The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Contradictions: OT V OT

Theology
#236

Actually Premise 1 is true.

I am beginning to think our apparent disagreement is but a matter of semantics. I think we may be understanding the connotation of the word “know” in two different ways.

In my understanding, if person P knows that K (where “K” is a proposition) then K is true. For if K is false, then P does not know that K.

For example, if you know that your son was at school at time T, then your son was at school at time T . It would not be possible for your son not to have been at school at time T. For if he had not been at school at time T, then you did not know that he was at school at time T.

As for statements about future events, it is no different. If you know now that you will attend a church on Sunday, then it is not possible for you not to attend a church on Sunday. For if you do not attend a church on Sunday, then you do not now know that you will attend a church on Sunday. You may intend to do so, but you do not know.

I remember when my son James was about four years old. I had trained him to come to me whenever I said, “Jamie, come here.” And he alway came when I said that. I might have told someone, "I know that Jamie will come to me, if I say ‘Jamie, come here.’ " But actually, I didn’t know. I thought I knew because he always came in the past when I uttered those words. But it is possible that he might have chosen not to obey. So sometimes we use the word “know” in a weaker sense. I should have said, "I am certain that Jamie will come to me, if I say, ‘Jamie,come here.’ " My certainty is a subjective state of mind, and not objective knowledge.

The words “I know that K” has the following meaning:

  1. I believe that K
  2. K is true
  3. I have sufficient evidence that K is true.

The third one is the difficult one. What constitutes “sufficient evidence”? But there is no question about the second one. If I know that K, then K is true.

It seems me that the actions of a free-will agent can be predicted in advance, but cannot be known—even by God, though He is in a much better position to correctly predict what a person will do than we, for being omniscient, He knows every thought and intention of every person.

In closing, I present a scriptural example in which God Himself thought Israel would do one thing, but she did the opposite. This example clearly shows that God did not know what Israel would chose. .

The LORD said to me in the days of King Josiah: “Have you seen what she did, that faithless one, Israel, how she went up on every high hill and under every green tree, and there played the whore? And I thought, ‘After she has done all this she will return to me,’ but she did not return, and her treacherous sister Judah saw it.” (Jeremiah 3:6,7)

And thus God’s omniscience does not include knowledge of what free-will agents will choose in the future.

#237

No, it is false. The consequent of premise 1 “it could not be otherwise that you will do A” is a necessary truth or a necessary proposition. It is a proposition that is true in all situations or all possible worlds. But God foreknows not only necessary propositions but also contingent propositions, propositions that are true only in some situations or in some possible worlds. So, just because God knows propositions, it does not follow that the propositions are only necessary propositions. Thus, one cannot correctly deduce the consequent of premise 1 from the antecedent of premise 1 because the consequent addresses only some propositions (i.e., necessary ones), not all propositions (i.e., necessary and contingent propositions) that God knows.

But I already covered that explanation, and it apparently wasn’t convincing to you, so let me try another approach.

Another way of looking at this issue is the antecedent of Premise 1, being a contingent proposition, addresses the possibility (contingency) that God foreknows you will do A in a particular situation or a particular possible world. (As I said in an earlier post, a possible world is a description of how the world might be). But the consequent of Premise 1, being a necessary proposition, says that you will do A in all situations or in all possible worlds. But one cannot logically deduce that if God foreknows you will do A in a particular situation or particular possible world, that you will do A in all situations or all possible worlds. Since one cannot logically deduce that, then Premise 1 is false. In a true premise, the consequent must follow deductively from the antecedent. That is a basic rule of logic.

First, not all Bible versions of those verses indicate God did not know, e.g., KJV and Douay-Rheims. Second, the vast majority of Bible verses indicate God’s omniscience, so a possibly contradictory verse raises more questions about Bible translations than about God’s omniscience, and third, what the Bible says has no bearing on the issue involved with Premise 1. And that issue is logic. Premise 1, irrespective of the Bible, is false.

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#238

Lancia, it seems to me that all you’ve done is confirm Paidion’s analysis (that you define “know” differently than he is using it). He says that if one truly “knows” A will happen, but it does not, then
you didn’t truly “know” A would happen. You insist “knowing” something means that you correctly know that only “some” times.

P.S. Your Jeremiah 3 example that God does not have “knowledge of what agents will choose
in the future” nicely confirms what I noted that Dr. Goldingay says is widely obvious in the Bible
(as well as confirms Paidion’s thesis about foreknowledge).

#239

Let me add an image commentary! :crazy_face:

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#240

We can make choices but we are subject to influences which may be mild or substantial so we seem to have a limited freedom.

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#241

This is what ALL this logic discussion, boils down to! :crazy_face:

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#242

My Jeremiah 3 example? What? It wasn’t my Jeremiah 3 example.

#243

O.K. How 'bout: The cited Jeremiah 3 example that God does not have “knowledge of what agents will choose in the future” nicely confirms what I noted that Dr. Goldingay says is widely obvious in the Bible (as well as confirms Paidion’s thesis about foreknowledge).

#244

I found this interesting Q and A, from Got Questions:

#245

How about what I said regarding the Jeremiah 3 example?

“First, not all Bible versions of those verses indicate God did not know, e.g., KJV and Douay-Rheims. Second, the vast majority of Bible verses indicate God’s omniscience, so a possibly contradictory verse raises more questions about Bible translations than about God’s omniscience, and third, what the Bible says has no bearing on the issue involved with Premise 1. And that issue is logic. Premise 1, irrespective of the Bible, is false.”

#246

This short 5-minute video, will help us ALL get through - this “interesting” logical discussion! :crazy_face:

#247

I suppose that the best course of action, when bored - is to stop getting involved in the activity? If this discussion bores someone - why are they involved in it? :slight_smile:

#248

I can only speak for myself. Perhaps this is what Holy Fools do. They do just the opposite, of what makes sense. :crazy_face:

Now I have to get back to reading, my latest library book! :crazy_face:

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#249

You put a lot of faith in repeating your assertion.
But that doesn’t engage any logic that Paidion or I argued. That’d be more interesting.
Our whole focus was on our impression that the meaning attached to words is the pivotal difference.

#250

Of course it engages the logic. The premise is logically unsound and undeniably false, so nothing useful emerges from it. Check the Stanford reference I linked to in an earlier post for further support for the contention that such a premise is false.

On second thought, I’ll save you the trouble. Here is the relevant part of that reference.

             *****************************************************

QUOTE

(1) If God has foreknowledge that S will do A , then it is necessary that S will do A .
(2) If it is necessary that S will do A , then S is not free with respect to doing A .

Therefore,

(3) If God has foreknowledge that S will do A , then S is not free with respect to doing A .

It is somewhat controversial exactly what Augustine’s own response to this argument is (in his formulation it is foreknowledge of a sinful action and not foreknowledge of human actions more generally). An influential interpretation has been given by Rowe (1964) and criticized by Hopkins (1977), who both think that Augustine denies premiss (2) on the grounds that human actions may be free even if they come about by necessity. An alternative interpretation has been defended by Wierenga (1989: 60–63), who thinks that Augustine only explicitly argues against the conclusion of the argument. In any event, it is clearer that Augustine denies the conclusion than that he identifies a flaw in the argument. Boethius, on the other hand, accepts the argument but denies that omniscience includes foreknowledge. Instead, God’s perspective is that of eternity , that is, “the complete possession all at once of illimitable life”. In other words, God sees everything that ever happens all at once, so he does not, strictly speaking, know things ahead of time. (For a more recent defense of this view, see Stump and Kretzmann 1981.)

Subsequent philosophers, however, beginning at least as early as Aquinas, identified a flaw in the argument. According to Aquinas ( Summa contra Gentiles , I, 67, 10), the first premiss is ambiguous between the “necessity of the consequence” and the “necessity of the consequent”. That is, (1) may be interpreted as

(1′) It is necessary that if God foreknows that S will do A , then S will do A .

or as

(1″) If God foreknows that S will do A , then it is a necessary truth that S will do A .

On the former interpretation the premiss is true, but under that interpretation the argument is invalid, that is, the conclusion does not follow. Interpreting the premiss in the second way results in an argument that is valid, but this premiss is false. Just because God knows a proposition, it does not follow that the proposition is a necessary truth; God knows contingent truths, as well. In either case, the argument fails.

END QUOTE

#251

Your apparent faith that just repeating your assertion (and previous language) will make folks eventually accept it as true reminds me of certain political salesmen.

All I can see is that you repeat that what the words in some syllogism you made up mean to you makes it illogical, in lieu of saying boo about anything in my recent responses and argument. That leaves zilch to answer.

#252

Look at the additional material I added after your post appeared.

#253

The key words in the syllogism come directly from Paidion’s original post to which I initially responded. These words are not made up, by me anyway, and neither are the syllogisms, which have a standard format for arguments of the sort used in the omniscience/free will debate, as can be readily seen in the Stanford reference I quoted a couple of posts above this one.

In that original Paidion post, he said, “The crucial thing in my statement is if such foreknowledge existed it would be inconsistent with the person’s choice. That is the reason the person could not do otherwise than what is foreknown.”

So, I used his words in writing this.

“There are two ways of looking at your claim: ‘the person could not do otherwise than what is foreknown.’ Both show your claim to be false.”

And here are the two alternate ways of organizing a syllogism that comes directly from his key words. The organization of the syllogism is fairly standard and not something I just made up.

Premise 1: If God foreknows you will do A, then it could not be otherwise that you will do A.
Premise 2: God foreknows you will do A.
Conclusion: It could not be otherwise that you will do A.

Premise 1: It could not be otherwise that if God foreknows you will do A, then you will do A.
Premise 2: God foreknows you will do A.
Conclusion: It could not be otherwise that you will do A.

I have discussed ad nauseum why these two arguments fail.

#254

Addressed to Lancia

It seems, Bob, that the old adage is confirmed:
Convince a man against his will; he’s of the same opinion still.

#255

Yes, I agree that it quite well fits several in this debate. Nice of you to be so humble.

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