Here’s a short argument for Open Theism. (This is actually more of an argument AGAINST eternal foreknowledge - e.g. CS Lewis/Boethius omniscience).
At moment A in time, God will prophecy that Peter will freely deny him at moment B because he “foresees” or “sees outside of time” or “observes” both Peter freely denying him and his interaction with Peter at moment B.
However, moment B Peter, if he is the same, must have already had all the experiences of moment A Peter - one of which would include the very prophecy that has not yet occurred.
Therefore, the prophecy made at moment A, which is logically prior to moment B, is at the same logically dependent on moment B. But this is impossible. An effect cannot be before its cause.
In short - Peter cannot hear a prophecy at moment A because it is “seen” in moment B, because moment B requires in itself all moments logically prior to it already, one of which is the prophecy itself.
Again - before God can prophecy B at A, he must see B. But the very B that he would have to see must already include the prophecy at A.
(Of course if God determines all events this argument doesn’t apply. It only works for free will theism.)
A short thought: ‘Free’ will has long seemed an important affirmation, and yet beyond my ability to comprehend and define. In any event, I sense that the coherence of a “logical” argument for open theism seems apparent to most thinking believers: If God already knows a particular future choice will occur, then we can’t figure out how that choice could in any meaningful sense be understood to remain “up for grabs,” or how a contrary (or ‘free’) decision could be made. Yet I suspect the weight of tradition’s view and the (debated) sense that revelational (exegetical) material does assert that God knows our future decisions leads many of us to retain that view anyway. And I wonder if our justification amounts to saying that we aren’t sure that our “logic” is sufficient to understand God and his capabilities, since the whole concept of a supernatural God seems to already extend beyond our limited comprehension. Therefore, we posit that We couldn’t know a future decision for sure if ‘freedom’ remained concerning that decision, but perhaps God has the mysterious ability to do that, to know in advance what someone will ‘freely’ do.
Open theism is a very leaky theological vessel, methinks . If God does not ‘see’ his prophecy being fulfilled in Peter’s future, his does he know his prophecy will turn out to be correct? (And in any case, Jesus made this particular prophecy, and I for one would not ascribe any infallible prophetic vision to him in his human mind.
If, as has classically been believed, God is outside of time, and observes all temporal events simultaneously, then there is no logical contradiction between prophecy and fulfilment. Both events are eternally present to God.
I have often thought that maybe we should just hang it all up: there is no understanding God or his revelation. The sooner we realize that the better. Once we throw our hands up we can move on with things. It is more practical. It would certainly eliminate our intellectual difficulties - e.g. the problem of evil, the nature of freedom, the trinity, Christ’s death on the cross. There is a beautiful line in Steinbeck’s East of Eden where Samuel’s son has just moved off to college and writes him a letter about his new found agnosticism. Samuel replies that he’s not surprised - indeed, he would be surprised if he hadn’t changed his religious views - but not to worry their mother about questions regarding the contradictions in the Bible. Her faith is a mountain, he says, and you don’t even have a shovel. This is because, as explained in the novel, she simply takes both sides of the contradictions and swallows them whole. You know, it’s like the Kierkegaard thing. What is faith if not believing in something in virtue of its absurdity? The very fact that it is unintelligible is a prerequisite for faith, which would not be possible without it. Maybe that’s the best thing for us to do?
But wouldn’t that mean that we can’t really know anything about God? Indeed, I find it impossible to formulate any positive idea in my mind at all about something “totally other” or absolutely antithetical to all my categories of thought. We could no longer call God “good” or “evil”. Indeed we could no longer call “him” anything at all. All we could say is that “it may be that some power totally alien to me, totally unknowable, has created me for a purpose which is inscrutable to myself and, for all I can see, will be forever. I certainly enjoy a great deal of this thing called life that it has given me and I hope will all my heart he may bring me and my loved ones to eternal life.” Such an option is possible, but would it not in the end destroy the very idea of belief altogether? Would it not leave us with (it may be all that is left in the end anyway) simple “hope”? Such a philosophy is possible - indeed it is what JS Mill espoused - “the realm of religious belief should be entirely replaced by that of hope”. But are we forced to accept we can go no further or do no better than this?
I find myself attracted to the idea of analogy - that we actually can, in some way, know God with our reason. If it is divine, and if he has given it to us so that we can connect to him in some way, shouldn’t we expect this to be so? And shouldn’t we expect to be able to trust it? Of course, we may always reason incorrectly, due to error, inattention, or just plain lack of intellect. But surely can’t we at least hope that, if there is a personal God, he has given us a way that can, at least in principle, tell us true and false things about himself?
I am often allured and tempted to throw in the towel and say “his ways are beyond ours” and become a man of simple hope. But I suspect at the back of that desire is the frustration and laziness that come along with reasoning correctly and thoroughly. Could it not be that more effort, purer thinking, and more biases need to be burned away or seen through? After all, a map is never wrong just because it is complex. The man studying Calculus may not be able to see the solution, but solution there is nonetheless.
As to your particular comments. Surely you have at least a vague notion of what free will means? You have, at least, experienced the sensation of freedom? And as for what tradition says regarding God’s knowledge of future possibilities - a man who believes in universalism knows how little “tradition” has to do with truth! And by the way, I believe there has actually always been very flexible and “roomy” orthodox beliefs about God’s knowledge of free acts. The current perception may be that the matter has always been unequivocally the classical view. Perception is not always equal to fact, however.
Great questions! There are many views on this. Here are mine.
God would only positively prophecy (as opposed to making a conditional prophecy - e.g. unless you turn back to me, you will be consumed) if he knew that a certain thing would occur. And he could only know with certainty that a thing would occur if he determined via his will to make it come to pass (e.g. in 10 days time there will come a flood).
Now in the case of Peter, I believe that God knew absolutely the character of his heart at the time of his prophecy - a character which, by the way, he had made by free choices. I think God must first act to soften a sinner’s heart to offer him freedom out of his sin. Once a man has sinned, I think he becomes enslaved (partially) by that sin, and that without God offering his hand to “do otherwise” at the next temptation, the man is a slave to that sin. Similar to an alcoholic. If he takes 9 drinks, he isn’t really in control anymore. But suppose there was a magic pill that sobered him up and he took it. He would then free to take the 10th drink - it’s totally up to him.
So with Peter I think God allowed him to be hardened until the prophecy was fulfilled in order to teach him (as I think all hardening is remedial). Peter was not totally “free” in the sense we all are when we’re totally “sober” from sin, but then again it was because of his “sober sins” or his free choices that got him to that point in the first place.
(By the way, I’m in no way claiming I know how often God gives us the magic sober pill.)
As far as for God being outside of time. I think my argument shows that it is still impossible - indeed contradictory - for God to see a free choice logically prior to its occurring.
Imagine every point of space-time and number them 1 to 100. Now God has a particular, eternal relation to each of these points. He is interacting with us here at point 50 and Peter back there at point 40. Now suppose that God is “seeing” Peter at point 41 freely deny him 3 times. That would mean that everything logically (not temporally, since there is no time in God, according to this view) to point 41 must have already occurred. Peter must have already been born, got married, met Jesus, etc. All THOSE logical connections must already be there, or else Peter would not exist at that eternal moment. But now here comes the rub. Peter would already have to have experienced the prophecy at point 40! It must have already (again logically or causally) happened to him in that eternal moment of space time at 41. But those who believe that God sees free acts because he is timeless are saying that the prophecy can only be made on the basis of seeing Peter deny God. In other words, the moment in which the denial occurs is logically prior to the prophecy and the prophecy depends on it, but at the same time the prophecy would have to already be made prior to the denial. In effect the prophecy and the denial become simultaneous events that are the cause of each of the effects of the other. But that makes no sense. The prophecy is what depends on the denial: the denial does not depend on the prophecy.
Or, as I said above, for God to see Peter denying him, he would already have to have made a prophecy about that denial. But the denial has not happened yet. It’s “not true soon enough”, logically speaking, to be seen yet.
If I’ve given you a headache, I’m sorry. But this I think - when really understood - is devastating to the timeless view of God.
What say you? Am I even making sense?
Note It would not matter if both the prophecy and the denial were “simultaneous” in time (which is absurd IMO, but which you’d have to assert on the divine timeless/Boethius view) because there is still a logical relation between the events. They still depend on each other in a particular way - i.e. the prophecy depends on the denial, the denial does not depend on it. So in other words, since the prophecy has to logically “wait” for the denial, it cannot be made “before” it, and therefore it cannot be related in a logically prior relation between God and Peter than the relation between God and Peter at his denial.
