The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Free Will: Its Essential Nature and Implications

Featured Writers Dr Thomas Talbott
#201

Thanks, Tom.

I appreciate your very thoughtful response and distinguishing between the two “very different sort of questions” makes things much clearer for me in this discussion. :smiley:

I did want to address one portion of your response which fits in well with what I was getting at with my previous question:

My point in my somewhat convoluted post was just that even if a person’s “desires, attitudes, beliefs, and judgments” are largely due to his genetic make-up, the randomness associated with how we acquire our genetic make-up --“Which chromosome we get from which parent, the way chromosomes recombine and the mutations that occur to occasionally change those genes (…)”–makes the idea of a “fully deterministic” universe implausible. Even in a very deterministic scenario where my parents were “destined” to be mine–for example, arranged marriage in some cultures–my genetic make-up is*** not ***“determined”, at least by “laws of nature.” I suppose we could bring in potential “supernatural” guidance in the process, but at least from a scientific point point of view, the randomness seems to rule-out determinism for how we acquire our genetic make-up. (Now if we wanted to talk about cloning… :laughing: )

I do agree completely that our ‘desires, attitudes, beliefs and judgments’ are not caused by our genetic makeup but would say that our genetic makeup at least strongly* influences* our ‘desires etc.’ and wanted simply to argue that what might seem to be determined by some people (our genetic make-up) is not.

#202

Hi, Paidion

Yes, you’re right – we have drifted over into a discussion of freedom as opposed to the simple ability to make choices for this or for that (or to refrain from either). I guess I’d go more for the alcoholic analogy rather than for the Chopin waltz example. An alcoholic has the physical ability to refrain from taking that next drink, and if she is strong enough, she may just do that, but she is fighting against her own physical addiction and will be doing so every time she feels the desire for a drink and fights against it with the (she hopes) stronger desire to stay sober. AA will tell her that she’ll never be truly free; she’ll always be an alcoholic and will fight this battle minute by minute. For some people this seems to be true and for others perhaps it isn’t quite that bad, but I think scripture is clear that without Christ, we are slaves to sin. Yes, we can resist, but it will always be a fight. It seems to me that the true freedom comes as our desires and our natures are transformed and reconciled to the nature and desires of Jesus so that our natural desires no longer conflict with the desires of our hearts to be and do what is lovely and good and right.

As for the waltz :wink: well, I could do that at some level. We have a piano and I could learn, but it’s not like I’m really tempted, so that I’m forced to resist the urge to play waltzes. Therefore I’m not a slave to the piano or to music. I AM tempted to sit here and fritter away my time on the computer, and yes I could resist that, but it’s hard, HARD, and I’d like to be freer than I am; I’d like to do what I want to do and be who I want to be without always having to push against the wind. Does that make sense? This is what I mean when I talk about freedom, and I kind of think it’s (more or less) what Tom means too, if I’m understanding him correctly.

Love, Cindy

#203

Cindy,

My interpretation of this is that once an alcoholic always an alcoholic. What this means is that we must abstain completely from alcohol. We cannot drink like other people. Once a cucumber turns into a pickle it stays a pickle. This doesn’t mean we aren’t free from getting drunk. In fact A.A. teaches that we never have to drink again.

#204

Bill Wilson - The Founder of A.A. States:

Can We Choose?

We must never be blinded by the futile philosophy that we are just the hapless victims of our inheritance, of our life experience, and of our surroundings - that these are the sole forces that make our decisions for us. This is not the road to freedom. We have to believe that we can really choose. - As Bill Sees it, page 4.

#205

Tom, thank you for engaging our perceptions! You told Chris, “we act freely when we have the power to follow our fallible judgment concerning the best course of action.” Yet you said, we may have “inability to do what we think is best,” despite having such “power.” What are you defining as “power,” if it does not provide ability to act on what we genuinely perceive as best?

You originally stated that “we act freely whenever our limited understanding of what is best determines our actions.” Isn’t that what a determinist would say, and yet believe that this is what regularly happens? You say that despite such “relevant freedom,” we may often act contrary to our understanding of what is best, as illustrated by an addict who knows that it is best to refrain, but (in 'bondage") chooses the “temporary euphoria” of the drug. But couldn’t we see this as actually succumbing at that point to a more deceived understanding of what is best, such that the addict in that moment wrongly sees the drug as best? Wouldn’t a determinist think that this choice too could be in line with what the addict recognizes at that point, but just reveals that his grasp of what is truly and ultimately best is actually deficient?

