The Evangelical Universalist Forum

William Lane Craig on the transworld damned?

Hi Tom,

I appreciate that you posted some criticism on William Lane Craig’s teachings related to hell. I’ll first say that I deeply appreciate Craig’s writings on cosmology, but his view about “transworld damned” gets my goad. If I correctly understand his view, Craig says that all who die lost would have died lost in any other possible set of hypothetical circumstances in any possible hypothetical universe, which makes those people transworld damned.

I like Craig am also a Molinist, but I fail to see how his view agrees with Matthew 11:21 (TNIV):

"Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.

I see Jesus teaching that some people who never repented would have repented if circumstances were different.

I’ll first ask you, Are you familiar with Craig’s view of the transworld damned and did I accurately describe Craig’s view?

Second, What is your assessment of Craig’s teaching about the transworld damned? (Apart from the obvious that you’re a Universalist while Craig is not.)

NOTE: THIS POST TOUCHES ON SOME RATHER ABSTRACT PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES THAT MAY NOT BE VERY EDIFYING.

Hi Jim,

You asked: “Are you familiar with Craig’s view of the transworld damned and did I accurately describe Craig’s view?” Yes, I am quite familiar with Craig’s idea of transworld damnation; indeed, I have employed essentially the same idea, which I have called “transworld reprobation,” in a couple of my own papers. It is a complicated and difficult concept (for the uninitiated), but your description definitely points in the right direction.

The idea of transworld damnation or transworld reprobation is patterned after Alvin Plantinga’s idea of transworld depravity and requires a basic understanding of two things: how Plantinga employs the concept of a possible world, and why many possible worlds, probably an infinite number of them, lie outside even the power of an omnipotent being to create (or, more accurately, to make actual). Plantinga explains all of this in God, Freedom, and Evil, pp. 34-48. I also provide a rather abstract definition of “transworld reprobation,” in “God, Freedom, and Human Destiny ((Religious Studies, 1990) willamette.edu/~ttalbott/DESTINY2.pdf and “Craig on the Possibility of Eternal Damnation” (Religious Studies, 1992) willamette.edu/~ttalbott/CRAIG4.pdf.

Perhaps the most difficult thing to get across to students, so I have found, is this: Even if a person S “suffers” from transworld depravity, there will nonetheless be a host of possible worlds in which S confronts one or more free choices and freely makes the right choice every time; and even if S “suffers” from transworld damnation, there will nonetheless be a host of possible worlds in which S sins, freely repents, and is saved. But here is the kicker. If S does “suffer” from transworld damnation, then nothing God can do–that is, no love he might display, no punishment he might deliver, and no possible set of circumstances in which he places S–would in fact result in S’s repenting freely and being saved. So it turns out that none of the possible worlds–even though they are genuinely possible–in which S freely repents lies within God’s power to make actual. Therefore, God knows from the outset that if he creates S, then S will never freely repent and be saved; God can both create S and save S, in other words, only if he is prepared to override S’s own freewill in the matter of repentance and salvation.

Now I would be altogether surprised if the above paragraph did not produce more confusion than clarity. But since a more elaborate explanation would likely be even more bewildering, I’ll now address your second more practical question: “What is your assessment of Craig’s teaching about the transworld damned?” There are really two questions here: First, is the concept of transworld damnation coherent, in my opinion? And second, do I believe that any actual person “suffers” from it? The answer: I seriously doubt that the concept is coherent, and I’m absolutely certain that, even if it is coherent, God would never create someone who actually “suffered” from transworld damnation.

I doubt that the concept is coherent for two reasons: First, I believe that the very idea of someone freely rejecting God forever is already incoherent. And second, I am now very skeptical of the Molinist assumption that the following kind of proposition, sometimes called a counterfactual of freedom, has a definite truth-value:

§ If Talbott had been an employee of Bernie Madoff and Madoff had offered him $1,000,000.00 in circumstances C to falsify some records and to keep quiet about it, then Talbott would have freely accepted the bribe. Don’t get me wrong. I do not doubt that God has foreknowledge. But I do doubt that he has what some philosophers call middle knowledge, which would require that the above proposition have a definite truth-value. I suspect, however, that it is neither true nor false.

But suppose I am mistaken about all of this. Even so, it is logically impossible, so I claim, that a perfectly loving God would permit the kind irreparable harm that hell represents to enter into his creation; hence, it is also logically impossible that he would create someone who “suffers” from transworld damnation. Craig counters with the following claim: It is at least possible, he says, that no one would freely repent unless God permits some to damn themselves freely; it is also possible that he could increase the number of those who freely repent and thereby gain heaven by increasing the number of those who freely damn themselves. And my rejoinder is that Craig provides no good arguments for such possibilities, which strike me as preposterous. For a more detailed explanation of Craig’s view and why I reject it, see my paper “Craig on the Possibility of Eternal Damnation” at the URL specified above. Or, for a less technical discussion, see Chapter 11 of The Inescapable Love of God.

Hope this helps, at least a little.

-Tom

Tom, thank you for the summary and pointing me to some references.

As a kind-of quick followup:

When Tom says he doubts that God has what philosophers call “middle knowledge”, he’s distinguishing between the following propositions.

1.) God knows all potential outcomes.

2.) God sees and knows all actual events (including in parallel worlds, if any).

3.) God knows that if (H)ypothesis involving supposedly (F)ree Willed entity ever occurred, then F would certainly do a particular (E)vent.

Proposition #3 is “middle knowledge”. A philosopher or theologian can deny #3 without denying the other two propositions.

So, putting it in terms of Tom’s chosen example (and using similar verb tenses):

1.) God knows all the potential outcomes that might have occurred if Talbott had been an employee of Bernie Madoff and Madoff had offered him $1,000,000.00 in circumstances C to falsify some records and to keep quiet about it. One set of potential outcomes involves Talbott freely accepting the bribe.

2.) God saw (and so knows) what Talbott actually did do when Talbott was an employee of Bernie Madoff and Madoff offered him $1,000,000.00 in circumstances C to falsify some records and to keep quiet about it: Talbott freely accepted the bribe.

3.) God knows that if Talbott had been an employee of Bernie Madoff and Madoff had offered him $1,000,000.00 in circumstances C to falsify some records and to keep quiet about it, then Talbott would have freely accepted the bribe.

Or, rephrasing the same examples in a more future oriented verb tense:

1.) God knows all the potential outcomes that might occur if Talbott ever becomes an employee of Bernie Madoff and Madoff ever offers him $1,000,000.00 in circumstances C to falsify some records and to keep quiet about it. One set of potential outcomes involves Talbott freely accepting the bribe.

2.) God sees (and so knows) what Talbott actually will do when Talbott becomes an employee of Bernie Madoff and Madoff offers him $1,000,000.00 in circumstances C to falsify some records and to keep quiet about it: Talbott will freely accept the bribe.

3.) God knows that if Talbott ever becomes an employee of Bernie Madoff and Madoff ever offers him $1,000,000.00 in circumstances C to falsify some records and to keep quiet about it, then Talbott will freely accept the bribe.

I’ve specially underlined the problematic combination of terms in each example of proposition 3. Notice that each P3 combines characteristics of the other two propositions in each set.

(Did I further clarify the issue properly, Tom? :slight_smile: )

I’m completely open to correction here but it appears to me that Transworld Damnation is a defense mechanism for free will logic. I know very little of it but in following the thoughts of Molinism it appeared to me the very question of favoritism arose. I came to the same fork in the road that calvinism does.

Again, correct me if I’m wrong on this:

In Molinism God knows all the possible worlds and all people who would respond in any or all circumstances. God then took the world which had the highest number of people who freely choose salvation and actualized that world which is what we live in now.

That is my understanding of Craigs position.

Perhaps I am wrong because sometimes he brings up “feasible” worlds vs. “possible” worlds to which I must admit I’m not sure what he is getting at.

If I am right about my understanding then a question arose for me.

If God sees (knows) a world in which there are 3 people: Talbott, Goetz, Pratt, and God knows all the possible outcomes and what these men will freely choose under all circumstances sees that 2 being saved is the maximum (optimum) amount of people saved then he would actualize that world at the cost of Pratt. I then thought but then what if in another world Pratt and Goetz could have been save and Talbott is lost. How then does God choose which ones are expendible?
If God should Damn Talbott when in another world he could have saved him then the reason why talbott is lost is for the sake of the many. This seems to me to inherit a justice issue. If it is for God’s own pleasure then it seems God is playing favorites.

I then thought the defense would seem to evade this by saying those who are lost in the actualized world are people who would NEVER have been saved in any other world. Thus God found a world in which the most optimum amount of people saved is accompanied with people who could NEVER have been saved no matter what circumstances thus the decision to select which scenario is best becomes easy. God does not have to choose one person over another (favoritism).

Perhaps I’m totally wrong about all this and I simply don’t have a good grasp of Molinsm. I admit at times it’s hard to understand.

