The Evangelical Universalist Forum

God won't violate human 'free will'

Evangelical Universalism Arguments for Evangelical Universalism
#226

I, too, majored in science, earned a Ph.D. in biology, and taught at the university level for 35 years. Knowing what words mean was kind of important in my studies, teaching, research, and publishing!

But it wasn’t until the last 15 years or so of my university career when I volunteered to teach a course in science writing that I grew to appreciate just how important words and their meanings are in clearly communicating. I’m afraid you will never convince me to act as though authorities, such as dictionaries, are optional and are just “authorities.”

Yes, it is too much to ask.

Engaging another in terms of his intended meanings is futile when those meanings stray from the meanings understood by the vast majority of English speakers, as reflected in dictionaries.

#227

Thanks. As you will (or as Paidion would say, you are free to choose!) :wink:

#228

Yes, but do you realize what it is you asked? Those double negatives can be confusing: “for you to not give him a similar courtesy by engaging him . . . doesn’t seem too much to ask.”

My answer “Yes, it is too much to ask” means it is too much to ask not to give him a similar courtesy.

#229

There are two words “cause” and “force” which differ markedly from the words “influence” and “motivate.”

When an act is “caused” or “forced” it necessarily results from a cause or force.
On the other hand, when a person is “influenced” or “motivated” to perform an act, he has the choice either to do so or not to do so. Sometimes the motivation is a threat.

Here is an example of influence or motivation:
Three men tell Joe Bloe that he has to swallow a fly. For is he refuses, they will beat him up. That threat is rather a strong motivation for Joe to swallow the fly. But he is not forced or caused to swallow the fly because of the threat. He has the ability to choose otherwise, even though the result is that the men will beat him up.

On the other hand, if one of the men hold Joe, another forces open his mouth, and the third shoves a fly down his throat, he has been forced to swallow the fly. He has been caused to swallow it. He is unable to do otherwise.

The case of the gunman threatening to shoot Jim unless he gives him his money, is another example of strong influence or motivation. But he is not caused or forced to give them his money. For he could have withheld his money.

If the gunman’s companions grabbed Jim and held him, while the gunman removed his wallet and pocketed the money, then Jim would have been forced to part with his money. There would have been no way for him to keep his money. That is “cause” or “force”.

#230

In those victims who otherwise would not have given up their money but did give it up because of being confronted by a person with a gun, their giving up their money WAS forced or WAS caused by the confrontation with the gun-wielding person. In every one of these victims, the following dictionary definition of force applies.

“to make someone do something that they do not want to do, for example by using or threatening to use violence” (Macmillan)

Notice the key words “by using or threatening to use violence.” Threatening to use violence is equally valid as using violence in satisfying the definition of force.

So for every one of these victims, being confronted with a gun DID force or cause the decision. Thus, their decision to give up their money was not a free decision.

#231

Lancia, if a mother says to her son, “Finish your chores, or you won’t get any pie,” is she forcing or causing him to finish his chores? Or is she merely influencing or motivating him to do so?

#232

In those cases in which the son would not have otherwise finished his chores but did finish his chores because of the threat, the threat did force the son to finish his chores. Definitions of force given above cover this scenario, too.

#233

That makes your conception of a the will as being ‘forced’ clear.

#234

But my understanding of a free choice is that it must be rational at least at some minimal level; otherwise it would be indistinguishable from a random occurrence. (See Thomas Talbott’s TILOG for a very clear discussion of this issue.) For example, choosing to run in front of a rapidly moving vehicle is not really free. It’s not free because it’s irrational and likely controlled by factors that are pathological psychologically, leading to faulty reasoning.

Refusing to hand over one’s money to an armed person is of the same sort. It indicates a mental deficiency that prevents a rational decision. That’s the case because in refusing to hand over one’s money to an armed person, one would not likely get to keep the money anyway, and also one would have a good chance of being injured or killed. That’s an irrational act, and so it would not be a free choice, using Talbott’s reasoning.

Thus, not handing one’s money over to an armed person is not a free choice because it’s irrational, and handing one’s money over to that person is also not a free choice because of an external forcing, as was discussed earlier. There is no free choice shown in this example.

#235

I wonder if ‘free’ choices can also have pathological causes? For instance, someone causing great harm to innocents - say working for the Reich at Chelmno - is acting freely and perhaps even with a clear conscience. Just doin’ their job. But it is still deeply pathological, right? It is such a deviation from the norm of humanity.
That’s why I quoted from the SEP above. When talking free will, there are more factors than a dictionary definition (though I use that tool often and with gain) - ontology, ethics, structuralism, psychology - it’s a biggie.

#236

I think some decisions made by psychopaths can be free, e.g., what clothes to wear today. But the decision you mentioned–causing great harm to innocents–is clearly irrational. Aside from the utter immorality of the acts, one will pay for it big time, sooner or later, usually in this life, if not in the next. Talbott considers the decision to repeatedly reject God, especially in the post-mortem world, one of these irrational decisions and thus not really a free one.

I agree it’s a biggie! For example, agent causation vs. event causation is another complication that has come up unannounced in this thread (until now, that is). But you have to start somewhere, and the dictionary seems the right place when the matter of definitions crops up.

#237

It is a good starting-point!
But you do see that other questions underlay the concept of ‘irrational’ - in this case were are calling an act ‘irrational’, based on what we feel rationality IS. So we’re halfway into ontology at this point. The argument gets circular quickly.
But I do agree - if we could settle on an ordinary language definition, then progress could be made.

#238

Wait, this is a religious site, right? We can use the Bible as a basis. Can’t go wrong there, right?

#239

Uh…:slight_smile:

#240

Well, we have different “unusual” theologies, all based upon the Bible. One chap had a big forum thread here, where there was no free will at all. And God was in control of everything. Christian Science says that sin, dead and evil are illusions. And everything is good, mental and ideas. And they are very solid, in scriptural backing. The same goes for Jehovah’s Witnesses. And I like to watch Joel Osteen on TV. Where God wants to give us stuff, to make us healthy, wealthy and wise (to coin the word’s of Ben Franklin). And how many competing theologies, do we have - in the Protestant world? Perhaps thousands! Now I do admit, many are NOT as solid as my advocation of Z-Hell (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9), as the most probable - end-times tribulation theory (whether the cause is the devil, science run AMOK, or both). One can create any number of philosophical and theological worlds, based upon the bible alone. :crazy_face:

#241

Earlier in this thread I mentioned that philosopher/theologian William Craig and others claim the critical factor in free will is not being caused to do something by causes other than oneself. Thus, if someone forces your choice at gunpoint, that would be a textbook example of not choosing freely, by this view of free will.

This view contrasts with the view based on The Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which states that all that is required for free will is the possibility that one could have chosen other than what one chose.

Craig said in 20013 that he then favored the former view of free will because of a thought experiment in which an observer to your brain activity can see when you are to choose alternative A or alternative B. But if you are to choose A, the observer will press a button on a circuit that connects to the brain and change your brain activity such that you will choose instead alternative B. But if the observer sees that you are to choose alternative B, he lets you do that. So, no matter what choice you would have made, you will end up choosing alternative B.

Thus, if you had freely intended to choose alternative B, you will indeed end up choosing alternative B. You have freely chosen that alternative. But since it was not within your power to choose alternative A, the Principle of Alternative Possibilities does not seem to explain free will. Instead, free will seems to be explained by simply not being caused to do something by causes other than oneself.

Now when Craig wrote this explanation, he did not know that it would be possible for an outsider actually to observe what our choices were before they are made. But now it is possible, as this source explains. This lends support to the thought experiment he described and consequently to the view of free will that he advocates.

1 Like
#242

:+1: :+1:

#243

Okay. Let’s say the son would not have otherwise finished his chores but did finish his chores because of the threat. Are you saying that instead of finishing his chores, the son could not have decided instead not to finish his chores? That he did not have the free will do make that decision? Only then could it be said that the thread caused or forced his decision. Otherwise, it was but motivation, or strong influence.

#244

That is precisely my own understanding of “free will”.

#245

I personally am also deeply sympathetic to Talbott’s case for this. Of course, a great many completely disagree, and define ‘free’ differently. And as Dave says, various authoritative or “dictionary definitions” become a bit irrelevant (as with other key terms like “caused” or “forced”).

E.g. all of my Fuller theology teachers were convinced that irrational decisions can be quite ‘free,’ precisely because as per Craig, they were not constrained, ‘forced’ or ‘caused’ by anything external to oneself. I.e. the subject was free to do what he himself chose and wanted to do, albeit it may have been ignorantly perverse or ill-motivated.

My own difficulty with their definition of ‘freedom’ is that while it sees persons as free or able to do precisely what they themselves are motivated to do, it ignores that these theologians see God as ordaining even the motives that persons are free to act upon, such that there is really no alternative than could be chosen. (Thus eternally condemning them for irrational choices seemed immoral to me.)

For others, ‘freedom’ is not the contrarian ability to be able to choose a foolish thing, but the ability to do the right thing, such that the greatest “freedom” is possessed by the one who could not even entertain the possibility of doing an evil thing (heaven?). In appreciating those with varying views, there is no substitute for grasping what such terms mean to the holder.