Paidion needs to take a look at this! He’s a far better logician than me.
How about the prophecies which DID NOT become reality, such as “In 40 days, Ninevah will be destroyed” in which case, “When God saw what they did, how they turned from their evil way, God relented of the disaster that he had said he would do to them, and he did not do it.” (Jonah 3:10). Now if God observed beforehand that the Ninevites would repent and turn from their evil ways, why would He have prophesied through Jonah that He would bring disaster to them? Such a prophecy would be a lie! Nor would He have relented of what He had planned to do. Rather He would have thought, “Ahhh. The Ninevites have repented as I knew they would. Fitting right into my plan!”
Also we read, “Jer 3:7 And I thought, ‘After she [Israel] has done all this she will return to me,’ but she did not return…”
Now if God were outside of time and saw all events simultaneously, He would have known Israel would not return to Him. He would not have THOUGHT that she WOULD return. Or even if the word means “said” instead of “thought”, surely God would not have SAID she would return, if He had knowns she wouldn’t return. That would have been a lie, and it is impossible for God to lie (Heb 6:18).
The idea of God being outside of time and seeing all events simultaneously is, in my opinion, incoherent. It seems to me to be a copout—a way of defending God against the charge that He does not know the future. However the fact that He does not know the future does not limit His omniscience, for there IS no future for Him to know. The future does not presently exist, but WILL exist when it comes about.
My view is that God is actively creating or “generating” time, all the time, and will do so forever. This is simply what it means for him to interact with his creation. He always has, in fact, seeing as there was no “time before time”, and he always will.
Simple answer I suppose, but don’t know how to say it any other way.
Thanks for engaging my focus on the prolegomena of belief and certainty. I sympathize with your thinking, and agree that ‘absurdity’ is not an attractive guide to truth. Your rejoinder is good, especially if I sounded cavalier about being “logical.” I love and prefer being logical, and would insist on not denying my best (though fallible) moral sense; for I think moral conscience derives from God and is injured when we trample on it. But I may be less confident that anything that presently appears logical to me must always trump the contrary indications among the whole of my sources of ‘knowledge.’
You strongly distinguish believing and knowing from hoping which you seem to find quite inferior. But I’m not sure how you see these differing, or what you mean when you say “we can really know about God” (yet can ‘know’ nothing unless it rests on our ability to reason our way to it). You rightly label your belief that with much “effort,” your own “reason” can enable you to “know” what is “true or false about God” as something you can at least “hope.” I don’t know what it means to call propositions like that something which one “knows.” It’s great to feel confident of certain beliefs that we have deeply considered. But my sense is that we actually have differing levels of assurance among varying aspects of our theological conclusions (and I’m unclear about where the line is drawn to determine which ones we “know”), and I’m frankly skeptical when opposing religionists declare that they “know” a bunch of their own theology’s ideas are the correct ones. My sense is that our “hoping” OR “believing” is genuine when it is sufficient for us to build our life on it, and guide our life by it (but that remains a choice we make while remaining well short of full or certain knowledge).
Amplifying on open theism, my sense is that it is a very “logical” conclusion for Arminians who feel sure that we have the power of contrary choice that annuls the usual causes of heredity and experience that are widely perceived as generally shaping the directions we go. But ‘logical’ observation suggests to me that the reality is that the more we understand of these influences upon a person, the more predictable their choices are. So yes, I do have “vague notions” of what “free will” has in mind, and of the “sensation” of feeling free, but I’m not sure that this makes clear the nature of what actually happens. I resonate with Talbott’s sense that we enter the world finite and ego-centrically ignorant, bound to mess up, and that we only learn something of what is practically true through experience (that sounds a lot like Skinner’s conditioning). indeed, I see you tell Johnny that you agree that such realities normally allow God to predict with certainty what we’ll do in the future. Except that you add that sometimes we may get a “magic pill” of ‘freedom’ that throws all that out the window. But I’m not seeing why I should be convinced that I “know” such a pill operates, or what is "logical’ about determining such a proposition, or how it is consistent with what the ‘logic’ of scientific observation tells us about how choices work. Could this “pill” be more like a hope or ‘faith’ that feels consistent with presuppositions with which some folk have started?