I think you’ve tagged it quite well, Aug. :slight_smile:

A Molinist could add that due to the extremely high population, the odds of there being two possible worlds with the same number of not-otherwise-necessarily damned (but with different people filling the set) is remote. I think it would still come back to that for the Molinst, unless the Molinst is also claiming that all those who are hopelessly damned would be hopelessly damned in any possible world.

(At which point the main distinction between the Calvinst idea of election and the Arminian Molinist would be who is primarily responsible for condemnation?–God, or the sinner? But I doubt most Molinists go this route anyway.)

Auggy, what Craig is getting at in that distinction is this:

There are possible worlds in which I do an incredibly large range of different things in circumstances C. However, says the Molinist, God cannot create just any of those worlds without overriding libertarian freedom, because in some of those worlds I am not acting freely. So if libertarian freedom is to prevail, some of those worlds, although logically possible, are not feasible for God to actualise. (That’s no typo, that’s my antipodean spelling.)

Glenn,
Thanks for the understandable explanation :slight_smile:

I’ve had a hard time until you explained it so simple without all the mumbo jumbo in between. I don’t think (at least for me) that it changes much for me on my understanding of Transworld damnation. I imagine you read my thoughts on it in my earlier post.

I simply have a hard time wrapping my mind around the idea that God simply cannot break them of their arrogance BEFORE he has to force them onto their knees in humility. (You can read my argument of humility I’ve been drawing up at Argument of Humility - Refined )

I know there is so much more to say than a few simple sentences. I want to be fair and not draw out some strawman or misunderstanding of transworld damnation. I guess at this point I just don’t get it :slight_smile:

Auggy

Actually, someone who rejects the kind of “middle knowledge” represented by the varieties of P3 I listed above, could still easily accept this in principle. (Like, for example, myself. :wink: )

However, this goes rather around the original topic of transworld damnation. So, to synch up: there are possible worlds in which you could do an incredibly large range of different things in circumstances C. However, says, the Molinist (and some non-Molinists also), God cannot create just any of those worlds without overriding libertarian freedom, because in some of those worlds you are not acting freely. So if libertarian freedom is to prevail, some of those worlds, although logically possible, are not feasible for God to actualize. In all remaining possible worlds, however, including all worlds actualized by God, you freely choose damnation; and God only gives up saving from sin (or never bothers to even try to save, depending on the Arm or Calv version), those who in all libertarian possible worlds would and do choose damnation.

(Which makes the transition away from a universalistic notion of damnation, since even in a world where you never accept God’s action to save you from sin, God could still keep trying to save you from sin. Moreover, even if in all libertarian worlds you insist on being punished by God in hell, or more likely if you insist on doing things for which God is going to punish you, this does not by itself mean that in all such worlds you will never choose repent as a result of God’s punishment. If God annihilates you in punishment, of course, then there’s nothing left for Him to act toward the salvation of from sin. But then God would be “violating” your libertarian freedom in the most extreme fashion possible.)

I’m not sure that logically follows. Seems a bit narrow to say annihilation is a form of determinism. If you say it’s not a form of determinism but it still violates free will it seems one could simply argue “what free will? It’s gone.” - I should type in a “LOL” here but I’ll refrain.

Exactly. There was free will and now it is utterly gone. (Which God quite forcibly determined, by the way. :wink: )

The only half-consistent way out of this contradiction (FREE WILL IS ABSOLUTELY IMPORTANT TO PROTECT!!–except when God annihilates a free-willed person as punishment for exercising his free will the wrong way–BUT FOR LOVE’S SAKE GOD WILL RESPECT THE FREE WILL OF THE PERSON!!) is for the annihilationist to disassociate the annihilation from God’s action at all. This, however, introduces subtle but serious ontological problems. (Not as ontologically problematic as having the hopelessly condemned sinner continue existing ‘apart from God’, admittedly; but still problematic.)

I have seen (much to my amazement) at least one annihilationist driven by the consequences of facing these problems, to claiming that the “annihilated” person somehow continues existing as a person (with free will) anyway, as part of God’s grace to that person. The obvious problem to this solution, is that it isn’t annihilation!–or anyway it isn’t any more annihilation than traditional damnationism.

(Lewis, at one point, had a clever way around this impasse by having the person continue existing at right angles to natural time, and so continuing to exist in relation to God but not in relation to any other created entities. I’d say there’s an admirable elegance to that theory–as far as it goes! :mrgreen: )

Hopefully Glenn will dialogue with Thomas on this topic, but if they go another direction instead I’d be happy to do so. :slight_smile: :ugeek: