Wow, I gotta play chatch-up!
Aaron,
I suppose I should qualify all my previous posts as intending to show how trinitarian theism entails UR. I can’t say how a Unitarian would view God in essential terms. Without getting into 1John, I’ll just say that I don’t think John consciously and explicitly intends to say something about the ontology of trinitarian relations. But I do think trinitarianism is implicated in the notion that God is love, as I understand the logic behind John’s claim.
Let’s take your suggestion that ‘God is love’ means that “the disposition of the Father toward the human race is that of perfect benevolence.” Just that much suggests to me that the Father is defined ‘dispositionally’ in such a way as to necessitate (I don’t mean by force or coercion) his ‘loving’ human beings when they come along. I’d be very interested in what you think that ‘disposition’ is. I think we’d agree that it defines God essentially (it’s not a contingent feature of God’s being, as if God is as dispositionally likely to abuse and hate as he is to love humans) and that it accounts for or explains the actual benevolence of God’s actions relative to the world. The only difference may be that I call this disposition a ‘definitional’ disposition, a disposition that only exists at all as it is actually exercised and not one which is exercised contingently, which I think you’d want to say about God’s disposition to love. So in the end, just what is this disposition to love that defines God essentially?
My hunch is that a disposition that always ‘loves’ in situations where love is possible is just another name for ‘love’ (or ‘potential love’ on your account, or something like that), however inconsistent I think it is to posit this disposition in the absence of personal relations. Be that as it may, even though John may have in mind God’s love relative to how the Father relates to us, it’s only (as you show) because God is already dispositionally inclined to love that John says what he does. In other words, John believes this disposition motivates God’s actions toward us (the acts we call ‘loving’) and not the other way around. God’s loving acts toward us reveal the divine disposition to love as opposed to that divine disposition being determined by God’s loving acts toward us. I think you’ll agree with that much. And if a Unitarian can agree that God is ‘dispositionally inclined to love’, then that may be as close as you and trinitarians can get on this issue, and that’s not bad! But my question is, just what is this essential divine disposition to love when someone comes along to serve as an object of love? I think in the end you and I are actually agreeing that God is essentially ‘love’. You just don’t connect ‘love’ necessarily to the presence of relations. And if you DO connect them, you don’t think God is always in relation to other persons (since created presons haven’t always been around). But you DO posit a necessary divine disposition to love when relations are present. You think the disposition is God’s essentially but not the relations.
On a side note, I’m not sure how to convince you that the act of loving (exercising one’s disposition to love) entails personal relations, or why it’s best to suppose that the actual exercise of this divine disposition to love defines God necessarily. Deep waters indeed. I take it as a fundamental intuition (or maybe just a ‘given’ of experience) that to love involves a certain being-in-relation, a certain giving-and-receiving between one and another. I honestly don’t know what else love is.
Luke: But one of the troubles with the assertion that ‘God is love’ is that wrongly elevates the unity of God over the distinctions of God. Besides which Augustine’s model from De Trinitate of the Father as the lover, the Son as the beloved and the Spirit as the love that exists between them is only a model (which he acknowledges) and one that starts to look to much like Sabellianism (one God, three masks) is used to often. Furthermore it’s also misleading to pull the statement “God is love” from Scripture but not “God is a consuming fire” (Heb 12:29) or “God is just” (2 Th 1:6) for example.
Tom: I don’t think I’m pulling it the way you think I am. For example, were God to have a disposition necessarily to ‘consume with fire’ how might we imagine this disposition to be exercised eternally or essentially? Who would this fire be consumming? Similarly with ‘justice’. So what I want to say is that all the world-dependent attributes we talk about (forgiveness, justice, chastisement, etc.) are just the love of God relating now to this state of affairs, now to that one. But orthodox trinitarianism doesn’t make the triune relations world-dependent. They define God essentially. I don’t know what word other than ‘love’ we can use to better describe these relations.
In the end I don’t see justice and forgiveness and judgment as something ontologically other than love, so when I pull ‘love’ out I’m essentially pulling out all the attributes and just naming what is common and essential to them all—viz., the benevolent will to secure the highest possible well-being of a thing. Justice IS love-in-relation-to-______ (fill in the blank with an appropriate injustice) seeking to achieve the highest well-being in its appropriate circumstances. Similarly, judgment IS just love in-relation-to- _______ (fill in the blank with an appropriate evil) seeking to promote the highest well-being in its appropriate circumstances, and so forth. But those injustices and evils are world-dependent states. Divine love (or so I’m arguing on the basis of the divine relations) is not a world-dependent state, and that’s why love can embrace all the other attributes conceptually as the fount from which they spring.
Tom