The Evangelical Universalist Forum

A Barthian argument against (church) dogmatic universalism?

Dear All,

I’ve been preparing for a lecture on a course on systematic theology and as some of you perhaps know, I am just a New Testament teacher - simply filling in for someone who cannot make that particular session, so well beyond my specialism! The lecture in question is on God’s providence and, as is my usual practice, I tend to first turn to Barth. Without hoping to summarise Barth’s complex and roughly 300 page argument, and not being a systematician, let me draw out what struck me as relevant. He seems to want to say:

  1. knowledge of providence is knowledge of God, and hence must be rigourously conceived only in terms of faith
  2. it follows that we should not stress metaphysical speculation from the perspective of the development of human history, when pondering the question of God’s providence (however valid some of those questions may be)
    This, however, leads to many unanswered questions, as it is reasoning bound to the strictures of the partial knowing of faith, one which best focuses on obedience and faith etc. (indeed with such subjects Barth ends his section on providence, CD III/3), not on grand unifying theological constructs.

Okay, what has all of this got to do with universalism?

To get to my point, I need just one more paragraph of preamble: It seems to me that the case for universalism is strongest at what I would call the theoretical or philosophical level of argumentation (the level at which John Kronen and Eric Reitan tend to argue. In fact, in this regard I refer to important comments on page 66 of their fabulous new volume, God’s Final Victory). The theological logic of a healthy universalism is certainly impressive. It is not the Bible alone which suggests universalism (and certainly it is not the Bible alone which proves universalism wrong!), but Scripture reading guided by a rational and consistent theological framework, itself faithful to key Christian commitments. At this complex, scripturally engaged level, the case for universalism is perhaps the strongest.

So, and to bring me to the key issue for me, is knowledge of eschatological salvation also to be humbly circumscribed in the way Barth treats providence? Although it is not wrong to press the consequences of the logic of certain theological positions relating to universalism, is it one which ultimately steps out of the bounds of what should be truly dogmatic, into the realm of either robust hope (not the same thing as wishful thinking!), or if you are less charitable, speculation? Knowledge of eschatological salvation is knowledge of God, and hence it is not appropriate to attach the label “dogmatic” to universalism as it pushes the theological logic beyond the bounds of what God has revealed.

This kind of reasoning reminds me of something Douglas Campbell said at a recent conference on his book, The Deliverance of God, that Christianity is a need to know business. We do not need to know the final eschatological destiny of everyone, and so dogmatic universalism cannot ever claim to be a church dogmatics.

I am also reminded of a response to an earlier argument made by (I think) Eric Reitin in the Parry ed. volume. Against the syllogistic arguments he proffered for universalism, somebody responded (I think in the introduction or preface) that an analysis of the problem of evil in these terms would lead to a theological explosion (not their words, but perhaps you get the idea!) - God is all-powerful, God is entirely good, yet evil persists etc., so logic breaks down.

So, does Barth’s theological exposition of God’s providence suggest a model for handling eschatological salvation? For those who are convinced by the philosophical/theoretical/theological logic of universalism, is the best way to hold this not as a church dogma, but somewhere between faith and robust hope (as a dogmatics, perhaps, but not a church dogmatics)?

I’ve tried out my new Dragon voice recognition software to write this, so I am not sure I have expressed myself 100% clearly! But I’m sure you’ll point out to me where I am speaking nonsense! Look forward to any thoughts …

Best wishes to you all,
Chris

At the end of the day, we might say that the case for hopeful universalism is made on theological grounds, whereas the case for dogmatic universalism is typically made on exegetical grounds. What I mean is this: dogmatic universalism tends to believe that certain passages can only coherently be read as stating that God will ultimately save all people, whereas hopeful universalism perceives significantly more exegetical ambiguity in these passages (or, at least, sees a dialectical tension between these passages and the “eternal punishment” passages and believes it beyond the exegete’s abilities to resolve that tension). It’s only once the conclusion for exegetical ambiguity has been reached that hopeful universalism is derived from the various theological considerations involved–God’s goodness, the scope of His salvific work, and so forth.

After all, if the Bible does unambiguously state that God will save all people (and I myself have mounted fairly complex exegetical arguments with regard to, e.g., Romans 5 that suggest that such passages devolve into incoherence when read in any other way), well, it’s hardly lacking in humility to believe it dogmatically. So the question that decides between the two positions (as well as between universalism and non-universalism) is whether Scripture is, in fact, explicit and unequivocal–that is, if there is a true dialectical tension, which to my mind seems simply a nice way of saying “contradiction,” or both sets of passages turn out to be too ambiguous to support either claim with certainty, then we can’t argue that either position is the singularly biblical position. Nevertheless, that seems a question first and primarily for exegesis.