Predictable, yes. There’s a relationshp between influences upon a person and the resulting actions of that person. But influences are not causes of a person’s choices—not even strong influences are causes. A man may hold a gun to your head and demand your money. That’s a VERY strong influence on you to give him your money. Notwithstanding, you could still choose not to do so.
I don’t think our notions of free will are vague. These notions are much more than a mere sensation of feeling free. I think the following definition is rather clear:
“P has free will if, after having performed action A at time T, he could have chosen not to perform action A at time T.”
Or a simple definition of free will: “The ability to choose.”
The compatibilist has a much weaker definition.
“P has the free will to perform action A if there are no influences to prevent P from doing so.”
Thus compatibilism is often called “soft determinism”.
Thanks Bob. I perhaps used “know” a bit strongly in my post. I don’t mean to imply that I “know” that God exists (and that certain doctrines about him are true - e.g. open theism). I mean only to say that I think our reasoning can refine our beliefs - which admittedly are closely tied to hopes - when we reason carefully.
I don’t have the time and I haven’t thought about it quite enough to be able to go into much detail regarding the particular differences between hope and belief. You rightly question me on several points to which I’m afraid I must decline answering. I will say, however, it seems to me that, though perhaps neither feeling can exist separate from a corresponding object of thought, the word hope conveys a different emotion than belief. I suppose I was really wanting to say that, if we reason correctly, perhaps we can refine more clearly what it is we hope for.
Again, I hope I didn’t sound like I had proof that my views are correct! And perhaps the phrase “magic pill” was mischosen - but I work in pharmacy, you can hardly blame me!
What I meant in my pill analogy was simply that it is up to God to grant the grace which provides opportunity for repentance. If he does not grant that grace, it seems to me the person will continue in the character he’s made for himself.
This does assume a free will theodicy. But I believe without free will, God is responsible for evil and that people become dehumanized. I also find it very difficult to have any understanding of the word “I” unless I have some separate causation independent of all the forces pressing in on “me”. In other words, if God causes absolutely everything, this seems to me to equate to a functional pantheism in which the word “me” loses meaning. I also do not believe that environment, genes, behavior, etc. must necessarily determine our acts. I think “influence” can be present to the nth degree without equaling determination. Of course, lots of outside factors do determine our acts, but not all have to in principle. Indeed, I believe that in order for freedom to be real there must be some things we cannot determine. Being completely free to determine absolutely everything would render all action impossible it seems.
Obviously none of this I can prove. It’s reasoning based on revelation - but I do think it is a self-consistent theology; or at least that it matches up well with any other out there.
I agree. How can God see the future, if it is contingent and has not happened yet? I don’t see how saying he’s outside of time solves anything, seeing as the future, if it really is contingent right NOW, has not yet come to be. If he still saw it, this would imply it is no longer contingent and is therefore determined.
In short - the sum of my argument above was: if God is outside of time, then there are acts of his which have already happened which depend upon other things that have not yet happened. Prophecy depends upon denial, but the denial would have already had to include the prophecy. Ergo: a cause must depend on the effect of itself in order to be a cause. Which is incoherent to me.
Greg Boyd offers 5 more rigorous philosophical arguments that I think are sound.
I appreciate and respect your perception that ‘free-will’ is easier to comprehend than I seem able to grasp. You say that “influences” are clearly not “causal.” But I’m not seeing what supports that assertion. Isn’t this precisely what determinists dispute (being inclined to think predictive correlation is evidence toward a cause and effect model)?
You say, “free will is ability to choose.” But even determinists recognize ‘choices’ are made. The dispute seems to be over what accounts for our ‘choices.’ You say, free will can’t be “merely the sensation of feeling free,” since we know that it means a person could have chosen contrary to what he chose. But it seems to me that this is precisely what skeptics about the sensation of free-will think is not the reality. My impression is that determinists find the typical scientific model and assumptions about causation to be most decisive, and that your side finds their own intuitive or direct experiential sense of ‘freedom’ to be the most persuasive source for knowing the reality, and I admit to feeling torn here.
Thanks. I quite agree that we should use reason to refine our beliefs (and hope my own points here haven’t been totally unreasonable ). On the semantics of “hope,” if it refers to what I “wish” were true, I see the distinction with belief. But if as in Hebrews (and Peter), for me it is based on “evidence” and “substance,” then, just like belief, any solid ‘hope’ should have reasons that support it.
