Chrisguy – definitely agree. 
It’s fun to talk about but not ultimately something we NEED to come to a conclusion on.
No one can prove this, of course. No one can prove even what we would call “clear cases of causation”; one can only observe that particular events follow the supposed causes. We may observe Event B immediately following Event A a million times, and so we say that A causes B. But DOES it? What if just once, event A occurred without B following?
Sometimes when we, for example, press a button and a bell rings, we have supposed that our pressing the button caused the bell to ring, when, in fact, this was not the case. It turned out that the fact that the bell rang immediately after we pressed the button was but coincidental.
Influences often do not have the expected results, and so how can they be causes? A father might influence his son not to be out past 10 P.M on any night. He might exert quite strong influences upon his son to abide by this rule. He may threaten not to give him his allowance for 6 months if he disobeys, or not allow him to use the family car, or to prevent him from participating in the prom, etc., etc.etc. These influences are enough to induce (I won’t say “cause”) some sons to conform to the 10 P.M. rule, but they are insufficient to induce other sons to do so.
Influences may EXPLAIN why people chose what they chose to do. But in no way do they CAUSE the person’s actions. For if they were causes, the actions would ALWAYS follow the influences. Isn’t “always follows” included in the very meaning of causation?
Hi Paidion,
I don’t grasp your distinction between “causes” and “influences” (which you agree could “EXPLAIN why people chose what they chose”). You appear to see a “cause” as a solely determining factor. For you say that “influences” can “in no way CAUSE a person’s actions,” because a particular influence may “not have the expected results.” But my impression is that this would only count against cause and effect if all actions could only be influenced by that one factor.
But don’t those who doubt your suggestion that cause & effect may be simply “coincidental,” but rather think it is actually the most likely reality underlying events, actually assume that most things are shaped by multiple factors? I.e. they believe outcomes are seldom explained by a single cause, but only by the comparative strength of many causes/influences. This would still leave room to philosophically and empirically question if this is what actually is happening, but not to argue that our failure to predict every event must mean that cause & effect cannot exist.
What do you think of Molinism (i.e. the doctrine of God’s “middle knowledge”?, which is the position of Christian apologist and debater William Lane Craig, espoused by the theologian Luis de Molina in the 1500s? I posted on it a few weeks back, and Johnny was correct to see in it somewhat of a muddling (and perhaps a wordy reduction of) of determinism/free will theology. Nevertheless, what would an open theist think of Molinism? Essentially, the view is that God knows and selects “possible worlds” based on his “middle knowledge” (not causal) of the counterfactuals or subjunctive conditionals (i.e. if Prince Myshkin possessed good reasons to be a universalist eight years ago, Myshkin would have been a universalist eight years ago) of human freedom.
I take it the open theist claims that God gets new information based on our responses to world and Him, so foreknowledge, deterministic omnipotence aren’t possible? I think Molinism wouldn’t give God new information, so in that sense, wouldn’t be “open”. Yet, it is an interesting attempt to the classic problem of determinism/free will, to which, among other things, I think open theism seeks to resolve.
Hey Prince,
I used to hold to Molinism - was quite familiar with what WLG said about it and have even discussed personally with Thomas Flint in the past about it.
In short, I think the grounding objection is devastating to it. How can God know the contingent, free act of a creature without observing it being made by that creature? To suppose he knows it before the creature makes it seems to me impossible. I know that Molinists (specifically Craig and Plantinga) appeal to mystery at this point. We simply don’t know how he knows, they say. But mystery doesn’t work for me here because I find the idea literally absurd: to know for certain an uncertain act not yet done is a contradiction in terms to me.
I have, in the past, offered a solution to the grounding objection by grounding the truth of counterfactuals of freedom in the mind of God (see here My solution to the "grounding objection.") but in the end this results, it seems to me, in determinism.
Besides Open Theism, the only other view of God and time that I could possibly hold is the commonly termed (at least on this board) “Boethian/Lewisian” view, in which creation is a single, utterly consistent act. From God’s perspective it is done such that everything is made - including free willed beings - and (and here is the important part) responded to simultaneously, at once. In other words, there is no “time” in which God does not simultaneously interact with his free creation, and he is doing this at all points of space time. Moments come to our consciousness one by one but, in reality (God’s eternality, as it were), everything has not “already” happened but “is always happening.” Thus, the view holds, there is no meaning in saying God knew what you would do “before” you did it, unless you were speaking in a practical way with regard to how we experience time. It would be more correct to say “God always knows what you’ve always done, are doing, and ever will do because in his presence you are a single, responsive and free being.”
