Hi Cindy and all,
I’ve gotten a bit behind the past few days. But I hope to cash in my promissory note and explain my own conception of human freedom soon. I’m also trying to keep track of the important questions already put to me that I have not yet answered. As for the growing block universe topic, I don’t mind having it here. For the record, I thought that Melchizedek’s post was right on target, and it is indeed relevant to the topic of free will.
Hastily,
-Tom
Since a block universe and free will is on topic, I want to throw in that a block universe implies not only that the future is set in stone but that the past and present and future have always existed in the now without cause while anything that is perceived as successive activity is an illusion. Likewise, in a block universe, any so-called decision making has always existed without cause.
By the way, an article of mine in review about eternity and successive time includes a critique of eternalism / block universe / B-theory of time / static theory of time. This article also corresponds to chapter 1 in the tentative outline that I previously posted.
James,
Are you an open theist?
Hi Chris, yes, I’m also an open theist. But I won’t go more in that direction in this thread unless Tom T goes there.
I haven’t really read about the block universe idea, but here’s a half-baked speculation of mine on that question of time…
I’m imagining a picture of a multiverse, a ‘flower’ if you will, with each universe connected to the multi-dimensional structure like its own ‘petal’.
God might be in His own global Space-Time frame of reference, which is ‘orthogonal’ to any one of the local space-times within each of the individual universes. He as the Author can create a new petal, a new universe, specifying the beginning and the end of its story (predestination) and the free will inhabitants who will reside there. From His perspective, within His Time frame, this new petal can be created instantaneously, but within it the complete local history will be present already – the entire flow of free wills and consequences and reconciliations instantly there. Another Story on His bookshelf, a static bundle with its own timeline present within its pages. He can then choose to edit it at will; but from our perspective, within the local space-time, these changes seem like they have always been part of the plan within our steadily unfolding history, because His orthogonal Time frame has no direct relationship with ours. He can choose to project Himself into our own story, to dynamically participate and experience it from our perspective, as the Son.
Perhaps this is my own small mind trying to imagine God in His own stream of Time, while still being timeless from our orthogonal time frame. It’s just so alien to think of a Person outside of the experience of Time completely.
Sounds kind of like the simulated universe speculation, Micah. I was thinking about that today – what if we all exist as sentient, free-willed beings, yet as thoughts in the mind of God? Our universe is, I’m told but don’t quite understand, not dissimilar to a sophisticated mental process.
THE FREEDOM THAT PERTAINS TO RATIONAL AGENTS
I concluded my recent summary with this question:
I shall now try to set forth just such a unified conception. To set the stage, however, I’ll begin with a brief summary of why I reject two other conceptions, for reasons already discussed, that may seem initially plausible.
(1) In general we feel free whenever we are able to do what we want. But if severe brain damage, insanity, or some powerful delusion should determine what a person wants to do, the ability to do what one wants would hardly qualify as the kind of freedom that pertains to rational agents. So the ability to do what one wants is, at most, a necessary condition of the relevant freedom.
(2) Taking their cue from this, some libertarians identify freedom with the power of contrary choice, insisting that one acts freely in a given set of circumstances only when it remains psychological possible to act otherwise in the exact same set of circumstances. But as you know, I reject this conception for several reasons: First, it seems inconsistent with such ordinary paradigms of free action as the loving mother who cares for her beloved baby and does so freely even though she finds the alternative unthinkable and therefore psychological impossible. Second, it seems equally inconsistent with the idea that the perfected saints in heaven submit to God and do his will freely. And finally, it seems inconsistent with the idea that the morally perfect God freely keeps his promises, freely acts justly, and freely promotes the best interest of those whom he loves into existence in the first place. I should perhaps also emphasize a point that I have not previously mentioned: Not even all libertarians equate freedom with the power of contrary choice. More than a few in fact concede that an appropriately formed character can indeed causally determine a free action. But the problem is that, unless I have missed it, no libertarian has yet provided a plausible account of what it might even mean for someone’s character to be formed in an appropriate way.
So if these are inadequate accounts, as see it, what might a more adequate account look like? Many here seem prepared to concede that God is the freest of all possible beings; and if that is true, then we should at least try, I would suggest, to understand human freedom as a reflection, however pale it may sometimes be, of God’s ideal freedom. Now God is not only the freest, but also the most rational, of all possible beings; indeed, I daresay that his freedom is itself an expression of his rationality, his wisdom, his love, and his moral perfection in general. We humans, being neither perfectly rational nor all knowing, are certainly unlike God in that respect; in particular, our meager rationality and the extent of our knowledge are both limited and a matter of degree. Still, despite the enormous, even unfathomable, difference between God’s perfect rationality, as traditionally understood, and our more limited rationality, human freedom remains analogous to God’s ideal freedom in one all-important respect: It too requires a minimal degree of rationality of the kind I have previously specified, and that includes, as we have seen, an ability to learn important lessons from the consequences of our own choices and actions.
Now it is almost a truism, I suppose, that the concept of rationality, as employed in ordinary moral and legal contexts, plays an essential role in the freedom that pertains to rational agents, as I like to call it. A necessary condition of such freedom is that one be rational enough in a given situation to make reasonable judgments concerning the best course of action in that situation. And in addition to that, human freedom reflects God’s ideal freedom in the following way: Even as God acts freely whenever his own perfectly rational and wise judgments determine his actions, so we act freely whenever our more limited understanding, as expressed through reasonable judgments concerning the best course of action, determines our actions. The crucial difference, of course, is that, whereas God always acts in accordance with his perfectly rational and wise judgments, we do not always act in accordance with our more limited understanding, as expressed in reasonable, albeit fallible, judgments concerning the best course of action. Nor does the relevant freedom require that we always follow our own judgment in this matter; it requires only that we have the power to do so, whether we exercise that power on a given occasion or not.
So that’s my single, unified conception of freedom to which I have alluded. It requires that we distinguish carefully between two very different kinds of cases: those where one finds it psychologically impossible to act in accordance with one’s own judgment concerning the best course of action, and those where one finds it psychologically impossible to act contrary to such a judgment. In the first kind of case, the relevant psychological impossibility is indeed incompatible with freedom, as the example of certain alcoholics and drug addicts can sometimes illustrate nicely. For it may happen that an alcoholic, having judged it best to refuse another drink, nonetheless finds it psychologically impossible to do so; and if that should happen, then the alcoholic’s will would be in a kind of bondage to an addiction or perhaps to the temporary euphoria that the alcohol can induce. In the second kind of case, however, the relevant psychological impossibility is not always, so I want to argue, incompatible with the relevant freedom. Quite the contrary. When a rational agent reasonably judges an action (or inaction) to be utterly unthinkable and the action is, for that very reason, psychologically impossible, this psychological impossibility may be, provided that the relevant judgments are both reasonable and well informed, just what true freedom requires.
Feel free to comment on this, to criticize it, or even to blast away!
-Tom
A perfectly simulated world is indistinguishable from a “real” world, and therefore identical to it. God, who is at least a hyper-computer, runs every possible world-simulation simultaneously. Every possible world exists as a real world in the mind of God. If you like, our universe can be perfectly described by a string of code. Every variation to that code (that results in a possible world) is contemplated by God. Everything that can exist, does exist.
If Bill “freely chooses” toast for breakfast in one world, an identical Bill must “freely choose” porridge in some other world because every breakfast eternally exists in God’s mind. It is simply not possible for Bill, in every world, to"freely choose" toast, because an alternative to toast exists that must be actualised in at least one world. If, in all other worlds, Bill has chosen porridge, in the last remaining world Bill must have toast. He has no choice. ie. Bill must “choose” toast if, in an identical universe, Bill has “chosen” porridge.
ie. Bill isn’t free. He only seems to be free.
Tom:
Would I be accurate in defining your view of freedom as following: the amount of resistance present in the will following what’s presented to it by the reason? That is, freedom is the amount of difficulty the will has in totally acquiescing and “reaching towards” what the mind says it should be reaching towards. The more resistance in the will, the less is one free; and vice versa.
I think it useful here, Steve, to distinguish between two very different sorts of questions, such as:
(1) Just what is moral freedom, as the libertarians, say, understand it?
and
(2) Do we in fact have such freedom on this occasion or that, or even at any time in our lives?
The first question is essentially conceptual, and the second is, in principle at least, partly empirical. With respect to the second question, suppose that from a complete description of certain conditions that existed back in 1900 (yes, that’s before I was born!) together with an accurate description of certain laws of nature–suppose that from these a superhuman computer should successfully deduce that I am now alive and describe accurately all of my present “desires, attitudes, beliefs, and judgments.” That would be powerful evidence, I presume, that we live in a fully deterministic universe and do not have libertarian freedom. (I here set aside the argument that reason would be otiose in such a universe and nothing would reliably count as evidence for anything, which would, of course, undermine the whole idea of scientific evidence.)
Similarly, if scientists could show that “all of our ‘desires, attitudes, beliefs and judgments’ are caused by our genetic makeup–that who we are is determined purely by our genetic makeup,” I would conclude that any action that these inner states determine would likewise be genetically determined. But I’m also wondering what such a scientific argument would even look like. Right now I hold the belief, based on a variety of sensory inputs and a properly working (I hope) cognitive faculty, that I am sitting in front of my computer screen. So what would it even mean to claim, I wonder, that this very belief is genetically determined? Would that not be rather like claiming that a computer program could forecast tomorrow’s weather without any input at all concerning recent weather conditions?
Beyond that, we all need to be cautious, I think, about half-baked causal arguments. Even good scientists, I fear, sometimes use the terms “caused” and “determined” in very imprecise ways.
Thanks for your question.
-Tom
Well said, Tom, thanks. Polanyi gives the whole reductionist argument a pretty good thrashing in “Personal Knowledge”, which I’m working through now; and Jerry Gill in his book “Mediated Transcendence” does much the same. Of course he derived much of it from Polanyi.
I recommend both books for those that are interested in the materialist/reductionist arguments.
Tom, regarding your assessment of freedom, I think I’ve found a relevant quote. 
And the slave does not abide in the house forever, but the Son abides forever; therefore if the Son shall make you free, you shall be truly free. Without Jesus, there is no freedom.
I’m thinking of a few things to compose per Tom’s posts from today, but now I want to quickly mention that there is a range of views that fit the category of libertarian free will (LFW). Two opposing views of LFW are (1) radical free will such as Cartesian free will and (2) Peter van Inwagen’s restrictivism / restrictivist free will.
Here’s a definition of Cartesian free will:
Restricivism says that the will is rarely free while humans are nonetheless morally responsible for their action. I lean toward restrictivism but a moderate view compared to van Inwagen.
.
For Tom and chrisguy…
One of the difficulties in discussions like this (which just makes them all the more fascinating and challenging!) is the different uses of words. (And chris, I think/hope I’m understanding your position better and better; thanks for all your time and work??)
You both seem to place importance on the concept of rationality. Perhaps Tom a bit more explicitly than chris. However, Tom seems to use the term in ways that suggests a comprehension of consequences, as well as the psychological power to choose what’s in my own best interest, while chris seems (I could be off here of course) to use it more as a discernment between right and wrong.
The idea that freedom is not possible without at least some degree of rationality seems crucial to me. But while Tom seems to strongly imply that a choice which is obviously not in my best interest (we should be able to agree that burning in hell forever, or annihilation, is not really in our “best interest” right?) must therefore not be free because it is so utterly irrational, chris appears to use a slightly different definition of rational. Chris seems (again, if I’m understanding here…) to suggest that rationality is present when one comprehends the difference between right and wrong. However, this rationality does not extend to the person actually doing the wrong act. ie I’m not seeing where rationality is actually held accountable in making the “wrong” choice in chris’s formulation.
Thus, as I’m reading you chris, it seems that rationality is what allows us to discern something as good or bad (raising the specter of sin or no sin) and yet still make the bad choice. But with Tom it seems that the making of the bad choice itself reflects some sort of irrationality.
What is to prevent me from simply saying that a choice which is not in my own best interest is, by definition, an irrational one? And if irrational, cannot qualify as free? Do you two gentlemen see this as a point of disagreement between yourselves??
Bobx3
Tom:
Sorry for two quick successive posts, but this question is very different from the above question…
We have mentioned, danced around, hinted at, the notion of our inner wants and desires. We say things like “freedom includes the ability to do what I want to do…” and so on.
Well, if part of our condition is that our wants/desires are skewed, inappropriate, wrong, would it be considered a violation of our “freedom” for God to just implant in us proper desires and wants??
I’m having a little trouble parsing all this out:
Paul, in Romans 7, seems to suggest he’s conflicted in that his wants/desires are good/appropriate but his innate power to act on them is defective. Well, my question is from whence those proper wants/desires? And what of the person whose wants/desires really are evil?
Does God “letting us go” to the consequences of our poor, destructive choices serve to sharpen our awareness of our condition? to our powerlessness to choose what is right? or both??
To what extend am I “free” to choose my inner wants and desires?
Wondering how all this fits for you??
Bobx3
A few quickies:
I’m not exactly sure what to say about this, Chris. Although I often use the term “free will” because it is traditional to do so, I do not typically think of the will as a kind of homunculus in us that makes decisions for us. It is we who choose freely or not and act freely or not; it is not some faculty in us called “the will” that makes our decisions.
So I guess I have to stick with this: We act freely only when we have the power to follow our own (fallible) judgment concerning the best course of action. But having that power in no way guarantees that we will exercise it, because a host of things, such as a desire for revenge (let’s say), may tempt us to do otherwise. And it is not “resistance in the will,” but the inability to do what we think best (and may even wish we could do), that places the will (or places us) in a kind of bondage.
Thanks for the opportunity to clarify this.
-Tom
Thanks Dave. I love the fact that you seem to have been reincarnated as a cat, and an intelligent one at that. Cute also. I absolutely love cats, by the way, although I repeatedly asked my own cat (before she died) why she felt so compelled to go outside and torment all of those little animals. Anyway, for those here planning to come back as a dog, I love dogs as well.
-Tom
I make use of that Romans 7 text in several places, Cindy, including the second edition of ILG. Thanks.
-Tom
Cindy, you seem to be using “freedom” in a difference sense from “Free Will: Its Essential Nature and Implication”, the title of the thread.
You seem to be using “freedom” in the sense that I do not have the freedom to play Chopin waltzes on the Piano (because I have not learned to play the piano through lessons and practice). I also agree that Jesus meant this same kind of freedom when he said that the one who practises sin is a slave to sin, but that He can set a person free from this slavery.
However, in the sense of free will as it is usually understood, none of this applies. Even a slave is free to make choices, even choices against his master’s commands (if he is willing to face the consequences). Likewise, a slave to some particular sin can choose not to commit that particular sin, and is sometimes able to carry out his decision, even without the enablement of Jesus. For example, I have known non-Christian alcoholics who have chosen to quit drinking, and have succeeded.
Paidion,
One doesn’t need God to change their life. I also know some alcoholics and drug addicts who have stopped drinking and using without God. It takes time but it can be done. Look at me. I’ve been labeled as bipolar and I’ve never harmed anybody when manic. When I’ve stopped taking my medicine in the past and started having emotional problems, I refused to sin and went to the hospital. Sin can be resisted even when you are under severe stress or depression. I don’t have to get drunk just because I’m feeling bad or afraid.