Your magic pill sounds like Arminians’ “prevenient grace.” And I appreciate your recognition that it and “free-will” (theodicies) are things you “assume” (a term I find more accurate than “know”). Indeed, I totally agree that it’s a helpful concept for a theodicy (and why I’m not satisfied with simple determinism as a moral alternative). Thus, I find it fully appropriate for you to say I “think” “influences” are not “determinative,” but that you can’t “prove” any of this. Indeed, I agree that this interpretation “at least matches up well” with alternative ones. I reckon my bind is that I’m not sure their interpretation can’t say the same thing, and feel that there are reasons and exegesis in their favor as well. My ideal would be some ‘synthesis’ of the merits of these two competing views (which I sense Talbott seeks some version of). But since I haven’t been able to grasp what a ‘middle’ position would mean, I’m afraid the best I can do is admit that there remains much mystery in this topic for me. Thanks for letting me explore my confusion with thoughtful people like yourself!
Yes – I believe so. If I say to you, “You and your family come over to our house tonight and I’ll fix dinner for you,” then you can reasonably count on dinner being (nearly) ready by the time I say, on me and my husband being there to welcome you, and etc. Since we’re human and live in a world beyond our complete control, that’s somewhat conditional, but not terribly conditional. If God says, “I will do such and such”, I think we can absolutely count on Him to do it (unless He changes His mind, like He did about Nineveh, to Jonah’s dismay but not altogether to his surprise). Probably He won’t be as punctual (as we view punctuality) as we’d like, but He’ll do all He purposes to do and nothing can prevent Him or deny Him.
He can do this whether or not He can see the future, imo. He’s that competent. If He says, “At such and such a time I will cause the great dragon to be bound and cast into the bottomless pit,” then I don’t think He needs to see the future to make that prediction. He’s got no need to base such a prediction on foreknowledge because He could fulfill it this moment and will still be able to fulfill it at any other moment.
As for predictions that depend on other people’s actions, well, I think you can see those in a number of ways. First, He knows us all through and through and I think He could predict the outcome of the world based on this present knowledge, even to the tiniest detail. Maybe there’s something wrong with that argument. There could well be, but if such a thing could be done, He could certainly do it. Second, I’m not such a dogmatic believer in free will that I think He does not occasionally put a hook in the jaw of the bear and drag him into a situation he might not have chosen for himself – or harden (strengthen?) the heart of a man who might otherwise lack the courage to do a thing that IS in his heart to begin with, or arrange circumstances in such and such a way to attain the necessary flow of events. I DON’T think He micromanages the universe, but I do believe He occasionally gives it a nudge or even a shove, if that’s what it takes.
Well any prophecy he made that was not conditional would be one which certainly came to pass. The problem is in knowing which prophecies are conditional and which are not!
Greg Boyd has an idea that certain Old Testament prophecies, even though they don’t sound conditional to us or in our language, should be interpreted such. E.g. That Nineveh will be destroyed wasn’t (I don’t believe, but you can check me) explicitly conditional. That is, unlike other OT prophecies, God does not explicitly say “UNLESS Nineveh repents, they will be overthrown.” But we can assume that is what he meant after the fact (since I do not think it possible for God to be mistaken). It may not be possible to know which prophecies God gives are conditional and which are unconditional. One is reminded of the mirror of Galadriel in the Lord of the Rings.
The truth is, the topic of prophecy is difficult for any theology one holds. According to Scripture, God does say things which on the surface do not come to pass. How we explain this depends on our greater understanding of God, his relation to time, and free will.
The whole argument between open theism and a timeless God is more or less academic. The important doctrines to hold are almost unanimously held by both parties, which are:
the we are free creatures
some things are really up to us
God responds to our prayer
God is grieved when we sin
As Lewis said in one of his letters: “although there is much to be puzzled about, there is nothing to be worried about.”
. If God does not ‘see’ his prophecy being fulfilled in Peter’s future, his does he know his prophecy will turn out to be correct? (And in any case, Jesus made this particular prophecy, and I for one would not ascribe any infallible prophetic vision to him in his human mind.
But this I think - when really understood - is devastating to the timeless view of God.
). On the semantics of “hope,” if it refers to what I “wish” were true, I see the distinction with belief. But if as in Hebrews (and Peter), for me it is based on “evidence” and “substance,” then, just like belief, any solid ‘hope’ should have reasons that support it.