Brunner's use of philosophical terms


The thread on Brunner’s book of Dogmatics used some very specific terminology that most folks are not conversant with. So I’m going to give a little background to that terminology. Feel free to contribute - I’ll be using a broad brush and also criminally trimming some subject to the bare bones.
As I mentioned earlier, I’ll start off with a section from Lewis’ intro to Harding’s book. (My comments in italics)

Quote -and this is a Long one. But it is ‘right-on’ and not difficult. If this gets any play here, I will continue on with the paraphrase of Brunner.

" "This book is, I believe, the first attempt to reverse a movement of thought which has been going on since the beginning of philosophy.
The process whereby man has come to know the universe is from one point of view extremely complicated; from another it is alarmingly simple. We can observe a single one-way progression.
At the outset the universe appears packed with will, intelligence, life and positive qualities; every tree is a nymph and every planet a god. Man himself is akin to the gods. The advance of knowledge gradually empties this rich and genial universe: first of its gods, then of its colors, smells, sounds and tastes, finally of solidity itself as solidity was originally imagined. As these items are taken from the world, they are transfered to the subjective side of the account: classified as our sensations, thoughts, images or emotions. The Subject becomes gorged, inflated, at the expense of the Object.
(Here Lewis is referring to (among lots of other stuff) a school of thought not originated by Descartes, but for which Descartes was a great spokesman, which stimulated two large rivers of thought, Rationalism (on the European continent) and British Empiricism, both of which ended up synthesized by Immanual Kant. Basically: are we born with blank slates for minds, upon which sense experience makes impressions, which are then combined into thoughts and then concepts, etc? Or, are we born with innate ideas, that structure our sense experience? Why is that important? For one: if our minds are simply the ‘Mirror of Nature’ (Richard Rorty wrote a good book about that) then we need to look at that mirror to see if IT is accurate. For two: if what we experience is only what sense data provides us, then we are not experiencing the actual tree, for instance, but what our senses are telling us about the tree. The ‘phenomena’ is what we experience, the ‘nuomena’ is the actual ‘thing in itself’ - and we don’t even know if it is there! It could be that all reality is ‘mental’ - the essence of IDEALISM.
So in studying reality, or trying to understand God, we would be studying our own minds. !!! (Brunner gets to that in that other thread.) The color is in OUR head, the smell is in OUR head etc. Ok back to Lewis)
But the matter does not rest here. The same method which has emptied the world now proceeds to empty ourselves. The masters of the method soon announce that we were just as mistaken (and mistaken in much the same way) when we attributed “souls”, or “selves” or “minds” to human organisms, as when we attributed Dryads to the trees. Animism, apparently, begins at home. We, who have personified all other things, turn out to be ourselves mere personifications. Man is indeed akin to the gods: that is, he is no less phantasmal than they. Just as the Dryad is a “ghost”, an abbreviated symbol for all the facts we know about the tree foolishly mistaken for a mysterious entity over and above the facts, so the man’s “mind” or “consciousness” is an abbreviated symbol for certain verifiable facts about his behaviour: a symbol mistaken for a thing. And just as we have been broken of our bad habit of personifying trees, so we must now be broken of our bad habit of personifying men: a reform already effected in the political field. There never was a Subjective account into which we could transfer the items into which the Object had lost. (**Note: The Brunner thread makes essentially this point - if we as humans try to understand ‘god’ using the tools of idealism, ‘god’ will never be more than a ‘concept’, and always bound by our minds. He will be an Object; but when we speak of revelation, we understand God to be Subject, not bound by our minds, but prior to them and utterly independent of them) Lewis:

There is no “consciousness” to contain, as images or private experiences, all the lost gods, colours, and concepts . Consciousness is “not the sort of noun that can be used that way”.
For we are given to understand that our mistake was a linguistic one. All our previous theologies, metaphysics, and psychologies were a by-product of our bad grammer. Max Muller’s formula (Mythology is a disease of language) from “The Science of Language”, 1864, thus returns with a wider scope than he ever dreamed of. We were not even imagining these things, we were only talking confusedly. All the questions which humanity has hitherto asked with deepest concern for the answer turn out to be unanswerable; not because the answers are hidden from us like “goddes privitee” from Chaucer’s “Canterbury Tales”, but because they are nonsense questions like “How far is it from London Bridge to Christmas Day?” What we thought we were loving when we loved a woman or a friend was not even a phantom like the phantom sail which starving sailors think they see on the horizon. It was something more like a pun or a sophisma per figuram dictionis (sophism disguised as language). It is though a man, deceived by the linguistic similarity between “myself” and “my spectacles”, should start looking round for his “self” to put in his pocket before he left his bedroom in the morning: he might want it during the course of the day. If we lament the discovery that our friends have no “selves” in the old sense, we shall be behaving like a man who shed bitter tears at being unable to find his “self” anywhere on the dressing-table or even underneath it.
And thus we arrive at a result uncommonly like zero. While we were reducing the world to almost nothing we deceived ourselves with the fancy that all its lost qualities were being kept safe (if in a somewhat humbled condition) as “things in our own mind”. Apparently we had no mind of the sort required. The Subject is as empty as the Object. Almost nobody has been making linguistic mistakes about almost nothing. By and large, this is the only thing that has ever happened.
Now the trouble about this conclusion is not simply that it is unwelcome to our emotions. It is not unwelcome at all times or in all people. This philosophy, like every other, has its pleasures. And it will, I fancy, prove very congenial to government. The old “liberty-talk” was very much mixed up with the idea that , as inside the ruler, so inside the subject, there was a whole world, to him the centre of all worlds, capacious of endless suffering and delight. But now, of course, he has no “inside”, except the sort you can find by cutting him open. If I had to burn a man alive, I think I should find this doctrine comfortable. The real difficulty for most of us is more like a physical difficulty: we find it impossible to keep our minds, even for ten seconds at a stretch, twisted into the shape that this philosophy demands. And, to do him justice, Hume (who is its great ancestor) warned us not to try. He recommended backgammon instead; and freely admitted that when, after a suitable dose, we returned to our theory, we should find it “cold and strained and ridiculous” in “A Treatise of Human Nature”, Book I, Part iv, section vii. And obviously, if we really must accept nihilism, that is how we shall have to live: just as, if we have diabetes, we must take insulin. But one would rather not have diabetes and do without the insulin. If there should, after all, turn out to be any alternative to a philosophy that can be supported only by repeated (and presumably increasing) doses of backgammon, I suppose that most people would be glad to hear of it.
There is indeed (or so I am told) one way of living under this philosophy without the backgammon, but it is not one a man would like to try. I have heard that there are states of insanity in which such a nihilistic doctrine becomes really credible: that is, as Dr. I.A. Richards would say, “belief feelings” are attached to it, in his book Principles of Literary Criticism, 1924. The patient has the experience of being nobody in a world of nobodies and nothings. Those who return from this condition describe it as highly disagreeable.
Now there is of course nothing new in the attempt to arrest the process that has led us from the living universe where man meets the gods to the final void where almost-nobody discovers his mastakes about almost-nothing. Every step in that process has been contested. Many rearguard actions have been fought: some are being fought at the moment. But is has only been a question of arresting, not of reversing, the movement. That is what makes Mr. Harding’s book so important. If it “works”, then we shall have seen the beginning of a reversal: not a stand here, or a stand there, but a kind of thought which attempts to reopen the whole question. And we feel sure in advance that only thought of this type can help. The fatal slip which has led us to nihilism must have occured at the very beginning.
There is of course no question of returning to Animism as Animism was before the “rot” began. No one supposes that the beliefs of pre-philosophic humanity, just as they stood before they were criticized, can or should be restored. The question is whether the first thinkers in modifying (and rightly modifying) them under the criticism, did not make some rash and unneccesary concession. It was certainly not there intention to commit us to the absurd consequence that have actually followed. This sort of error is of course very common in debate or even in solitary thought. We start with a view which contains a good deal of truth, though in a confused or exaggerated form. Objections are then suggested and we withdraw it. But hours later we discover that we have emptied the baby out with the bath water and that the original view must have contained certain truths for lack of which we are now tangled in absurdities. So here. In emptying out the Dryads and the gods (which, admittedly, “would not do” just as they stood) we appear to have thrown out the whole universe, ourselves included. We must go back and begin over again: this time with a better chance of success, for of course we can now use all particular truths and all improvements of method which our argument may have thrown up as by-products in its otherwise ruinous course.
It would be affectation to pretend that I know whether Mr. Harding’s attempt, in its present form, will work. Very possibly not. One hardly expects the first, or the twenty-first rocket to the moon to make a good landing. But it is a beginning. If it should turn out to have been even the remote ancestor of some system which will give us again a credible universe inhabited by credible agents and observers, this will still have been a very important book indeed.
It has also given me that bracing and satifying experience which, in certain books of theory, seems to be partially independent of our final agreement or disagreement. It is an experience most easily disengaged by remembering what has happened to us whenever we turned from the inferior exponents of a system, even a system we reject, to its great doctors. I have had it on turning from common “Existentialists” to M. Sartre himself, from Calvinists to the Institutio , from “Transcendentalists” to Emerson, from books about “Renaissance Platonism” to Ficino. One may still disagree (I disagree heartily with all the authors I have just named) but one now sees for the first time why anyone ever did agree. One has breathed a new air, become free of a new country. It may be a country you cannot live in, but you now know why the natives love it. You will henceforward see all systems a little differently because you have been inside that one. From this point of view philosophies have some of the same qualities as works of art. I am not referring at all to the literary art with which they may or may not be expressed. It is the ipseitas , the peculiar unity of effect produced by a special balancing and patterning of thought and classes of thoughts: a delight very like that which would be given by Hesse’s Glasperlenspiel (in the book of that name) if it could really exist. I owe a new experience of that kind to Mr. Harding."

Any question?


Yes. What’s the point? I minored in philosophy at University, but this resembles rambling more than it does philosophizing.


As I said in the beginning, there were questions about Brunner in a post I made, and I explained (I thought pretty clearly) that some background was needed before I paraphrased what Brunner was saying.
This piece from Lewis and my comments were meant to be part of that background. In itself it was not intended to be philosophy; it is just an overview.
If you don’t get it, that’s fine, don’t bother reading it. But it may be worthwhile to someone else. If not I’ll just drop it. Not a big deal to me.


I’m not very clear on the “philosophy” Lewis attacks here, nor on what present day thinking corresponds to it. When he says that it seeks to “break us of the bad habit of personifying men,” and to see us as having no “selves,” it sounds like it’d apply to seeing people as machines who lack personhood. And it sounds like he is defending modernism as he saw early signs of today’s postmodernism that questions the authority of narratives that we have received in our varying traditions (though that’d include the 'scientific tradition’s breaking us down to machines).

But as I experience some of today’s (even a bit new age) popular self-help philosophies, I’m not sure the assumption is that we are not persons or lack a self. Indeed, the focus is often on recognizing one’s true self as the vantage point from which to evaluate what is presented to us.

(Indeed, one feature of this emphasis on affirming our own personhood is assuming that there must be a parallel in the nature of God as personal such that his values can’t violate the values most intrinsic to our own personhood (e.g.he can’t torture folk forever and call it “good”). And to traditionalists’ chagrin, this often causes questioning of received religion.)

But I fear I may not be correctly grasping the relevance of Lewis here?


Thanks for the thoughts, Bob! The Lewis quote was just an overview, a taste, of some concepts that I wanted to use, working toward that paraphrase of Brunner I’ve been working on. There are maybe 2 people on the forum that have any background in philosophy and any paraphrase I could give would be impossible for other readers without a lot of background.
IMO the project was too ambitious for a forum. No biggie, we’ll move on to something else.


I think folks would be better served, pondering questions - like these articles illustrate.

The Zombie Threat to a Science of Mind


Randy - is there a copy of the Zombie Book of Common Prayer? Do Z’s observe Lent - if so, what do they give up? Would ashes even show up on their foreheads, if they even have a head? Those are the pressing questions of today.
Yes that was intended to be humor :-), perhaps the best use of this ‘thread’ :thinking: