The Evangelical Universalist Forum

The omnipotence of God and the necessity of sin

Evangelical Universalism
#41

Pog,
If you’re still following along, I thought I’d address your last post.

I think this definitely warrants some clarification on my part. What I’m arguing is that a free moral agent that can act or think will still be capable of sin until conformed to the “will” of God. Why am I so insistent on the importance of a “process” of “conformation of the will” involving that individual? There are several reasons:

  1. An individual could be made sinless by having God’s will “plugged in” to his, by being, in essence “possessed” by God. The individual could still have consciousness and self-awareness but would no longer be free. I’m sure it would be a glorious state and wonder if this might actually be that of unfallen angels. If “unplugged” from God, the creature would be left with its own will and unless this will had been perfected, would sin eventually. Undergoing the process of being conformed to God’s will through experience, teaching, the work of the Holy Spirit and, yes, making sinful errors would be analogous to learning calculus. The student does practice problems, learns from his teacher, makes errors and eventually masters the work. A lazy and dishonest student could simply get the answers to a test beforehand and get all the questions correct, but if asked to do a problem on his own, would fail. The student that learned actually owns the ability to do calculus. An individual that is “perfected” by being “plugged into” God would be analogous to the student with all the right answers but relying on someone else to solve the problems.
  2. Isn’t this “process” what we are going through on earth? We are to “be conformed to the image of his Son”. If there is no need to go through a “process” to achieve this and it will be miraculously completed post-mortem, then why struggle in this life to work toward this goal.
  3. If a process is not necessary, then why not create perfected free moral agents?
  4. As far as babies going through the “process” post-mortem, it certainly is possible that they are immediately imbued with the will of God, “possessed” by God, but wouldn’t they be a lower form of being not having their own wills perfected, continually dependent on God’s own will coursing through their minds?
  5. The only speculation I can make regarding this “process” post-mortem is that it would probably bear some resemblance to life here on earth. It could be in some way similar to what George MacDonald portrays in stories such as “The Wise Woman” or the novels Phantastes or Lilith. Would there be pain? If necessary, I’d say. Sin? As long as the “student’s” will is unperfected they would be capable of sin. These might be just selfish thoughts or desires. The full spectrum of sin and evil would likely not be at their disposal. Sin is not part of the process but what the process eliminates. Would the “student” be able to inflict pain on others? Probably not. How long would this take? As long as it needs to.
    6.Pastorally, I would tell a grieving parent their dead child is being conformed into the image of Christ by the one who loves him/her more than they do themselves.

Interesting question! I think there may be indeed," borderline" cases of free moral agents in the animal realm and I do indeed believe that (at least some) animals “go to heaven” but haven’t been able to come up with a satisfactory concept of what that would mean. Are animals perfected in some way? Do some grow to become our mental equivalent and converse (telepathically, of course) with us? Are all animals vegetarians or do perhaps animals sacrifice themselves as meals for each other? Will my dogs now obey me every time (or maybe the tables are turned and I obey them)?

The whole angels subject is difficult as there is so little explanation biblically. From what I’ve read,(in Wikipedia) it seems that when early Hebrew scriptures mention “the Angel of the Lord”, this is indeed an aspect of God, or God himself a “theophanic angel”. Later books such as Daniel mention angels by name, and angels become “benevolent semidivine beings” we are familiar with. The concept of fallen angels and demons apparently is thought to have been incorporated from Zoroastrianism. In any event, I can see unfallen angels as those that are “plugged into” God, operating according to his will and, perhaps, “fallen angels” are angels “let off the leash” so to speak. Why would God do that? I have no idea but perhaps they are undergoing the same perfecting process I am postulating.

I don’t think God “punishes sin” in order for someone to"pay a price", only correctively to get them to the point where they no longer sin. Is it possible for people to keep the commands of God? Well, I’ve never met or heard of a sinless person other than Christ, (setting aside babies, those with mental disabilities etc)so I’d say it is impossible for an un-perfected person not to sin. As far as punishment for sin goes, did Christ recommend punishment for the woman caught in adultery? And yet, the jewish law called for stoning. So was the law and its punishment from God? He did tell her to “go and sin no more”. I suspect she was indeed a morally better person after that but doubt she lived the rest of her life sinless. As far as an inevitable sin goes, I suspect every person has had a selfish thought. Is that not a sin (in the broad view)? The point of the inevitability of sin is not that a particular sin is inevitable, it’s that we are inevitably self-centered and inclined to seek our own will and desires and not God’s.

Per my other posts, I really can’t accept the Genesis account of the fall of man as much more than an ancient myth of people trying to understand the world they found themselves in, including the presence of evil. The idea of God “cursing” Adam’s descendants and thus (according to the story) resulting in all the evil in the world is unacceptable morally and presents a view of God I can’t accept. There is probably some way to get good out of the story but I have a hard time seeing it just as I can’t accept that God ordered genocide in the slaughter of the Amalekites.

I agree with what you are saying and see a potential role for an “open view” of God here. If God does not know what a free-willed creatures actions will be, then in this scenario, he could have anticipated an infinite number of possible courses history would take, many with less evil than this one. Perhaps the “probabilities” were that things would take a different path. The ancient Jews would really understand him and be a light to the nations. Hitler might have been born in a different environment. The Treaty of Versailles may have been less punitive. Earlier on hunter-gathers may have learned to peacefully coexist with other bands, men learn to respect women. It seems conceivable to me and the open view would make the analogy I presented even more accurate as we parents also have a limited knowledge of the future.

All the best,
Steve

#42

I agree with you here. Open theism does absolve God from creating inevitable evil. And, as you say, it allows him to be truly against it when it does occur.

This is a really interesting idea - tying in natural evil and perhaps even the creation of the human brain/physiology with the free willed choices of angelic beings. If God wanted collaborators in the creation of “human nature” and those collaborators were free they could have acted against his will and caused certain evils to be inherent in our bodies and/or the natural order/natural laws. Very Tolkien/Silmarillion like.

But seriously, extremely insightful.

I can accept this too: namely, that God, while he did not know much “probablistically” he still knew everything that was possible, and set up the ultimate parameters in such a way that would forbid the ball ever possibly even being able to bounce outside the court. And, if he was infinitely intelligent, he would know – since he doesn’t reason discursively – just how he would respond given any actualization that came to be.

You know, I’ve been racking my brain with this one and I think it’s a real deal breaker for my argument. It pretty much destroys the main idea that sin had to be logically necessary in creation.

Although you don’t articulate it in this way, I think following through with your initial idea – “God could only create a universe with evil” – actually posits a metaphysical dualism and makes evil coterminous and on equal footing with the other divine attributes of God. If sin is a necessary part of creation, then evil is necessary part. God then NEEDS evil somehow, his nature is somehow dependent on it. Evil would be “built into” his nature just like the other virtues he has. To get what he wanted, he HAD to have it there.

I believe you’ve checkmated me. You know what this really entails if you take it to its logical conclusion? That, if God HAS to have evil as a certain outcome of creation, then he is, at least in part, evil. And if creatures are DETERMINED to be evil, then again, God needed evil, and the same consequence follows.

The question then is how can God know for certain that evil will occur if he creates? Molinism says that God knows free creaturely decisions eternally - but, if that is true, then the truth of the creaturely decision would be true BEFORE IT WAS DETERMINED BY THE CREATURE. Therefore it could not have been something the creature did freely. And again, this would mean that the truth is determined by God, which is the same as deterministic Calvinism. I used to think positing the grounding objection in the mind of God would solve matters, but all it really does is make it so that God has determined ideas of creatures who sin and do evil, and this again amounts to the same – namely, that God has evil and needs it as a part of his being.

So any view of divine omniscience which holds that God knows the actions of free creatures beforehand really entails that the creatures could not possibly act any differently, or God would know their decisions as only possible, not actual. And any view of divine omniscience that has such possible acts of creatures as being evil before the creature was created and before (causally and temporally) it did them, posits God as the source of the evil. How could the creature be the source of the evil if it was not yet able to be evil? All of the properties which are necessary for evil to come about do not yet even exist, and the creature itself has no power to exercise which would entail that the evil came from IT.

In other words, I think you’ve just convinced me that any view of God’s knowledge that is not the Open View – or any view that does not say that God, logically prior to creation, can only know evil as a POSSIBILITY and not a CERTAINTY – is a view that logically entails that God is evil.

#43

I think this is the force of the argument in the first post of this thread: namely, that it would be impossible for self-conscious beings to exist unless they were in some way inclined to themselves and saw themselves as objects of knowledge. If they were created already in the presence of God, they would never know themselves as separate beings from God.

But, after much reflection, I don’t think this means that sin was certain or had to happen. Bob and I have gone back and forth about this, and I believed at one time that sin could be certain or necessary and God not be implicated. But I think I now see that if this is true it would imply that God, on a deeply metaphysical level, is dependent on evil. He is somehow hampered by it and needs it to exist to get what he wants. And if he is dependent on it, it must be either separate and apart from him (dualism) or part of his very being, which would make him himself evil.