Being completely honest with myself, I am not able to get any farther than “hopeful universalism”. I think that God leaves himself plenty of “wiggle room” in the scriptures in that there are enough vague areas (or areas of tension) that leave open the possibility of other options, though I am fairly dogmatic that he will not punish forever since there are many passages in many different places that speak directly to that. This does not close the door on annihilation, for me, or perhaps something else that we do not yet understand.

Thanks, snitzelhoff. Your last point about what seems “primarily for exegesis” is fair, i think, so long as exegesis not be thought of in separation from theological thought. On this, I think Robert Jenson stated that matter well:

As someone who is supposed to professionally rub their nose up against the text, I think it would be a bold person to claim that the “original” (or “plain”) meaning of all scriptural passages is united concerning matters of eschatology, but I don’t think that is what you are arguing.

Dirtboy (great name!), I very much understand you. The only concern I have is to emphasise that “hopeful universalism” and annihilationism both require considered engagement with the theological implications of their claims. And how do they stand when considered in light of the resurrection, etc.?

I was much taken with a facebook conversation involving Keith de Rose in which he said Christians tend to unjustifiably overstate the certainty of their views. Bearing that in mind, I do know for certain that I hope God exists, that God is good as I understand goodness, and that other real people actually exist. I’m pretty certain universalism flows naturally from this, and I’m quite certain there is no point whatsoever in choosing any lesser God.

I don’t know for certain if God exists. Perhaps only one person exists, namely myself. Perhaps there’s an infinite regression of gods and the Lord Most High doesn’t exist (cannot exist) no more than the final digit of pi exists. (Is this is a powerful argument against the existence of God? None of the atheists I’ve read seem to have thought of it.)

I don’t know for certain if God is good, though my intuition leads me to believe any boundless entity would need to possess perfect integrity. I do know for certain if God isn’t good, we’re all doomed.

I don’t know for certain how many real people actually exist. Most other people might be “bots” placed in the Matrix by the programmer to see how the few real people (the Elect) react. A good author will create bad characters in his novel with the sole aim of destroying them. Sauron was destined to destruction from the very beginning. Perhaps it is also possible for a good God to create bad people destined to destruction.

Far from clarifying matters, Biblical eschatology, exegesis etc beg a thousand more questions relating to revelation, fallibility etc, adding more layers of uncertainty even as my trembling shoulders sag under the load.

In the end I smile, shut my computer, go outside, hoe my veggie patch and breathe the fresh air.

Ps 131 gets it just right:

My heart is not proud, O LORD,
my eyes are not haughty;
I do not concern myself with great matters
or things too wonderful for me.
2 But I have stilled and quieted my soul;
like a weaned child with its mother,
like a weaned child is my soul within me.
3 O Israel, put your hope in the LORD
both now and forevermore.

So simple, that psalm. So wise. And stunningly beautiful.

No, of course it does no good to separate exegesis from theology; that’d be a bit like setting the bones in a broken arm while ignoring the fact that it’s been severed from the rest of the body. And I find that “the plain sense” of Scripture tends to be a useless term due to its high subjectivity (what is “plain” varies from person to person). Nevertheless, I think that working through issues of the original languages, context, genre and literary matters, historical and cultural factors, and so forth will yield a coherent narrative within Scripture. While I don’t believe that every passage of Scripture actively supports universalism, neither do I believe that any passage definitively undermines it.

Put plainly, it boils down to this, from my perspective: there are some passages that appear to teach some form of irrevocable eschatological punishment, and some that appear to teach that all people will be reconciled to God. The former set of passages, I find, can be explained in terms of the latter with no real contradictions in thought. Doing so is the approach most readily congruent with the overall biblical narrative and leaves very little theological and philosophical tension to be resolved except in its interaction with historical tradition (and even there, a good deal of evidence can be offered to show that universalism is a viewpoint faithful to Christian tradition). The latter set of passages, in my experience, cannot be explained in terms of the former without falling into incoherence.

