I’ve just recently discovered Laura Ekstrom and her works looks interesting. But I admit to really struggling with the jardon too. After reading a paragraph three times I’m like, “Now what does this mean?” I don’t think any libertarian yet has managed to answer the randomness objecton with anything like a final reply, so there’s always a faint chance I’ll end up on your side of the issue. God forbid! 
Tom
Hey Aaron,
I have a couple of brilliant friends whom I use as sounding boards from time to time. They’re really helpful and they help me break things down into bite-sized pieces. Greg Boyd is one. You probably know of Greg from his open theism. But he’s a brilliant philosopher (Princeton) and Hartshorne expert. Alan Rhoda is the other. Alan taught at UNLV but has been a fellow a some Notre Dame center for research the past couple of years. Extremely bright and open minded. Greg (many don’t know) was a hard-core Calvinist and determinist early on. His first research interest was Jonathan Edwards, whose thinking he understands as well as he does Hartshorne’s. But things changed and he migrated toward the Arminian side of the line. But he “gets” the other side too, and that’s valuable. So I check in with them from time to time.
I check in with them on the ‘randomness’ problem facing LFW too. Alan suggested checking out agent-causal libertarian models as opposed to event-causal approaches (both competing libertarian models). He felt event-causal theories could not overcome the randomness objection.
Just something more to think about!
When Arminians play off “agent” cause against “event” causes, I’m confused. It sounds like saying ‘agents’ are not shaped by events, and seems to just posit that we are to just ignore our usual observation that actions are ordered by previous Causes and consequent Events. Does it say, just assume that there is a mysterious transcendent choicemaker within you that somehow is entirely culpable for its’ actions because that is what it used this capacity to inexplicably calculate to do?
Hi Bob and Aaron,
I thought this was interesting. I like the chart at the end. It helps visualize things.
informationphilosopher.com/freedom/agent-causality.html
Tom
I’m too ignorant to grasp the impressive chart, but sentence 1’s simple definition seems to support my conjecture. It implies that an “agent-cause” is one that can’t be affected by any “events of the past,” or “laws of nature.” That strikes me as much easier to trust in eras before modern science, wherein it is generally assumed that outcomes (including human choices) are regularly affected precisely by consistent laws of nature and by past causal chains. It seems to explain such a “cause,” not by clarifying anything about the substance of its’ operation, but only negatively by what it excludes, which is everything that we think that we have learned about how things function.
The Chart was just lovely. Does it come in other colors?
Given determinism that extends right back to God himself, no, there’s no other possible colors that could have been picked! 
Think about it, given the nature of God, every tiny detail–all the minutia of the way the world has in fact unfolded–is the “best possible world.” The nature of God is why those colors are what they are.
Wow. 
Tom
Now how can you say people have libertarian free will and grace is resistable and he does not take a risk?
God took SOME risks. I didn’t deny that. But among the risks I think a perfectly loving God (who doesn’t need to create) would not be willing to take would be risking the irrevocable loss of any sentient creature. He might risk his own suffering and the suffering of creatures, yes. But all sufferings can be redeemed and healed. What I don’t think he’d be willing to risk is irrevocable suffering (ECT) or irrevocable loss (annihilationism; though this is more tolerable than ECT).
When it comes to UR, my first conviction is that we cannot permanently/irrevocably remove ourselves from God’s offer of love and grace. We can freely reject God, yes, but we can’t irrevocably (and finally) reject God. We don’t have the freedom to say to God, “Stop loving me, forever remove your offer of grace, and never pursue me again,” such that the integrity of our freedom means God MUST honor our request. We can determine OUR response to God, but we cannot determine GOD’S initiatives with respect to us. God’s freedom as creator means God defines our existence as an essential openness to or possibility of Godward becoming. But as created, we’re not free to determine the nature of our existence, metaphysically speaking, though we are free to determine whether we embrace the truth about our existence or not.