All that needs to be suggested is that there is an INCLINATION or DESIRE for self, not that the desire *must *be acted on. My error was in not seeing that the desire can be present to the nth (look at Christ’s temptation to escape crucifixion), and not necessarily be given in to.

So the question is, if God KNOWS for certain that sin will happen prior to creation, how does he? It can’t be from the free willed choices of creatures, because they’ve not yet made such choices. But if it’s from his own idea of the creature as it must exist when he brings it into being, then evil already exists in the mind of God, which makes it part of his nature.

#44

Hi Chris,
Thought I’d respond to your post and also let you know I’m enjoying the John Hick book. I enjoy his style and I’m learning quite a lot. Currently, I’m on the section of Catholic theodicies. As with most philosophical literature, it’s quite dense, so slow-going at this point. Glad you hopped back in to this thread!

I think Christ would be considered quite different from the rest of us humans. If Christ, who possesses the Will of God, was able to be tempted, how much more us ordinary humans? Can we get to the point where we resist the desires to act contrary to God’s will? Absolutely! But this is a very difficult process. If you posit that we, as humans have a “corrupted” will, perhaps through the malevolent work of Satan, fallen angels etc, through manipulation of DNA or some other process, then I ask, did Christ have corrupted DNA in the incarnation? Did he have an inherited evil nature? Was the paternal inheritance enough to cancel out this “fallenness” from his mother’s side?

Does God anticipating actions, thoughts *other than what he would have done * mean that “evil” exists in his nature? I find it hard to believe that God anticipating “non-God” means that he has evil in his nature! Does God thinking of creature who will almost certainly sin (though he doesn’t desire that) make him have sin in his nature? I think that’s stretching it a bit a bit too far. I think the analogy proposed to Pog in a previous post still holds true and especially if you propose an “open” view of God’s knowledge of the future.

I would say God “knows” for certain that* sin *will occur because he is creating creatures that have a “will” other than his own. The results of that sin, I would say, (assuming an open view) are unknown but anticipated as possibilities. Even with the open view, however, if God “loses” in his gamble, he (and we) are still ahead, though it may not seem like it at this point.

Steve
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#45

I agree, Steve, as second person of the Trinity, Jesus could not sin (however we want to unpack that). On the other hand, in the Incarnation God the Son assumed human nature, including the faculty of will. Hence the dogmatic rejection of monothelitism by the Sixth Ecumenical Council and the assertion that Christ possesses both a divine and human will.

So if that is the case, doesn’t that affect the claim that sin is somehow a practical necessity for us to achieve human perfection. Jesus wasn’t pretending to be human. He really was human. Why is he an exception?

#46

Loads of great comments from people - and it’s clear that this is a huge topic which spreads into various areas like the nature of Christ, interpretations of Genesis, angelology etc - far bigger than a web thread can handle! :slight_smile:

Just a couple of small points to throw in at this stage (most things have already been covered):

A) It’s interesting just how much of a role open theism is playing in theodicy - as well it might. I think a lot of the issue boils down to whether or not God knew for certain that sin/suffering would enter into His creation. Cosmic warfare theodicy (angels/demons part of the FWD) is also relevant here for connected reasons.

B) Alec, I think it is logical to say that sin was inevitable, but I wonder why, given the problems and ramifications that position throws up, you prefer it to the alternatives? What exactly is gained by saying it was inevitable rather than just a possibility that actualised?

C) I think I may have been using ‘sin’ in a way different to other posters. Thought experiment: a rich man passes by a beggar and gives him £10 out of his wallet. Has the rich man sinned by only giving him £10 rather than £50, or £100, or everything he had? I think I would say that although he didn’t act as perfectly as God would act he has not sinned. I see sin more in terms of an act that is contrary to God’s nature rather than just a failure to fulfill God’s will utterly. Thus, giving only £10 is less than ideal, but still virtuous. Passing by without giving anything is a grey area. Mocking the beggar or beating him ‘for the lolz’ is clear sin. In this way I see progress of virtue, the ever increasing reaching towards God’s perfect moral character, as a process that need not include sin; nor is having God’s will necessary to be sinless. However, if, as I think you are alec, taking sin to be anything short of God’s perfection, then I guess I agree with you that finite creatures would always and inevitably fall short of that (and indeed we will always be short of that forever, I think).

So, it seems that we might need to define ‘sin’ a bit better here. If we’re saying that less than ideal choices are inevitable, then I tend to agree since the only consistently perfect being in all His choices is God. If, however, we use ‘sin’ in the stronger sense of acting contrary to God’s will than I disagree that such actions are either willed, foreknown, required for spiritual development or inevitable. Evil is always gratuitous.

#47

Hi Akimel,

Brilliant! :smiley: You’re absolutely right and I feel very stupid right now… :blush: Of course you’re correct. Two wills! Sanctification, becoming sinless, isn’t a matter of changing the creature’s will but of submitting that will to the Will of God and Christ is the perfect example, i.e. “…not My will but Thine be done”. This complicates everything and totally blows up the argument or at least requires major revisions to salvage it. It seems to me still inevitable that we all sin given that we do but I’m not sure why. I still hold to a process-based sanctification but of course that process is now learning and listening to God’s will and learning to submit to it and not necessarily changing our own.

All the best,
Steve

#48

Hi, Steve

Wow! There’s been a lot of conversation since I was last here! I haven’t even skimmed it yet, but before I forget, you said:

I’m sorry – I wasn’t clear about this. I was assuming a metaphorical/parabolic interpretation of the Garden story. Please read everything I said as metaphor because that’s the way I meant it. I don’t know whether the Garden can be interpreted literally or not, but whatever the case, it is the spiritual/metaphorical interpretation that has significance for us, imo.

That said, I’m not sure what to do with the rest of the post. I think it’s a story about what people believed and how we reacted to the world – choosing to go our way as independent individuals as opposed to behaving in a childlike capacity toward our Father, depending on Him for our teaching and training. Depending on ourselves leads to death. If we turn to Him, then we begin to be free, walking away from sin; if we turn away, we go back toward bondage to sin (in other words, when we turn away, we are eating from the wrong tree). Does that make more sense?

I would agree that sin is inevitable, given our weakness and God’s progressive work with us – bringing us out of sin and into holiness. (I am considering sin here as unloving acts or failures to act in love, which would be against the nature of God.) I’m not sure necessity for sin follows from inevitability of sin. I do believe that we need suffering, though, which may be as controversial as a need for sin. Sin isn’t the only thing that can bring suffering however; we might suffer for the benefit of others, from natural disasters, sickness, etc. A literal interpretation of the Garden would preclude these things of course, but a progressive evolutionary interpretation would allow for suffering whether or not we sin. With my limited understanding of science, I don’t see evolution as an adequate explanation for creation. However, theologically it works better for me, so maybe God really did create in this way.

I hope this explains my ideas on this (which are admittedly in flux). It’s probably a mute point because I don’t believe God could have created us both capable of eventual freedom AND incapable of sin. We had to be capable of sin or we would be automatons, imo. And if we were capable of sin, then that we WOULD sin, given our immaturity, necessarily became inevitable. Sin was not necessary, but it WAS inevitable. That’s my take on it – whether it’s right or wrong I don’t know. Doubtless some of both. :wink:

Blessings, Cindy

#49

Hi Cindy,
Thanks for your post! I understand much better your views, so thanks for the clarification. After the “Ah Hah!” moment of understanding Akimel’s last post I think I also have a better appreciation of the Genesis story of the fall of man. Of course we are dependent on submitting to God’s will to avoid sin as was “Adam”. Sin is inevitable if we follow our own will. This certainly changes the syllogism I proposed early in the thread and probably makes it weaker for the purposes of theodicy, but much more biblical and theological. I would agree, also, with your thoughts regarding suffering, very George MacDonald there! ( “The Light Princess” etc"). With that in mind I propose the following:

Could God create free moral agents that would immediately subordinate their will to God when they reached the stage of actually being free moral agents? Could he make it more clear exactly what his will is? Could he be a little more accessible to guide us confused free moral agents? At least at first glance, it seems he could, so the argument has little benefit from a theodicy standpoint. That being said, this whole discussion has been a tremendous benefit to me. I always think it’s interesting how much we learn from the mistakes we make on a test as opposed to the questions we get right. In this discussion, I made a major error and ran with it for quite awhile before Akimel pointed it out. The importance of submitting my will to that of God’s is crucial and like the student learning calculus in my earlier analogy, I’ll take this lesson to heart and make it my own.

All the best,
Steve

#50

Hi, Steve

I’ve gone back and read what I missed, and I congratulate you on your desire for the truth (as opposed to a desire for victory). It’s rare, though not so much here maybe, as other places I’ve been. Anyway, very helpful for you; very inspiring for me and others. :slight_smile: I guess I’d say in answer to your points:

  1. Agreed
  2. Agreed with the caveat that this moral agent has yet to be matured/perfected
  3. Agreed, though I think God takes into consideration the motivation and limited knowledge of the person in question. It may be possible to do something wrong, that causes suffering, yet with the most loving of motivations. Granted that if you’re being led of the Spirit, that won’t happen, but a person trying to be led of the Spirit but not yet mature enough to discern the voice of the Spirit perfectly, will hear imperfectly. I’m not sure whether this would qualify as “sin” or not. Still puzzling over this . . . .
  4. Agreed – at least until said agent reaches maturity/perfection.
  5. Absolutely. So long as we submit to Father, we’re safe. :slight_smile:

Blessings, Cindy

#51

Just going to throw out a couple more thoughts:

  1. as well as there being a difference, IMHO, between ‘less than ideal’ and ‘sin’, I think there is a similar difference between a degree of environmental intractability (necessary for a mutual medium of relationality required for freewill choices, and necessary in order to develop certain virtues such as teamwork, loyalty, patience, fortitude, wisdom, adventure etc) and true or extreme ‘suffering’. Like ‘sin’, ‘suffering’ is unnecessary to maturation and development. Whereas one may make a fair argument to show that God had to create (or at least it is morally reasonable to create) a universe with a degree of intractability, I can think of no way of arguing that a God who makes a universe with inevitable true suffering can remain morally perfect in doing so. An argument for an irenic vale of soul making theodicy does not also necessarily justify any level of suffering or evil. And, again, consider that if true suffering and evil is necessary to being free willed, moral and mature, then those who die in infancy must cry in heaven.

  2. it seems that we need to be careful to distinguish between whether or not sin is inevitable for humans, or for all non-God free moral agents (whether angels, demons, ETs, proto-humans or hypothetical beings). It may be that humans will, given enough time, inevitably sin in this world due to their biological heritage, environmental pressures, spiritual blindness, epistemically limitations, etc - but this doesn’t mean that every free moral agent would be likewise limited. And it may be that Gods first creatures were not humans, or perhaps not humans exactly as they are now. Both original sin theories, and cosmic warfare theories would posit this. This seems fairly prevalent in mainstream theologies, and should be considered.

#52

Hi Cindy and Pog,
Thanks for the kind words Cindy! :slight_smile: To be honest, I do think Truth is more important than victory. For me, the pleasure in discussions like this is to grasp a new “Truth” whether it’s something I’ve come to independently or presented by another poster. The process of presenting an argument or idea and defending it in a friendly forum like this is (in my opinion) ideal for this.

Pog, excellent points and I definitely think they’re worth exploring.

I had wanted to get back to your earlier points about sin and throw out some thoughts. I would agree that there is indeed a difference between ‘less than ideal’ and ‘sin’ but I’m not sure if we can limit sin to “an act that is contrary to God’s nature”. In your earlier example of the rich man giving £10 to the beggar, motive certainly plays a role. If the rich man gave the £10 to the beggar, who then went out and ate a nice meal, but had hoped the beggar would use it to buy cheap liquor and die in an alcoholic coma, then I think we’d agree he sinned. Likewise, if he gave it to him thinking he’d use it for a good meal, but instead bought liquor and died, the rich man hadn’t sinned. Sin is a strange thing and even neutral acts can be sinful, as per Paul’s teaching regarding eating meat sacrificed to idols. If we do something we believe is wrong, even if it’s not or no harm comes of it, it is “sin”. I do think there is some leeway, however, especially regarding thoughts. If even Jesus had thoughts contrary to God’s will, then not all thoughts contrary to His will are sinful. Jesus had thoughts of avoiding the pain and humiliation of the crucifixion and yet submitted to God’s will. If someone has lustful thoughts regarding the man’s wife next door (but doesn’t act on them) he may sin if he holds on to the thoughts, fantasizes etc but not sin if he quickly dismisses them. In any event, I think a fairly broad definition of sin is useful for this discussion.

I agree whole-heartedly with this. “True” suffering has no benefit to God’s creatures, is not desired by God and must always be prevented or eliminated if possible. And of course, the question is “why then, does it exist?” Your combination of theodicies is as good as any I’ve seen, but IMO, all are lacking to some degree. I’ve been reading the blog of an apologist/theologian/philosopher, Randal Rauser, (as well as a couple of his books) recently. He’s a very bright guy with an entertaining writing style (and a hopeful universalist) and it’s interesting that he mentioned (and apparently surveys of atheists support this) that the “problem of evil” is, indeed, theism’s biggest problem. (And, IMO, it remains a problem).

Ah…interestingly just understanding that a free moral agent subordinating it’s will to that of God could keep it from sinning made the idea of other, non-human, free moral agents being sinless much more plausible. The idea of a free moral agent submitting it’s will to that of God allows it to keep it’s will and its individuality and yet, remain sinless. I think it’s entirely plausible that creatures in an environment different from ours could have more direct access to the will of God and subordinate their will to his and yet remain distinguishable from God. Perhaps they require some epistemic distance initially to establish their personhood (prior to becoming, in fact, free moral agents) such as babies who are exploring their environment, establishing their personhood do but without sinning as they haven’t reached that stage yet. In any event, The idea of “the fall” of non-human, possibly spiritual beings seems eminently possible. The idea of the fall of an “Adam” seems plausible, but the idea that all his descendants suffered for his fall due a curse from God is unacceptable. I’ve got some embryonic thoughts regarding how our current circumstances could be a protective response from God due to the fall (from an “open” understanding of God) but have to think a bit more about this.

Finally, some thoughts regarding the revised syllogism I proposed:

I’d like to explore proposition #5 further. How does one subordinate their will to that of God? It seems to me, based on my experience with making moral decisions, that this is a* free will* decision that occurs whenever a free moral agent makes a decision with moral implications. (i.e. I don’t need to seek or subordinate my will to that of God when choosing which shirt to wear) Could a free moral agent subordinate his will to that of God “once and for all”? It seems possible, but doesn’t correspond to my experience in this life at least. It seems to be that we have to decide to follow (or not) God’s will with each moral decision. How do we know what the will of God is regarding any particular moral decision? This is where it gets tricky and perhaps excuses much of the sin we commit. (" Father forgive them for they know not what they do") Perhaps God reveals His Will through our moral intuition or “conscience”. This is in essence, our moral “sense”. Just as we have senses for vision, smell, touch, etc, we have a “moral sense” but just like our other senses it is imperfect and can be damaged. This “moral sense” is modified and developed by our religious education, teaching from our parents, experience and the Holy Spirit. Do atheists have this moral sense? I’m sure they do and I think it’s the work of God within them. In any event, it seems that avoiding sin is submitting to God’s will through this moral sense. Interestingly, (if we believe Paul) it means submitting to this moral sense even if it’s wrong. So if someone’s moral sense tells them not to eat food sacrificed to idols (even though this is incorrect) they should obey their moral sense.
Finally, one implication of proposition #5 and submitting to God’s will by a “free-will” decision is that remaining “sinless” requires *continuing *to subordinate the will to God’s with each individual moral decision. It seems difficult to (in American baseball lingo) maintain a batting average of 1,000 forever. So…how is one confirmed into sinlessness? Is the free moral beings own will actually changed to be consistent with that of God? Does the individual make a “free-will” decision to “once and for all” submit his will to God’s? Or perhaps there’s some other mechanism I haven’t thought of. Honestly, I don’t know and wonder if there are any historical or traditional answers to this (or your own speculations). There must be *some *mechanism or plan or sin would be possible forever!

Steve

#53

Just some quick thoughts:

Pain, in some degree, it seems is necessary for the emergence of selves. Extreme suffering is not.

Free will, it seems, is necessary in order to experience that self as truly existing apart from God; there would be no way to distinguish the will of self from the will of God unless it were possible to go against that will. This also makes committing evil possible. Not even omnipotence can change that. It is the price God pays for self-aware beings who are capable of knowing him.

But it follows from none of this that actually acting or sinning is a necessary part of the divine plan.

God does not know for certain what these beings will possibly do with their free will until they do it.

#54

Alec, I agree that my definition of sin was inadequate, but I hadn’t really meant it to be a full definition :slight_smile:. Rather, what I. Was getting at (and with the beggar analogy), is that there is very broad spectrum of not-God’s-will that even includes virtuous acts. So a being can act and choose differently to God, less than God, yet still be choosing good as well as not sinning. The point of this is to highlight that whilst inevitability of failing to choose always what God would choose is a strong argument, this does not in any way necessitate that sin is inevitable. Does that make sense? So when you say evil is necessary I strongly disagree, even though I agree that non-God beings cannot always choose to do exactly what God would do 100% of the time (this can be further complicated by introducing ideas of humans making their own moralities, but lets avoid that for now).

Alec & chrisguy, We should be careful with saying pain is necessary (to distinguish pain from suffering). The only level of ‘pain’ necessary would be that level of sensation required to indicate that an attempted action was being met with resistance - like trying to lift something far too heavy. A partly intractable shared medium of relationality only requires this - and that is all that is required for the development of co-operation, trust, adventure etc. Pain as we understand it, ie uncomfortable and unwanted sensations, is not necessary. In order to avoid confusion we should say that a degree of sensation is necessary in creation, not a degree of pain.

You also note that my proposed combination of theodices still leaves some holes/problems. What are these holes that it leaves? Again, I cannot see any benefit to saying that evil is inevitable that alternative theodices don’t already have, and yet it throws up many difficulties avoided by alternative theodices - so I can’t see why you’d even want to embrace the idea.

#55

I guess I’d say that “suffering” happens (in a way) whenever we need to suborn our desires to the desires of another. Thus (and probably in other ways) the Son learned obedience by the things He suffered. As for the babies, I really don’t see them being raised as full grown individuals (but what do I know?) I suspect they’ll still learn obedience by the things they suffer. Certainly there are other ways to suffer in this world/age, and that suffering (I hope!) is also a means of benefit to us though perhaps not God’s highest will for us. That said, even the tears of a 2 year old at not getting what he wanted are suffering to him, and imo very necessary suffering for his development.

If, as I suspect, procreation stops, or at least becomes other than it is when the already meets the not yet of the Kingdom, perhaps the babes will already have grown up and thus no more suffering. I suspect though, that we’ll all continue to “suffer” in the sense of preferring others before ourselves, and whatever other duties we might find in the ages to come. This is the suffering of love, though, and as parents often delight to sacrifice for their children and friends for friends, is not to be a cause of pain, but rather of joy.

#56

Hi Cindy,

I agree that there are forms of suffering which are virtuous for what they demonstrate (sacrificial love) and that they can be used as elements in a maturation process. However, in my mind, this was never Gods ideal plan - God never predestined those two year olds tears as part of a good creation. Rather, suffering is inevitable in this environment. In a differing environment, with alternate biologies, there would be no need for sacrifices of the variety which caused ‘pain’ or ‘suffering’, and as truly moral beings the serving of others would be our highest joy.

Whilst suffering is a pre- requisite for demonstrating, and possibly developing, certain high virtues (extremes of love, loyalty, fortitude, bravery, faith etc), it is not a pre-requisite for the development of all virtues nor for mature beings - after all, we constantly seek to reduce suffering in this world, don’t we? We don’t stop giving children pain killers in order to better develop their characters! I think it much better to see these suffering forged virtues as the ways in which God can subvert evil and bring good out of bad, rather than sin and pain being God’s eternally chosen tools of education for others. After all, using pain as an educative device without consent is clearly immoral.

Again, I simply point to heaven and babies to show that pain and suffering clearly aren’t necessitated by God for us. It seems that people would rather that there was suffering for children in heaven as part of a maturation process rather than simply acknowledge that all suffering and all evil is ultimately gratuitous and pointless: not wanted, not necessary, not God’s idea.

#57

Hi Cindy, Pog and Chris.
I’m going to refrain from much discussion of suffering for now as I’m just getting into the meat of John Hick’s book and at this point, would simply agree with Pog’s views on the subject.

I continue to be puzzled by your complete resistance to the proposed argument, when it is based on essentially the same propositions as Plantinga’s FWD. The argument is, in fact a type of free-will defense (though admittedly far too ambitious). The propositions Plantinga’s FWD is based on are these:

Plantinga’s idea of “transworld depravity” is used to show that #2 is possible, while the argument I presented seeks to use Talbott’s thoughts (as presented by Chris) regarding how free moral agents are created to attempt to also show that #2 is possible.

Now on to problems with the argument.

I think you’re right there, though there might be a thin line between these “Non-God, non-sin” acts and actually crossing over into “true-sin”. Is it conceivable that there could be creatures acting on their own will who do not “cross the line”? Perhaps. Certainly the fact of these non-sin acts would at least make proposition #3 untenable and require revision. The definition of sin, is, I think important. Does a free moral agent that sins need to have some access to the will of God in order to sin? In other words does he need to know (or at least think he knows God’s will in order to make a choice to act against it? If a creature acts contrary to how God would act (such as murdering a neighbor)but had no access to God’s will, would that be sin? Does everyone have at least some access to God’s will through their conscience or moral intuition? Perhaps access to God’s will as a “benchmark” is part of what it means to be a free moral agent?

Regarding your theodicies and the “holes/problems” in them, the major hole in that of the “non-intervention of God” in at least, horrific suffering. I think “cosmic warfare”, and the actions of non-human, powerful created beings bears too large a burden and is at first glance, not especially plausible. (It may be to others) Also, though any theodicy must necessarily limit God’s benevolence, power or knowledge (and I would rather limit anything other than God’s benevolence), The use of the FWD limits God’s power (albeit through a logical limitation) and the use of open theism limits God’s knowledge. Honestly, though, it may be necessary to use both those concepts to have anything approaching an acceptable theodicy.

Steve

#58

Hi Alec,

The issue of the non intervention of God is a problem that all theodices share, and which is, as far as I can see, in no way alleviated by proposing that sin and suffering is inevitable. Therefore nothing is gained by saying it is, but much is lost. Why go down that road when it adds nothing?