#206

I’m continually amazed, Bob, at how adept you are at spotting these problems, and yet how far we sometimes seem, when a game of words between us is played! You capture precisely the problem.

I find it easiest to break up Tom’s main point into the categories of “will” and “reason”. Not because Tom does that but because I think traditionally this is how our acts have been defined. This model is such that “reason” describes a certain state of mind which “sees” the acquisition of such and such “good.” Thus it is, as it were, a computational valuation. I “see” that I should get up and get a sandwich because I am hungry. The “will”, on the other hand, is often juxtaposed such that it is what “follows upon” such rational judgments. It is what “desires” the good presented to it. The two operate in a sort of tandem. The reason being the carrot, the will being the rabbit, if you will.

But I reject this whole representation - because I think it leads to determinism.

Whatever categories we employ, I think we must always allow some “room” such that what he “know” does not determine what we “do”. Thus the traditional, scholastic, Thomistic “reason vs will” dichotomy does, I believe, break down. But what Tom seems to suggest is that we maintain the Thomistic divide, and yet have the cake of libertarianism.

The short way to put the problem is, if Tom thinks our ultimate beatitude can be “caused” without us making a free choice towards God, then he’s falling back on the “will determinately follows what’s presented as certain to the reason” model. But I don’t think he wants to do that, since I think he believes freedom is the answer to the Problem of Evil. In other words, if the will isn’t a homunculus, then it choosing Good cannot be caused or guaranteed by God.

I think the answer revolves around a sort of total God-creature syngery. I think God’s interaction with the creation can never be such that he, by his sole power, causes anything. That is, he cannot be the solve reason why anything happens. I think such would destroy the independence of whatever he was acting upon. If God totally caused Bob Wilson to do such and such, Bob Wilson would cease to be himself, cease to be a person, cease to exist. I think God is always extending a sort of divine influence - thwartable, in itself - upon the creation as a whole. Thus I think it ultimately incoherent to give a “one sided” explanation to any event in the cosmos. I.e. I think it impossible to say “I did this” without including “but God did such and such.”

Anyway, just some thoughts.

#207

Well, I have a friend W. who was identified as an alcholic in his early twenties. In his concern for his own well-being he began attending A.A. He was taught there that once one is an alcholic, he can never stop being one, and if he takes a single drink, he’s back where he was. Well, W. became a Christian, and was delivered from alcoholism by the power of Christ. He was then able to take a drink without falling off the wagon.

As you know, those who attend A.A. meetings are require to say at the beginning of every meeting, “My name is -----. I am an alcoholic.” W. had been doing that, but he got under conviction. He realized that every time he said that he was lying. So one day, he decided to tell the truth. He knew he’d get kicked out of A.A., but he did it anyway. He went to the meeting and said, “My name is W.—. I am no longer an alcohlic. Jesus Christ has freed me from alcoholism.” Sure enough, he was kicked out. The truth that he spoke negated the main premise of A.A.

#208

Paidion,

It’s not necessarily a single drink. Some people go for a few years. But they end up back where they were. But as Bill Wilson has stated in the above quote that I gave, we can choose.

#209

Paidion,

To freely admit you are powerless and say you are an alcoholic means that you cannot drink like other people and that you must abstain completely and that you need help. It may take awhile for some but they will be back where they were if they continue to drink. The disease concept of alcoholism means that an alcoholic cannot drink like normal people. He can make free will decisions to abstain and work the steps to improve himself and his life and become a productive member of society. We can choose to turn our wills and lives over to the care of God. We can choose to do the steps. We can choose to go to a meeting. We can choose to pray. We can choose to call a sponsor. I go to A.A. because there’s a lot of interesting people there. Doctors, lawyers, judges, politicians, nurses, musicians. It’s a good place to socialize. As for Christ, Bill Wilson’s Higher Power was Christ but he left it open for others to have their own Higher Power. Bill Wilson in “As Bill Sees It” page 114:

The First A.A. Group in the World:

What Bill Wilson meant here is that he was “cured” in the sense of the fact that he was no longer going out and getting drunk. He was still an alcoholic in the sense that he could not drink like normal people. This is what is meant when people say they can not be cured. Spiritual growth is a lifelong process. We are never made perfect. It’s progress not perfection. Keep in mind that not all groups are the same and that people at the groups don’t all agree with each other. The only requirement for membership is a desire to stop drinking.

#210

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#211

Thanks for bringing this up, Bob, because others may want to see it clarified as well. As it turns out, however, you inadvertently left out a critical word–and, believe me, I know how easy this is to do–in your quotation from my 8:15 reply to Chris on April 16th. You left out, that is, the little word “only.” For I had written: “We act freely only when we have the power to follow our own (fallible) judgment concerning the best course of action. And what that sentence actually says is that having this power is a necessary condition of our acting freely; it does not say that having this power guarantees our acting freely. But when the word “only” is omitted, the sentence misleadingly says that having this power is a sufficient condition of acting freely and therefore that having it guarantees our acting freely. As you can see, then, and no doubt already know, a single word can make a huge difference as to what a given sentence says.

Now the crazy thing is this: If we simply replace the word “fallible” with the word “reasonable” in the misquoted sentence, then the resulting sufficient condition is one that I would indeed accept. For I do hold that we act freely whenever we have the power to follow a reasonable judgment concerning the best course of action. But the judgment must be reasonable, all things considered, to qualify. Accordingly, if I have the power in a specific set of circumstances C to follow a reasonable judgment concerning the best course of action in C, then I act freely in C. But if, having made such a reasonable judgment, I do not have the power in C to follow it, or if, as amounts to the same thing, I suffer from an “inability to do what” I think is best in C, then I do not act freely in C. So contrary to what you may be suspecting, I have no distinction in mind here between a lack of power to do something and an inability to do it.

Suppose, to be a bit more specific with my illustration, that in circumstances C a heroin addict should make a reasonable judgment that it would truly be best not to use the heroin available to him at the time. If our addict has the power to follow his own reasonable judgment in this matter, then he acts freely in C whichever choice he makes; he acts freely, in other words, whether he uses the heroin or refrains from using it. Indeed, in this case he would have the power of contrary choice. But if he is so tormented that he lacks the power on this particular occasion to follow his own reasonable judgment in this matter, as I think sometimes does happen, then he does not act freely in C.

Does that make any sense to you? You go on to raise an extremely important and pertinent issue that I will address in a follow-up post. Thanks for your willingness to reason along with me.

-Tom

#212

As I said in my previous post, you raise an extremely important and pertinent issue here, Bob, and one that I need to address. So thanks for that. But may I also suggest, as gently as possible, that your quotation from my 1:22 p.m. post on April 15th is once again inaccurate? Here is what I actually said, and I’ll put the crucial part in bold: “Even as God acts freely whenever his own perfectly rational and wise judgments determine his actions, so we act freely whenever our more limited understanding, as expressed through reasonable judgments concerning the best course of action, determines our actions.” If you drop out the part in bold, it may look as if just any judgment concerning the best course of action, however irrational it may be, would qualify as a relevant judgment. But that is not my view at all. Recall that a minimal degree of rationality, including the ability to draw reasonable inferences from the consequences of our own actions, is a requirement for free action on my view.

Now you would not deny, I presume, that we sometimes knowingly act wrongly and in that sense act contrary to our own understanding of the best course of action. Or would you? Certainly Paul thought we sometimes sin in that way, as both the first and the seventh chapters of Romans demonstrate. Still, having said that, I certainly agree that, with respect to all of us and not just a heroin addict, our “grasp of what is truly and ultimately best is actually deficient.” And beyond that, reasonable people (who are not omniscient) often disagree about “what is truly and ultimately best.” Although most people probably spend precious little time reflecting upon their own actions in this way, I daresay that many reasonable people–the Timothy Leary types, perhaps–have honestly believed that experimenting with certain drugs, such as LSD, is a worthwhile activity. If Leary honestly and reasonably believed it best, all things considered, to experiment with LSD, as I suspect he did, then it follows from my position that he acted freely in doing so. If, moreover, I were a heroin addict suffering from withdrawal symptoms even as my life was falling apart, I can easily imagine myself making a reasonable judgment on some specific occasion that one more hit may be the best thing to do at the time, particularly if I were planning to seek treatment the next day.

But again, we must bear in mind the crucial point that a minimal degree of rationality is a requirement for the freedom that pertains to rational agents. Suppose (a) that I am a heroin addict, (b) that as a result of my addiction my life has become one long sordid tale of misery, © that a doctor has informed me that I will soon die of heart failure if I continue using the drug, and (d) that I nonetheless have a strong desire to continue living. If under these conditions I continue to deceive myself that taking the drug is a good thing, not to mention the best course of action, then I have become too irrational to qualify as a free moral agent. And if I remain sufficiently rational to judge it best to find a cure for my addiction, then once again my freedom depends on whether or not I have the power to follow my own judgment in this matter.

Thanks again for your willingness to reason along with me.

-Tom

#213

Tom, thanks for your gracious response. I knew your word “only” implied that “power” to act on our judgment was not alone sufficient, and I should have included it in the quote! And I see that you clarify that truly acting ‘freely’ also requires possessing a “reasonable” judgment.

But my actual puzzlement may be the other issue you said remains. It is why you think persons with such ability to act on their understanding sometimes would not. You tell Chris that they may not “exercise” this ability to act on their judgment," because a contrary “desire” wins out, which you seem to describe as “a kind of bondage.” Is this the same as your occasion here of being “so tormented that he lacks the power to follow his judgment”? Since that would sound like a person with this ability may also lack the ability, I assume that I’m not following you.

You say that a person sometimes has the ability to “act freely in C whatever choice he makes.” But I’m not seeing how one can be sure that choices to not follow one’s ‘judgment’ (including when he has a reasonable one) do not imply that at that time his judgment changed into some distorted form. Why not think there is a form of bondage any time that a person rejects an action that he has reasonably recognized as best?

Thanks for indulging my confusion,

Bob

#214

Tom T, I appreciate this and possibly completely agree. This might fit with van Inwagen’s restrictivist model of moral agents occasionally exercising free will. Do you suppose that your model could fit with both (1) soft determinism / traditional Western Christianity and (2) partial determinism/indeterminism / traditional Eastern Christianity / Arminianism?

Added note: I don’t want this to look like a trick question. For example, van Inwagen’s restrictivism is not compatible with compatibilism / soft determinism, but I wonder if your view is compatible with compatibilism.

#215

Haven’t had a chance to read through the last page or so of this very engaging and thought provoking thread yet. But I thought I’d throw in a little lighthearted comic relief here (topic appropriate).

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/exploringourmatrix/files/2014/04/wpid-Photo-20140405225848.jpg

#216

I think you could be right on track with this line of thinking, although I don’t think it would require a multiverse. As I understand block universe theory, it would only require that God is, or is somehow part of the fourth-dimension hypersurface which simultaneously interacts with all “points” in the space-time continuum and is introactively causative. (As opposed to proactively or retroactively, even though it may appear as one or both of those to us from our perspective).

#217

There’s a slight problem with how you’ve framed this in the above statement. According to block universe theory, there is no such thing as an objectively identifiable “now”. So, it’s not quite accurate to say that past, “present” and future have always existed in the “now”.

I think how we typically define (for practical purposes) what we think is ‘now’, is what our immediate perception (based on our relative position in time/ space) tells us, but this is subjective/ relative. Think of a star 6,000 light years away (keeping in mind that space and time are essentially the same thing, kind of like two sides of a coin). When we look up into the night sky, we can see the light emanating from that star, and it appears that what we see is what’s happening “now”. But in reality, the light that we perceive from that star at the moment we view it is actually the light that emanated from that star 6,000 years ago. :open_mouth:

#218

i1098.photobucket.com/albums/g374/Paidion9/DNA_zpse62d64f9.jpg

#219

Or eating twinkies!! The twinkie defense was actually in the news, as you remember. :laughing:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twinkie_defense

#220

Eve and Flip Wilson blamed the devil :wink: