15 For I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. 16 Now if I do what I do not want, I agree with the law, that it is good. 17 So now it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me. 18 For I know that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh. For I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out. 19 For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I keep on doing. 20 Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me.
Well, I am arguing that The Principle of Alternative Possibilities does not apply as the criterion of freely choosing. So, the availability of the alternative choiceāhere that would be not finishing his choresāis irrelevant. The criterion of freely choosing, I am arguing, is lack of outside forcing. And since there was an outside forcing, there was no free will expressed. See my post #240 above for a more thorough discussion of this issue.
Of course, I am arguing this. But I still find the hybrid view of free will, as elucidated by Talbott in TILOG, quite attractive. And it has affected my responses in this thread. Here it is.
āI perform a given action freely in the relevant sense only if it is within my power, at the time of acting, not to perform it; and it is within my power not to perform a given action only if, first, it is logically possible that I not perform it and, second, nothing outside my control causally determines (or necessitates) that I do perform it.ā
āIf someone does something in the absence of any motive for doing it and in the presence of an exceedingly strong motive for not doing it, then he or she displays the kind of irrationality that is itself incompatible with free choice. A necessary condition of free choice, in other words, is a minimal degree of rationality on the part of the one who acts freely.ā
Thus, he combines three things in his concept of free will: alternative choice, lack of an outside cause, and a minimum degree of rationality.
Itās worth thinking about.
But following Talbottās view would not change my answer to your above question. Because an outside factor forced his choice to finish the chores, the existence of the alternative of his not finishing the chores made no difference. His decision is not free because of the outside factor forcing his choice. At best, only two of Talbottās three criteria for the expression of free will would be met here.
We may have continued differences in our views of how words are commonly used. It appears Talbott says that human will is not āfreeā when an external factor beyond my control causally ādeterminesā that I do one specific thing in the sense that it ānecessitatesā that specific action, and that you equate this with your understanding of a causal āforceā that often explains and leads to that specific action, but does not necessarily produce that action.
I interpret Talbottās language of a cause that would ādetermineā and / or ānecessitateā a specific option as something that would āforceā that outcome in an inevitable sense.
(The usual absence of such a deterministic cause allows Talbott to hold that my internal motives, ego centrism or ignorance may make me bound to make a given poor choice, but since God orchestrates no external ādeterminism,ā we can call such choices āfree,ā assuming a degree of rationality is present too.)
Yes, Iām not sure I agree with his strong language concerning the outside factor that removes free will as a necessitating factor. Itās the same sort of issue as we saw earlier (i.e., in the omniscience thread) with saying something will happen vs. something must happen. Choice concerns contingencies. As such, I have trouble seeing these choices as necessary. But he is the philosopher, not I, i.e., itās beyond my pay grade.
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It feels over my head too, though philosophers themselves have no consensus about such deep questions (or corner on them), and the semantics are usually pivotal to disputes.
But Talbott does not argue that outside necessitating factors regularly remove free will, in that he thinks such factors are not usually present. A Calvinist who views God as the sovereign and determinative ācauseā of all actions (Talbottās CRC tradition) would believe God is always such an outside factor. But Talbott rejects such determinism, in favor of God creating a world full of indeterminacy wherein God leaves most things up to basic laws of nature and chance. Other rare exceptions would be where sheer outside physical force makes a person do what they do (he didnāt leave the house because he was tied up by the robber). So with a God who only directly intervenes occasionally, by Talbottās definition, most choices can be labeled āfree.ā
The catch, as I alluded, is that Talbott also sees that we come into the world ignorant and ego-centered, without any rational experience of consequences or what to believe. Thus we are pushed about by influences and bound to make wrong choices because we are not actually in a position to be very rational (I sense this is central in Talbottās view that God owes persevering and bringing everyone to the light and to salvation). In that sense, we are not āfreeā in the libertarian sense of having the power of contrary choice. We are more like pawns pushed around, not directly by God, but by the nature of our ignorant being and circumstances into which we are placed.
I sense in Talbottās posted papers on freedom, the will, and what Genesis suggests about how humans are formed, that he sees many events as involving a randomness, wherein we only learn what it is to make real choices by trial and grievous error (with attendant consequences). Indeed, he articulates that he thinks the only way God can create creatures who develop actual independent personhood that is not simply a reflection of God, is to put us into a creation, where we lack ability to be independent and rational, but develop such in a life that is essentially pedagogical in teaching us what it is to be a free and good person. At least thatās how I understood some of his more difficult papers about this.
And some philosophical schools of thought (i.e. Logical Positivism), would reduce all metaphysical and philosophical categories - to how we use language. 
Letās look at an example, from this short video.
Here is a short critical review of the Hulu series āDevsā. The producer of the show is an admitted atheist grappling with the idea of free will. The author of the piece is less than impressed. Snippet:
" First, Christians do grapple with the notion of free will and predestination. Itās one of the central philosophical challenges of a Christian: to believe in Jesus Christās choice to lower himself to become human and Savior while also knowing that this action was planned at the foundation of the world. Sure, there are plenty of unthinking Christians. But for most, where they come down on the answer to that question determines where they end up worshipping God ā from Calvinist Presbyterians and Baptists to Catholics and everyone in between. It also determines the Christianās self-view. At a recent Bible study, two old members at the church I attend vehemently argued this issue again. They have had an intense feud over this for more than 20 years.
Second, Devs ā protagonist, Lily, is not Eve, though Garland has said he wants viewers to grapple with God creating Eve knowing what would happen to her beforehand. Eve was at the beginning, ostensibly, in Garlandās telling, though the viewer never sees her. They see cave people painting on walls for thousands of years but donāt see humanity or consciousness come into being. They see neither creation nor evolution. Those sticky dilemmas are glossed over. The fall of man, the time in the garden, and the prophecies of a coming savior in Genesis 3:15 arenāt addressed, but neither is the evolution of man."
Another look at why even good ādefinitionsā can create problems. (Though as Iāve said, we need the definitions at some point). The limits of language.
"Wittgensteinās philosophy also accounts for the disastrous state of Internet discourse today. The shift to online communication, textual interactions separated from accompanying physical practices, has had a persistent and egregious warping effect on language, and one that most people donāt even understand. It has made linguistic practice more limited, more universal, and more ambiguous.
"The meaning of what we say canāt be abstracted away from the context in which we say it: āWe are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we donāt know their real definition, but because there is no real ādefinitionā to them,ā Wittgenstein wrote. Instead, our speech acts are grounded in a set of social practices.
The idea of words having relative meanings was not new, but Wittgenstein pioneered the controversial linguistic conception of meaning-as-use, or the idea that the meanings of words, relative or not, cannot be specified in isolation from the life practices in which they are used. Instead, language should be studied from the starting point of its practices, rather from abstractions to syntax and semantics. As Wittgenstein put it, āSpeaking a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.ā
Unfortunately, this makes the study of language considerably more difficult, since examining the meanings of words now requires not just verbal definitions, but analyzing the whole ālanguage-gameā of situations and practices to which they are attached."
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Hereās the Wiki article on Devs. 
This issue continues to crop up here, but I think it is a non-issue. To me, there seems to be no substantive difference between using cause in the case of a free-will event and using cause in the case of a physical or biological event.
Let me make this point by using one of your examples of what you believe to be a cause: āThe cause of her being born with red hair is the genetic makeup she inherited.ā
Yes, it is the usual case that the cause of red hair is the presence of a mutant form of the MC1R gene in oneās genome inherited from oneās parents. But people are sometimes born with red hair that is not caused by the genetic makeup inherited from their parents because they in fact have the normal MC1R gene (i.e., for non-red hair) inherited from their parents. In such people, something about their physiological state is what prevents the expression of their normal MC1R gene.
Similarly, exceptions can be made seemingly for all physical or biological cause-and-effect relationships.
So,āThe cause of her being born with red hair is the genetic makeup she inheritedā is not essentially different in nature than āA person confronted by an armed bandit demanding money will be caused to give up his money.ā In each case, the expected effect does not always result from the cause.
For example, a person confronted by an armed bandit demanding money, though usually caused to give up his money, may not be caused to give up his money. The biggest if not the only reason: heās acting irrationally.
Thus, an event may not be caused as would often or normally be the case if other circumstances are involved, whether itās a free-choice event or not. So, I donāt see that the cause of a free choice is different substantively from the normal cause of any other event.
Now, Talbott, in defining free will, is wise in saying there is no outside cause of the choice AND the choice is rational. So, now, we can say definitively that giving oneās money to an armed bandit is not an example of free will because there is an outside cause, but not giving oneās money to the armed bandit is also not an example of free will because it is an irrational choice.
The free will definition I used was from Bill Craig, and that one depends only on the absence of an outside cause. Rationality is not part of Craigās definition. So, if one adds rationality to Craigās definition of free will, both definitions would be fairly similar.
I like the concept of longitudinal studies as relates to this subject. I use the term in the following way:
" Longitudinal study
A longitudinal study is a research design that involves repeated observations of the same variables over short or long periods of time. It is often a type of observational study, although they can also be structured as longitudinal randomized experiments. Longitudinal studies are often used in social-personality and clinical psychology, to study rapid fluctuations in behaviors, thoughts, and emotions from moment to moment or day to day; in developmental psychology, to study developmental trends across the life span; and in sociology, to study life events throughout lifetimes or generations; and in consumer research and political polling to study consumer trends. The reason for this is that, unlike cross-sectional studies, in which different individuals with the same characteristics are compared, longitudinal studies track the same people, and so the differences observed in those people are less likely to be the result of cultural differences across generations." - Wiki
One reason I like it is that whether we prefer to use ācauses and effectsā or ācontributing factorsā or just āvariablesā - if we spot similar behaviors (acting out sexually, e.g.) across test subjects, and then see, via longitudinal studies, the same ācontributing factorsā - as an example, sexual abuse - it should be obvious -imho - that whatever we call those factors, they do ācauseā the behaviors in the normal way we use the word ācauseā.
Causes can be necessary or sufficient, I agree. But they remain causes nonetheless.
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Thanks. We appear to understand Talbott differently, and I may be confused about what you are saying. You appear to say that he maintains āfree willā because "nothing prevents outside forces for necessarily causing a certain choice. I donāt comprehend why outside forces causing our choices is the essence of āfreedom.ā
As I said, I take him to argue that we are āfreeā (as opposed to being victims of Godās determinism because there usually is no outside force causing our choice. Though as I tried to express, in another sense, it appears that he does see that profound influences (or ācausesā) typically explain our choices.
If Love Omnipotent doesnāt āviolate human free willā & force them to be saved (or annihilated), but instead tortures them endlessly, is He not the opposite of what He is (Love), and a monster, or some sort of Dr Jekyll & Mr Hyde being?
Thatās assuming humans even have āfree willā in the first place, which is highly debatable.
No. I am saying Talbott defines free will as having NO outside cause, i.e., ānothing outside my control causally determines (or necessitates) that I do perform it.ā So it is the absence of an outside cause that is a part of his definition of free will.
Again, this is how he describes and defines free will in his book TILOG.
āI perform a given action freely in the relevant sense only if it is within my power, at the time of acting, not to perform it; and it is within my power not to perform a given action only if, first, it is logically possible that I not perform it and, second, nothing outside my control causally determines (or necessitates) that I do perform it.ā
āIf someone does something in the absence of any motive for doing it and in the presence of an exceedingly strong motive for not doing it, then he or she displays the kind of irrationality that is itself incompatible with free choice. A necessary condition of free choice, in other words, is a minimal degree of rationality on the part of the one who acts freely.ā
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Does Talbott agree that some things āwithin usā are NOT in our control? Such as Paul saying that he wants to do good, but is unable? Or would Talbott call that āirrationalā?
Yes, delusions would be an example. He talks about being held captive by our delusions.
I think irrationality could be caused by such things as delusions and other pathological conditions.
Thatās why I think Talbott has a better definition of free will because some things within us can prevent free will, too. So, according to any definition of free will that depends only on the absence of outside causes of our decisions, choices guided by a pathological mind would be considered free. That doesnāt seem right.
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Here is a thoughtful take on free will. The second paragraph begins the work on āwillā.
I like this approach quite a bit. YMMV.
CREDO: Agency and Spectatorship
Whether or not God and the soul are real, and whether or not this life has any final meaning, we are free to live as if they are and as if it does. And this is how we ought to live. We can go around and around on the Big Questions, and to do so is a way of honoring the seriousness of life and of living at the highest pitch possible; but we will achieve no satisfactory result on the theoretical plane. Reason is weak and its conclusions are inconclusive. God and the soul can neither be proven nor disproven. The same goes for the objectivity of morality and every other question on the far side of the quotidian, including the question of the freedom of the will.
The freedom of the will is proven, in the only way it can be proven, by an act of will, by descending from the theoretical to the practical plane. And then the theoretical question becomes moot: to act is to demonstrate practically the freedom to act. To act is to act freely. The freedom of the will in the pregnant sense as liberum arbitrium indifferentiae is a presupposition of action. So act, and verify , in the sense of make true, the presupposition.
By acts of will we de-cide what to believe and what to do. By de-ciding, we cut off reflection which, left to itself, is interminable. After due consideration, I WILL accept this and I WILL reject that; I WILL live according to my best lights, dim and flickering as they may be, for as long as I can and as best I can, all the while continuing the search for truth on the theoretical plane. I WILL NOT allow doubts to undermine decisions arrived at in moments of of high existential clarity.
āBut canāt one still ask whether the will is really free?ā You can, but then you are abandoning the point of view of the agent for the point of view of the spectator. Mirabile dictu : we are both actors and spectators. We both march in, and observe, lifeās parade. How is that possible? How integrate our subjective freedom and our objective determination? A nut that cannot be cracked at the level of theory can only solved at the level of praxis.
from https://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2020/05/credo.html
If Influence A causes event B then event B was necessary. It would be impossible for event B not to have occurred. Are human choices caused by previous events? Definitely not. No matter what event influences a person to behave in a particular way, any rational person could have chosen other than he did. A person can be caused (or āforcedā) to behave in a particular way, but his choices are not caused. If a particular behaviour was caused, then it was not a choice.
I believe Iāll have to question that statement, Don. Thatās why I posted that article: there is a difference between agency(subjective) and spectator, I think. What looks causal to a spectator who has a particular theory about free will, might very well be an exercise in uncaused choice by the subject.