The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Love: is it REALLY Volitional? ie a “free choice”?

Evangelical Universalism Arguments for Evangelical Universalism
#27

I thought I’d jump in here and totally derail this topic. :laughing:

Just kidding, of course, but there was something Cindy said that resonated and may be worth exploring…

I feel the same way, Cindy! :smiley: I can see them trying to understand me and trying to please, but also following their instincts at at times(too often, I suppose.) I also think that dogs show not just affection, but (dare I say it) “real love”. There are too many stories of what dogs have done for their masters or their behavior after they’ve died to attribute it simply to a desire to keep the meals coming.

In any event, my point is that there is analogy somewhere here (and a “true” analogy at that) in the relationship between humans and dogs and God and humans. Of course everyone know dogs see their owners as “gods” as they can open doors and have unlimited access to food. :wink: I guess my point is, are we really that different from dogs? Do dogs love their masters because of “free will”? What kind of “will” do dogs even have and does it even matter? I really don’t know, but it makes me wonder…

#28

Hi NightRevan: I’m not sure I understand what you mean here… because later you say

This seems to affirm just what I am trying to assert. Yes, sin will be, at least, hypothetically possible. Will it happen? Absolutely not.
Thus the question is, and given that we both seem to believe that sin will be both a possibility, and an impossibility, will we consider ourselves to be ***free ***in the hereafter??
My premise is that we will be more free in this condition than we have ever been before! But it is a freedom that is fully informed (thus we wouldn’t dream of “going there” – ie we know where that path leads)

Just trying to clarify/understand…

Bobx3

#29

We should start a new topic on that, Steve. It would be fun to discuss. :slight_smile: I love my doggies and my doggies love me – but not as much as they love my DH, who is much too marshmallowy with them. :wink:

#30

Bob X3, I’m with you. I think that you and I agree. We will be free (If the Son sets you free you will be (not you are already) free indeed.) We need to be made free and when we ARE made free, we’ll no longer be slaves at all, at all to sin. Therefore though we COULD choose it, we never will and never would, because we don’t WANT to. We’re free to do what we’ve always wanted to do – to be happy, to make our loved ones happy, and most of all, to delight in our God. As for those who haven’t always wanted that, well they’ll be free enough to know it’s just plain daft NOT to want that. :wink:

#31

Hi alecforbes and Cindy…
Well yes, derail a bit perhaps…
It seems you detect a level of cognition in the dog world that, well, escapes most of the rest of us! I’ve a wife, and a sister, that are forever relaying to me exactly what this dog is thinking! They “channel” the dogs mind for me!
Stop! I say… you may not anthropomorphize this animal in this way! These are your feelings/thoughts which are being projected upon this dog!

Note then, I was speaking of what it would be like for a HUMAN to do that unspeakable act of which we dare not, well, speak. I in no way wanted to enter the realm of what might be happening in the dogs mind as he engaged in that … unspeakable act.

To the point then… (and I’m fully willing to grant that ALL dogs will be saved! Thus, we can confine our discussion to the more flawed species: humans) When it comes to responding to that overwhelming flash of insight, to that overwhelming realization of love, to the “sudden” awareness that God is not only there, but intends to enjoy our companionship forever, that response is rather hard for me to categorize as a “free” one. And yet, it’s a demonstration of a freedom never before experienced.

That is why it’s so intriguing…

Bobx3

#32

Okay . . . here’s the new home of the doggie discussion. :wink: Waking Fido, Fifi, and maybe even Felix

#33

Your wife and sites are, perhaps, very wise… :smiley: I won’t push it, but I suspect there is a correlation between dogs and their masters (much like parents and children) which is under appreciated and poorly understood. :smiley: That being said, there are, of course, major differences between humans and dogs, not the least of which is thought for the future and appreciation for mortality. I think the “dog and master” idea could be worth exploring at some point, but I’ll have to leave it for now and we’ll get back to that more “flawed species” and its Master.

Edit: I see Cindy has started a thread about the whole dog thing, which is nice. :wink:

#34

Cindy’s example of “eating steaming dog poo” illustrates the importance of distinguishing a host of different senses in which people sometimes use the term “freedom.” So here are two senses in which she may indeed be free to eat such a snack:

  1. Even as she has the ability and knowhow to eat a hotdog, so she has the ability and knowhow to eat what her dogs deposit on her lawn. She need only pick it up, put it in her mouth, and start chewing. (Okay, that’s a bit over the top, but, seriously (?), I’m not sure which would be unhealthier: eating an ordinary beef hotdog or eating dog poo. Hee. Hee.)

  2. When Cindy walks her dogs, the act of eating fresh dog poo is occasionally available to her in this sense: She would successfully do it if she should undertake to do so. She is thus sometimes free to eat dog poo in a sense that she is not free to fly like a bird.

Now with respect to 1), any good libertarian would point out that having the ability and knowhow to do something in no way guarantees the psychological possibility that one would want to do it; and with respect to 2), a libertarian would likewise point out that an action’s being available in the specified sense in no way guarantees the psychological possibility that one would undertake to do it. Still, we can easily imagine a context in which I might indeed find it psychologically possible to undertake eating dog poo. If, for some strange reason that I’ll not even try to specify, my eating such an unappetizing morsel would prevent some mad man from carrying out a threat to torture one of my own precious granddaughters, I would have little trouble doing it.

Generalizing from such examples, libertarians typically adopt the following principle: I refrain from some action (whether it be eating dog poo or committing some sin) freely in a given context only if it is psychologically possible in that context that I should actually do the thing I have chosen not to do. But as initially plausible as such a principle may seem, I now believe that it rests upon a mistake; and it is, in any case, utterly inconsistent with our ordinary paradigms of free action, such as a loving mother’s caring for her beloved baby and an honest banker’s refusing a bribe. If a mother, filled with love for her baby, finds it utterly unthinkable and therefore psychologically impossible to neglect her baby, then she does not, given this common libertarian principle, care for baby freely. And similarly for the honest banker who finds it psychological impossible to accept a bribe: Such a banker does not refuse the bribe freely. Neither do the perfected saints in heaven obey God freely, since it is no longer psychologically possible that they should disobey him. And neither does God himself act freely with respect to his most important actions, since it is not even possible that he should act in unloving ways. Are not these implications counterintuitive? I certainly find them so. I also think that Free Will Theists need to rethink their understanding of freedom in a way that enables them to explain why the loving mother freely cares for her baby, why the perfected saint freely obeys God, and why God himself acts freely with respect to his most important actions.

Any thoughts?

-Tom

#35

So many great responses since I last posted. Since I am a bit pressed for time at the moment, I thought I’d respond to Bob Wilson’s for the time being.

With respect to what you call argument 1. I made the point only to say that I experience my own freedom, and I see no reason on the surface of things to say this is an illusion. Sure, you could say “feelings may be wrong”, but we must distinguish a bit. Is it really the case that one’s subjective experience is itself mistaken? If I claimed to feel pain, it wouldn’t make much sense to say I was only mistaken about my own feeling, would it? Of course, you could say that insofar as my experience reflects an objective fact about myself - i.e. that I am, indeed, really free - it may be mistaken. And so it may. I offer the point only as one prong, so to speak, in a many pronged argument in favor of free will. But I hasten to say that *any *intuition is subject to the same skeptical criticism. God’s overwhelming grace compellingly “shattering” my illusions and rendering free choice impossible may just as well be illusory. In the end, what is such a double-sided criticism worth?