I don’t hold this view because I think it incoherent for God to have such a “single” act of creation, all at the same time creating and responding to innumerable free willed choices. It seems to me there must be sequence - dependent sequence, that is - in his response to his creation. And actually, I have tried to trace more precisely the logical contradiction involved in assuming there is no sequential response on God’s part in his simultaneous creative act in the first post of this thread. But I think that so long as it is maintained (as Lewis and many others maintain) that God does in fact truly respond to his creation and that we are in fact free, the deeper of the two truths is honored and I see nothing wrong with maintaining such a belief. It really doesn’t matter how he’s able to do this. Hence my quote above by Lewis which really sums the whole thing up: though there may be a great deal to be puzzled about, there is nothing to be worried about. I would chuck every doctrine on the market in the trash before I’d believe God doesn’t respond to us, doesn’t love us, or is the author of sin.
But, with respect to Molinism from the purely philosophical level, not only does it equate to determinism, and not only does it posit what I consider an absurdity at the very heart of its doctrine, it also seems to take away from the genuine response of God to his creation. As I said, I think this latter doctrine is deeper than any theory we have can about God’s foreknowledge, and so if I ever have to pick between believing in a God of interaction and true response (what does the death of Christ mean if not this?) and a particular theory of how God knows the future, the former will win every time. (Similarly, any interpretation of Scripture which makes God seem less than all-good and perfect I also jettison in favor or the latter.)
Here is something I wrote on the forum a while ago somewhat summing up why I abandoned Molinism. It’s in response to a long time friend (and somewhat adversary!) Pog:
In the end, Open Theism just seems the most intuitively consistent for me with all the “deeper” doctrines I hold about God (that he is not the author of sin, that we have free will, that he responds to us, that he is personal, etc.)
Anyway, just some thoughts. Hopefully I haven’t rambled off into meaninglessness!
Hi Chris,
Just wondering if you are familiar with the concept of the “block universe” also called “eternalism” based on implications from the theory of relativity that suggests “…that time is just another dimension, that future events are “already there”, and that there is no objective flow of time.” Here’s the Wiki link;en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternalism_(philosophy_of_time)
I just encountered this idea in some reading and thought it was fascinating. As far as I can tell, it’s the most widely accepted theory of time by physicists but I may be wrong. 
Interesting implications if true…
Stuff almost blows your mind, you know?
As I said, I think any theory of God and his “interaction” with time is fine so long as the “deeper” truths of interaction, freedom, personhood of God, etc. are safeguarded. In short, so long as we avoid strict determinism, I think we’re fine! 
My take on this from a scientific standpoint is almost identical to my views on the “historic” Adam. So long as we hold fast to the essential doctrines, I think Christianity can – indeed SHOULD – grow as our knowledge of the universe grows.
Hey Chrisguy90,
I share you with some of the convictions of open theism; I agree that when doctrine/theology clashes with the Bible or exp, such as potentially Molinism, it isn’t helpful at that point. However, I think you could hold Molinism, particularly the notion that foreknowledge is non-causal or non-deterministic, for two logical reasons instead of an appeal to mystery. This doesn’t mean that Molinism is a satisfactory view, for I think some of the talk about God choosing/arranging possible worlds collapses into determinism as you observed, but I don’t think foreknowledge entails predestination, especially in the case of God:
If God can in some respect can see all time in a way that all humans can’t (lets put aside a particular philo of time and just assume that, for I am assuming, though you are an open theist that you aren’t a pantheist or a process theologian to the extent that God lacks attributes at least some way greater than we humans), then there is no logical contradiction in asserting that God foreknows what we’re going to do, without Him actually causing it. To be omniscient, we might say that God is the equivalent of a perfect better, a perfect weather man . Though some of us might be tempted to think that, in those cases, he rigged the races or has a rain machine or something, it is, at least, logically possible, for there to be perfect betters and weather people w/o them causing those events, or would you disagree? Of course, it could be complete dumb luck that a perfect better or perfect weather person are 100% successful, but in the case of God, whose intelligence (though I realize you might not see God’s intelligence the way a more classical theist would) is greater than our own, then it would probably more than mere chance…
There is an Internet post about the Fatalism Fallacy (by Jonathan Sarfati), who appeals to principles of logic when looking at foreknowledge and necessity/predestination (creation.com/does-gods-foreknowl … l-fatalism). Basically, Sarfati argues that to say that divine foreknowledge doesn’t means that an individual necessarily had to act the way God foreknew him/her to. Now, symbolic logic wasn’t my No.1 college course b/c I was only B or C math student, so you might have better job appraising this argument, but I think it makes sense even w/o getting into modal logic operators or what have you To say that God necessarily knows that I will eat an apple isn’t to say that I necessarily eat the apple (or that I could not have fasted from the apple), for my eating the apple is a contingency, even if God necessarily knows that (or can’t be ignorant of that). Or what if there are Martians and they have perfected time travel, and travel to the future and see me eating the apple, and then travel to my current time and tell me I have no choice, I will eat the apple. (Let’s assume, to not open a can of worms, that their time travel doesn’t disrupt what I will do or anything, just like lots of B-grade sci-fi movies ) Well, they are right that I will eat it, but they r wrong if they mean I had no choice to eat it. Wouldn’t it be the same with God and foreknowledge?
Prince,
Thanks for the thoughtful response.
I would say that the problem with Molinism has never been the idea that “foreknowledge implies determinism” because “foreknowledge” always boils down (on this view) to simple observation, and no one would argue that simply observing a fact removes its contingency. The problem that I have is in the notion that God can “foreknow” with certainty an act that has no ontological reality at all. How can God foreknow an act that is not determined by anything besides myself if “myself” does not yet exist to determine it? Plantinga and WLC appeal to mystery - they do not even attempt to answer this question (which has been called the “grounding objection”). I almost think it constitutes a logical contradiction: to suppose a contingent act can be known with certainty before it actually becomes ontologically real, i.e. certain, is self-contradictory. The only way I see that he could know this is if he somehow grounded the truth of the proposition in his will. But this would entail determinism.
More to come later though. Got to run for now.
I don’t think anyone claims that God’s foreknowledge of an event (if He has such) CAUSES or determines the event.
The problem is the idea that there is a future NOW for God to know. That implies that the future is now settled. If it is now settled that you raise your hand at 2 P.M. tomorrow, then how can you keep it down when that time arrives? And if you can’t keep it down, then where is your free will?
(And the same with all of your other actions. In order for anyone to KNOW them in advance, implies that those actions now exist, and could not be otherwise.)
Paidion and Chrisguy90,
Hi. I don’t know if I understand the "grounding objection"completely, but at any rate, I think it is perhaps a different way of phrasing the foreknowledge is causal objection.
The fact that God foreknows our actions doesn’t have to, at least as I see it, cause our actions, no matter how you word it. For instance, Paidion wrote that God’s knowledge of future settles the future (please correct me if I have misstated, b/c I don’t know if I understand what the “future now” is, I am assuming that God can see all time at once - or - that God can, due to superlative wisdom/intelligence can just predict our actions with 100% accuracy) - this seems just another way to phrase the deterministic foreknowledge objection. I think it is reasonable to ask: how can God know the future with such precision if our actions are truly free? Yet, I would not say, in principle, that God’s knowledge of the future necessitates it. There is an equivocation of “necessity” here.
Take the alien example again, if aliens have perfected time travel, and they come to us now and say, “Hey, Prince, in five minutes you are going to mistype.” Would I be to correct to infer that I have no choice in the matter? I will necessarily mistype; but I did not necessarily mistype - “necessary” is used in two different senses.
How would it be different with God? My future choices might exist, or are observable, for God or the aliens, but not for me. Also, what if God’s foreknowledge is more like perfect wisdom than an actual seeing of the future; God just knows what we’re going to do b/c he is too smart not to know, but he doesn’t cause our actions. Again, it is worth inquiring how God’s wisdom or intuition can be this perfect or precise w/o being causal, but that is a different question. It is possible that I can just guess every word in the next five pages of a book. It would be highly unlikely, but it is possible. Probably you’d assume that I had known the author, or had seen the book b4, b4 assuming such an incredible explanation, but, theoretically, it is possible for a human being to predict the future with 100% accuracy. Then, if we grant God anything like His classical attributes (though Chrisguy90 being an open theist might not allow this, I don’t know where Paidion stands on open theism), then wouldn’t it be more likely that God could make these predictions. Is it valid to think of foreknowledge in terms of perfect prediction or prophecy or is it something stronger?
No, I didn’t suggest that God’s knowledge of the future settles the future. Indeed I said the exact reverse. Here are the words:
.
It’s not that if God had perfect forknowlege this would settle the future. Rather it’s that God (or anyone else) could not KNOW the future in the absolute sense of “know”, unless the future exists now.
You indicate that you are not certain what it means to say that the future now exists. It means that we can utter sentences about the future, and they are either true of false NOW. For example, if I say, “Prince will raise his hand on March 30 at 3 P.M.”, then this sentence is either true or false NOW. But if the sentence were true NOW, then Prince could not keep his hand down on March 30 at 3 P.M. If the sentence were false NOW, then Prince would be unable to raise his hand on March 30 at 3 P.M. But supposedly the sentence is either true of false NOW. Therefore either Prince will be unable to raise his hand on March 30 at 3 P.M. or Prince will be unable to keep his hand down on March 30 at 3 P.M. Conclusion: On March 30 at 3 P.M., Prince will not have free will (because either he will be unable to raise his hand, or else he will be unable to keep it down. Either way, there is something which Prince will be unable to do on that date and time. However, unless some factor prevents him, Prince CAN choose either to raise his hand on that date and time, or not to raise it. That is because Prince DOES have free will.
Major conclusion: The sentence. “Prince will raise his hand on March 30 at 3 P.M.” is NEITHER true nor false prior to that time. The sentence, “Prince raises his hand on March 30 at 3 P.M.” BECOMES true or false at that time when Prince makes his choice either to raise his hand or not to raise it. Notice that foreknowledge by anyone is not a factor in this argument.
Now we come to the matter of forknowledge. Since “Prince will raise his hand on March 30 at 3 P.M.” is not true NOW, no one can know that it is true NOW. Since the sentence is not false NOW, no one can know that it is false NOW. In other words, there is NOTHING TO KNOW.
I know there are many theologians who affirm this, but to me this sentence is unintellible. It would make sense only if all time exists simultaneously, and to affirm that is inherently self-contradictory. If true, it would lead to such absurdities as, “Nice knowing you. I’ll see you again yesterday!”
It doesn’t matter how wise or how intelligent a person is, or even if he is perfectly wise and intelligent as God is, no one can KNOW what a free will agent will choose prior to his choosing it. For the free will agent hasn’t made his choice yet. So there’s nothing to know.
I must honestly say that I was unable to take your alien example the first time, and still cannot take it this time. That’s because the concept of time travel is inherently self-contradictory. But let’s suppose that time travel IS possible and that someone has perfected it, and the Prince chooses to go one day into the past. Whom should he meet there? None other than yesterday’s Prince. But to Prince, yesterday’s Prince seems to be a different person from himself, although he looks identical. So he invites yesterday’s prince to jump into the time machine, and travel to the day before yesterday. Together they come across the Prince of that day. If they continue to do that for a year, they will end up being 365 Princes. Which one is the REAL Prince? Or are they ALL real Princes. But which one has the consciousness of the Prince who writes in this forum? Or do ALL of them share the same consciousness? If they go back to Prince’s birth year, they might meet Baby Prince, or they might go back a bit further and meet Prince’s pregnant mother. Then there would be a pre-born Prince in existence. Does of this doesn’t seem ludicrous, irrational, and contradictory to you? If not, there’s nothing more I can say.
If time travel is impossible, then this argument fails.
Your future choices DO NOT exist. That is why they cannot be KNOWN in advance. However, some one can make a good prediction of some of your choices based upon his knowledge of you, and the choices you made in the past. God is in the best position to make such predictions, because He has COMPLETE knowledge of you. He knows your every thought and action. Yet even God’s predictions sometimes do not turn out to correspond to reality. I gave a couple of examples of this in a previous post.
It doesn’t matter how “smart” God is. He cannot know something when there’s nothing to know. He cannot know that there’s a pink elephant in your bedroom if there is none. He cannot know that you will raise your hand tomorrow, if you choose not to raise it. He cannot know that you will keep it down if you choose to raise it. None of this denies God’s omnscience. He knows everything that is possible to know. But He cannot know something when there’s nothing to know. The future does not exist, and so there is nothing to be known about the future.
Rather than starting a new thread, I thought I’d post this here:
Tom Belt over at An Open Orthodoxy has just published an article of mine on open theism and the God of radical transcendence: goo.gl/XoZAkg. FYI.
Thanks Chris,
I’m getting my books by Boyd and Sanders today. Can’t wait. Maybe it will help me out and help clear up my confusion about the Bible.
Take care buddy.
That is a GREAT article, Fr. Akimel! It brings together so many themes that needed to be put in perspective. Thank you!
Thank you, Dave. That means a lot to me.
Do you have any plans to either expand that article, or bundle some of your related articles into one work? That would be a great source.
One never knows. 
But at the moment, I have a number of blog articles scheduled in my head: I have another article or two to write on St Gregory of Nyssa, and then I want to read and blog on Dumitru Staniloae’s book on eschatology, followed by Sergius Bulgakov’s treatment of the Last Judgment. I have no immediate plans to return to open theism and divine foreknowledge. I really feel out of my depth (and I am!). I hope my article, though, might encourage others to read Herbert McCabe, whom I find particularly stimulating.