A common criticism of the Universalist position that post-mortem repentance is possible is that it violates the exercise of free will.
The Universalist position is based on the view that in God’s presence in the post-mortem world, there will be no doubt that God exists. Thus, all will believe at that time that God exists. But the logical possibility remains that some will still not believe in God. So, if in the post-mortem world, all also freely believe in God eventually, despite the logical possibility of their not ever believing in God, then all will have freely chosen such that all will be saved.
The criticism is that in the presence of God, believing God exists is self-evident and so free will not to believe in God has been effectively removed. But the belief that God exists and the belief in God are two different things. One can logically have the first but not the second.
One might question on what basis do I say “in the post-mortem world, all also freely believe in God eventually, despite the logical possibility of their not ever believing in God.” On what basis could one claim that all would eventually believe in God? I would argue that though it is logically possible to refuse to believe in God in the post-mortem setting (in that there are no logical contradictions in doing so), as Talbott says, it is not psychologically possible to refuse to do so, given basic needs that decisions are based on in rational humans (e.g., needs for love, comfort, and safety). But since these basic needs come from within the person, there is nothing outside of the person that is causing the decision to accept God. The decision is based on the internal decision-making process of the person himself or herself. Thus, it is a freely made decision.