If my exegesis is correct (and I acknowledge that it could be mistaken) and Scripture is true, then there is no way that all people will not be saved. Hence, with Robin and others, I might identify as a “hopeful dogmatic” universalist–dogmatic because, so far as I can see, solid exegesis of Scripture leaves no other viable alternative, and hopeful because I recognize my own intrinsic limitations as an exegete and a human being and might be wrong. But a pure hopeful universalism is not necessitated by appeals to humility if, in fact, Scripture declares that all people will be saved; it is not presumptuous or lacking in humility to trust that God will fulfill His promises if, in fact, He has made them.

Certainly, if the exegesis is shaky enough to leave significant room for doubt, then a pure hopeful universalism becomes, at least, a viable option.

I hope that clears up my thoughts on the matter: hopeful universalism (as opposed to hopeful-dogmatic or even pure dogmatic) seems to be only viable from an Evangelical standpoint if the exegesis of the relevant Scriptures comes to an impasse–that is, if the exegesis of the universalistic texts is uncertain, or the exegesis of the infernalist is certain enough to set up an irresolvable dialectical tension between the two sets of passages.

What worries me about what you wrote, the books and men you quoted, not to mention universalism as a whole. There is not one mention of Jesus Christ. I find this very troubling if not disturbing.

Oxy,

Yet, all of universalism falls apart without Jesus just as surely as any other soteriological framework. He plays the central role in our theology, just as He does in yours. Whereas in a non-universalistic theology, the narrative goes, “Without Jesus, none would be saved; because of Jesus, some will be saved,” in a universalistic one, the narrative goes, “Without Jesus, none would be saved; because of Jesus, all will be saved.” In either case, there is no salvation apart from Jesus.

Oxy,

The books quoted by Chris mention Jesus Christ quite often in an orthodox fashion, and anchor their points on the logical implications of the two-natures Incarnational doctrine of trinitarian theism.

Chris’ main post was about methodology more than about the theological details themselves. In other words, how to go about deciding what the implications of Christ are for soteriology. If there are inherent problems with trying to figure out what those implications are, then that becomes a logically prior argument against attempts (like in K&R’s book) to figure out what those implications are. The first line of criticism starts before the details of their arguments.

That’s why Chris isn’t (yet) discussing the details of K&R’s arguments.

Hi Chris,

Nice sunglasses :sunglasses:

I’ll say upfront that I’m no expert on Barth, but I sympathize with his caution against dogmatic universalism. I don’t see the Bible teaching dogmatic universalism while I see it teaching the possibility of universalism with God never giving up any lost soul. However, my philosophical conjecture is that everybody will eventually accept Christ’s salvation. I guess that makes me a dogmatic hopeful universalist and a conjectural universalist.

Medical issues with my Dad are going to keep me from participating much in this thread for a while (or on the site at all, actually), but I very much want to. :slight_smile: Maybe by the time I get back I’ll have finished reading through K&R’s book myself and can talk more about the details.

I will say, as someone who first arrived at universalism from a study of the theological implications of the Trinity (and with the relationship of the Trinity to the Incarnation in mind), that my approach to the hopeful/dogmatic options were different. I could be dogmatic that God would persistently act toward saving all sinners from sin, and I could hope and trust that God would eventually succeed, but I still had to recognize the technical possibility of a permanent ongoing stalemate. My dogmatic belief that God will definitely succeed is based on scriptural interpretation pointing toward God’s revelation of final victory (including details of what that victory ultimately entails, poetic in form though those details often are).

I’m unsure if my synthetic metaphysic would be able to arrive at certainty of (instead of hope in God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, for) ultimate victory–maybe it could in some way I don’t yet perceive. (For several years I wasn’t sure whether my approach could validly arrive at several points of doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit, although the basic orthodox points could be established. A couple of years ago, thanks to Sergius Bulgakov, I figured out how to get there. :slight_smile: No thanks to his being a universalist, though.) But I do know that, thanks to the overall systematic approach, I was in a position to be sensitive to the kinds of questions being raised by Barth where quoted by Chris: is it possible to arrive at any kind of certainty on such-and-such issues?–if so, how far?–if not, why not?

K&R’s book, not being a wholesale metaphysic, doesn’t have the advantage of approaching such questions within the framework of that kind of development, although they can’t be blamed for that (they aren’t attempting a total systematic work after all). I’ll have to wait until I get to the chapters where they start their actual positive argument, to see if they hold up to Barth’s challenge.

