We should have a short song, to illustrate this!
Of course, some folks here are curious…as to Got Question’s take on this.
We should have a short song, to illustrate this!
Of course, some folks here are curious…as to Got Question’s take on this.
I think the point remains, though - IF time includes the future, then God is committed to it.
Now we can go all Calvinist and claim that God pre-ordained each thing that happens, from beginning to end, before it happens. Every atom in the Universe, for 13 billion years or so. In that way, we do lose free will - whatever that is - but we do save Omniscience - whatever that is.
But if God has to ‘look’ to see ‘what happens’ - then time is in control.
If the future is yet to happen, God is still in control, and free will is saved.
Causal or logical priority does not imply temporal priority in a being who transcends time as we know it. So, just because nothing can be temporally prior to God, it doesn’t follow that nothing can be causally or logically prior to God’s foreknowledge.
In saying that an event is foreknown by God because it is causally or logically prior to God’s foreknowledge, we are not implying that the event occurs prior to God’s existence. We are saying that God foreknows the event occurs at some future time (as we view the future) because the occurrence of the event at that future time causes God, who transcends time as we experience it, to foreknow it.
That’s the troubling clause, and I don’t know how to get around it. If the future event is so embedded that it has the force of causing God to acknowledge it, we have I think a conceptual hurdle.
Interesting! If I may ask, what is the source of the quotation “cause to which every chain of causes must ultimately go back”? I’d like see the context of the quotation. I think it’s important to know whether such a statement applies to abstractions like logic.
I say that because there are many occurrences in the Bible in which God responds to apparently free actions of humans. Though these occurrences are temporally prior to God’s response, (unlike the ones involved with omniscience), they are nevertheless logically prior to God’s response. So, apparently free actions by humans, per se, can be logically prior to God’s response.
In addition, propositions like 2 + 2 = 4 seem to be independent of God, so do not seem to be necessarily part of a logical causal chain that goes back to God.
I have made my argument more succinctly in the following thread. I invite you to check it out, if you have not already done so:
Some would perceive that’s it bizarre to speak of a future choice that has not yet been contemplated by a future free person as causing present knowledge of it, and that it’s more convincing that this future event doesn’t yet even exist to be accessed.
Of course one can posit any notion, e.g. that the nature of time and a deity enables events that apparently haven’t yet happened to causes knowledge of those events. But without evidence, that just seems like a speculative leap of faith to one like me who doesn’t have any such grasp of time or God.
Oh that logic such as this should prevail! Thank you, Bob.
As is the belief that Jesus rose from the dead or that the Christian God is the one true God, or that God can do all things possible, etc… None of these have “evidence” by any real measure. They are taken on faith. It isn’t like you or Paidion are debating a factual God, either. The God you defend is speculative, as well. I don’t really see a difference.
Oh that I could dodge posts, and snipe away at the side lines when people ask me to defend my positions. Oh wait, that’s you, Paidion. You have a history of dodging pointed questions by flat out ignoring them until you can quote a piece or a mistake from someone else as if “that settles it!” Keep up the antics!
Of course it’s speculation. But accepting the attributes and existence of God or accepting much in the Bible is accepting speculation, too.
If God indeed created the Universe at an event like the Big Bang, which changes reality from a timeless to a temporal one, it would seem reasonable to assume that such a creator, who can function in both timeless and temporal systems, could deal with time in a way that is very different from how we deal with it.
Okay— if you insist.
Yes, I agree; it’s neat we both recognize that.
You may be right, but it’s not apparent to me how we know that. I may not grasp what you do about how “time” works.
Thanks. Do you indeed see claims that supposed historical events can only be about speculation in the same way as are claims that future choices by people who don’t even exist yet cause knowledge that can be accessed now?
I fully agree that historical claims like a resurrection (the miraculous) involve speculation and require real faith (falling well short of proof and counter to what I can see and experience).
But I perceive that claims about past events in history can be somewhat investigated by looking at accounts, sources, effects, impact, etc, that provide a limited evidence that can weigh in on how reasonable and unreasonable such a faith might be. Whereas the claim about access to knowledge of things that apparently haven’t come close to even happening or being contemplated by the human agent yet seem to me to rest on metaphysical speculation that is even harder to support.
Basically I’m skeptical of the implication that ‘faith’ and ‘evidence’ should be posited as necessarily being one or the other. Some see faith as resting in what seems most reasonable to a given person. And I think some claims of “faith” are more reasonable (or have better evidence) than others.
Foreknowledge of a free willed actor’s behavior on the other hand may be metaphysically impossible.
May is the operative word. If it may be impossible, then it may be possible, no? I find resurrection impossible, tbh. But if we allow metaphysical, sure, it is possible, just like it is possible for what you say may not be possible.
But I perceive that claims about past events in history can be somewhat investigated by looking at accounts, sources, effects, impact, etc, that provide a limited evidence that can weigh in on how reasonable and unreasonable such a faith might be. Whereas the claim about access to knowledge of things that apparently haven’t come close to even happening or being contemplated by the human agent yet seem to me to rest on metaphysical speculation that is even harder to support.
Big difference between finding evidence for physical things of the past, that leave a mark and are written about vs miraculous things. We can find all crazy stories of resurrection pre-Christian, but does that make them any more plausible? People talk if UFOs and Bigfoot, even seeing them, and some corroborate their story. Do you believe in Bigfoot, or the sun God Ra?
Just because something is written about doesn’t make it true. Imagine if 1,000 years from now all that is left are fragments of “Tokein’s Lord of the Rings”. We dug it up and we start believing that Earth, was once like Middle-Earth. We talk of Giants (like the OT when it references the Nephelim) Demons, Dragons and great wars. Or perhaps something less magical and they find a Tom Clancy novel and believe it to be historical fact?
Certainly there is a difference between the Bible and my ficticious scenario, but the point is about what is possible. Believing that magical things happened back then and not now is a strained world belief, just like the cessation of the “gifts”. The world is likely the same yesterday as it was today, full of charlatans and superstitious beliefs.
Do you indeed see claims that supposed historical events can only be about speculation in the same way as are claims that future choices by people who don’t even exist yet cause knowledge that can be accessed now?
If talking about the physical, then yes. History is something we can observe at least, whether we interpret it correctly or not, who is to say? But evidence of the past about the metaphysical has the same weight as the present about the metaphysical. Metaphysical ideas from Plato are of no more weight than today’s philosophers about the metaphysical. Just because we find a physical papyrus containing the alleged wonders of the metaphysical bears no more credibility that an author of today regarding their wonders of the metaphysical.
Basically I’m skeptical of the implication that ‘faith’ and ‘evidence’ should be posited as necessarily being one or the other. Some see faith as resting in what seems most reasonable to a given person. And I think some claims of “faith” are more reasonable (or have better evidence) than others.
Take Mary for example. What is more likely, parthogenesis or fornication? To say that parthogenesis is more reasonable is patently absurd. You can believe it, but it isn’t reasonable to take something that has happened a million or billion times against something we have never observed in humans. That is just the cold hard facts. Unless you believe other claims elsewhere, it is a 10,000,000,000 to 1 chance.
Secondly, even if Jesus was the result of fornication, it doesn’t mean he couldn’t be favored by the Almighty. Bastards are a human invention, their worth is intrinsically the same as a non-bastard. Essentially they are made up rules, to suggest that he could only be divine if He was birthed from a virgin. But of course, a God who created the universe is certainly capable of fathering a child. But that isn’t really the point. We know all things are possible, but most definitely not plausible.
Okay— if you insist.
Wouldn’t matter if I insisted or not. Old habits die hard.
We know all things are possible, but most definitely not plausible.
Gabe, thanks for elaborating. I resonate with most of your thoughts, and in reflecting, think you’re right in you central thesis that all in the realm of faith and the metaphysical involves speculation and faith. As one quite unorthodox, I sympathize with your skepticism about historical and metaphysical claims…
I think when the discussion on whether it’s coherent to hold that future choices remain free and undetermined, yet are already events that can be accessed and known (by God) focused on linguistic syllogisms confirming a yes, it sounded as if such beliefs could be known, when I sensed that such ideas just remained deeply speculative. So the present recognition that a range of such ideas remains unknowable and in the realm of faith suits me.
I think which notions about claims that we can’t directly check out seem most convincing and reasonable will vary among bright people like us. E.g. Lancia may sincerely see affirming that free will and omniscience are compatible is far more convincing that I perceive it to be. But then I may find propositions believable that he or you would only smile at.
On whether metaphysically miraculous events have or do happen, and if so, which claims are most convincing to a given individual, perceptions of equally intelligent people are bound to differ. My sense is that evaluating the historical evidence, credibility of witnesses, etc is relevant to seeking a reasonable faith, but that more individual subjective experience and beliefs that one may sense intuitively enter into which beliefs and faith we each find most reasonable or convincing.
FWIW, my apologetic for believing something about Jesus (and even his resurrection) may practically illustrate how that crazy combination seems to function for me: Reasons to Follow Jesus - An Apologetic
Wouldn’t matter if I insisted or not. Old habits die hard.
In following your arguments, I noticed that.