I’ve been going round in a couple threads with various people and topics that all seem to center around sin’s necessity, what this means regarding personhood and freedom, and the omnipotence and moral character of God. I want here to present a different angle on these issues - one I have not seen articulated before - and then give possible answers to my own objections as I have been challenging others with them.
I stumbled across a very interesting theodicy summarized by RC Sproul*. He claims it is Leibniz’s, but after some (not very thorough) research on the internet I couldn’t find the idea he expressed identified with Leibniz. Anyway, here it is (I have taken some liberties with it in order to draw out its conclusions to a more terminal, logical end).
Even an omnipotent God could not create a universe that lacked metaphysical imperfection. The very fact that the universe was created, the argument goes, makes it already in some way metaphysically imperfect. For instance, it would necessarily lack self-existence, immutability, eternality, omnipotence, full-asiety, etc.
Now, the really interesting part follows.
Metaphysical imperfection by nature gives rise to other imperfections, in whatever realm the various created objects exist. So, on the natural level, metaphysical imperfection would be manifested in death and perhaps what we call “natural evils” (the necessity of evolution?). But more importantly (and clearly articulated) for the sake of theodicy - metaphysical imperfection gives rise to moral evil. Created persons, therefore, must in some way be metaphysically imperfect. Person’s are by nature rational beings with intelligence and will. Their reason and will, then, since they are (and must be) in some way metaphysically imperfect, have such imperfection manifested in what is called “evil” or “sin”.
I want to say first that I think I’ve been sloppy with the word “evil” in my arguments henceforth to those who want to say sin is a necessary consequence of God’s creation. The most clear definition of evil I can formulate is “a selfish or ego-centered intentionality”. The key word is the last - intentionality. I want to quickly say that I’m applying the word evil only to states of mind or acts of rational agents. “Natural evil” does not seem to me “evil” at all, except insofar as it causes suffering or pain. But here we come to an important point. There is a great deal of difference between suffering and a certain mental state or intentionality. It is only the latter, it seems, which can actually be classified as evil in the sense of meriting moral fault, blame, or guilt.
With these thoughts in mind I want to turn to the actual theodicy itself.
If it is true that God could not create something other than himself without at the same time making it imperfect, and part of this imperfection was manifested in what we call “evil” - that is, an imperfect or selfish intentionality - it would not necessarily follow that God himself was evil. For evil as defined is a certain selfish intentionality. But God, in creating, though he may have indeed made it so that evil came about, would not therefore himself be acting selfishly. One is reminded of the classic, biblical Calvinist response to the problem of evil: “you meant it for evil, but God meant it for good” (Gen. 50:20). From God’s perspective, he would be causing a “metaphysically imperfect” being or act to exist whenever evil or sin occurs. But, since his *intention *is pure, that causation is not evil because it doesn’t have evil intent. So thus far the argument: God can create a universe where evil is inevitable and unavoidable - even in a sense determined - and not himself be evil. He cannot create a universe with rational and moral agents that lacks all metaphysical imperfection whatsoever (ergo he cannot create creatures who perfectly exercise their reason and will since this would imply “moral perfection” which is incompatible with metaphysical imperfection - a necessity of creation).
What about other concerns I voiced, specifically the fact that determinism destroys personhood, renders pointless all the warnings and exhortations we read about, does away with responsibility and culpability and sin; and reduces us to the “mere instrumentality of the divine will”?
Well, I think by answering the latter I can perhaps make a great deal of headway on all the rest.
My objections above concerning determinism almost seem to me to result from not really divorcing Christianity from pantheism. I was worried that since we were “preprogrammed” or “determined” to act as we do we were somehow part of God. But I think I may see differently now. So long as we really suppose that God has “ejected us” (to quote Lewis) from himself as actually separate beings, even if all our acts were determined, we would be separate objects from God. Hence, would not we be real “persons?” Just because I’ve determined all the characteristics of my creation - say my house or my supper - doesn’t mean such things aren’t “real”, does it? As far as responsibility, culpability, and sin - perhaps it does not hinge on the libertarian notion “to do otherwise” but simply from the fact that when we do a given act, we intend evil in doing it? In other words, we at the time possess a state of mind in which our consciousness prefers or agrees with the evil in the act. And for warnings and exhortations, pleadings, “receiving not the grace of God in vain” – perhaps these very warnings are means through which our wills are perfected? That is, they are not meaningful because we have the ability to do otherwise but because by the very mental states that they give rise to - fear, worry, the hideousness of selfishly denying someone who is continually extending you grace and help - perhaps, I say, these mental states are the means by which we grow?
I proposed a question in another thread: couldn’t an omnipotent God make it so that not all medicine tastes bitter? Well, perhaps not, given the idea presented in Leibniz’s theodicy above. Again, I’ve never ran across this idea before (even in Tom’s book, which presents in subtle what-if questions just about every theodicy known to man) but find it extremely promising. Its positives, to me, are the follow:
- It guarantees universalism rather than hopes for it
- It solves the prophecy problem
- It solves Bob Wilson’s observation of the ubiquity of sin
- It fits better with Scripture (predestination, grace, and the plan of redemption - e.g. the lamb slain “before” the foundation of the world)
- It fits better with Steve’s (and current physicists’?) notions of the block universe
- It fits better with the classical understanding of God and Christian theology
- It fits better with my own existential experience of “becoming a better person” throughout my life
Sproul’s lecture can be found below at the link. I think it can be started at part 3, but the entire thing is quite good. I’ve always respected Sproul Sr. because he’s satisfied with leaving the existence of evil a mystery, unlike his son which teaches that God actively causes evil and sin in order to send people to Hell. I truly believe, however, that most (all?) of Sproul’s logic - here and in his writings - sit infinitely better with universalism than ECT. (Interestingly, ECT is the reason Sproul rejects this theodicy).
youtube.com/watch?v=ZX7t3-uEZPA
Just some thoughts here - would appreciate any reflections.
I’m not sure this solves the problem of “natural evil”, but it may. I think I’ve got more to say on this and will, perhaps,in another post. 