Tom
TGB, I’ll come back to your last point, primarily becuase I thought I recall you saying that grace is resistable and therefore one coudl eternally hold out against God. But lets let that go for now and come to this statement of Talbott’s from U S the C debate.
“So the question I would put to Walls, Sanders, and Marshall is this: Do you believe that the difference between you and those who will supposedly be lost forever, or even between you and the worlds worst criminals, lies in the superior character of your own free choices?” - Universal Salvation the Current Debate, p260.
I think Talbott, being a far more careful think than myself has chosen the right words to frame the question. Here I think you we can redirect the proposition, which I believe Bob Wilson has been doing all along. While Arminians most certainly do attribute salvation to grace, the real reason why Calvinists urge the question of boasting is of character. And currently I see no escape from Talbott’s question. In fact, my experience (recently) with Arminians is that they do hold that the one who makes the superior choice is of better character - how else can someone see it.
Where as Calvinism (determinism) seems to me to hold no fault here. The lack of libertarian freedom leaves no room in such a determinist system since the character is also in the hands of the one determining.
** Edited to omit unnecessary comment **
So as Talbott puts it, would you agree that one who chooses God is of better character than a man who rejects God? And if so, how did he come to be of better character?
Auggy: “So the question I would put to Walls, Sanders, and Marshall is this: Do you believe that the difference between you and those who will supposedly be lost forever, or even between you and the worlds worst criminals, lies in the superior character of your own free choices?” – Universal Salvation the Current Debate, p260.
Tom: I don’t mind the question, but I think there’s something fundamentally flawed with it and that’s my beef. To ask “Isn’t the only difference between you as a believer and some unbeliever in the end just YOU?” is to ask a question whose design encourages boasting. Maybe this is what you’re looking for. BUT don’t boast too soon because the question itself seeks an ‘explanation’ (for the belief of some and the unbelief of others). And when it comes to ‘explanations’ we are duty bound I feel to be as inclusive as we can, more inclusive than you’re question allows us to be. And that’s the problem with the question. To ‘explain’ why I’m in Christ requires me to say alllllll the other stuff we’ve said about dependency and grace, etc., that accounts for me being in Christ; and THAT is a full explanation. And it’s the whole truth about our being in Christ that should go into any attempt on our part to boast about our faith. But once the whole truth is told, all grounds for boasting disappear. You only get a possible ground for boasting by excluding crucial truths about why we’re in Christ. And why should I disparage free choice on account of a partial and skewed perspective on what explains my being in Christ? OK, so I can exclude Christ (and grace and dependency, etc.) and focus juuuust on the question “What’s different about me as one who chose and that guy as one who chose to reject Christ?” But SHOULD I narrow my focus like this? Absolutely not. Partial truths and partial explanations will always create opportunities for pride, but only because partial truths allow us to misconstrue THE truth.
Tom
Tom, you seem to assume Talbott’s question “excludes crucial truthes about grace and dependency.” I don’t see that at all. I think he assumes those vital realities that apply to all people, in order to focus on what is different. Pride never assumes that there are not rich realities that people share in common. Its’ innate definitional logic requires always that it point to whatever distinction might account for someone being superior. The inclusive universal truthes thus simply form the backdrop for the part of the explanation that it evaluates. Since they aren’t seen to disqualify its’ explanation, they don’t NEED to be “excluded.” Its’ whole logic is that a difference in outcomes can ONLY be explained by what it is that differentiates two people, and thus is what explains the difference. Your view just seems to be that such comparisons are always illicit. For it appears to me that you stipulate that what’s shared in common makes any differences irrelevant for such a comparison. For you, it simply appears that viritually NOTHING could qualify as indicating that one person was better than another.
Bob: Tom, you seem to assume Talbott’s question “excludes crucial truths about grace and dependency.”
Tom: Just to clarify, I don’t assume it. I’m claiming it. If I narrow my focus on just what accounts for the difference between me and some unbeliever, I’m necessarily excluding other truths that account for why I’m a believer at all. Talbott’s question ONLY focuses on why I’m a believer AND HE IS NOT. What accounts for this difference? Accounting for this difference requires only that I focus on what is difference between me and the unbeliever and that excludes other things/truths.
Bob: I think he assumes those vital realities that apply to all people, in order to focus on what is different.
Tom: If the question really does assume all that is common between the believer and the unbeliever, then I’ll just argue that the believer has no grounds for boasting because of the difference, for the difference ‘assumes all that is common’ as you say.
Bob: Pride never assumes that there are not rich realities that people share in common.
Tom: But it clearly fails to appreciate them.
Bob: Its’ innate definitional logic requires always that it point to whatever distinction might account for someone being superior. The inclusive universal truths thus simply form the backdrop for the part of the explanation that it evaluates.
Tom: Since they aren’t seen to disqualify its’ explanation, they don’t NEED to be “excluded.” Its’ whole logic is that a difference in outcomes can ONLY be explained by what it is that differentiates two people…
Tom: Yes, but why in the world would somebody boast about this? Why does it count against the free nature of some choice that someone didn’t make it and I did? Because my making it means I’m superior in some sense to the unbeliever? To boast that I’m in the faith and some unbeliever is not (there’s the difference) because I choose and he did not (there’s what accounts for ‘the difference’) is to fail to perceive the grace and dependency that defines every aspect of my choosing at all, which ought to preclude boasting. So whatever lip service the believer is giving divine grace and his dependency upon it, if the believer is boasting over his superior worth to the unbeliever because HE chose rightly and the unbeliever chose poorly—in truth the believer has failed to appreciate this grace and dependency.
Bob: For you, it simply appears that virtually NOTHING could qualify as indicating that one person was better than another.
Tom: Who thinks there is anything that could qualify one person as better than another? Indeed, who IS better than another?
When one repents and agrees with the gospel and God’s offer of grace, one embraces the truth that he is no better than any other. To boast ABOUT THIS is to fall from its grace. One can’t boast about not being better than anyone else. If he does attempt to do so, he’s forgotten everything that’s important. What prevents one from boasting about having freely given into the gospel? THE TRUTH, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. I can easily show you at the heart of some Arminian pride a LIE that’s being believed. If the truth that we are free is set within the truth of God’s grace and our dependency upon him, boasting can’t get off the ground.
This is how determinism sometimes ends up being taken as grounds for boasting as well. For the elect sometimes (as Israel did) suppose that God’s choice of them and his choice to overlook others means they are better than the non-elect—Look at me, I’m elect! You’ll correct this by pointing out to the elect that their being elect has nothing whatsoever to do with them. They didn’t elect themselves. But that’s not what the elect are thinking. They’re thinking God’s choice of them reveals some already special quality that motivates God’s choice. And you’ll remind them that God’s election is unconditional, decreed without reference to anything outside God whatsoever.
I don’t see why the qualifications I would make in reminding a boastful Arminian aren’t the same type of corrections you would make of our boastful Calvinist.
Tom
Hi Tom!
You “claim” (not assume) that someone like Talbott (with his question) “fails to perceive the grace and dependency that defines my choices.” Or at least that he “clearly” must not “appreciate” the realities that he does see that people share in common. But, since I find that Talbott fully appreciates grace and dependency, both premises simply seem false.
You clarify that “if one agrees with God’s offer of grace, he embraces the truth that he is no better than anyone.” And of course that stipulation means that ANY explanatory comparison that points to peoples’ moral differences is illicit. You say this can be “easily shown.” But how is it that your premise becomes clear to all believers in grace? As you say, a proud Calvinist has simply rejected the very definition of election. But I’m not seeing how a proud Arminian has violated an equally obvious definition. My impression is that they are inclined to believe one can accept that the Gospel means receiving unearned grace, but not see why it must follow that those who cooperate in shaping their heart to be receptive to it would not be superior.
Bob,
I think the reason given is usally that LFW (within the lib. Christian heritage) does not endorse that salvation is by a work; only the choice is required and that choice is not a work. Thus I think TGB has a burden of proof to provide that the LF choice is not dependent upon God’s forming that character. But if he conceeds that then I would be inclined to believe that it cancels the defense he makes that God requires a LF choice in order for there to be a relationship. In other words, if God requires a person to make a proper LF choice but the person’s LF choice is dependent upon God forming the character in that person so that the proper choice might be made, then it’s self collapsing. What is different about this vs. soft determinism?
As Talbott wrote “Isn’t that his point of Grace, that in order for God to save us from our delusions, he must first save us from our unwillingness to be saved, which is of course a product of that very deulision.”
Hi all,
Let me suggest that what explains the difference between my believing and another person’s not believing isn’t just my having freely believed. The difference is as much explained by the other person’s freely not believing. We BOTH explain why we BOTH are different. This isn’t problematic for a libertarian that I can see. Once I recognize that the unbeliever’s free rejection explains why he’s not my brother in Christ when it was in his power to be so, I can hardly boast that my freedom accounts for the difference between us. There’s no inherent superiority or worth which I possess that he does not possess which explains why he didn’t choose. Any good libertarian worth his salt knows that if the choices are libertarian, then no inferiority of nature can account for the different choices–they are libertarian after all, which means that given all the contributing factors at the time of choice, either choice was possible. It’s a denial of the principal of alternative possibilities to say that something superior about me explains why I chose while something inferior about the unbeliever accounts for his having chose not to believe. A libertarian has to deny the very nature of libertarian choice in order to boast about his having believed libertarianly over the unbeliever’s having disbelieved libertarianly. Boasting over a libertarian choice is a denial of libertarian choice.
Secondly, to boast about my part in believing is to deny the very belief I claim to have freely embraced, namely, that I’m not worth more or otherwise superior to any other human being. Imagine it; to be proud of having freely accepted the truth that ‘I am no better than anyone else but equally and unconditionally loved by God like everyone else’ is to deny this very belief and claim instead that I’m better than many others! Come on, no libertarian can consistently boast of being superior to unbelievers for having freely embraced the truth that he’s not superior to anyone else.
That pretty much empties my arsenal on this issue. If folks still insist that libertarian free choice provides a rationale for boasting, there’s nothing more I can say to convince them otherwise.
Tom
Bob: You “claim” (not assume) that someone like Talbott (with his question) “fails to perceive the grace and dependency that defines my choices.” Or at least that he “clearly” must not “appreciate” the realities that he does see that people share in common. But, since I find that Talbott fully appreciates grace and dependency, both premises simply seem false.
Tom: Talbott is a prince of a man. Far be it from me to question is perceptions or appreciation of grace and truth. Me geneto! Perhaps what I should say is that to the extent that TomT believes his question exposes LFW to some inherent weakness (namely, when all it right understood, LFW provides us a rationale for boasting) he has failed to appreciate grace and dependency from a libertarian’s perspective and has tripped unwittingly over the obvious. I offer that possibility with the fullest respect to TomT. What a wonderful brother!
Bob: You clarify that “if one agrees with God’s offer of grace, he embraces the truth that he is no better than anyone.” And of course that stipulation means that ANY explanatory comparison that points to peoples’ moral differences is illicit.
Tom: It’s illicit so far as constructing grounds for boasting, right.
Bob: You say this can be “easily shown.” But how is it that your premise becomes clear to all believers in grace? As you say, a proud Calvinist has simply rejected the very definition of election. But I’m not seeing how a proud Arminian has violated an equally obvious definition. My impression is that they are inclined to believe one can accept that the Gospel means receiving unearned grace, but not see why it must follow that those who cooperate in shaping their heart to be receptive to it would not be superior.
Tom: I hope my immediately preceding post clarifies. Two things; 1) The difference between me and the unbeliever is explained by BOTH our choices, not just mine (which in itself ought to warn the perceptive libertarian against boasting), and 2) the definition of libertarian choice precludes appealing to any superiority of nature of character to explain why I chose and another did not. If libertarian, my choice was not ‘determined’ by some superiority of nature, nor was the unbeliever’s choice to refuse (if libertarian) ‘determined’ by some inferiority of nature. To say that my libertarianly choosing X and your libertarianly choosing ~X is explained by some superiority of nature I possess that you lack is to imply that this superiority ‘determined’ the choice, which is to deny that it was libertarian.
Tom
Tom,
Forgive me for taking you around the block too many times, but I did warn you and because I warned you – Auggy grabs TGB’s arm as he tries to jump out of the moving vehicle – You’re not going anywhere 
Here’s where I think I’m confused. - and yes I think I’m not understanding you -
Heres how where I’m totally missint it:
a) The decision to reject God is a libertarian free choice.
b) Libertarian free choice can only be made when one realizes his value is no greater than any other person.
If this is true than how can the decision to reject God be called libertarian? For he denies the grace, which teaches that all men are of the same worth
I think now I have a right to request a reason why you believe libertarian choices must deny one person not be superior? I don’t see these as being in opposition.
Why can’t a person make a libertarian free choice and believe his worth is greater than the next man.
If an appeal to the definition of grace is made then it seems like a non-sequitur. And again it seems then if a man rejects this grace then his choice cannot be libertarian. So how does he freely reject God’s grace? As I understand Talbott, a man who rejects God cannot do so and have it be called free (in the libertarian sense)?
Aug
Hi Tom! Toward clarification, I agree better choices as “caused” by an “inherent superiority” or “nature” would be determinist and illogical. I don’t think Arminians say that!
But it seems a non-sequiter to say that it follows from an unbeliever “having it in his power” to reject Christ, that one who chooses Him could not then boast of his choice. Why?? How could anyone boast without assuming such LFW? It seems to me the only possible logical basis. Thus, I find Arminians intuit that it is (not their “nature,” but) precisely their better choice itself (when our inherent natures are indeed equal) that properly indicates who is superior.
On your 2nd defense: You say saving belief means you “accept the truth that I am no better than anyone else” (tho couldn’t one start there yet assume that going forward they can achieve proud differentiation). I think you mean, the Gospel requires “accepting that I can never become better than anyone else.” But I find that Arminians don’t see that as the Gospel. Their emphasis about belief is that all are sinners equally in need of unearned grace, and equally able to make the required response. But they usually also see those who choose to perseveringly accept this free gift, in contrast to those who stubbornly resist it (or in Auggy’s words: choose to maintain “unwillingness to be saved”) by that choice display that they have developed a morally superior heart.
Studying Luke 8:15 with Clark Pinnock, I once said, "Jesus may agree here that retaining saving belief shows who has the better “heart.” He didn’t object. So I’m wondering who shares your contrary sense of LFW’s logic? (I think Roger Olson may be one.) And why would Arminians be “inconsistent” to think that choosing to accept God’s free gift shows who is a better person**?**
I was sure this conversation would eventually get both sides to agree there’s no future in arguing that we can’t be libertarianly free since the belief in such freedom encourages pride and boasting. I must move in very different circles from you guys, because I’ve never (just speaking honestly about my own history) met a libertarian brother or sister in Christ who was arrogant and boastful about being superior to other people JUST BECAUSE they choose to follow Christ libertarianly. I’ve heard Calvinists say they’re out there, and I have no reason to doubt people, but I’ve never heard a libertarian spout such nonesense. And I’ve traveled around the world and taught and ministered for my whole life.
Send them all to me. I’ll be the man in NY harbor:
Send me your proud and arrogant,
Those boastful and arrogant souls,
Parading their superiority on account of having chosen freely…
etc. etc.
Seriously. Round up those Arminians you know who arrogantly boast that they’re superior to other human beings just because they freely chose to follow Christ. I’ll talk to them. I reeeeeally want to hear their boasting with my own ears.
Tom