If FWD is acceptable, especially in combination with Open Theism, then Cosmic .warfare should be likewise acceptable - after all, it is really just the extension of the FWD into the angelic sphere and using that to explain natural evils, the red in tooth and claw nature of evolution, etc. it also helps explain a large amount of the non intervention as the need for people to do x to prevent y is extended to angels with vastly greater power to cause/prevent evil than humans. It seems all win to me :slight_smile:

The reasons I’m so resistant to the idea of the necessity of sin are primarily that 1) it makes God less good, 2) it makes evil less evil, 3) it means there’s still pain and sin in heaven, 4) it means dead babies still have to suffer and sin in heaven, 5) it seems to undermine libertarian freewill and moral accountability. I can’t accept those things, and I see no benefit from any theodicy which requires me to. :frowning:

I don’t accept Plantiga’s ideas about feasible worlds and trans world depravity etc. it seems, for a start, to be built on the back of Molinism AFAIU. For example, what is the evidence/argument to back up the assertion that God couldn’t actualise a world full of good beings who never choose sin? And how does that work on open theism and libertarian freewill?

#59

Hi Pog,

I don’t find Cosmic Warfare unacceptable it’s just the idea of it as the explanation for natural evil sits wrong with me somehow.For me, a theory that would explain natural evil as a logical necessity, that explained what we see in nature as it being “immature” or “undeveloped” in some sense would be more acceptable than seeing nature as intrinsically corrupted, fallen and “evil”. It’s hard to get excited about something such as wildlife conservation, preserving the environment etc. if it’s essentially corrupted and evil. Haven’t come across such a theory, but that’s where I’m coming from. :slight_smile: (Also, giving malevolent spiritual beings this degree of power in a theodicy starts to bridge into dualism.)

I see now where you’re coming from! Your complaint is not with the inevitability of sin in a world (such as the impossibility of a world where morally free creatures produce only moral good) but of the inevitability of sin in each individual creature or particularly the necessity of sin to perfect them in some fashion. After working through this argument, I see that there are too many things we just don’t know, such as how free moral agents are created, whether creating a creature with God’s will would make it indistinguishable from God, what are the free-will choices like involved with sinning, the role of knowledge of God’s will and subordinating our own to it for the argument to hold in any fashion or strength. The implications (especially in regards to babies in the after-life) are also untenable. There may, indeed, be something about creating individual creatures with free will (excluding babies etc) that makes sin inevitable for each of them (just as there may be something about creating a world with free-willed creatures such that it is inevitable, at least some of them, will sin), but at this point the most we could say is: “for all we know…”

I just can’t follow his argument, period. :blush: I may have to spend some time studying it just as a mind exercise to ward off Alzheimer’s but “weakly actualizing a world?” “maximal world segment?” “transworld depravity?” Please! The argument does have quite a reputation, however. Whose FWD do you incorporate and do Plantinga’s propositions (that I posted before) still hold?

Steve

Addendum: Just to let you know, when I first formulated that syllogism It had just “jumped out” at me from Chris’ posts and Ireally didn’t think about the implications. It just seemed to make logical sense. I saw it as a type of free-will defense, though at an individual level, not a world level.

#60

While I agree that we must be careful and say that extreme suffering is not a necessary part of the intractable medium, I think it is extremely important not to overlook the fact that. If it is true that we must experience “frustration” in some sense, say, the desire for food or the separation from others of the opposite sex, and if, indeed, to develop self-consciousness on some level we must first experience desires for those desire for fulfilled, then it is true that there will be extremes inherent in the very boundaries of these desires. If the worst feeling in the world was a empty stomach, this would seem horrible, since it lies at the extremity of our boundary of pain. Perhaps millions and millions of years of evolution would sensitize us in such a way to the empty stomach that would be equivalent to our experience – presently – of a broken bone? In other words, whenever there are degrees of frustration, those degrees can be more or worse and appear unbearable. But this can only be in relation to the suffering that we have been exposed to.

None of that’s to say that starvation is such a necessary boundary for the development and perfection of self-conscious beings. I think it takes the abuse of free will is the only explanation for extreme suffering. There is a boundary, then, between the amount of pain necessary in the physical world, and the amount that is caused by free beings acting evilly. There is a distinction then between “necessary” pain and “gratuitous” pain.

I agree with what you say here pog. You’ve pulled me around to the open view, at least as regards God’s knowledge. Otherwise you basically end up with God actively determining sin and evil.

What I would be interested to hear you go into detail about, however, is… how do you account for why God gave creatures free will in the first place? If it’s because it’s only by acting freely that good acts are possible, and if creatures must freely “climb the ladder of being” up to God, until they are perfect, how does this logically tie in to Universalism?