The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Challenges - and I believe answers - to Talbott's UR

Evangelical Universalism
#1

I’ve just completed Dr. Talbott’s book. I’ve also been reading through past posts of his. I’ve done so primarily because of what seemed an incompatibility of his. Let me try to explain.

Dr. Talbott says repeatedly that God will eventually “check mate” all people into coming into his loving presence. Now the standard free will criticism is that the type of freedom that God wants to predicate a creature’s decision to “come to him” or “love him” on cannot be such that it is determined. In other words, as soon as God plays the “trump card” as Dr. Talbott has called it, the choice, while it may no doubt be rationally made, is not made in the same sort of context which God finds most meaningful - namely, an epistemic distance which allows for freely made moral choices that are not determined.

It seems helpful here to introduce a distinction I’ve developed which perhaps has not been clearly brought out by others writing on this topic. It is between “moral” and “amoral” choices. It appears to me that the classic libertarian view of freedom wants to maintain that the choices we make are not determined by the reasons we see for making them. That is to say that at least on occasion our intellects do not determine our wills. I think this would entail of necessity that there was some sort of conflict between our desires and our reason, because if there wasn’t creatures would only be making moral decisions “coincidentally.” If every choice I made was something I already wanted to do, it is not clear that we would have the same sort of libertarian freedom as if there were certain choices I made over and against certain desires. I’m perfectly content to say that such a foundation - desires vs. reason - is necessary for this type of epistemic distance and libertarianism and though pain may be a necessary ingredient I by no means think it would be an “evil.”

Hopefully now the distinction I’m drawing is more clear. An “amoral” choice would be a choice which was good in itself, but which was not made in the sort of “ambiguous” context above. In other words, for a choice to be moral, there must necessarily be a motive to go against that choice. I don’t want to get into the details of Kantian vs Aristotlean morality. I do agree with Lewis that the more one makes moral choices the more one loves being moral. But at the same time I think it true that a certain degree of effort and certain strength of moral choice is diminished in a choice the more that pleasure is associated with that choice. It is more moral to give a man a ride if you don’t happen to be going in the same direction for instance.

But “amoral” choices would be the type of choices, as I said, that are good in themselves (they produce goodness), but which are not made in “epistemically distant” circumstances. They are not made libertarianly free. Some examples of such goods would be choosing the most efficient path on a map or eating chocolate vs. vanilla ice cream.

What I am getting at in this distinction is that Dr. Talbott’s argument that no “rational” person would choose to remain in Hell, while true, does nothing to remove the Arminian or libertarian difficulty. This is because the type of free willed choices that they are speaking of are not amoral choices. A computer could be rational, for instance. It could “see” that such a decision would be bad for it, and would therefore avoid it, but surely we would not call such a thing “moral.” The type of decision that is made then is an entirely different kind of decision.

The free willed theist sees decisions made in epistemically ambiguous scenarios having an intrinsic worth that mere “rational” scenarios do not have. Indeed, they will argue, it is only in such scenarios that “sin” can properly occur. Who would call a man guilty for what appears to be a mere miscalculation? The trouble then is that there is a difference between an *irrational *choice and an *immoral *one. Hence the need for distinguishing between moral and amoral choices. One kind of choice requires ambiguity and, I believe, a conflict between desire and reason (and hence “pain” in the form of desire of self which stands against the desire of an other, say God, which is present to the reason may be a necessary part of the formation of free self conscious beings). And one kind of choice does not require such ambiguity. Indeed it is exercised and fulfilled in the “air of compatibilism” as it were. Who would complain or say it is an evil that they were “determined” to enjoy a good steak?

This brings me to the interesting question posed by TGB who unfortunately no longer posts here. I’ll reproduce it below.

For a long time this question tripped me up. There seemed to be a fundamental difference here. If, as Dr. Talbott suggests, God can use his “trump card” any time he pleases, why not use it from the get go and prevent all the mess that libertarian freedom brings with it? But then what about the importance of such “moral” vs “amoral” decisions? I think I see an answer, however.

It seems to me entirely possible that both libertarians who stress the ambiguity (or, I would rather say, “self desire” which stands over and against “God given reason”) necessary for moral (vs. amoral) choices and Dr. Talbott who says that God will eventually use a trump card can both be right.

Were God to use his “trump card” from the get go, there would be no emergence in any sense of the word of creatures who were moral beings. If ambiguity is required for moral choices (which I think it is, otherwise words like “guilt” and “sin” lose meaning, since acts lose personal causative explanatory power), then epistemic distance is necessary for such moral beings to emerge. But it doesn’t follow that it need always be allowed. Though it may be necessary for such creatures’ emergence it need not be the case it is forever in place for their continuance.

Indeed, this is where Talbott’s logic really comes in to help, particularly regarding his thoughts about “irreparable harm.” God would not give such a freedom to a creature if it would result in ultimate harm. But what about giving it freedom for a time, in order to serve a higher end? If such freedom is necessary for a creature to differentiate itself from, say, “soulless matter” - if such freedom is necessary to become a person, then it would have to be granted before God could save that person. All this can be summed up in the idea that God only gives us as much freedom - and the specific kind of freedom - that is good for us. Libertarian free will serves its temporary purpose (namely, the building of the particular person) like anything else.

This would entail that God gives us libertarian freedom and then replaces it with compatibilistic freedom. And I do not see any problems with this. Both types of freedom are for the ultimate good of the creature and are necessary for the formation of it into a self conscious being distinct from God. Without putting words in Dr. Talbott’s mouth, I do think I’ve articulated what he believes. He seems to affirm LFW but also thinks God can checkmate all possible created beings.

This is all terribly convoluted. I’m in a hurry but wanted to get the rough ideas down here. I’d welcome any questions, criticisms, or comments!

#2

Chrisguy,

Thanks for wrestling with challenging questions! I miss TGB too. For me, conceptions of “freewill” remain difficult to clarify. For example, I’m unclear as to why the ‘guilt’ of bad ‘choices’ is worthy of severe consequences when epistemic distance means reality is so ‘ambiguous’ that it’s plausible to do what is ‘irrational.’ I sympathize with Talbott’s view that a loving God would be obligated to meaningfully develop us and ultimately bring us to where we act in accord with reality.

Having said that, your solution to combining ‘freedom’ and an ultimate ‘checkmate’ is indeed precisely what I have understood Talbott to point toward. Have you read the essays on his site that touch on this? I think his article here (willamette.edu/~ttalbott/Determinism.pdf) “Why Christians Should Not be Determinists” develops such an argument.

Grace be with you,

Bob

#3

I come at it from a somewhat different direction: at the level of God’s fundamental self-existence as the ground of all existence (including of not-God creations), reason, will and morality are all the same thing: the Persons eternally choose to act in mutually supporting ways (including self-sacrificial ways where that’s applicable, primarily in regard to God Self-begotten).

Any created person, however, cannot be a self-existent interpersonal relationship, so the creation of not-God persons, substantially different from God, necessarily splits the reason/will (which still on this account amount to the same thing) from morality. They’re still related abilities which aren’t in actual conflict with one another, but the possibility now occurs that something can personally choose to act against fulfillment of mutually supportive interpersonal relationships without ceasing to exist (because God chooses to keep the person in existence anyway, though necessarily with a goal toward bringing the person back into chosen communion. Technically the Persons of God could act against each other in such a way, too, but not without God ceasing to exist along with all creations of God, past present and future. We can thus be sure the Persons will never behave that way toward each other, nor act in contravention to the principle of their own self-existence in other ways – from which God’s universal and persistent salvation of sinners follows as a logical corollary, but neither are sinners doing something simply impossible for God to do as though we achieved something beyond God’s power.)

In other words, I distinguish between non-rational behavior (that of the created system of Nature which goes about its randomly determinate business in a merely automatic reactive and counter-reactive fashion) and ir-rational behavior, where a nominally rational entity (given the capability by God to introduce effects into a system which the system of itself would not have produced by its own behaviors) temporarily behaves as though non-rational.

Irrational behavior might still be entirely accidental, like a rational entity sneezing, and so amoral (neutrally moral, neither good nor evil); and rational behavior may still reach mistaken results while still being rational behavior (like rationally adding up numbers but being incompetent at arranging the data validly or not having accurate data). But to act against one’s own rationality would be to behave irrationally in a fashion that encroaches on immorality, depending on whether the purpose is to help other rational persons somehow (as the Son Himself might be said to act irrationally in self-sacrifice for the sake of creating not-God entities, or in voluntarily suffering the Passion), or whether the purpose is selfishness.

That is why sometimes “irrational” behavior is recognized as a moral fault, as im-moral behavior not merely a-moral (neutrally moral neither good nor bad. I’m not much in favor of your application of the term “amoral” to good deeds of a particular class, Chris – I don’t understand why you would choose a term that means not-moral for that which is good, or to divorce the concept of good from morality. :confused: )

I’m not sure how this helps resolve Talbott’s checkmate, but then the gist of my theology is such that I don’t have to figure out how God can arrange things so that someone will be finally and surely forced to freely choose something rather than to freely rebel against the truth further. (God’s own choice to continue to self-exist isn’t forced that way either.)

I understand the risk of moral fall or failure or imperfections inherent in creating derivative not-God creatures, but that risk isn’t primarily about teaching a lesson, it’s a factor of the situation (although lessons can be taught from the resulting circumstances). Putting it in Genesis terms (whether that happened literally or figuratively or anywhere in between), Adam and Eve didn’t have to rebel against God in order to learn the knowledge of good and evil or to learn every lesson which would be proper and necessary for unfallen creatures. They chose to do something that they had overtly no good reason to do. It wasn’t a rational mistake, it was a selfish irrationality against what good reason they did already have. Had they refused to eat the fruit, they would have gotten the knowledge of good and evil the ethically proper way; rebelling, they must now get the knowledge of good and evil as rebels. The form of the lesson will be drastically different, and God brings good out of it anyway, but (at least in principle) it would have been better not to rebel at all.

Consequently, I don’t regard immoral behavior as something God decided to set up because He saw that that was the only or best way to achieve some desired goal. The possibility of immoral behavior, yes (which God from His perspective would know was going to happen); but that possibility was enacted instead of the possibility of moral behavior by the choice of the created persons, with effects rippling down and across to other persons who now have to deal with those effects one way or another.

Thus I don’t accept that as an explanation for why God doesn’t immediately checkmate people in some fashion that forces them to freely choose the good (which I strenuously doubt is even possible anyway), which would be another way of saying that God could have prevented any moral fall from the outset but chose not to for some reason.

#4

Bob,

Thanks for pointing me to that essay! After reading it I’m even more convinced of my interpretation of Dr. Talbott. I’m not quite on board with the idea that sin was “virtually inevitable” however. That almost goes so far as to say that God required evil in order to make his creation. I disagree with this, and, though I think God can bring good out of even the most horrendous evils (otherwise they wouldn’t be allowed to occur), I don’t think that evil is a tool God had to use. The best way to put this is to say that, if there are other creatures which God created in a “pre-fall” state, I don’t think it necessary to suppose they sinned.

I’m aware that Dr. Talbott doesn’t like to suggest that Adam and Eve were “morally upright” or “perfect.” And I agree with this. I think he would agree with me when I say that a certain ambiguity is required to become a moral person and that until one encounters such a situation it would make no sense to suppose that person was morally upright already. I do, however, think “the fall” can be used as an accurate metaphor, so long as it is not thought to have occurred to already perfect beings. After all, one may fall on his climb up a mountain, right?

As to your question. I agree that you raise a serious problem - why is guilt imputed to a person who is or can be justified in making his decision? If there is always a good reason to do what one does, how can you ever really say one reason is “wrong” and another “right”?

Perhaps the answer is that guilt, as experienced by us, is none other than a form of God given pain which serves to correctly orient us to the nature of the universe. What I mean is that “guilt” is the way in which God lets us know that we ought not to act the way we do, even if we can rationally justify such actions.

I have speculated that “free” acts (in the moral sense) are such that the terms “rational” and “irrational” do not apply to them, any more than the growth of a plant or the revolution of the planet would be called “rational” or “irrational.” What is, simply is. We can be rational about what is. We can apply this mysterious thing called “logic” to it, but I see no reason why acts in themselves should have such classifications. In other words, perhaps our moral acts are “supra-rational”. Afterwards we can apply rationality to them. I can say, “hey it’s a bad idea to go to the beach without any sunscreen.” And this is how we learn about the nature of ourselves and reality. Hence the first man to touch fire “discovered” it was able to burn him and cause him harm. There is nothing intrinsically “rational” about such an experience. It is simply a brute fact about the man and his nervous system and fire. There’s no way he could have reasoned to such a universe in a vacuum. He would have had to experience it first. Perhaps this is the case with both moral and amoral acts. Rationality is therefore only, as it were, derivative and parasitic. So, too, perhaps with our choices. It is not so much that we are guilty in the sense that there is no conceivable reason for us having chosen what we did. Rather, the truth of who we are and who God is - the objectivity of our relationship to God in the universe - is such that, when we do “happen to act” certain ways, we are therefore rationally informed that we ought not to orient ourselves thusly. Guilt then is simply another means of discovery which serves to reveal and rightly orient us, as self conscious beings, to those things outside ourselves (i.e. God).

I mean, if we remove the notion of eternal damnation all together and reorient our thinking regarding the nature of God - if we suppose him to do NO act contrary to the good of his creatures - then doesn’t that really entail that even the notion of guilt must be subsumed under the larger umbrella of “pains necessarily endured by creatures to achieve outcome x”? The problem then shifts totally to that of the allowance or existence of evil. In other words, if we’re able to get over the problem of evil, the problem of guilt is swallowed up/disappears.

For what it’s worth though I think “guilt” is an applicable term because I believe in libertarian free will which implies the knowledge of what is morally “right”, whatever the nature of the desire to the contrary may entail.

Just some thoughts. Thanks again for the essay.

#5

I think I would agree here - classical view of the simplicity of God.

I believe I’ve bolded the sentence relevant to the topic, and again, I think I would agree with you - God creates persons with free will.

I too draw a distinction between the actions of nature (with you call non-rational) and those of a person (which you say may be rational or irrational.)

I’m still in agreement here - more explanation of the above distinction.

I’m not quite sure you’ve clearly explained what separates “immoral” from “irrational” behavior. Maybe this is why my distinctions are confusing you.

I believe (and I think the common sense notion that everyone has informs us that) the difference lies in the fact that what is “seen” as the “right” action is not desired nor chosen by the will to do. Thus, while I think irrational behavior may be accidental, I do not believe immoral behavior may be. In fact, conscious knowledge of the decision is a requirement for a moral choice to occur. This is what the idea of free will and moral culpability rests upon. It is its backbone. You are only morally guilty or at fault because you knew you shouldn’t do it. Hence Adam sinned because he had a command from God which he rationally understood. If the law wasn’t there, or if he simply misunderstood it, it would be nonsense to say he “sinned” (at least that’s what I’ve argued). And what is a prerequisite for such a choice - the context which makes them possible - is a conflict between creaturely will and God given reason. In other words, for a free moral choice to even be possible, I maintain that there must be a fundamental conflict between what the person wants to do, and what he knows or “sees” is morally right. Otherwise you run into a compatibilistic account of moral choices, and then the whole problem of evil turns you down a dead end.

Hence the distinction between

a) moral choices - ones which require the desire vs. reason context (which I believe was present, at least at some point, in Adam)

and b) amoral choices - which are really just compatibilistic choices (which therefore cannot incur certain terms reserved for personal responsibility, like “guilt” and “sin”).

That is why I divorce a certain sense of “goodness” from amoral choices: because compatibilistic choices, whatever else they may have going for them (and for what I can see they are nothing more than sheer unmerited pleasures given by God) cannot be good in the same sense as libertarian choices. I’m not saying compatibilistic choices are not good at all. Far from it. I’m only saying the two kinds of choices aren’t the same.

But my - and I think Talbott’s - point does not see any problem in saying that God finally does close up the epistemic gap between himself and created persons. In fact, his love and desire for the happiness of all his creatures demands it. Freedom serves its role in creating, or as I have said above building, the very person whom God wants to save. Once that individual has exerted his own causal forces and becomes him or herself, libertarian freedom serves no more purpose.

Neither do I think God “decided to set up” immoral behavior. Again, that would make immoral behavior impossible on my view because it would destroy a necessary prerequisite for it - libertarian freedom. If there are other creatures like us on other planets, I do not think it necessary to suppose they’ve fallen. Hence I do not think sin was a necessary ingredient in the creation of the universe, however certainly it was foreseen by God.

I do agree with all the other conclusions you draw in the quoted paragaphs however.

#6

On the meanings of the terms I’m using (because “irrational” has a wide number of rather different meanings in literature of various kinds), ir-rational behavior is at-least-somewhat non-rational behavior by a rational entity, which might be voluntarily entered into, or (speaking of creatures, not about God) might be imposed upon the rational entity.

I’m talking about rational behavior as meaning intentional, voluntaristic behavior, willful choice, action instead of reaction, authoritative. Ultimately it’s God’s kind of behavior, which He grants a derivative version of to creatures through the self-sacrificial creative action of the self-begetting action of God (the 2nd Person, the Son).

By immoral behavior I mean behavior that intentionally acts against fulfilling fair-togetherness between persons, toward fulfilling non-fair-togetherness between persons, acting against the ground of all existence (which is itself an intentionally chosen interpersonal relationship fulfilling fair-togetherness between persons).

By amoral behavior I mean behavior that doesn’t have fulfilling fair-togetherness or non-fair-togetherness between persons in view, although if a rational entity chooses this behavior that might be the same as acting in willful disregard of fulfilling fair-togetherness between persons, which would be the same as choosing to act against it. But usually I mean non-rational behavior of mere reaction and counter-reaction to stimulus, including morally neutral reactions from rational agents (i.e. sneezes are neither immoral nor moral, unless there is a specific intention by the agent in one of those directions.)

I don’t see how that could possibly be true about God, so I’m doubtful that’s the best understanding of the relationship between morality and rationality even at a human level. Accidental irrationality has no moral end in view one way or another, so would be amoral on my usage of the term not immoral; intentional irrationality might have one or the other end in view (although in human experience it usually has a violation of fair-togetherness between persons in view), so would be moral or immoral but not (usually) amoral.

(I am not sure it is possible for a rational agent to inflict irrationality on herself or upon another rational agent without a moral end in view and yet be only amoral in intention instead of immoral, but I’m willing to be positively agnostic about the possibility. I have trouble believing this happens often, though: in my own experience such reduction of the rational in human experience is moral or immoral, more often immoral than otherwise, and I can’t say I recall any morally neutral intentional applications of such a reduction. Still my memory may be faulty, and even if my memory is 100% perfect about my experience, I still admit this is only an inductive inference from what I recall of my personal experience.)

Agreed.

Agreed, but I don’t believe full conscious knowledge of all aspects of the decision is a requirement for an active (non-accidental) choice to be moral or immoral. (Perhaps relatedly, I acknowledge that a decision may be partly moral and partly immoral in intention.)

Agreed.

On that account God (whether considered as the singular ground of existence, or as the Persons of that singular ground) has no free moral choices, and so on your account must only behave amorally and not morally; relatedly, on this account humans must be capable somehow of doing that which God is not actually capable of doing. I’m going to have major problems with that.

An entity which starts with (let us say) a bothersome set of feelings which feeds him data at odds with the righteousness of God might easily have a conflicting want, and I could see how any creature existing within a created neutral field of reactive existence (where I expect any creature must exist to exist at all distinct from God) might feel inadvertent pressures from the status of that existence which the creature would be responsible for choosing between insofar as possible according to the light of truth currently perceived (without culpability in the choice so far as the light is unavailable, but with culpability for choosing against what light can be seen).

But I don’t think such a creaturely situation, which would apply even to unfallen creatures, is a proper way of assessing and describing what must be moral and immoral (and amoral) behavior in itself, i.e. what must be necessary for moral behavior per se (or immoral). Not unless we’re going to divorce God from any humanly possible concept of morality, and thus at best attribute to Him some utterly alien notion of ‘good’. We might have to do that (which I will observe sounds a lot like Calv excuses for the incoherencies of some of their specific doctrines :wink: ), if mere monotheism is true (and again I will observe that sounds like a lot of Islamic excuses for moral incoherencies in their doctrines!) But if trinitarian (or even binitarian) theism is true, the ultimate standard of proper personal behavior is not utterly and indescribably alien to human experience, nor is it the mere imposition of power to cause effects (common though that is to human experience).

But then neither do moral choices as such require impositions of wants external to the rational agent. Presumably the Persons know that if They act against one another They and the Godhead will cease to exist, but that doesn’t mean they have to choose within an already existent conflict of will.

Let me quote you again on the point I have severe ontological problems with (your original emphasis in italics, mine in underline): “In other words, for a free moral choice to even be possible, I maintain that there must be a fundamental conflict between what the person wants to do, and what he knows or “sees” is morally right.”

There is no such thing, there can be no such thing, as a fundamental conflict if God exists, including if the Trinity is true; and certainly there can be no fundamental conflict between the Persons of the Trinity (even if the Persons always choose against the fundamental conflict). Neither can I accept that God behaves amorally, nor that God’s choices are not free moral choices. I am certainly not going to say that creatures have free moral choices but God does not!

Any ethical account of creaturely morality or immorality or amorality must be set coherently within that framework, or else the framework should be rejected as false on at least some detail and the reasons for arriving at that theological framework re-examined for improvement.

Whereas I understand rational freedom (what libertarians tend to mean in describing freedom) to be essential to God, thus the ground of all reality, and so not something with temporary purpose even in the existence of derivative creatures with derivative freedoms. We cannot quite become free with the freedom of God (since we can never be self-existent entities), but we can freely choose to share in the freedom that God graciously shares with us. So long as libertarian freedom exists there is a technical possibility of rebellion, but it is entirely possible to freely choose (from an unfallen position or from a fully regenerated position) what God chooses freely and eternally without ever (or ever again) choosing otherwise.

Libertarian freedom, on my account, is no more optional for true love than compatibilistic freedom is (the freedom of capabilities); nor on my account is libertarian freedom some kind of temporary chrysalis. Compatibilistic freedom, the freedom of capabilities, is a freedom God provides for all creation, even non-rational behaviors, but
libertarian freedom, freedom of contributory authorship, is the freedom of the Father of Spirits which He shares in making children in His own image: we contribute to His story, to history, for better or for worse, but the goal of God if we start contributing for the worse is to bring us to where we will ever after authoritatively contribute for the better.

I do however see now that your position doesn’t involve God setting up immoral behavior situations where creatures (whether human or angel) must fall in order to learn lessons they couldn’t have otherwise learned by not falling. :slight_smile: (I noticed that in your recent reply to Bob, too.)

#7

And such a choice, since it involves self sacrifice, is one in which the conditions that I laid down are met - namely “desire vs. reason.” I see no reason to think this sort of relationship does not exist within the Godhead. Indeed there is good prima facie evidence to the contrary. One need look no further than the “nevertheless, not my will be done, but thine.”

Why not suppose there is an element within the Godhead that involves overcoming one’s self for the good of the other? Indeed, in what sense can we talk about Christ’s “sacrifice” if there was nothing he “denied” or gave up?

Actually I believe my view is the only one that allows God to be able to be moral. Surely you don’t deny that when we sin we

a) had the ability to do otherwise and
b) clearly knew that the action we did was wrong when we did it.

Now how, on a view that does not posit some sort of tension that is overcome within the Godhead, could God have the ability to “act” in such a similar way? And if he does not have such an ability, then your criticism against my view turns back on your own - namely that “we have the ability to do an act that God does not.”

But I see no reason for thinking we have a capacity for acting any differently than God. I see nothing wrong with positing “own desires” or “self desires” that must be overcome freely by the will even within the Godhead. In fact, if there weren’t such independent, self desires and if they were not necessarily different I would see no way of distinguishing the persons in the Godhead. But if Trinitarian theism is true, then each person in the Godhead has distinct desires. And again, I see no reason for thinking that such desires cannot be at odds, at least in some points, with the desires of the other persons. Indeed without such competing desires I see no way in which persons in the Godhead could act freely (vs. compatibilistically), nor do I see how a “sacrifice” could be possible. Is it to so hard believe that within the Godhead there is an eternal act of self-abnegation? Is that not what the Christian religion is all about?

Aside from all that, how would you explain the nature of a free choice, granting that there need be no context of “desire vs. reason”? I can’t see how you could (though you may stand ready to impart vision to me!) in any way that would not entail compatibilism - and at the back of compatibilism looms the problem of evil.

#8

I’m also curious how you square this with universalism. If it is always possible to “rebel” then how can universal salvation be guaranteed?

#9

Chris,

Glad you enjoyed the Talbott article. On sin’s ‘inevitability’ meaning “God required evil,” and thus believing humanity could have been sinless, I’m tempted to quote Scot McKnight’s response this week to a similar issue: “I don’t do hypotheticals!” But I do think Talbott assumes that the epistemic distance necessary for creatures to morally develop indeed made failures inevitable (and for me, just as W. L. Craig argues that removing epistemic distance would violate freedom by compelling a universal righteous response, ISTM that ignorance’s presence insures inadequate responses). Thus an omniscient God would have deemed sin as necessary for experiencing our existence in a meaningfully moral way.

Like ‘Adam,’ we all enter the world only able to see everything through the ignorant and insecure, ego-centered eyes of our finite self. And we enter lacking the benefit of experiential confirmation of the consequences of bad choices that can appear to be good. So, without gaining experiential ‘knowledge’ that rids us of such ignorance, how could one expect anyone to always make right choices?

I actually doubt that the O.T. saw Genesis 3 as an explanation of sin’s origin, or even of its’ inevitability (the message to Cain, or to Israel under Mosaic Law, is that you can choose to obey, not that you are now fallen or dead in trespasses and sin.) I see it as just illustrating Israel’s human predicament. For Adam’s disobedience and exile picturesquely parallels Israel’s exile in Babylon for similarly violating God’s express commands. And while a pre-scientific Paul probably assumed sin began with a ‘first’ man, I doubt Romans 5 relies on assuming “original sin.” I think it rests on coming to perceive that Christ provides the solution for humanity’s universal problem. So what correlates is (not knowing how sin originated, but) the observable reality that indeed all persons do sinfully fail.

Thus, as we struggle with the impossible task of judging how ‘guilty’ or responsible this leaves a given person, I love your idea that the painful consequences that come with bad choices is God’s pedagogy to “let us know we ought not act that way.” This puts God in a role analogous to a parent. If my child ran in the street, (for ‘discovery’s’ sake) I’d probably administer some measure of pain, whether I thought she rationally grasped the serious reality of her error or not. (Of course we’re always groping to sense the right balance of mercy that tempers such consequences to a person’s capacity for responsibility)

The classic problem of evil remains in suffering that doesn’t seem pedagogical, or seems out of correlative proportion to our deeds. But I sense that the best religious faith is precisely a bet that Ultimate Reality is love, and thus that Love will ultimately triumph, even when we don’t understand all that may happen on the way.

Thus I don’t think I understand your statement that we have (now?)“the knowledge of what is morally right.” But your suggestion that we need “to experience it first” makes sense to me.

#10

Thanks Bob for a thoughtful reply. I’m just uncomfortable with the idea that sin is something “necessary” for created beings to do to get them into a perfected state. This is mainly for two reasons.

  1. It conflicts strongly with my personal experience. I’ve felt very strongly the feeling “I know I should not do this, yet I’m going to anyway.”
  2. For the concept of guilt to have any meaning it seems to me that a knowledge of the sinfulness - that is the wrongness - of a given act must be understood.

