I love cake, so I hope that is possible.
The elite gravitate towards Calvinistic theology. This is a case where the leaders just donât represent the common view of the flock. Most peoples concept of God, is truly the like the one that Lancia depicted. Most people believe that the Christian God is essentially the philosophical God. Now, I canât back that up with any poll, and this is a case where a bunch of anecdotes may actually be useful, even in science. In fact, I was reading an article on this the other day. The phrase âI could have told you thatâ was a very interesting article indeed.
Yes, my perception is that every conception of God is short of âknown.â So I assume
we use logic to arrive at what is most convincing to us about what is not directly known.
Well, yes, saying âsomething may be like this, becauseâŚ.â is how logic appropriately proceeds. But I donât see whatâs illogical about (humbly of course) saying, "I donât believe (i.e. Iâm quite unconvinced)
X is possible, therefore (I believe) âit isnâtâ reality.
The opposite alternative would seem to be "Iâm not at all convinced to believe X can possibly be true, therefore I believe it is. That would sound to me more like ignorance masquerading as logic.
I.e. it seems illogical.
Well, you left out the part of your post I was answering: âYour 1st paragraph seems to just repeat the assertion I find nonsensical, but maybe I donât follow your jargon about âconsequentsâ, etc.â So, I was trying to help you follow the jargon and show you how the consequent does not follow logically from the antecedent. And if thatâs the case, the premise is false and the argument fails.
Well, as I said, a possible world is simply a description of how the world might be. As such, the concept can be useful to understand things such as what you and Paidion have raised about omniscience and free will, subjects that are well handled by the possible-worlds approach.
Thatâs interesting, given that Iâm in fact not a Christian, but more of an agnostic with a strong liking and leaning toward Universalism. Thatâs why Iâm here at this site (and at reasonablefaith.org)âposting, reading, and learning.
1 Like
I know, and appreciate your effort. But Iâm still dense to how that denies my argument. I must confess that I donât even know what âconsequentâ you think I affirm, or is illogical.
I know, but I have no idea what our claim has to do with how a âworld might be.â I confess I donât even know what that last phrase means, or how it helps me understand or âhandleâ premise 1.
This all started, I believe, when I placed Paidionâs claim into syllogisms. This was premise 1 of the first syllogism.
Premise 1: If God foreknows you will do A, then it could not be otherwise that you will do A.
I said proposition 1 was false, and you said you were lost and could not see how the proposition was false. I tried to explain again how it was false to no avail. So, let me try once again and be more careful in showing what the terms mean.
Now, the antecedent of this premise is âGod foreknows you will do A,â and the consequent is âit could not be otherwise that you will do A.â I said the consequent does not follow deductively from the antecedent. But it must in this premise. It doesnât follow deductively because God foreknows not only necessary propositions like âit could not be otherwise that you will do A,â but also contingent propositions like âyou will do A.â Thus, premise 1 is false because the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent.
How the world might be could be a description of the present world with one slight change that is of relevance. For example, if one has free will, one could choose to do A or choose to do B, letâs say. Well, if one could choose to do A, then there is a possible world in which one chooses to do A. But if one could choose to do B, there is a possible world in which one chooses to do B.
I explained to you how a necessary proposition behaves in the possible-worlds scenario: a necessary proposition exists in all possible worlds. I also explained to you how a contingent proposition behaves in the possible-worlds scenario: a contingent proposition exists in only some possible worlds. Finally, I showed you how the improperly combined necessary and contingent propositions of premise 1 would create a chaotic situation in the possible-worlds scenario, reinforcing the idea that premise 1 is false.
1 Like
The âA would be certainâ part is the only point of disagreement. If you simply substitute âwill choose A,â or something equivalent, then all will be well logically. Thus we have this syllogism.
Premise 1: Necessarily, if God foreknows X, then X will happen.
Premise 2: God foreknows X.
Conclusion: Therefore, X will happen.
Note that the conclusion is not âTherefore, X must happenâ or âTherefore, necessarily X will happen,â or any other propositions that imply necessity. There is no necessity in the conclusion; there is only contingency (i.e., X will happen) because that is what the consequent of premise 1 claims. If there were any necessity in the conclusion, the conclusion would be false.
Whatâs more, if there were any necessity correctly placed in the conclusion, the claim that free will is prevented by omniscience would be valid. But of course, there is no correct way to place necessity in the conclusion, so the claim that free will is prevented by omniscience is not valid.
L - youâve gotten to the nub of the argument. Of course, though the syllogism is valid, it may not be true. I think you brought that up earlier too if I remember.
Given the truth of the premises, the conclusion is valid and true, in other words - sound.
If either of the premises is not true, the conclusion is still valid, but not true.
And premise 1 is still a big question mark for me.
We donât really need God in this, either, right?
If a future person knows what I will do at a specific time, part of the historic record, and then travels back in time to right before I do the act, in what sense am I free in doing it?
But this all begs the question as to how we can think of the future just as we think of the past; i.e., as if they are both already âdoneâ somehow.
I just donât see how even God is free. Take some scriptures in the Bible âHe hears the cries of his childrenâ - What parent, creator, guardian, whatever can hear the cries of their children and not be pulled/moved in a direction?
I guess I still dispute Paidionâs concept of âbecause we have free choice, Xâ I donât understand why he thinks he is free. He would submit to me that he can decide to do otherwise. But I would submit to him that if I knew his thoughts, I could predict his choice. There is always a âwhyâ when someone does something different than what is pulling at them. If I wanted a candy a bar and refused it, it isnât because I am free. It is because of competing priorities. While I do want the candy bar, my reason for refusing could be any number of reasons. Maybe I am trying to lose weight, maybe I am sick to my stomach. My choice has a reason.
Paidion argues that he could make choices contrary to what he wants and desires and that means he is free. That is where he is gravely mistaken. When Jesus went to the cross, almost everything in his being said no, but guess what? There was something in his being that said âyesâ! That yes, was higher on the hierarchy scale than all the other reasons combined. He followed what his true desire was.
We donât exist in a vacuum⌠I donât think we are free.
Maybe I am not making myself clear⌠You can and do, certainly make deductions that seem true to you. We all do. The problem is when those deductions turn to dogma and even more so, when they use one example to explain away another. We see this constantly. For example:God cannot be bad, because God is good. Ok, that is good enough for an opinion, but far from a fact. How do I know that God is good? You must first demonstrate God is good. Then you must demonstrate why being good or bad is dichotomy. Maybe God is both good and bad?
X happening is what provides Godâs foreknowledge with information about X happening, but X happening is also contingent. So, it may not happen; itâs up to us to choose. But if it did not happen, say Y happened instead, then the syllogism would be different.
Premise 1: Necessarily, if God foreknows Y, then Y will happen.
Premise 2: God foreknows Y.
Conclusion: Therefore, Y will happen.
We ALREADY have theological and philosophical theories, to explain Godâs All-knowing and manâs free will.
Anything from the Calvinistic
to
And anything in between!
So we wonât be able to solve the conflict, between Godâs All-Knowing and manâs free will - via âlogical syllogism rulesâ
Itâs been tried and has produced, no comprehensive theory - we can all buy into.
And while our science, philosophy and AI machines, follow the laws of logic. DO they apply to God or just to mankindâs attempt to understand, how God operates?
Time for a crash course in logic. I think some here, are like a computer program or app - stuck in an infinite loop, throwing out logic. 
No, what I am saying is this, using your terms.
Premise 1: It is always true that if God foreknows X, then X will happen.
Premise 2: God foreknows X.
Conclusion: Therefore, X will happen.
Perhaps this thread - Contradictions: OT Vs OT - is stuck in an infinite, logical syllogism loop?
1 Like
Premise 1 should be this: It is always true that if God foreknows X, then X will happen.
Well, will is not indicative of necessity. It is indicative of contingency, just as do and did and have done are indicative of contingency. These verbs just inform that this is an actual state of affairs that happened. But they do not inform that this is a state of affairs that must happen or that must have happened.
Iâm off today, to buy a Sherlock Holmes hat. This way, I can dress properly - to follow this tread dialogue.
The omniscience/free will relationship is not an easy subject. I suggest this as a way of showing how omniscience does not affect free will.
Premise 1: Necessarily, if God foreknows we will do X, then we will do X.
Premise 2: God foreknows we will do X.
Conclusion: Therefore, we will do X.
This syllogism means that if God foreknows we will do X, then we will do X. But the statement âwe will do Xâ in the conclusion is a contingent proposition. That means it may not happen. We might do Y instead. But how can that be if God foreknows we will do X? Well, God foreknows we will do X because we have done X. But we could have done Y and if that were the case, God would have foreknown our doing Y, in which case the syllogism would be this.
Premise 1: Necessarily, if God foreknows we will do Y, then we will do Y.
Premise 2: God foreknows we will do Y.
Conclusion: Therefore, we will do Y.
Thus, it would always be the case that if God foreknows something, that something will happen, as premise 1 states, even though we have freedom to choose.
How can this be explained? As has been suggested by William Craig, this scenario can result from Godâs foreknowledge being temporally prior to our choice, as must be the case with foreknowledge, but our choice being causally prior to Godâs foreknowledge, as must be the case if He knows what we will choose.
How could our choice be causally prior to Godâs foreknowledge? It could be causally prior to Godâs foreknowledge if God is capable of operating not only inside of our temporal realm but outside of it as well. When He operates outside of our temporal realm, He can know our choices whenever we have made them. But observers on the inside of our temporal realm are not aware of our choices any sooner than when they are made.
The only simplification I can see is in Premise 1.
Premise 1: It must be the case that if God foreknows X, then X will happen.
Mcarans to Lancia
Excellent! Laymanâs terms are fine. Perhaps I donât need to get, a Sherlock Holmes hat after all. 
1 Like
Well, foreknowledge is knowledge of what happens in the future. So, since the word will conveys that sense, I donât think there is an easy way around using that word.