, to go further, I do not take this view of grace. I view grace — along with many other theologians — as DEmerited favor, not UNmerited favor. However, even if this distinction doesn’t hold, the argument that Adam could have merited everlasting life for finite actions undertook in a probationary period still go through.
As far as Christ, I believe he did fulfill the law, did what Adam failed to do, and so earned rewards like, titles, honor, and everlasting life for a people (Rom. 5:18, putting aside any universalist reading of Romans 5). As far as Jesus being one-of-a-kind, I agree, but gave some answers to why I don’t think this is a defaater-deflector in my Tue May 24, 2011 8:22 pm post. The acts Jesus did is sometimes called “the one act” or his “active obedience,” and this includes his keeping the law of God, e.g., honoring his mother and father, etc. I see no way to claim this wasn’t a finite act or an act similar to my failing to do so. If not, how is it credited to me?! Jesus was “tempted as we are.” I see a need for a tight fit between Jesus law-keeping and my law-breaking, such that the one is credited by God as having been done by me because he looks at what Christ did instead.
In any case, I’m just touching on some things here. I appreciate the pushing on the theological issues, and if I develop the argument and refine it a bit more, I will include a section arguing more fully for TAA. I can appreciate that some people would want to see that filled out.
I do have some other questions for universalists here that I’d like to start new threads on, specifically “hopeful universalism.” So I’ll put those question up. But also, feel free to comment in this thread on anything I’ve said, as I appreciate the chance to fine-tune matters and get critical feedback.
DC: At least one issue brought up — by TGB — is that we would have always needed grace, fallen or not. Well, maybe, maybe not. All I need is a maybe not.
Tom: You have to argue the possibility of this “maybe not.” That is, you can’t just rest your wider argument on what we don’t know about grace. The “maybe not” can’t be the expression of epistemic limitations. It has to be a positive statement about grace ‘objectively’ speaking. So you have to rule out “maybe” as a possibility, for so long as “maybe” is true (or conceded to be true) your wider argument is not proven. And the entire Eastern tradition will have something to say about such a view of grace. In my view, of all the things I’ve come to truly appreciate and embrace without reservation about the East is their view of grace.
Tom
Tom, not in arguing against a necessity claim.
<>¬p <-> ¬]p
If it is possible that not-p, then it is not the case that necessarily p. And some proposition p is possible if and only if p’s not impossible. And p is impossible, broadly, if there’s a contradiction involved in asserting p. I can see no contradiction. If you can, then I would be interested in seeing it derived. So it’s just a point of logic.
I have also given several prima facie arguments for my claims about Jesus earning infinite rewards by his finite actions, and even interacted with defeaters to my claim. Moreover, my position is held by several theologians and has an entrenched, long-standing, and respected history and pedigree. So, maybe, maybe not. If you think my view is impossible, you’re free to argue it.
I also said that even if my view of grace is off, the argument still goes through. So even if grace is unmerited rather than demerited, that has no bearing on my argument. Several respected theologians have taken the view that grace is unmerited favor and still held my position on Adam and the covenant of works, e.g., John Murray, O. Palmer Robertson, &c. As far as I can see, the fact that grace is unmerited doesn’t negate the argument from the covenant of works.
The idea of earning eternal life by finite actions has strong prima facie support in the Bible, e.g.,
“…Teacher, what good deed must I do to have eternal life?..If you would enter life, keep the commandments.” Matthew 19:15-17
“For Moses writes about the righteousness that is based on the law, that the person who does the commandments shall live by them.” Romans 10:5
“You shall therefore keep my statutes and my rules; if a person does them, he shall live by them: I am the LORD.” Leviticus 18:5
“But like Adam they transgressed the covenant; there they dealt faithlessly with me.” - Hosea 6:7
“For whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become accountable for all of it.” James 2:10
For all who rely on works of the law are under a curse; for it is written, “Cursed be everyone who does not abide by all things written in the Book of the Law, and do them.” Now it is evident that no one is justified before God by the law, for “The righteous shall live by faith.” But the law is not of faith, rather “The one who does them shall live by them.” - Galatians 3:10-12 (quoting Deut 21:23, Deut 27:26, Hab 2:4, and Lev 18:5; also see Is 32:15, 44:3; Jer 11:3; Ezek 18:4; Joel 2:38; Matt 5:19; John 7:39; Acts 5:30; Gal 2:6, 4:5, 5:4; Rom 1:17, 4:9, 15-16, 10:5; Heb 10:38; 2 Peter 2:1; Rev 22:3)
“But when the fullness of time had come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons.” Galatians 4:4
“For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do. By sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh, in order that the righteous requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us…” Rom 8:3-4
“Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them.” Matthew 5:17
“John would have prevented him, saying, 'I need to be baptized by you, and do you come to me?” But Jesus answered him, “Let it be so now, for thus it is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness.’” Matthew 3:14-15
“In the days of his flesh, Jesus offered up prayers and supplications, with loud cries and tears, to him who was able to save him from death, and he was heard because of his reverence. Although he was a son, he learned obedience through what he suffered. And being made perfect, he became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him, being designated by God a high priest after the order of Melchizedek.” - Hebrews 5:7-9
“For as by the one man’s” disobedience [Adam] the many were made sinners, so by the one man’s obedience [Christ] the many will be made righteous." - Rom. 5:19
This is summed up in “Do this and live.” And Paul noted that “the very commandment that promised life to me brought death to me.” Note, a commandment promised life. In Romans 7, many think Paul is referring to the covenant of works principle implied in the law, the “do this and live” motif that accompanied the giving of the law. In any event, the argument is that there was, from the beginning, “infinite” reward offered for “finite action.” At the very least, there’s something of a case that can be made here, a prima facie one presented by me. And so it seems that I’ve shown “possibly ¬R*,” which shows ¬P*.
DC: Tom, not in arguing against a necessity claim.
<>¬p <-> ¬]p
If it is possible that not-p, then it is not the case that necessarily p. And some proposition p is possible if and only if p’s not impossible. And p is impossible, broadly, if there’s a contradiction involved in asserting p. I can see no contradiction. If you can, then I would be interested in seeing it derived.
Tom: I was actually arguing this very point against you. I understand you to be arguing the ‘necessity’ of your view. That would mean contradictory views are logically impossible, i.e., necessarily false. But I see no obvious contradiction in the view of grace I mentioned (or in eternal life not being “earned” in the sense you seem to require)—on which view your view does not go through. There’s a bit more to it that grace’s simply being unmerited (or at least letting the scope and consequence of its being unmerited hold consistently throughout one’s worldview). If all human accomplishment is by definition grounded in a previous grace which is both “unmerited” and a necessary requirement to human accomplishment, then human accomplishments can hardly be said to “earn” eternal life. Maybe we’re employing our terms differently. I won’t sidetrack you on this any further.
DC: The idea of earning eternal life by finite actions has strong prima facie support in the Bible, e.g….
Tom: All the passages you mention are read in the East consistent with their view of grace, which precludes the possibility of unaided human acts ever “earning” eternal life. I’m not offering a formal argument here. I’m just exploring whether or not your argument jives with commitments I already hold to.
Gotta run,
Tom