How could sin, if it were necessary, incur “guilt”? In what ways do you understand the two points I’ve brought out above?

Well I presuppose that it is possible to act against one’s own reason; i.e. one’s reason (in the case of moral choices, not amoral) does not determine one’s will. I think a distinction needs to be drawn here from intellectual ignorance and the ambiguity involved in the notion of epistemic distance.

Now, I do not think there really IS ignorance in the notion of an immoral choice. Indeed, a perception of the truth of the rightness and wrongness of a choice must be present for sin to even be possible. Intellectual ignorance, on the other hand, may be present in all sorts of degrees and sin never occur. I don’t know the temperature at which copper melts, for instance, but my not knowing this has no bearing on my sinning per se.

Epistemic distance only requires, it seems to me, enough “wiggle room” to revolt against one’s own reason. All that is to say, again, that the reason in moral choices does not determine the will. The further question you raise regarding moral culpability is different. Should we say that a person is still at fault, given the fact that they did not have “determining reasons” to act on? Our answer to this question may actually show that we are in much more agreement than initially appears. According to the Universalist understanding of justice, it would seem that God would be unjust to “punish” the sinner “infinitely” because there was not an “infinite good” present to the reason. Hence the whole notion of punishment being corrective and of “setting things right.” Whether or not this renders all retributive punishment incoherent is a further question still, but not one I care to discuss at the time.

(It is interesting to note that the above argument - sin’s “excusability” as it were" - can be used to refute the idea of infinite punishment. It would go somewhat like this: when people sin, they do not reject God as seen in himself; therefore, they do not reject an infinite good; therefore, they cannot justly incur infinite punishment. Personally, I don’t like using the ambiguous word “infinite” but the above argument can serve a purpose when dealing with people who commonly employ such language.)

I’m on board with your views as Scripture. Or at least I very rarely find the question practical when it comes to philosophical discussions of free will and evil. There is a lot of room for play in the Bible. That’s not a bad thing. The writers, I don’t believe, were meaning to address certain questions and hence did not make certain distinctions in their language.

I agree, the question is thorny, but I think it helpful to remember a few things.

a) The suffering of one can often be remedial to another.
b) Allowing one to inflict suffering on another can itself be remedial. (An all-knowing God would know, for instance, that by allowing me to hurt someone, I may then be drawn to repent once I realized how much harm I’d done.)
c) Accepting suffering can help draw oneself closer to another if they believe or know that their own suffering can be remedial to another.

Thus the suffering of innocents, while troubling, does not pose a problem so glaringly contradictory to the idea of a good God as may initially appear. It does seem that all suffering is, at bottom, a sort of “sacrifice”. I don’t think it possible for God to get the good he wants without conceding its allowance.

#11

Hi Chris!

You entice me to get in “over my head!” I too am “uncomfortable” with thinking sin is/was “necessary” (it’s seems immoral to punish as guilty something unavoidable). For I too experience your #1, “I know I should not do this” while doing it. Indeed it feels to me like I have the power of ‘contrary choice’ and ability to avoid sin. Indeed, in shaping behavior, I don’t know what else to do, but treat people as accountable for negative consequences of bad choices.

I also affirm your #2: “A ’knowledge’ of an acts wrongness must be understood.” But what knowledge? For as a Skinnerian Psych grad, I also perceive that every action is determined by causes. And I observe that motives for competing choices often conflict, and there are ‘reasons’ to believe either makes more sense. So despite you saying, “I don’t think there really is ignorance in an immoral choice,” my previous contention that we often experience much ‘ignorance’ remains.

Jesus says, “Forgive them, for the know not what they do.” Paul says, God had mercy on me because I acted in ignorance. Apparently, despite perceiving they had reasons to kill, some aspect of knowledge is missing. They knew the commandment on murder and that they were ungraciously killing Christ/Christians. So weren’t such actions a sinful choice? Yet there ‘immoral choice’ appears to be excused on the basis of their limited knowledge.

The Adam story assumes he’s heard that one tree is forbidden. Yet it can appear that gaining God’s knowledge of good and evil would be a good step. Does he have ‘knowledge’ if which voice or logic is most trustworthy? He appears to think that it is most reasonable to pursue knowledge. Why must or should he act against what he reasons?

It appears that I’m not grasping your differentiation between choices being “moral” vs. “culpable” (I’d assume these overlap). You repeat something I’m not understanding: “One’s reason doesn’t determine one’s will.” Why? What does or should guide one’s will? It strikes me that sound reasons (in accord with reality) should determine our choices.

#12

Touche! I’m inspired by people like you and Talbott who’ve made the pursuit of truth such a fundamental part of their lives. And I can’t say enough how much I enjoy the time and thoughtful responses you and everyone on the board I’ve discussed with have afforded me.

I don’t want to side step your specific questions to me, but I think it would help me to talk more freely and “off the cuff” right now. So I’m going to let your questions simmer and fly more from my gut in this post.

I think you’re on to something, as hard as it is to put my finger on exactly, when you suggest that sin was potentially “inevitable” with the creation of free finite rational beings. But somehow, even if this is so, we cannot say that God has “caused” this sin. It’s also difficult to say in what way creatures are responsible for their acts if they occur of necessity. At least, we may have to alter some of our notions of personal accountability (which I’m prepared to do.) Maybe it’s the case that even if sin is inevitable and unavoidable we still ought to react the way we do - hold people accountable in the same way - simply because that is the way to abolish it. So maybe it’s the case that even though a person cannot help but sin, they ought not to be treated any differently than if that sin was done “contingently.” After all, if a man is on fire, how that occurred doesn’t change the fact that we ought to put it out. Perhaps the necessity vs. contingency problem is simply irrelevant to how we ought to deal with “wrong” actions. (Maybe as Lewis suggested the question of “what is the difference between freedom and necessity” is really a meaningless question? )The fact that one is capable of doing wrong actions is reason enough to make them become incapable. (Would this entail that no punishment could be retributive, but is rather entirely remedial?)

Let us suppose that “sin” is merely “acting for one’s self, over and against acting for God.” “Acting for God” need not include an awareness that it is God who one acts for. I mean only to point to the dichotomy between acting for self and against a higher “moral law” or intuition or conscience that seems to be involved in sin.

Let us suppose also that the creation of finite rational beings entails the awareness of self as an entity over and against God. I maintain that the notion of finite rational selves apart from God necessarily brings along with it a “me vs. other” awareness. In other words, what would be a necessary prerequisite for creating a free being distinct from God would be for that being to perceive the good and desirability of his own existence as his own, separate from the existence of all other beings. If this is correct then it would be impossible to create a being with self awareness immediately in God’s presence. The creature’s own self would then never be an object of its knowledge. It would be eternally fixed on the good of God, who is irresistibly good. Hence “epistemic distance” would be necessary for the creature to discover its own existence and have that existence as an object of knowledge.

May it not be possible that God could not have made it any differently than that if he wanted to create such personal, finite beings (we could just call them “wills”) that it would necessarily entail a resistance experienced by that will (i.e. pain)? It seems entirely possible to me that, for God to make self aware wills distinct from himself, he must allow them to have their own desires which are over and against the desires of God and other beings as well. And for God to make his existence known (in a way that doesnt overwhelm the will and destroy its ability to perceive itself) he would somehow have to communicate with it that he himself had certain desires contrary to that of the will (hence the moral law.) This means that pain must be experienced, at least in some basic sense, in order to come to a knowledge of self awareness and that selfs awareness of an other. It is not clear to me that one could have a knowledge of self existence unless one in some measure comes up against a “resistance” to its own will in some form. Further, if God wished to make these self aware wills such that they “abandoned themselves” and found their ultimate good in Him, this would entail further pain, for all the desires which were necessary to develop the wills own self consciousness, its feeding and swelling into life and power, must of necessity be killed by God. But they must be experienced first.

The self must flourish and feel its own life to know it is a self at all, but, once it is a self, it must be saved from itself, since only God can fully satisfy it. Both stages - the growing of the self and the abandoning of it - it seems may require pain. And both stages are necessary to the process. A self must first exist before it can be one with God.

Does this mean that, though sin is “necessary” it is in no wise caused by God? And does this mean that, though one still only acted in his own best “reason” and interest that he is still guilty of sin? Perhaps. Especially if we consider the word “guilt” to mean that, given what the creature is - that is, a being who desires only itself; that is, who makes the self God - he ought to be set right, he ought to be delivered from himself by God. From God’s perspective, it is a much better good for the self to rest in him than to rest in itself.

And I see no reason why God cannot do all this compatibilistically. Indeed, the dynamic may be that, any choice God leaves up to libertarian free will will necessarily result in “sin” in the sense that the agent acts selfishly. But God must needs let the being act in such a way and “sin” (again, of its own) because this builds self-knowledge and self-awareness. Selfish choices are the fuel that feeds the knowledge of “I”. Yet that knowledge must come about, because it is “I’s” that God wants to save. Once God deems this process complete - once the creature has “built” its own self - then God goes to work compatibilistically (irresistible grace) and (either slowly or immediately) starts saving that self and making it a “god.” And he can do this by infusing his knowledge into the creature and holding it up to a “mirror” as it were. Note something interesting here. This sort of knowledge - this “repulsion of self” - cannot be from the self itself. It can only see itself as desirable. Left up to libertarian free will, I’m not sure it’s possible for the self to hate itself. But, by revelation of God, the creatures mind is one with its maker and it sees itself as God sees it and hence begins to move away from itself and towards God. For one to be able to even say “I am a sinner” can only be by a type of revelation. (This is very MacDonald-ian.)

Hence the necessity of the two step process. Perhaps instead of saying “libertarian freedom gives way to compatibilist freedom” it would be better to re-classify these two stages of freedom as *natural *freedom and *supernatural *freedom (I actually think both could be philosophically compatibilist notions of the will.) Natural freedom is what “naturally” occurs when a will is left to itself; it rests content with that self and is, as it were “selfish” and satisfied with that by nature. But supernatural freedom is only possible by the infusion of knowledge by God. This leads to the “revelation” that the self must be saved from itself. And from there I would simply point any reader who wanted to know about this process to MacDonald’s sermons.

I do think that combining both *traditional * or “lay” understandings (leaving aside the *metaphysical *part of the question) of libertarian free will and compatibilism is the most sound scriptural approach to the issue of our wills. If you leave either one out you have to totally ignore crucial ideas found in the New Testament. At least, I think we should say that all sin comes from us, and all “supernatural” acts leading to salvation, such as faith, come from God. Perhaps the distinction above - between natural and supernatural freedom - allows us to do this? (After all, God would only need to “leave us to ourselves” and we would all, theoretically, become a Hitler or a Stalin.)

Just some thoughts. I hope I haven’t crossed over into meaninglessness!

#13

Chris,

Wow, great minds ( :wink: ) seem to go the same direction! Here’s a few quick reactions. Talbott’s rejection of “determinism” seems to agree precisely that God hasn’t ‘caused’ our sins. Yet he also seems to agree with you that creating a free self distinct from God may have required the tension that God creates us in a (ignorant) condition where ‘sin’ seems ‘inevitable.’

That last perception leads me to share your speculation that such moral development means we still need to treat persons as accountable. This does uncomfortably sound like how we train a dog or rat in a maze, who doesn’t know better, until rewards and punishments condition the ‘right’ responses. So yes, I think ‘punishment’ must be "remedial. Though Parry understandably says that in Biblical thought, it’s both retributive (e.g. in proportion to an offense’s evil) and remedial, love’s nature leaves me troubled with any ‘punishment’ that’s solely concerned for retribution and not redemption.

Still, this distinction between “necessary” and “not caused by God” seems problematic. Yet, I don’t know how else to affirm both that sin is truly evil (that in some meaningful sense we participate in a ‘choice’ that God doesn’t perform) and yet cause and effect operate. Acts must be able to truly be ‘against God,’ and yet not prevent God from carrying out his purposes.

As you say, it seems that sin and guilt have much to do with “making the self God.” Indeed, I sense that objectively sin involves decisions that deny God and his ways. Thus, the paradigmatic problem with Adam’s choice was exalting self in not “trusting” that God’s command was best since God would lovingly have his interest at heart. Perhaps it was reasonable for Adam to value seeking “the knowledge of good and evil.” But the ‘right’ way to gain it was not this experiential way of disobeying God. But it seems that in our ignorance, we must learn to trust God (in the school of hard knocks), including a discerning trust in His Spirit’s quiet voice which tells us what is right, often opposing the desires and reasoning of the ego-centered self, and telling us that love is the way.

I.e. Such learning, as you well put it, involves “the revelation of God,” to then “see our self as God sees us, and hence to move away from itself and towards God.” So again, it seems we’re thinking similarly that we must try to combine some sense of ‘free-will’ with a ‘compatibilism’ wherein God ordered how things work and is ultimately sovereign. As you say, the practical view is affirming that “sin comes from us,” but in its’ ultimate source, the truly good stuff “comes from God.” Indeed, I often find that it’s healthiest for me to see myself (in an Arminian way) as not a deterministic victim, but one empowered to be able to make good choices. Yet, it’s better to graciously see others’ bad choices (in a more Calvinistic way) as due to their remaining ignorance, so that if it seems I’ve made better choices, I more humbly ascribe that ultimately to God somehow allowing me more early on to receive necessary awareness and knowledge.

#14

Bob,

I’m with you - saying that sin is “necessary” and at the same time “not caused by God” is problematic.

After thinking more about it, I just cannot conclude that sin or evil could have been necessary and yet at the same time that beings are still “guilty” for doing evil or committing sin. The two things seem to me mutually exclusive. If I am not able not to do an action, or if I’m determined to do it, or if it was necessary for me to do it in God’s plan - I cannot make sense of the idea that I am “guilty” of doing anything outside the divine will for me to do. God’s will is what made sin necessary for my growth or development or what have you. To say at the same time that I’m going against God’s wishes by doing what he requires me do is to me unintelligible.

Sin, therefore, must be both a denial of God in some way that truly involves going against his will (that is, the action of sin cannot be such that it is in any way “necessary” to God’s further purpose for me), and something that I had the ability to refrain from doing. If I am determined to sin by God, I cannot see how my act has any causative power in relation to “me” or “myself.”

Thus, contrary to what I may have suggested above in my “shooting from the hip” post, I think creatures who are capable of sinning must possess true libertarian freedom. I cannot square the notion of compatibilism with sin. I can square it with many other acts, but it seems to me at the end of the day if we are only compatibilistically free, all sin is really reduced to mere miscalculation (which really in effect is reduced to misprograming!).

What, then, of “learning” to trust God?

I think this notion of “learning” is one which needs to be teased out from the concept of sin. I think it perfectly possible to imagine a race of entirely sinless beings, every one of which learns through their free choice more and more about God.

I want here to return to something I wrote in a few posts above: namely that, a requirement for a libertarian free choice to be made, it seems to me, must necessarily involve a degree of opposition within the mind and will of the person making the choice. A further requirement appears to be the knowledge of self-awareness. To truly make a free choice, it seems to me that the one making it must be able to say “it is I who am making this choice.” I see no other way for the knowledge of “I” to be possible without some degree of pain which serves to alert the self of its independence and, for lack of a better word, “loneliness” or “singularity” in the world. And finally, I think for a personal God to be manifest to a rational self consciousness, it appears this may only be possible by revealing himself in the form of a contrary desire. How could the mind distinguish its own rational desires from those of God unless, at least initially, God “came” to it or was presented to it in the form of a contrary desire? We would be safe, I believe, in calling such a feeling a “command” or “conscience.”

All these things then seem to me to be requisites for a free choice and do not entail the existence of evil: pain, self-awareness, and a command from God which is set over against the natural inclination of the creature. Not all pain, then, is evil or the result thereof. This is significant and I think really needs to be paused and thought about.

As regards “learning” then. If what I have said above is close to accurate, it may be that the only possible way for a rational, self-conscious being to come to understand God is through pain - or, as you say, “the school of hard knocks.” Given all the metaphysical requirements necessary for self-consciousness and the goal of the knowledge of God being infused into it, pain - and a great deal of it - may be something that not even God can prevent from occurring.

The real difficulty is seeing more clearly how, precisely, our freedom prevents or magnifies our experience of pain and how far such freedom extends. How much power do we have; and how much power can a “free” being have over its acts which is at the same time “rational” and “determined” to be happy?

Perhaps the notion of “epistemic distance” is not important in the sense that it is the only context which makes choosing God meaningful; but perhaps it means that it is only in such contexts that free creatures can emerge. As free as we are, we are not free to be irrational. This ambiguity, far from granting us license to be irrational or to do irreparable harm to ourselves, is just the sort of context that allows us to mold our own interpretations of ourselves. Our freedom seems not so much with being able to choose heaven or hell or the end of our destination, but rather the specific and unique process by which God uses us and enables us and even, in a sense, causes us to get us there. For if Talbott is right, and God does have a trump card, if we have free will he still can only use it on the supposition of our free choice.

#15

Chris,

Yes, I do see that the meaning of ‘guilt’ is problematic for an action you’re “unable” to avoid, etc. Of course, unlike Calvinists, libertarians are uncomfortable if God “causes” troubling actions. But let a devil’s advocate push back.

For I don’t see how saying sin can’t be ‘necessary’ isn’t also problematic. We can see that every person sins! How does sin as unnecessary account for this inevitability**?** Are you just claiming the traditional puzzle that the original human condition provided a good possibility of humanity being sinless? Even If didn’t doubt that reading of Genesis 3, would seeing Adam as free to be sinless, make accepting that it’s inevitable for us any less troubling?

If sin is “inevitable” among God’s creatures, its seems that in that sense, God must have deemed it ‘necessary’ for his project. I think Talbott gropes for a middle way here by rejecting “Determinism.” Your language that a given sin against his wishes is “what God requires me to do,” would not be his. God does not “cause” us to sin in any directly deterministic way. He lets us be real actors. Yet he establishes conditions of randomness and finite ignorance wherein bad decisions (sins) are bound to happen in our development.

Yes, I’d agree that it remains troubling to clarify how sin is not then, as you charge, a “miscalculation.” Yet sin, as irrational blindness and deception, is easy to find in Scripture and life. And many have thought that what’s needed for our deliverance is precisely divine intervention, enlightenment, or ‘reprogramming.’ On the other hand, if without such a causative act of God, we all possess the capacity, to not mess up and get things right, shouldn’t I reasonably claim the credit, if I come to show more signs of saving righteousness than do others? When Paul says about Damascus Road, Because of my ignorance, God had mercy on me, does he really mean that the key in my turn around was that “I” just freely decided to exercise my free will better? He seems to describe an offer that it didn’t seem he could refuse.

#16

Bob,

I’m enjoying this running conversation! I’ll jump right in.

I’m not sure I’m fully on board with you when you say “we can see that every person sins.” Can we? Do children sin - do infants? And, are we really sure that so many people sin as frequently as we think? I can well imagine humans existing all over the planet that either have not sinned (who yet still may), or who sin very rarely, or who have conquered sin in this life altogether.

But even if every human sinned, that wouldn’t prove that sin was a necessary condition for rational self conscious existence. In the whole entirety of God’s creation, the earth is but a small, isolated pocket. It may be that as regards the universe, sin is a mere blip - an anomaly. It may be that (and here we’re getting into muddy waters), given God’s foreknowledge of our rational souls as free sinners, he decided to make all such beings the same species. If God has middle knowledge, he knows what all free beings would do in any temporal circumstance and under any material conditions. Perhaps he decided to put all (or very many) of such souls into bodies of the same species (humans), in material circumstances that are similar (e.g. earth)?

So, although it may be that sin was “certain” given God’s infallible knowledge, it need not follow that it was “necessary.”

However, we can I think replace the word “certain” with “necessary” and retain the essence of your point - namely, that, although sin was certain, yet it’s allowance was necessary. I think what I want to say then is that, given that sin was certain, it then was necessary for x, y, z.

You bring up a good point regarding freedom and pride - if it’s because of ME, why can’t I think myself better than X, who does not live the way I do, etc.? Well, as difficult as this may appear, I think that it has to follow, at least in some sense, from the consequence that we’ve been given free will. Unless we are determined to do bad, then we can possibly not do it, and do good. Therefore, if and when we do good, we really do perform something meritorious and worthy of credit. I think a problem we run into is mistaking our outward acts which may appear good for actual acts of goodness which come from the inside. Mere disposition and personality often makes certain acts look good in a man who hasn’t the slightest motive of their actual goodness. This goes back to the notion I’ve talked about above - that there must be an element of difficulty or pain in at least the first time a certain good act is done. As we advance in virtue, we master certain lessons and find them easier and so little by little become more and more good. In this way, we acquire virtue like we do an education. But as a prerequisite of advancement there must be some element of difficulty or pain that is overcome.

I think the answer to reconciling libertarian freedom with God’s “check mate” or “trump card” lies buried in two ideas: a) it is only through our free will being exercised that we develop an identity and that our “I’s” become real objective facts. In that case, it cannot be denied that the very trump card itself is only brought about by the exercise of our free will; and b) the choice which is prompted by the trump card involves seeing the horror of the acts of the old self and repudiating it. In this way the choice for God may, indeed, be a compatibilist choice. But the more I think about it, the more I go back to my idea above that perhaps libertarian free choice - whether sinful or good - of necessity gives way to compatibilistic freedom. When we become virtuous, we actually become in a sense less free to be bad. Our libertarian choices have a sort of complimentary effect or state that is not itself free, but imposed. Maybe the trump card is the ultimate imposition,based on the free willed choice of the creature, of rational light or knowledge that leads to the final “building” of a being who now hates and could never any more commit sin?

Perhaps, then, Talbott is right in saying that the scope of our free will does not extend to the fact that we will spend an eternity with God. Perhaps the exercise of free will simply (I am not discounting it!) provides the context in which we as “selves” experience that process.

#17

Chris,

I fear that what folk mean by our will being “free,” or explaining how libertarian choices are made, remains fuzzy to me. I don’t grasp your discussion of “capatibilistic freedom” (?) or the implications of a ‘trump card,’ but I’ll try to pursue that on your new thread. Arguing that most ‘free’ creatures are actually sinless, but that God has put the few sinners all into human bodies sounds like strange speculation to me, but I’m not seeing how it would change my efforts to understand the only (earthly) existence I know. You do seem to agree that a freedom or capacity to be sinless could justify pride, since our “meritorious” acts would be “worthy of credit.” But the Bible seems to discourage such a calculation.

I’m left sensing that our divide on calling sin “inevitable” springs from strikingly different perceptions of human experience. For you “can well imagine humans all over the planet that have not sinned,” and many others who later have “conquered sin altogether.” And you question that “children sin.” I gotta ask, Do you have children? My impression is that even my precious children practiced sin very much as do I. If sin involves choices that violate God’s express will, or display a selfish ego-centered point of view, I seem to see children exhibit plenty of it, in a refreshingly unvarnished way! So yes, it does appear manifest to me that everyone I know at all well has an inner battle with the ‘flesh,’ that is sometimes lost.

My perception that a sinful proclivity runs as deep as more loving ones (and thus must be countered to be overcome), probably depends on my own mixed motives and complicated ego. Perhaps you lack this dark side? But my doctoral dissertation was on Wesley’s affirmation of sinless perfection. Though I deeply admire him (including his refusal to claim such sinlessness), and I detested much of Fuller’s reformed theology, I believe it was correct that sin’s universality is both Biblical and empirical, and that efforts to deny it often lead to disillusion and more sin.

Grace be with you,
Bob

#18

On that account God (whether considered as the singular ground of existence, or as the Persons of that singular ground) has no free moral choices, and so on your account must only behave amorally and not morally; relatedly, on this account humans must be capable somehow of doing that which God is not actually capable of doing. I’m going to have major problems with that.

An entity which starts with (let us say) a bothersome set of feelings which feeds him data at odds with the righteousness of God might easily have a conflicting want, and I could see how any creature existing within a created neutral field of reactive existence (where I expect any creature must exist to exist at all distinct from God) might feel inadvertent pressures from the status of that existence which the creature would be responsible for choosing between insofar as possible according to the light of truth currently perceived (without culpability in the choice so far as the light is unavailable, but with culpability for choosing against what light can be seen).

But I don’t think such a creaturely situation, which would apply even to unfallen creatures, is a proper way of assessing and describing what must be moral and immoral (and amoral) behavior in itself, i.e. what must be necessary for moral behavior per se (or immoral). Not unless we’re going to divorce God from any humanly possible concept of morality, and thus at best attribute to Him some utterly alien notion of ‘good’. We might have to do that (which I will observe sounds a lot like Calv excuses for the incoherencies of some of their specific doctrines :wink: ), if mere monotheism is true (and again I will observe that sounds like a lot of Islamic excuses for moral incoherencies in their doctrines!) But if trinitarian (or even binitarian) theism is true, the ultimate standard of proper personal behavior is not utterly and indescribably alien to human experience, nor is it the mere imposition of power to cause effects (common though that is to human experience).

But then neither do moral choices as such require impositions of wants external to the rational agent. Presumably the Persons know that if They act against one another They and the Godhead will cease to exist, but that doesn’t mean they have to choose within an already existent conflict of will.

Let me quote you again on the point I have severe ontological problems with (your original emphasis in italics, mine in underline): “In other words, for a free moral choice to even be possible, I maintain that there must be a fundamental conflict between what the person wants to do, and what he knows or “sees” is morally right.”

There is no such thing, there can be no such thing, as a fundamental conflict if God exists, including if the Trinity is true; and certainly there can be no fundamental conflict between the Persons of the Trinity (even if the Persons always choose against the fundamental conflict). Neither can I accept that God behaves amorally, nor that God’s choices are not free moral choices. I am certainly not going to say that creatures have free moral choices but God does not!

Any ethical account of creaturely morality or immorality or amorality must be set coherently within that framework, or else the framework should be rejected as false on at least some detail and the reasons for arriving at that theological framework re-examined for improvement.

Whereas I understand rational freedom (what libertarians tend to mean in describing freedom) to be essential to God, thus the ground of all reality, and so not something with temporary purpose even in the existence of derivative creatures with derivative freedoms. We cannot quite become free with the freedom of God (since we can never be self-existent entities), but we can freely choose to share in the freedom that God graciously shares with us. So long as libertarian freedom exists there is a technical possibility of rebellion, but it is entirely possible to freely choose (from an unfallen position or from a fully regenerated position) what God chooses freely and eternally without ever (or ever again) choosing otherwise.

Libertarian freedom, on my account, is no more optional for true love than compatibilistic freedom is (the freedom of capabilities); nor on my account is libertarian freedom some kind of temporary chrysalis. Compatibilistic freedom, the freedom of capabilities, is a freedom God provides for all creation, even non-rational behaviors, but
libertarian freedom, freedom of contributory authorship, is the freedom of the Father of Spirits which He shares in making children in His own image: we contribute to His story, to history, for better or for worse, but the goal of God if we start contributing for the worse is to bring us to where we will ever after authoritatively contribute for the better.

I do however see now that your position doesn’t involve God setting up immoral behavior situations where creatures (whether human or angel) must fall in order to learn lessons they couldn’t have otherwise learned by not falling. :slight_smile: (I noticed that in your recent reply to Bob, too.)

Interesting discussion. I think I can think of at least one type of scenario in which immoral behavior could be accidental; possible only because what is considered moral or immoral can vary widely across people groups and cultures. So, it seems at least theoretically possible that someone from culture A could accidentally do something immoral from the perspective of someone from culture B. This would seem to introduce an additional difficulty involving some level of subjectivity in what is considered moral vs. immoral.