I’m lost. I don’t see what can be “possibly false” in premise 1. If God indeed knows that A will happen, but it’s even possibly false that A will happen, then God did not truly know that “you will do A.”
Wouldn’t his supposed ‘knowledge’ then simply be incorrect?
Premise 1 appears coherent to me. If it is really “known” that A will happen, then it could not be otherwise that A will happen. If God knows you will do A, you inevitably will do A.
I wonder what Got Questions, has to day? 
As I said, God foreknows not only necessary propositions–those that cannot be false–but also contingent ones–those that can be false. So, just because God foreknows a proposition, i.e., in this case the premise 1 consequent, which is a necessary proposition, it does not follow that such proposition must be a necessary one. It could be a contingent one, in which case it could be false. Thus, the if/then deductive structure of premise 1 is violated if its consequent does not follow necessarily from its antecedent. That makes premise 1 false.
Consider this issue through the lens of possible world semantics, where a possible world is a description of how things might be. A necessary proposition is true in all possible worlds, but a contingent proposition is true in only some possible worlds. The antecedent of premise 1 “If God foreknows you will do A” is a contingent proposition. It is true only in whatever possible worlds He foreknows you will do A. But the consequent “it could not be otherwise that you will do A” is a necessary proposition, which means it is true in all possible worlds. So, even in possible worlds in which God does not foreknow you will do A, you will do A. That disconnect between God foreknowing you will do A only in some possible worlds and your doing it in all possible worlds makes no sense deductively. That disconnect is incompatible with the deductive logic inherent in the if/then form of the premise. There is no way that logic would have it that because God knows you will do A in some possible worlds, you will do A in all possible worlds. Just think of the possible logical mess resulting from a situation in which God foreknows you will do B, not A, in some other possible worlds. Given the consequent above that “it could not be otherwise that you will do A,” you would then end up being faced with doing A, even in possible worlds in which God foreknew you would do B, something that is indeed logically absurd.
Your 1st paragraph seems to just repeat the assertion I find nonsensical, but maybe I don’t follow your jargon about ‘consequents’, etc. I may need a real life example to follow how in omniscience, what God knows about what I will do could be false.
Your appeal to “possible worlds” theory was more intelligible. Though I doubt there even is such a thing, I’d agree that if God knows I will do A in this world, another conceivable world could have me doing B.
But heavens, surely other ‘possible worlds’ has nothing to do with what Paidion or I was observing. We were talking about what God knows that we will do in this life, this world. Would you agree that what God knows will happen in this world can’t be false if God is omniscient?
I don’t know what to say to Bob and Paidions objection. It is like saying water is wet, but then using that as proof that the reason water is wet is because we know it is wet.
Since Paidion already agrees that God was not the cause of the choice, how can he say that the choice was not free? As far as I can tell, Paidion is the one being unintelligable.
I suspect, as mentioned before, that people are purposely using the word free differently. Lets stop using the word free.
If God knows Gabe will ask question x at x time, does that mean Gabe did not choose this? If he didn’t choose it, who did and why?
The only sense I can make of Paidion’s argument is that he is trying to say that God only knows the future because he looked into the future and then solidified it. Because, what Paidion is trying to say that it is impossible to for God to see in the future. This is consistent with many statements Paidion has made in the past about time and space, but he is rather coy about up front. This is more about what Paidion believes is possible than what is theoretically possible.
Certainly Paidion is of the camp that God knows all that is possible to know, which rules out the future. Certainly a valid opinion, but it would be more intelligable to just say that than argue ass backwards about free choice, unless you can prove that knowing what someone will do invalidates choice and responsibility. Something I don’t think Paidion has demonstrated.
For you “logic” fans, here. Logic is something the Greek philosophers “invented” or “discovered”, depending on your perspective. But how do you know, that God doesn’t transcend - or supersede - our “laws of logic”?
Or we should ask, one of those AI super computers.
It’s not at all nonsensical. In these syllogisms (say premise 1 is “If P, then Q.”), deduction is used in deriving the consequent Q from the antecedent P. Deduction is truth-preserving, so Q must capture the truth of P. But in the syllogism in question, Q does not follow deductively from P. If the consequent does not follow deductively from the antecedent, then the premise is false and the argument fails.
The possible-world scenario helps interpret difficult logical ideas. Its utility is it can be applied to practically any logical puzzle, such as the one we are discussing here. You said it helped in your understanding, so why not accept that it can be applied productively to Paidion’s and your claim? And as to the existence of possible worlds, they need not exist in reality to still serve as a useful learning tool.
All I can say on that is it seems logical to assume that God foreknows what we will do because we do it. But I am cautious about the words used to describe this foreknowledge-free will issue. Words like must do it and cannot fail to do it don’t fit aptly into the arguments because they describe necessities. But when we do something, that something we are doing is contingent.
The model we seem to be using is this: God ‘sees’ and thus ‘foreknows’ the beginning all the way to the end. He ‘sees’ what I will do at point A in the future.
If God ‘sees’ me at Point A, then I will do that thing at that time. It is not contingent, under this particular model.
If God does not ‘see’ it - I will still do it, if this model is correct. God’s foreknowledge under this model is not a factor.
But - does this model reflect reality at all?
This brings to mind:“If a tree falls in the forest, and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?”
Thus, when it comes to getting to grips with the Scriptures I find these philosophical pontifications so very, wide of the mark… but that’s probably just me as I’m not wired that way.
Agreed. The question cannot be solved on ‘this side’.
Thanks, but I have no idea how that denies my argument.
Because I have no idea what our claim has to do with other worlds?
Not sure if that was a yes or no. But what is logical about being able to know a future event because it will yet take place? Wouldn’t it be just as logical to assume that since nothing future has been done (or yet chosen) there is nothing to look ahead and know?
FWIW 1. In a recent seminar with Fuller’s OT prof, John Goldingay, he laughed at the idea that the Bible presents God ‘foreknowing’ everything in the sense that you use that term, arguing it represents stark denial of the Biblical reality that God is often presented as not knowing in advance, being surprised at outcomes, but learning after events play out, and then readjusting his approach after the fact.
Well I don’t know about solved Dave, but from my perspective… God’s foreknowledge has zip, zero and zilch to do with whether you start eating a peanut-butter and jelly sandwich in Central Park in 15yrs-5days-6hrs-32sec time and it just starts to rain… weird IMO.
Foreknowledge was pertinent the outworking of redemption, period!!
I think you’re right. My point about ‘solved’ was - we have a question we cannot possibly answer. We don’t know what ‘time’ is, or if it’s a line, beginning to end that can be ‘observed’; or if the future ‘exists’ (weird to even think of that imo) already.
OTOH it is a fun problem to think about, and I’ve spent some time myself doing that. 
I agree the word ‘free’ is unclear, and I affirmed that it can be consistent with my argument.
Shucks, even most Calvinists insists on using it to modify human choices.
‘Foreknowledge’ also is consistent with speaking of Gabe “choosing,” another unclear semantic, since again Calvinists and determinists regularly refer to our ‘choosing’ of things.
You rightly imply Paidion is not arguing that God knows the future by looking into it or solidifying it, because he doesn’t think God can even do that.
But none of these clarifications justify arguing that if God could omnisciently know my future choice will be A, it remains logically possible that this proposition could be false, or that I could still yet choose B. I still maintain A would be certain.
We could be making progress! So, let me ask this again.
If God knows Gabe will ask question x at x time, does that mean Gabe did not choose this? If he didn’t choose it, who did and why?
I thought I answered No, it doesn’t mean that Gabe didn’t ‘choose’ this. But the unclarity is in the meaning of “choose.”
Wouldn’t it be fair to suggest that no being, then, possesses free choice, besides a mythological concept of a God who controls all laws of nature and can bend or violate them at will? The God we argue against that could be said to not arbitrarily determine morality? Besides that type of a God, is any being capable of posessing free choice in the sense that there is no causative forces at pull, even against him?
I’d also add, it seems that some of the opinions of God borderline on heresy in the mainstream church. The God of most believers is the philosophical God that Lancia mentions. I am not using the term heresy as a way to undermine, indeed I am a heretic myself, but I can’t help but notice you are closer to an atheistic view of God than what the mainstream Christian believes. Mainly because you argue for limits in God based on this worlds physics and logic, which is precisely the reason that Atheists believe what they do. They have ruled out the metaphysical as a fairy tale violating physics and logic. How is that different than Paidion doing that by saying God cannot transcend the laws of nature and is incapable of knowing the future?
I’m other words, Paidion reduces God to a demi-God like Zeus, albeit, far more moral. Atheists believe that there may exist a more intelligent species, far more intelligent than us. Suppose that isn’t a lot different than a demi-God, to me. But I am no atheist, l am just saying that I see their viewpoint on these matters, awfully similar…
Yes, I have edited this like 20 times! Phone while on the treadmill is more difficult than I thought.
That’s a curious sequitur. You bypass defining “free choice” (though I love your thoughtful reflections). But if you mean that logic leads in the direction of laws of nature wherein all events are a result determined by cause and effect (with the exception of God), that’s hardly a unique theory.
As a UCLA psych student, that meant lots of rat lab and B.F. Skinner (Beyond Freedom), where no one questioned cause and effect. So if you argued there actually is “no causative forces at work” that are best able to explain outcomes, they’d assume you were a religious nut.
Further, this way of thinking is duplicated in the dominant theology in the evangelical tradition. The vast majority of conservative theologians and systematic theologies are produced by the tradition that came out of the Reformation. Indeed, e.g. among my dozen theology and church history profs at Fuller, every single one was a Calvinist. And they essentially affirm what you call the mythological God who alone has sovereign choice, and orchestrates everything according to his will.
Whether that consensus is correct is above my pay grade, but it’s a potent double punch.
So is the case for developing views of God without using any logic better? How would you then decide what to believe about God? You concede that rejecting that just anything can be true of God (as Paidion appears to do) leads to a “far more moral” belief, albeit a smaller view of God.
Maybe there’s a way to have your cake and eat it too here. But if moral and orthodox are in tension, my premium is on moral. For me, as my posted apologetic piece shows, the most vital value of a faith in ‘God’ is that God epitomize moral goodness. To put it in Biblical terms, to take as actually valid, that “God is love.”
Not exactly. Would you say there is a difference between using logic and ruling out things that are unknown? To me there is a difference in saying “God may be like this, because” from “Well, I don’t believe X is possible, therefore it isn’t”. The latter is ignorance masquerading as logic and knowledge, imo.