From my own approach I would say doctrinal certainty about God’s intentions and actions on this topic is appropriate. Should it be dogmatic? Dogmatics are doctrines for group identification and (in the Pauline sense of how he coined the phrase) “membership”. Part of me would say yes, such belief should be dogmatic, partly due to the relationship of such belief to evangelism (and the assurance that our toil in Christ is not in vain, as Paul puts it in 1 Cor 15), and partly because in my experience denial of Christian universalism tends to lead implicitly or explicitly to contradiction of trinitarian doctrines (which are theologically more important, for soteriology necessarily depends on what is true about God!) That which reinforces accepted dogma, and the denial of which undermines accepted dogma, ought in itself to be dogmatic.

Consequently, and with an eye toward scriptural revelation in the details, I treat God’s scope and persistence as dogmatic in my devotional life, as part of ortho-praxy (right action) and ortho-doxy (right praise and representation, including for evangelical witness).

I regard the certainty of God’s evangelical success as dogmatic (as in fact Calvinists also do in their own way), too, although the grounds are more purely scriptural: where I cannot by the grace of God see yet in one way, the scriptures enlighten by the grace of God in another way. And here I would want to know where someone like Barth draws the line and why. Does he not consider it dogmatically important (beyond the concept of doctrinal certainty) to affirm that God shall be all in all, and that all shall submit to the Father in submission to the Son as the Son submits Himself, and all things in Him, to the Father? I suppose he does–I seem to recall that he does (I’m far from an expert on Karl Barth), but if he does not I would want to know why he thinks this shouldn’t be dogmatic.

If so, then it may be a further question as to whether this or that interpretation of what such things mean should be dogma. But wouldn’t such an affirmation of dogma up to that very far mark, point (at least on the face of it) to questions that ought to be dogmatically answered? Should we consider such things to be dogmatic, yet consider the issues to which they point to be separated intrinsically from even the possibility of dogmatic answer? If the scriptures speak so strongly so often about such a victory, I would have to see some major arguments about a necessary gulf (across which no man can cross) between dogmatically accepting the doctrine of such a victory and dogmatically accepting what such a victory means.

The sudden crash into nothing possibly more than mere speculation on what the total victory means, or nothing possibly more than cloud-of-unknowingish hope about what the total victory entails, seems rather inherently implausible instead.

The new voice software provided some great results, btw, Chris! :smiley:

My friend. I understand all that. I am only expressing what I constantly observe when talking to a universalist or reading their material. I don’t know, maybe it’s the “Lordship salvation” in me?

My friend. I do understand that. I am not saying, he nor the book never recognizes or acknowledges Jesus Christ, but that Christ not being mentioned at all in what the OP wrote is troubling to me. That’s all

Hi oxymoron, well, the OP mentions “God” in the context of “Christianity,” while Christianity teaches that Jesus Christ is God. So the OP clearly refers to Jesus Christ.

so does every starting post have to have a Jesus’ name quota?
:confused:

Hey, it’s never wrong to sing praise to Jesus. :smiley:

:laughing: so very true!

Thanks very much to you all for your comments!

Let me try and clarify what I tried to argue above and simultaneously simplify and shorten.

For Barth, one should not try and develop a doctrine of the providence of God on the basis of the observation of history, say the evolution of humans, the rise and fall of empires etc. However logical and appropriate that might seem, as indeed the providence of God involves history, it is not the proper place to start. Rather, for Barth the key point was to think about everything in light of Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ not only constitutes doctrinal thinking, for Barth, but Christology also rightly orders and rightly restrains theological thinking (protecting it from the speculation that Athanasius rejected in confessing the homoousios). In terms of the doctrine of the providence of God, this means that many questions cannot be pursued to logical conclusions, but must humbly submit to the scope of revelation such that providence is all about Jesus Christ, and not a worldview, or complete explanation of world history and how it is to be understood as relating to God.

The impact this line of reasoning may have on universalism is to curtail confidence in the results of logical syllogisms when applied to doctrine. Further, this may suggest that if one claims to be a dogmatic Universalist, they should not insist that this be a *church *dogmatics. Put another way, I still think the Universalist could say “I am *persuaded *by the case for universalism”, without it being churchly *credo *(Latin for “I believe”).

I don’t know if that clarifies anything, and I am just toying with these thoughts at the moment. Rereading it, I can anticipate already where I probably need to be clearer! But time is limited!

Best wishes to you all, and thanks again for your comments. I look forward to more!
Chris

Hi Chris,

Based on my understanding of scripture, the revelation of Jesus, I am convinced that Jesus has, is, and ultimately saves all - a convinced universalist. Should the local church or denomination that I’m a member of thus make that “The” doctrine of that church/denomination, excluding others who are not convinced? In short, no; I don’t believe UR should be elevated to that point of acceptance. And yet, of course, I believe that I should be free to share why I’ve come to have faith in Jesus not only for the salvation of all, but even for me.

That’s pretty much what I thought your argument from the OP entailed.

But first (and I think this is a standard critique of Barth’s approach), logical syllogisms (and for this purpose I’m including inductive and abductive as well as deductive inferences) are how we, as persons, come to have any details about Jesus Christ at all for data about subsequent theological thinking; and logical syllogisms (especially the stricter definition of this as deductive inferences) are how we then constrain theological thinking in light of data about Jesus Christ thereby. (Inductive and especially abductive inferences wouldn’t be so useful for discovering constraints on what can and cannot be accomplished by reasoning on the topic, much moreso what ought or ought not be believed to be true.)

So I don’t see how this line of approach can (validly!) curtail confidence in the results of logical syllogisms when applied to doctrine, per se. Critiquing the practice of historicism is a much more particularly focused topic than that. (And a critique I happen to agree with, as any good student of C. S. Lewis would. :sunglasses: In exactly the same proportion I would reject a universalism based on historicism, which was not-incidentally a topic of the 19th and early 20th century philosophers. e.g. social and/or biological “evolution” shows development to perfection, therefore we can be confident that humans will develop (by God’s grace or otherwise, depending on how the notion went!) to moral perfection.) But if we did not observe and reason about claims of history, we would not have data about Jesus Christ to reason from at all.

And second, such a line of approach could not in itself be any curtail to confidence in the results of logical syllogisms when applied to doctrine insofar as those syllogisms are premised on details about Jesus Christ. Which I would include details about Christ’s ontological existence and relationship to God.

So a theologian who arrives at universalism from implications of theological details about Jesus Christ, is thereby exempted from such a critique (although not necessarily from related critiques: are his details about Jesus Christ accurate, and has he included enough such details, or do his conclusions run up against details he agrees or should agree to be true? Or again, do various details about Jesus Christ preclude the theologian from legitimately arriving at various conclusions or types of conclusions?–and should those details result in agnosticism on the topic for now, or forever, or should those details result in different conclusions about the topic?)

Only if such a conclusion follows legitimately from the constraints of the data; but that would have to be argued and I don’t think your presentation so far arrives at anything like such a constraint.

However, I’m in favor (as I said in my earlier reply) of being generous about regarding conflicting dogmatic positions (even as dogma beyond assent to doctrinal belief). Do I believe one or another kind of Chrisitian universalism should be dogma? Of course. It would be ridiculous for me to claim that it was and/or is dogma, though, except for small groups of Christians at most who have professed it as dogma in their group.

This gets into all the complexities of what constitutes the true body of Christ historically speaking and how far those members are members of the body. I do believe that Christ requires of me that in my faithfulness to Christ I believe in the total scope and victory of Christ’s salvation of sinners from sin, and that I should live according to those beliefs. I am not sure how far Christ requires this of other people yet on pain of being found unfaithful to Christ for lack of doing so (whatever that pain may entail). If I believe, as I do, that Christ would regard me as a baby goat in the judgment if (given my advantages) I didn’t believe in the salvation of the least of Christ’s flock from sin (i.e. the baby goats!), and faithfully put my belief into practice, then obviously I had better be faithful to Christ on this!–or be found a baby goat! I can see as an inference that this involves a prophecy that some people will be found thereby to be only baby goats. But only if they were in a position to realize they ought to have believed and acted on their beliefs about this. (Nor by the way do I consider the warning of that judgment to only apply to that topic.)

I don’t think it’s for me therefore to insist that churches be dogmatic about this: I’m not an apostle, much less Christ Himself. But in membership with Christ I believe I ought to be dogmatic about it. That’s an issue of personal responsibility.

I expect at least some of the Eastern Orthodox proponents of Christian universalism take this approach to relative dogmatics, too: they shouldn’t teach Christian universalism as a dogma of the church and membership in the church, although they are free to argue for it in dialogue with the church; but they may believe they should hold it as a dogma themselves in personal responsibility to Christ in membership with Christ. But I can also see how holding as a dogma that which the organizational body of Christ does not yet hold as a dogma, much moreso what the body as a whole does not yet believe, might run against the strong Catholic notion of what it means for the church to be in unity. And I can see plausible arguments from the teaching of St. Paul being marshaled both ways.

All of which amounts to what Sherman posted while I was composing. :smiley: :ugeek: :sunglasses: