The Evangelical Universalist Forum

God won't violate human 'free will'

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#104

Making a square circle is logically impossible. God’s omniscience and omnipotence do not allow the logically impossible.

Well, those some who contend that are apparently wrong. There is nothing logically impossible about an omniscient being knowing what a free-willed creature chooses. The logical argument supporting that contention was covered many months ago by me in this forum in a thread (Contradictions Are Not Objects of Power or Knowledge). Those who contend that omniscience does not allow knowing what a free decision is commit what is known as the modal fallacy.

Not all participants here accepted the argument I presented, but it is apparently well accepted by many philosophers.

#105

Not true, according to much philosophical opinion and analysis.

#108

But it’s not impossible for someone not to do something if that something is contingent. That is the definition of contingent. Paidion continues to confuse contingent and necessary.

This is again the argument in syllogism form.

Premise 1: Necessarily, if God foreknows X, then X will happen.
Premise 2: God foreknows X.
Conclusion: Therefore, X will happen.

And X happens in agreement with God’s foreknowledge.

The problem is many people see the “Necessarily” at the start of Premise 1 and think it modifies the consequent “X will happen” and they thus think it means “X must happen.” But “Necessarily” doesn’t modify the consequent; it modifies the entire premise. The contingency “X will happen” is in the consequent and as a result, the contingent “X will happen” is what follows logically in the conclusion, not the necessary “X must happen.”

Now since “X will happen” is a contingent proposition, it is possible that Y would have happened instead. But if Y happened instead, God would have foreknown that contingency and thus would have foreknown that Y will happen, as described in the syllogism below, which concludes that Y will happen.

Premise 1: Necessarily, if God foreknows Y, then Y will happen.
Premise 2: God foreknows Y.
Conclusion: Therefore, Y will happen.

Thus, when X is foreknown to happen, X indeed happens, and when Y is foreknown to happen, Y indeed happens. God never foreknows something happening that doesn’t happen.

I could put it the other way around. There are multiple verses that attest to God’s omniscience concerning free choices of humans. The fact that there are different verses that claim both sides of an issue is not an indictment of the modal fallacy. It’s an indictment of the Bible or our comprehension of it.

#109

Yes, and so what? Have I said anything that depends on the logic of middle knowledge? The point on what Jesus said about Tyre and Sidon doesn’t depend on middle knowledge. Middle knowledge depends on what Jesus said about Tyre and Sidon.

There is no “waving a victory flag.” I’m just telling you what philosophical argument makes sense to me, knowing full well that not all people, including philosophers, agree. But at least I have an argument in the form of a valid syllogism, unlike the syllogisms of some critics, and some critics don’t even have them.

And if you want proof, you’re in the wrong forum.

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#110

On the first phase, how is what is “possible” determined? On the second, why does it follow that every thing thought ‘possible’ must exist?

I don’t think most philosophers agree this is wrong, and I see nothing logical about knowing a free choice that’s not yet been made.

#111

Holding that some texts oppose omniscience, and others encourage it, I have no axe here. But I don’t see where this verse "states" that God knows intents “for any moment,” particularly not that he knows those intents in moments that haven’t yet occurred. It sounds to me as though God knows thoughts when they are being thought, rather than being a text on his ability to predict all future free choices.

P.S. Wouldn’t arguing that Jesus of Nazareth is presented as “omniscient” be in tension with his own recorded insistence that he did not “know” when future events he spoke of would happen?

#112

Your syllogism importing the label “contingent” for known and certain choices as a way to deny that it’s ‘impossible’ for the person not to do what omniscience knows he will do, sounds like a word game to me, that I do not comprehend. Your conclusion that once God foreknows a choice, it will always happen, seems to concede qaz’s premise that it IS then “impossible” for that person not to do what’s foreknown.

#113

I think you are confusing me with the person who wrote this argument. That would be Alvin Plantinga. I am not a philosopher. But I would guess that if it is not contradictory, it would be possible. So, if there is nothing contradictory about a maximally great being existing, it would be possible.

Well, you left out all of the intervening steps, so no wonder you are confused. If you follow each step, it may become clearer.

I haven’t polled them, so I can’t evaluate your first claim. But I know of several philosophers who see no problem with foreknowing what a free agent chooses. On your second claim, the point isn’t how it can be done. It’s whether any rules of logic are violated if it is done. And as the syllogism shows, no rules are violated.

#114

Well, of course He knows the thoughts when they occur and given that those thoughts occur at any moment when the individual is thinking, then He knows what those thoughts are that occur at those moments.

#115

‘Contradictory’ to what?’ I would think the only thing that must exist is that which is not contradictory to what actually exists. But what is perceived as ‘contradictory’ seems at the heart of the dispute. We disagree are whether it’s contradictory to know for certain a future free choice, on whether a maximally great being has to be able to do this, and whether everything ‘possible’ must exist.

#116

It’s not a game. A contingent event could have been different. A necessary event could not have been different.

If God foreknows a choice, it will happen because the chooser made that choice. That is, it is the chooser’s choice that determines God’s foreknowledge, not the other way around.

#117

Exactly. Thus, knowing what those thoughts are at the moments when the individual is thinking those thoughts, means that future thoughts and intents that at the present moment have not yet occurred, are not something this verse says that God can know. I.e. The reality of those future thoughts does not presently exist as something to be known.

#118

Contradictory means that there is no contradiction in such a thing occurring. There would seem to be no contradiction in a maximally great being occurring.

#119

Attaching a word to the choice, and then asserting that that word means it is still possible that a different choice could be made is precisely a word game. The reality remains that qaz is correct that once God knows or declares a person will make a certain choice, it IS “impossible” that this person can make any other choice.

#120

Again, now you are questioning how this can occur, not whether this can occur.

But to anticipate your next question, it could occur if God’s knowledge of an event is temporally prior to the event (as it must be if this is true foreknowledge) but the event is causally or logically prior to God’s foreknowledge, such that the event determines God’s foreknowledge. Such would be possible in a being who is not limited by time the way we are, not an impossible assumption in a being purportedly responsible for the creation of the universe and as a result in a being who is not limited by the time dimension (since He created it) as we are.

#121

I have no idea what you are saying here.

No. The reason why God knows a person will make a certain choice is that the person has made that certain choice. The choice is logically or causally prior to God’s foreknowledge, but God’s foreknowledge is temporally prior to the certain choice being made.

The choice is contingent, not necessary.

#122

You appear to define “not contradictory” as “no contradiction” which just repeats the term in question, and I’m ignorant of how one evaluate whether the occurrence of something I can imagine would be ‘contradictory.’ Would there be a contradiction in a giant unicorn occurring, and must it thus exist? I also have no idea what the required existence of a “maximally great being” means. What would logically be the greatest amount of knowledge in a great being seems precisely what is in dispute.

#123

You can look up the word as well as I can. I don’t feel it’s my job to serve as your dictionary.

But let me give you examples of a contradiction. A married bachelor would be a contradiction. Five equals not five would be a contradiction. It’s just a logical incongruity. See I did just give you a definition. I’m such a mensch.

Now is there something contradictory about a maximally great being?

#124

Lancia, thanks for trying to engage my response. But with respect, your response seems to be a Yes, but. For offering reasoning about HOW you think God knows the certainty of future choices, does not deny qaz’ observation. However you think God knows future choices, it remains “correct” that “once God knows or declares a person will make a certain choice, it IS “impossible” that this person can make any other choice”?

#125

No it is not impossible. Again, God knows what a person will freely choose because the person has freely chosen it. And that choice is what provides God with the information that determines His foreknowledge.