Now, you object to my positing free will as the source of all evil on a very good ground - natural evil and the universal bent towards sin. What I would say to that is this. From a metaphysical perspective, if we take the idea that our free will has “bad consequences”, not only for ourselves, but for those in which we’re given “say so” regarding, I see nothing wrong with supposing that all suffering, be it in the form of natural disaster or an inclination to sin, is somehow the result of evil wills. In other words, I think the history of this planet (i.e. life evolving through the red in tooth and claw of evolution) as well as our natural tendency towards sin (“concupiscence”) is due to evil wills. Not to say that those who did the evils that gave rise to such things perfectly foresaw the consequences of their actions, but I do believe that our freedom entails either doing good, or not doing good to others and ourselves. And if we suppose, say, that we have the freedom to do good to our own kind, refraining from doing possible good would entail doing to them evil. So if we imagine a sort of “bad influence” being passed on by way of poorly exercised free will, I think we may be able to say without contradiction that a sort of “fall” (both heavenly and earthly) may indeed account for evolution, say, or our desire to sin. In other words, I think it possible - and indeed very traditionally Christian - to hold that “angelic” powers had some sort of say or control of the machinations and natural laws (e.g. biochemical, sociological) of our planet. They were really given partial power to “take part in” the creation of the earth. And likewise, humanity was given a similar opportunity. We could pass along “good genes” as it were, or a good influence (“influence” may be applied as broadly as imaginable for my purposes) or, corrupt both ourselves and the bodies/psyche’s that would thenceforth come into being.

In terms of determinism’s empirical case for the existence of evil. What is its answer to why evil exists? I hate to belabor the point, but I have not yet seen it answered and don’t believe it can be. If God determines all, where does evil come from?

And does evidence seem weak concerning “we actually do choose contrary to all the influences that shape us”? Is this not just the sort of question begging and “illusion” that may be present in the assertion of free will? But I think your objection rests on a misunderstanding which I will now try to clarify.

Libertarianism does not imply that a choice is made without an influence. In fact, without influence, no choice could even be made at all. There would be nothing for it to “act on”. There may certainly be *different *influences, each of which act on the “choosing part”, which I will call “me”. The only piece of the whole event called a “free choice” which is not bound up with a material, or you could say deterministic, causative chain is the choice made by me. Such a choice takes place in the midst of outside, deterministic influences. Indeed without them choice itself would be impossible.

What really needs to be lain down or explained in a free will theodicy is why it is so important or for what reason it is given. I think it totally mistaken to say that it was given so that we could “pass the test” of having faith, believing in God, doing good works, etc. This whole notion is wrong-headed. I believe the purpose we have free will almost has nothing to do with our relation to God - odd as it may sound. I believe it is all about our becoming or, as it were, our causing, Good. I think God wants us to be true, live, real causes of Goodness. We are to become like him. Thus, as shocking as it may sound, I think such examples of “sweet necessity”, such as Lewis’ “compelled” decision to believe in God, are acts which, in their own way, do not have certain qualities which God really wants from - indeed ultimately demands of - us. Do you believe Lewis would say his journey of becoming like Jesus ended - or was even very much impacted - at that particular moment? What battle, so to speak, is won in such moments?

Because if God did only want those moments, why would sin ever occur? That is the real problem with determinism and irresistible grace. If God could guarantee that all persons would always see clearly enough to choose the good, why would he not always give them this light? If you go down this road you eventually must conclude that somehow God wants or needs evil in his creation. He is metaphysically dependent on it, either for his own happiness or for the maximum possible good to exist. But I don’t believe this. I think evil is pure privation. I think God exists in himself in unapproachable light, sheer and utter goodness, without any darkness or any evil in him at all.

Determinists want to say that God must have evil so that he can bring about a greater good. But I think this is wrong, for reasons above. Rather, God brings about good in spite of evil. The two notions are diametrically opposed. In the first case, God needs evil and wills it; in the second, he may will its possibility, but he in no way wills its occurrence, and neither does he need it. Yet, if indeed it comes about, he will - in spite of it, but not because of it - bring forth good.

If you really take your example regarding our necessarily needing to experience pain and sin in order to be “taught” or “educated” to pieces, it amounts to saying that the type of world God had to create was one in which evil was necessary. But again, metaphysically speaking, what does this say about his asiety, his perfection, his absolute goodness? Why does an all-good God need evil in his creation to bring forth all good? What standard is he appealing to? It cannot be anything outside himself, or that would be God. But if he’s appealing to himself, what part of God has to behold evil in order to enjoy perfect goodness? What gives, his omnipotence or his goodness? I don’t believe either has to.

Now, in terms of God being more than involved in the preservation of evil, I’ll say this. I do not believe God created a universe in which he knew evil was “inevitable”. I do not believe God can know free willed actions before they happen. Of course, I think he knew all the different possibilities of what may happen, and he thought the universe was still worth creating, even granting that. But this is very different from saying he intended to create a world he knew would be evil, from his own doing at that, which he could have prevented (as he does with some when he overwhelms them with grace and they do not sin.)

Back quickly to free will. The type of conditions necessary, I believe, for us to actually be and do good are such that we cannot be determined by influences regarding our actions. What I mean is, for the particular type of moral act that God is concerned about, there must be enough “epistemic space” for us to make either a right or wrong decision. In other words, our mere intellects cannot be given such information that determines our wills. That sort of robotic, computational process is not the only type of act of ours that God cares for. Where does our willing towards goodness come in? I well concede that all day long we operate in such a way where our intellects do determine our wills (and I believe many conversions, such as perhaps Lewis’, are in this boat), but, concerning the particular kind of choice that God finds valuable, we must exist in such a state where the ambiguity of the world allows our sheer will to operate and bring forth its own fruit.

Do we value such acts? (Again, not all acts are like this, nor need they be; but they do, I believe, exist to bring forth a creation otherwise impossible.) Well, to be honest, I think we do. Ask yourself, if you could put a computer chip in a loved one’s brain and they always did exactly what you wanted them to do, and if, indeed, it became impossible for them to ever do anything contrary to your desire, would you do this? And all of this is simply because *you *put the chip there to make them be such a way, not because they’ve become that sort of person. If you would not, why wouldn’t you?

So to comment on Cindy’s example. It is interesting - but I do not think it really meets the criteria for the type of act required in a free will theodicy. The very type of act is such that it cannot be irresistibly “seen” by the intellect as something that must be done. Or, it may be better to say that though the mind sees something as “inescapably right” - we would call this conscience or God’s voice - the will must still come along and confirm such a thing by reaching out to it. There must always be enough “room”, as it were, to do the opposite act (Lewis even says exactly this in a letter of his I can reproduce.) Why is this? Because the conditions must be such that we are the ones that are ourselves becoming like Jesus, becoming Godly. I do not think God would be satisfied with anything less. MacDonald speaks many places about the “rags” of imputed righteousness, and how they can’t be pleasing to a God who wants more than anything to behold his sons and daughters actually being like him. And elsewhere he says we have no hope in being made good, we must become it.

But, as I always say, Alas! the distance from the light!

#36

Interesting thoughts Tom.

It would seem to me bizzarre, irrelevant, incorrect, to therefore suggest that these people, who are not free in the sense you mean, are therefore either “robots” or are being “forced”. – Which are two things free will theists insist God will not tolerate. How then can we say they are not free, yet also not determined robots??

If we include in our definition of freedom that being free means we will do what we want to do, then God’s primary task in saving us might be seen as getting us to want to do the right thing – not so much making sure we have other options. The process of being saved then is the process of learning to desire what God also desires. So the caring mother/honest banker, in a very real sense, don’t even have the option of doing otherwise, yet they are acting in ways they want to act, and so are free.

Might this mean that God can not be charged with violating our freedom if He creates – de novo – a desire within us to love/do the right thing?? If so, that’d be great for UR … wouldn’t it?? But I’m not quite sure this is allowable for God. Is he allowed to “compel” desire, but not compell love?? Again, not sure.

I’ve always found it befuddling to hear free will advocates say things like “God allows us to use our freedom to choose to obliterate our freedom…” Huh?? What kind of freedom is it that invalidates itself??

Anyway, I’m not quite sure what conclusions we can legitimately draw from all this… but that’s why we’re here talking I guess!!!

Bobx3

#37

Thanks for the warm welcome, Bob. You wrote:

You are right, of course, that all of us who accept the biblical idea of universal reconciliation need to work on how better to explain our position to our Arminian brothers and sisters. But cheer up, Bob. So far as I can tell, no free will theist has even come close to giving an adequate account of what it means to act freely. Here is a point that I make in my entry on universalism for the Oxford Handbook of Eschatology

One way to illustrate the need for a more complete and more plausible analysis of freedom is to reflect upon the freedom of God. If, as we read in Titus 1:2, God cannot lie; and if it is logically impossible that he should ever act in an unloving way or should ever act unjustly, does it follow that he is somehow in bondage to his own nature?–or that actions springing from the necessity of his own nature are somehow less than perfectly free?–or that he is not morally praiseworthy for excellences he could not help having?–or that he is like a robot in relation to these excellences? None of this follows, I believe, given a more adequate understanding of what it means to act freely. But more on that later.

Thanks again for the welcome.

-Tom

P.S. I wrote the above in my word processor and posted it before reading your own latest post. So I now use the editing function to add this postscript. Suffice it to say, because I am now short on time, that God can predestine each of us to a glorious end, as I see it, without causally determining our individual choices. In the extreme case of the most hardened sinners, he need only permit them to experience the very life apart from him that they have freely (albeit confusedly) chosen for themselves. In fact, as surprising as it may at first seem, it is a free will theodicy of hell, not universalism, that requires that God interfere with human freedom in inappropriate ways. For a brief argument to this effect, see section 4.2 of my entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which is available at the following URL:

plato.stanford.edu/entries/heaven-hell/

I will, of course, welcome anyone’s comments on that argument.

#38

I think I could make a case for finite free will, or the Free Will Enough defense - which is not something an analytic philosopher would tolerate. :smiley:

What I cannot make a case for is infinite free will, or determinism - the extremes on either side of the spectrum.
What if, as Wittgenstein said, we “Don’t THINK, LOOK!?”

As I look around at folks making choices, some things are clear. For instance, people cannot make choices based on insufficient information. Take health care - please :smiley: - obviously one cannot make a free choice of something one is not aware of. This has been mentioned before. We are finite and cannot know all the choices.
Hardly earth-shaking, I agree. Suppose though we consider a young girl who has been abused by men, men who were important in her life, who should have been giving her guidance into wholeness and female-ness (?). The probability is very high that when it comes to future choices of trusting or not trusting men, there will be an option she does NOT see - that men can be trustworthy - and is therefore not ‘free’ to make the choice to trust, and may often lead to destructive lifestyles.
We might shake our heads and say ‘the poor thing never had a chance’ or maybe 'yes, yes, she had it rough, but that is no excuse for her tramping around." (Said with a hard expression).
Compassion would make me want to express the first response above - compassion and may I add, personal experience and that of people close to me as well. If someone brought up: “She just needs to show a little will power” we might answer “How? She is not able to see the choice. Were you there when she was repeatedly abused, made to feel insignificant, like dog poo perhaps? Did you feel the shame, the guilt, the life-sucking lamia that drained her of a precious part of what it is to be human?”
What would be the reason for the second, judgmental response? if I may make a guess, it would be that there is a lack of understanding that ‘freedom’ IS a spectrum, and some people are pushed way along, one way or the other, by ideology or experience - ‘influences’ if you will.

Well we are all smart people here, so I don’t need to blather on, other than to say that, if we locate ourselves at either radical end of the spectrum, we are very liable to JUDGE others. To not walk a mile in their moccasins. To not see life through their eyes.
At the end of Pilgrim’s Regress, two pilgrims are told that, for real maturity, they must take two different roads - the one pilgrim, a very legalistic type, had to be softened; the other needed to slay dragons and be toughened. It was hard for both of them. It’s hard for us, because we are each oriented a certain way - by our ‘influences’ - and to be balanced and compassionate, we are often put on a difficult path - part of GMac’s theodicy, I think. :smiley:

#39

I wonder . . . are we mixed up on this topic because we have the idea that freedom means freedom to do absolutely anything we’re capable of doing at any time? The thing is, that sort of freedom describes the torture of the mentally deranged, the disorganization and death of a wilderness, the wild reproduction, immaturity and unpredictability of a cancer. This sort of freedom DOES lead to death.

A person who obeys his every whim and does all his heart desires, unresponsive to any outside influence, will live in constant torment. He’ll be socially isolated, impoverished, and probably physically ill. If our bodies’ cells did this, we’d be dead in moments. If the universe behaved in a completely “free” (ie: random) manner, it would not exist. Because of the organized (and yet free) dance of the universe around us, an individual person can survive for a time in a state of complete psychic disorganization. He’ll end up in a mental hospital if he’s lucky, a prison if less so, or soon he’ll be dead. Neither society nor the world can tolerate this kind of freedom for more than a very brief time.

We have this romantic idea that wilderness is beautiful and full of life and natural and perfect as it is. As a person who lives in what is more or less a wilderness, I beg to differ. Wilderness means things go in their own way, fighting with one another for survival. One sort of plant (Ponderosa Pine in our case) overgrows all the other plants to the point of excluding almost anything other than itself. As a consequence, whole forests die from unchecked infestations and thorns grow up in their place. Populations of animals ebb and flow in a constant battle between predators and prey, with disease and depredation as a wild card. There is great beauty here, but the beauty is in the organization, and the organized things are the healthy things. Mankind was deputized to keep the garden, which essentially means to introduce organization, to keep all things in balance with one another and in a state of health and optimum well-being. Which of these states is truly freedom? Only the garden offers a space for genuine freedom, for all the plants and animals to thrive and live in peace with one another. The other way – the way of libertarianism – is the way of chaos and death. If all the residents live according to a higher nature, that is, in love toward one another (not the letter), then the garden thrives.

Cancer occurs when cells grow and reproduce out of control – in a disorganized fashion. They never mature, but continue to grow and stack up one on another on another in a chaotic mass which is, in itself, extremely viable – until it kills its host. Are the cells free to do as they will? Maybe – at least they’re free to do what’s in their nature. What they “will” is to garnish all the resources of the body to feed their wildly reproductive nature. The problem is, that they’re broken. But they’re doing what they will, as broken things. Is this freedom? Is this the sort of freedom Father wants for us? WE are broken. We’re following the will of a broken nature.

When we die with Christ, we leave behind that broken nature, that unchecked chaotic wilderness, that deranged and disorganized mind. All these things are bondage. What I think is that He’s lifting us up into the next stage of our development (evolution, if you like) from the merely physical plane into a new freedom. As we are naturally, we’re confined to the physical, but when we die with Christ and are raised with Him, we add the spiritual dimension; we become new creatures, learning to live in the life of God, in the dimension of the spirit, rather than merely in the life of the flesh. In our new level of life, we no longer desire to do the things that lead to death. Does that mean we’re not free? I suppose you could look at it like that, but in truth, I think it means we enter a freedom the like of which we can’t yet fully comprehend. We enter life. That does mean organization as opposed to chaos, and maybe in our present state we see that as somewhat restricting. I don’t think we’ll see it that way for long though.

A child who learns to keep his bedroom clean and tidy is free to enjoy his room far more than a child who has to climb over piles of toys and dirty clothes to get to a bed he must first clear of books and candy wrappers, more toys and more dirty clothes before he can relax with his new magazine. We tend to resist this kind of freedom. It doesn’t follow that organized freedom is any form of bondage. In fact, it is maturation (which you remember cancer cells never experience), and keeping the garden so that it fills with life rather than death, and finding true mental stability and peace. It is, I believe, becoming the adult sons and daughters of God – His representatives in the physical universe who have become fit to orchestrate the Kingdom of Light in the realm of disappearing darkness.

#40

Chrisguy,

This thread is indeed full of rich ideas, and blessed with Tom (and Bobx3)'s especially profound reflections on the nature of our ‘will.’ I can now only barely chew on your own challenging contribution.

You suggest that “evil wills” are “the source of evil,” because “angelic powers” were “given” “control of the natural laws of our planet.” But I don’t see how other “powers” causing evil relieves God of all responsibility, or would be more comfortable than determinists’ admission that evil comes from what God set up (Would Job or Paul feel better toward God in that the work of Satan’s ‘thorns in the flesh’ in their lives were only indirectly administered (or ‘permitted’) by God?) You do assert evil was not (metaphysically) “necessary” or “inevitable,” but was “worth it” as an “unintended” risk or possibility. But I don’t see how that would appreciably improve my sense of God’s character. And my own classical supposition that God well knows what his design sets up, means even less comfort is provided by such theoretical distance.

Yes, I knew that you see the decisive ‘influence’ in our actions is not the usual external determinants, but your own “choosing part.” I just don’t see that the evidence supports that belief.

I too do sense that God values our “becoming Good.” Rather than instantaneously programing us to righteousness, going through a process of becoming who we are meant to be appears essential to becoming genuinely conscious persons who are distinct from God. Yet it’s not clear that the incredible ability you believe we have follows from this. You conclude that God mustn’t find “many conversions” “valuable,” since they are “robotic,” and “ambiguity” is the key to moral acts that God really wants. I agree that ‘choices’ where we feel torn can be used to wonderfully develop us, but actually wonder if God is not especially magnified when we are so clear about is good, that it’s no longer a hard call at all. I want to recognize that our ‘participation’ is somehow vital in experiencing what God pursues. But when you say that “we are the ones that are ourselves becoming like Jesus,” it seems to imply more personal credit for even my paltry sanctification than I seem to deserve. My impression is that there are mysterious and challenging tensions here that are difficult to keep in balance.
’

#41

Lots of good contributions here. I think Cindy raised a very salient point.
The point I wanted to make above is that ‘the will’ is a concept we use to describe behavior; it is shorthand for a process, not a description of a thing. We can LOOk, not think metaphysically, and SEE what people do, and can even understand the ‘why’ of their activities, and this will provide us plenty of material to flesh out the concept.

If you are a Cartesian dualist, perhaps you won’t agree (and you may have other reasons not to agree as well). But if you think holistically, you would see that focusing on a separate entity called ‘the will’ is a severe form of reductionism. The will is ‘me’ - and I am ‘built on’ material ‘stuff’ - my mind does not operate without a blood flow, cellular communication, organs working more or less as they should - in fact, if those things fail, “I” cannot think or love or act - or choose - at all. So, in some way, unless dualism is correct, even the state of our physical bodies - and that includes neural pathways - is ‘me’.

I like Paidion’s definition of free will just fine; my difference is, that I don’t think we have that kind of free will. We can observe that for ourselves, a phenomenology of will, so to speak; and this would keep us from reifying the concept ‘will’ into a concrete reality.

I believe we are a subtle blend of deterministic behavior AND a power to make meaningful decisions. I think if you look at concrete human beings and their actions, that blend is obvious. Trying to articulate it, not so much. :smiley:

#42

Dave B, it seems that we share some similar insights (or confusions) :slight_smile:

#43

:smiley:

#44

Bob,

Thanks as always for a stimulating reply. I don’t have much time right now (an exam tomorrow!) but do want to offer my reflections. I am really enjoying our exchange!

Yes, I did offer the suggestion that higher beings played some role in the corruption of our world. I offer it of course only as an hypothesis. You say this doesn’t provide you with a God more trustworthy/good than one in which directly caused evil. Perhaps the line between permission and causation is blurred and they mean the same thing, you seem to suggest. But it seems to me that by having the buffer of other free agents, this does in fact relieve God of some responsibility regarding the existence of evil. The alternative is that all evil is directly caused by God himself, rather than simply permitted for some higher end. A determinist is committed to believing that God actively caused the Holocaust, for instance. But why? That is the question! Why did he cause it? A free will theodicy at least offers some sort of possibility. I would be happy to hear an alternative. Perhaps there is some higher end for which he caused it, but I’m not sure that makes sense, for reasons I’ve given before (why does God need evil in his creation? How does evil come forth from the all-and-only good? Does admitting that God causes evil actually destroy the notion of evil altogether? What greater good makes it necessary for such an horrendous thing to occur? The whole idea that evil must be necessary for good seems backwards - e.g. would I have to cheat on my wife for us to have a better marriage?)

Perhaps I am mistaken in everything I’ve said. But what is your explanation for the state of the world and the existence of evil? Do you believe in angels/demons? I really feel a sense of one sided criticism here. It’s not as if free will theists choose this theodicy because they see no problems with it at all. Rather, how else do you answer the questions that are demanded of any theodicy? Where is the determinists engagement of the actual problem of evil? All I see, from many of them, is a wave of the hand in dismissal because the concept of free will is “vague”. But the state of the problem has not been advanced one inch. So, directly, I pose the question: where does evil come from if we don’t have free will?

Now, I do really sympathize with many of your points. In particular, the freedom you (and Dr. Talbott) talk about in reference to doing good acts totally free of any inclination to sin. This point is particularly powerful to me due to a certain amount of psychological torment - which has indeed reached levels of anguish, I must say - I have suffered. Is not a truly free act one in which we’re unfettered, as it were, by evil impulses, feelings, pain, etc.? Isn’t a free act one in which we are fully informed of all the consequences that will result of our action? I can really sympathize here.

In fact, I have at one time believed that the purpose of free will was not to “love” or “become godly”, but rather that it was necessary for us to experience the idea of “causation” and our own consciousness. I argued that it would be impossible to understand the term “cause” unless we had causative ability (free will) at some point, and likewise this free will is what gives rise to the notion of “myself” over and against an objective universe and/or persons.

I am not totally against this idea. It does jive very well with my sense of overwhelming grace and the sort of psychological state that allows “free” acts, in the sense of being unimpeded by evil/painful forces, to occur. If that is the case, free will is indeed a necessary part of creation, but not because without it people cannot be loving or good or believers. Rather, it would be necessary in order for us to formulate certain concepts in our minds otherwise impossible, such as: myself, other, and causation. I am still interested in pursuing this line of reasoning, because I do believe free will is essential to an answer to where evil comes from. I am not so sure where it fits elsewhere in my belief system. I certainly sympathize with you regarding my own growth and maturity. I often feel very strongly not that I personally have overcome my own weakness, but rather I’ve simply been “delivered” from such sufferings.

If you’re interested, here is a post I made a while back which fleshes out this idea - that is, of free will serving as an explanation of evil, what it’s purpose is and how it plays no part in salvation or perfection.

Thanks again,
Chris

#45

Chris,

Thanks, I’m retired and appreciate what you squeeze in amid studies! I too enjoy this dialogue that provides scrutiny for my own very uncertain and tentative instincts here. I’m blessed by how you wrestle with such a challenging subject. To be healthy, I find that we mustn’t be paralyzed by the feeling that we can’t make good choices. And the struggle to do right doesn’t seem like a charade to me, even though contradictorily, my questioning of our ability sounds like that.

But you’re right, I’m skeptical that an omnipotent God “indirectly” ‘signing off’ on evil protects him much from sharing responsibility. I suspect that simply blaming ‘Satan’ et al for evil to genuinely isolate God from it would require a real but problematic dualism. Otherwise, great difficulty remains here. As I’ve said, a scripted determinism needn’t be the alternative reality. Yet it seems that we find our self in an existence where evil can be recognized as at least indirectly inevitable.

I agree that where I’ve pushed seems to troublingly diminish the very concept of ‘evil.’ But “cause” is a tricky word. So when you say, God surely wouldn’t “cause Evil for some higher purpose,” I suspect you see the high value of freedom as what makes having evil worth it (i.e. God sees a need for that in his creation, and that effectively means that there will be evil). In that case, it seems that we’re just quibbling about what higher purpose warrants evil, and this creation where it seems inevitable.

You just want a satisfactory explanation of evil!!! But That is THE challenge for theism (I often think the only huge one) that great minds have struggled to satisfy!!! One has to appreciate here the attraction of process theism (which at least coherently gets god off the hook), and perhaps join the host who aren’t sure what could make having such evil be worth it.

As you’re aware, Talbott seems to reflect much on these questions, though I don’t think I’m able to comprehend all he says. As I’ve alluded, I suspect the more determinist alternative lies in the direction that forming genuine persons of character distinct from God can’t happen by just programming them to know nothing but the divine instinct (what you call “our own consciousness” and reflect on in your attached “faces” post), rather than the kind of character development that is possible living in an inevitable mixture of good and bad (whether the bad is conceived of as a direct or indirect result).

Grace be with you,
Bob

#46

Thanks for including this, Tom. This is exactly what I was thinking about as I was reading through the thread. As discussed in later posts, I think many of us likely have a fundamental misunderstanding of what “free” really means in the context of this discussion.