The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Open Theism and the Origin of Sin

Jason: Roughly speaking, the point to “closed” theism is that God certainly knows all historical facts as well as all potentialities and probabilities. The point to “open” theism, very roughly speaking, is that God doesn’t certainly know all historical facts.

Tom: As Arabs say when they get excited out here in Iraq, “Habibi, La! La!” (Darling, no! No!).

No published open theist I know (and I think I know them all) denies God’s knowledge of historical facts. It’s future facts—if what’s meant by this is what will or will not occur in the future—that’s the issue. And it’s a matter of debate whether traditional theists (or non-open theists in this case) grant that God ever ‘knows’ probabilities of future contingencies. Since he knows the future exclusively in terms of “this shall” and “that shall not” occur, probabilities all reduce to 1 (“will occur”) or 0 (“will not occur”). Open theists are almost always the only one’s talking about “objective probabilities” (of greater than 0 and less than 1) regarding future events.

Jason: (A criticism that looks borne out when some o’theists end up going the distance and becoming process theologians: promoting a type of naturalistic theology with a number of subcategories, where God is actually the system of Nature in a process of being/becoming deity.)

Tom: Process theism. Bad. Bad process theism. ;o)

Tom

While I agree that the terms of the debate tend to focus on this, I think at bottom the issue is on of the ontology of God: is God such that He has to force effects in order to be certain of His knowledge of them?

While neither open theists or closed theists (or non-open, which is like closed except different except not :wink: --which is why I just say ‘closed’) have to go with that idea of God, weirdly both sides often do.

I say ‘weirdly’ because both sides are usually also trying to affirm supernaturalistic theism (though open theists are more likely to openly chunk that); and the notion that God would have to force effects Himself in order to certainly know what those events are, is quite antithetical to supernaturalistic theism (including trinitarian theism–which both sides are also usually trying to affirm, when they’re Christian. Jewish, Muslim, deist and unitarian Christian debators on the topic obviously wouldn’t care about that.)

I never said any open theist did deny God’s knowledge of ‘historical facts’ simpliciter, including in the quote you quoted. Read again. :wink: In that quote I said “ALL” historical facts. And went on to detail that the debate is about whether God knows future facts (not just present actualities).

Thank you both for your explanations - it all makes a bit more sense to me now except for…

I have not the first notion of what that means :mrgreen: but I may use it in a sig somewhere…

Hi Jason-

I have some off time today so I’m gorging out with online friends!

Jason: Both sides are usually also trying to affirm supernaturalistic theism (though open theists are more likely to openly chunk that)…

Tom: You may be lumping open theists in together with panentheists and process theists. Just running through the open theists I know, they all believe God can and does intervene miraculously (to reveal, call, heal, judge, and otherwise kick the furniture over). Unless you have something in mind by “supernatural” other than the belief that God can perform miracles, I can’t think of a single open theist I know who doesn’t believe God can so intervene. So if the truth be told, open theists are far more likely to reject this aspect of process theism.

Jason: I never said any open theist did deny God’s knowledge of ‘historical facts’ simpliciter, including in the quote you quoted. Read again. In that quote I said “ALL” historical facts. And went on to detail that the debate is about whether God knows future facts (not just present actualities).

Tom: But “future facts” are not “historical facts.” Historical facts are truths (or facts) about the past, at least that’s how the term is employed in the debates. So looking at your comment…

The point to “open” theism…is that God doesn’t certainly know all historical facts

…I’d still disagree. Open theists do believe God knows all historical facts. That is, there are no historical facts open theists would claim that God does not know. If you’re using “historical facts” to cover facts about the past, present, and future of all history, then you’re using it differently than I’m used to running into it in the published debates about all this. But nobody’s got a corner on how terms have to be used! ;o) Anyhow, I think I’m following you know.

Tom

TGB - If the open theist believes that God can act miraculously within nature - how does that God know that any action he performs mightn’t result in evil (e.g. cures a terminally ill person who goes on to murder)?

Jeff: TGB - If the open theist believes that God can act miraculously within nature - how does that God know that any action he performs mightn’t result in evil (e.g. cures a terminally ill person who goes on to murder)?

Tom: He knows that it might and that it might not result in evil. Both futures are possible. Healed people can and do go on to bring great blessing/beauty and/or evil into the world all the time. But that’s not to lay the blame for any subsequent murder healed people commit at God’s feet. I mean, we could say the same thing about God’s choice to create at all. That’s a free choice God didn’t have to make. But he chose to create. Let’s ask your question of this scenario too. How’s God know that this action (creation) he performs might not result in evil? Well, God very well might have known (I think he had to know) that evil would certainly arise eventually. So God acts (creates) in this case knowing evil will indirectly arise from his action.

We freely have kids we don’t have to have all the while knowing they’ll commit sin and harm others to some extent. Yet we perform this action (having kids) knowing evil will surely arise! Are we justified in having kids? I think so. Why? We do so because we believe love is worth the risk.

I sense there’s something more behind your question, Jeff, and that I’m not getting it. If I need to explain myself better I’ll try.

Tom

No - I think it’s my inability to clearly express my thoughts here.

Perhaps a better way of putting it would be - If God doesn’t know the future then he can’t know that his own interventions in nature will always be good (or have beneficial results if you will). As a doubter of course I have a lot of sympathy with your comment that doubt could be cast on the wisdom of creating at all if it leads to any kind of evil whatsoever.

Jeff: Perhaps a better way of putting it would be - If God doesn’t know the future then he can’t know that his own interventions in nature will always be good (or have beneficial results if you will).

Tom: Yeah, that’s kinda what I thought was going on. And the answer is the same—God doesn’t always know that his interventions will yield exactly the goods he desires. God doesn’t always get what God wants. Sometimes God can act in the world with a view to bringing about certain goods and flat out fail to achieve those goods if…IF…God has determined that those goods also depend upon wills other than God’s will.

Open theists often speak of God’s knowlegde of the future in terms of a branching future, like a tree with a single truck that spreads out into multiple branches. From any present moment, the future will branch out accordingly. It might go this way, might go that way; if that way, it might THEN go this or that way, etc. The future possibilities might be near infinite. God knows them all, contemplates them all, and is resourceful enough to be prefectly prepared for any one. We laughingly say that open theists don’t believe God ‘underknows’ the future, we believe he ‘overknows’ it.

Of course, God can SOMETIMES guarantee outcomes even when having to face contingencies over which he has no determining control. Like playing Kasparov in a game of chess. Kasparov doesn’t know or determine your moves, but is there really any doubt in our minds who will win if Kasparov is playing somebody average like me? None at all. There are a million different ways God may win. And he doesn’t have to have a printout of the whole game upon which to base his moves (that would be impossible anyway, though some imagine it to be so). Sometimes Kasparov can predict which move you’ll make if you’re cornered with just one option. Sometimes he’ll know all the contingencies so well he can predict, “Hey, no matter what moves you make, it’s check-mate in 12 moves. Period.” But sometimes the board really IS open, and Kasparov won’t ALWAYS get what he wants. He may lose a few pieces. He may have to sacrifice a few pieces…all because he’s playing a REAL opponent who has REAL “say-so” about how the play is determined.

Fixed goals (Kasparov wins; all are saved), open routes (could happen this way, that way, any ole way…dudn’t matter; God’s foreknows all the possibilities and is prepared for whatever; bring it on).

Tom

OK - I shall have to digest that :smiley:

One thing that always puzzles me is that if God is eternal and not bound by time, why, from his perspective, is there a future for him to not know about? Doesn’t he ‘see’ all the states of the universe superimposed on one another simultaneously (effectively knowing the ‘future that did/will happen’).

If God has incomplete knowledge of future events which he subsequently gets to know because the future events eventually happen then God has changed - by now having knowledge that he did not previously have. But God is static and eternal and cannot change state or else he becomes different (by the addition of knowledge) than he was (but there is no was in eternity)

Excuse the muddled thinking but this always messes with my head :smiley: .

Jeff-

It’s a whole set of complex issues. Take your time! But in the end the open theist says good-bye to divine timelessness and the ‘static’ sort of immutability that locks God into being unable to experience changing states of mind and/or emotion. We (open viewers) unanimously reject the proposition that God is timeless or exists “outside of time” or “above” our temporal world so that he has simultaneous access to every temporal location along our timeline which informs him of all our free choices.

We’ll never have enough time to discuss (and probably shouldn’t, I don’t want to advertise open theism or press it on a site that’s not dedicated to it) all the reasons why divine timelessness ought to be left behind.


But I will say this…to get back to universalism and freedom. The reason open theism is thought so often to be incompatible with universalism is because (a) open theists insist that ‘love requires freedom’, that is, agents must exercise libertarian free will in embracing the life of the age to come, and (b) free choices cannot be foreknown in their resolved state (i.e., God cannot foreknow which options will actualize). So if God can’t ‘know’ the future free choices of agents and agents have to exercise libertarian freedom to pass into the life of the age to come, then (so the argument goes) God cannot ‘know’ that all ‘will’ freely choose God and be saved. So open theists can’t be universalists. Keith DeRose offered this very argument over at Prosblogion some time ago (prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2006/06/keith_derose_un.html).

I think the bite of this argument is only apparent. I agree with DeRose, if eternal life can only be had through libertarian choice (on some level, let’s say), then it’s true—we can’t get a strict, mathematically defined probability of 1 for the eventual salvation of all. An open theist would have to admit, “Well, yeah, I can’t say with absolute certainty that God knows all will make the right libertarian choice eventually.” But is this really that big a deal? If Reitan’s shoe-box analogy is appropriate, then you can get an incalculably high percentage for eventual libertarian outcomes; so high that talk of qualifying “all WILL be saved” with “all MIGHT NOT be saved” borders on insanity (on the far side of the border!). If I can’t say “with probability of 1” all will be saved, what’s the real probability (given unfailing love, unending time, and the impossibility of irrevocably choosing hell)? Let’s say it’s a decimal point followed by enough zeros to run to the edge of the universe and back followed by a 9. So if somebody wanted to get ‘technical’ they could challenge the open theist’s claim to believe that all will eventually be saved. OK. I give. I believe all will eventually freely choose with a probability of .999999 (…to the edge of the universe and back). I can live with that. I have more reason to believe that a box of Scrabble letters tossed from the Eifel Tower will fall to the ground and form Psalm 23 (100 times in a row) than I do to believe that even one soul will continue throughout unending time to reject God’s offer.

That’s the best I can do without TomT’s trump card. TomT can be more confident that I can be (within that tiny space between his 1 and my .9999999999999-to the edge of the universe and back) because in his view God can play that trump card and get exactly the response he wants from us WHEN he wants it. In my view God HAS to wait for it.

Tom

Assuming TomB is correctly interpreting TomT, then I [mostly] agree with TomB while I’m a Closed Theist and an Arminian. [For example, I strongly doubt that anybody would continuously reject the love of the Lord literally forever.]

Thanks for that Tom - That has made a whole heap of sense of the paradoxical position I was describing :smiley: .

:laughing:

I’m using a spatial metaphor to try to get across a difficult conceptual notion. Do you know how electrical fields and magnetic fields generate each other at right angles to one another? A similar metaphor.

Consider the following sentence:

“At the moment of choice between aspiration and mere ambition—she chose ambition.”

(That’s from CoJ, by the way. Plug, plug, etc. :mrgreen: )

This is a fictional character who doesn’t personally exist and so ‘who’ isn’t really ‘choosing’ anything. But it could be a description of an actually existent person, too. It succinctly describes an action she chooses to take and the circumstances in which she chooses to take one action instead of another. Also, despite some thematic complexity, it’s a relatively short sentence. Many readers (hopefully you, too, or this principle illustration won’t work very well…! :laughing: ) should be able to keep the whole sentence ‘in view’ at once.

The reader, being non-omniscient, still has to ‘read’ it in a linear fashion at least once of course. But once you’ve read it and gotten a basic grasp of what the sentence is describing, you should be able to go away for a minute and then, coming back, see the sentence itself as a unity: this ‘shape’ represents ‘these meanings’. You shouldn’t have to read it again linearly; you could in fact spot-read pieces of it in any order, maybe focusing on particular portions for consideration of ideas.

If you’ve gotten to that point, you’re approaching (in our limited derivative fashion) how the ultimate Independent Fact if it is actively sentient (i.e. if the IF is God), transcendent of natural history, can view all history. You’re acting (in a spatial metaphor) perpendicular to the bit of ‘history’ that you’re contemplating.

I can actually borrow a similar illustration from earlier in CoJ, in regard to the perceptions of that same character. Portunista is using a special type of sight to try to understand a highly complex piece of circuity which constitutes a whole large map of a valley inscribed into a ceiling.

"]Where to begin?

She didn’t have the faintest clue.

So, she tried to get a simple feel, for its shape in total.

She tilted her head, deep in thought. How peculiar—now she seemed to be looking down on the valley from high above. The trees and streams and contours all were there; there were the ridges and mountains, too; there was the Tower. But, it wasn’t like looking at any map, or even seeing it like a bird.

It was…like feeling every tree and shape, in detail, all at once. She didn’t have to move her focus here or there. All the map, all the sigil, twenty-four paces across or more, seemed to be one point—a point with the strength of a unity.

Was this…how the Eye beheld the whole world…?

One difference is that God would not have to read it linearly to start with. He would always be acting perpendicularly to it in His understanding of it. Similarly, the whole system would exist (as my sentence there does not, by the way) in continual dependence upon His creation of the system, not even as a mere temporal fact (in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth), but constantly at every point of its existence.

“Point” is a good word because there’s an interesting confluence there between geometry and quantum physics. A “point” in geometry is a limited non-spatial existence. It has zero physical dimensions, yet nevertheless exists. But it only exists due to the intention of something positing it into existence.

A ‘point’ that Portunista perceives, by the way, to her own annoyance… :wink:

"]I preferred to be a fortress to myself. To be, instead, invested in another’s value, left me open to attack!

And yet, I still could taste the fear I’d felt: when I had seen that a point, itself, has no true strength. A single point can’t even claim existence!—except by postulation, by the grace, of something other than that point.

Which, not incidentally, is a main reason why she chooses ambition instead of aspiration in that key sentence above.

Anyway, if you can see that shorter sentence up there all at once and hold an understanding of its meaning all at once (or as close to ‘all at once’ as a non-omniscient creature like ourselves can do), then you are actively perceiving at ‘right angles’ (so to speak) to the ‘reality’ of the sentence.

And if you have authorship authority, you can add things to the sentence, making your own contribution to the shape of it. As merely human authors we can only do this within our own linear history, but the ‘history’ of the written work both does and does not necessarily correspond to our linear history: it does in the sense of being part of our linear history, but I can hop back and forth in the story introducing effects as I choose and so creating and altering the shape of the whole–which, depending on how competent I am as an author, I am hopefully able to keep sufficiently in mind at any given time! (When I do not, I generate compositional and thematic problems.)

But my fictional history isn’t real; and the persons are not real persons. Yet in principle I could interact with a real (though subordinate) history with real persons in much the same way. (Certain Christological theories involve the Incarnate 2nd Person interacting with ‘past history’ relative to the Incarnation in such a way: it is in fact the Incarnate Son acting as the Visible YHWH eating dinner with Abraham, for example, or sitting under a tree talking to Gideon, or speaking with Moses “as a man speaketh to a friend”–even though in terms of this natural history, the Incarnation itself “hasn’t happened yet”.)

Not lumping them together, exactly; I know open theists (per se) are not process theists (per se). Just noting that open theists are more likely to move into some kind of naturalistic theism than closed theists are, at least here in the West. In Eastern religions, pantheism tends to be very deterministic by contrast. Even so, closed theists in the West don’t seem to move very often into deterministic pantheism. I’m not entirely sure why. Possibly their tendency to chunk ‘human reasoning’ in order to protect divine revelation–and notice how this is consonant with their tendency to minimize or chunk human free will to protect divine omnipotence and especially omniscience–in favor of systemic presuppositionalism, guards them from following out the logical corollaries of trying to claim that God can only ensure His certain knowledge of all events by dictating them Himself deterministically.

I am doubtful that open theists are “far more likely to reject” the aspect of process theism where God doesn’t intervene, compared to closed theists. Or are you aware of that many more closed theists than open theists who minimize the amount of action being taken by God in history?

I would think it is obvious that a side of theology which tends, if anything, toward divine determinism would be less likely to minimize the actions of God in history than a side of theology trying to protect human free will against divine determinism. I certainly have never run into any evidence myself that closed theists are more likely to trend into process theism than open theists.

Obviously, insofar as open theists still insist on supernaturalistic theism, they will thereby be guarding against moving into process theism. (Boyd comes first to mind as an example of warning against this.) But (here in the West at least) it isn’t the closed theists who have a tendency among their ranks to abandon supernaturalistic theism for process theism (non-deterministic pantheism) per se. I think there’s a pretty obvious reason for that, too: the doctrines that closed theists are specially hyper to protect, run directly against process theism per se. Open theists avoid becoming process theists by not going too far in their protection of human will (and/or natural behavior) in relation to divine action.

‘Future facts’ are not yet ‘historical facts’ to us natural creatures existing dependently on an overarching spatio-temporal system. Facts which occur in a natural history, however, are still historical facts ontologically speaking, whether they happen to be ‘future’ facts from our current perspective or not.

I certainly grant, very heartily, that you’re right about how the term is being employed in debates between closed and open theists. It illustrates my previously claimed point that both sides, despite being nominally committed to supernaturalistic theism, have a common tendency to present historical time as a framework within which God is constrained to operate–like us creatures ontologically dependent upon Nature for our existence.

If we were talking about Zeus or Odin, I wouldn’t have any criticism of either side on this topic. But we’re supposed to be talking about Nature ontologically depending upon God for its existence and operations, not the other way around.

Hi Jason-

Thanks for the clarification. I’m sorry to say I’m not sure that I’m following you.

Jason: Obviously, insofar as open theists still insist on supernaturalistic theism, they will thereby be guarding against moving into process theism. (Boyd comes first to mind as an example of warning against this.) But (here in the West at least) it isn’t the closed theists who have a tendency among their ranks to abandon supernaturalistic theism for process theism (non-deterministic pantheism) per se.

Tom: The “tendency to abandon.” Yes. The ole’ slippery slope. Gets ya every time!

This would be difficult to show, Jason. You could be right. I’m not disagreeing. Who knows? It might seem like this is the case because open theists and process folks have some things in common (things which opponents of both views hammer on as evidence of…well, of something I suppose). But they disagree in no uncertain terms over other core convictions (convictions open theists share with historical Christianity). I haven’t counted all the process folk out there to see how many were formerly open theists (probably very few) and how many were formerly traditional ‘closed’ theists. I believe if we counted heads we’d find that of those process theists who have any background in the Church (nominal or otherwise), most come from nominal churches and formerly bought into the whole classical package of divine attributes. But that’s just going on the few process folks I know. None were formerly open theists. They all reacted to the classical God and ran as far in the opposite direction as possible, which is why they can’t stand open theism. We are, they say, “too classical.” We can’t win for losing. Ha!

I suppose my question about all this is (sincerely now), So what? I mean, any worldview has more or less in common with every other worldview (all considered). So the nearest contrary worldview to open theism is process theism (let’s say). Fine. But you surely have a nearest contrary worldview. So do we all. So what’s the point?


Tom: But “future facts” are not “historical facts.” Historical facts are truths (or facts) about the past, at least that’s how the term is employed in the debates.

Jason: “Future facts” are not yet “historical facts” to us natural creatures existing dependently on an overarching spatio-temporal system.

Tom: Yes, so say you and others who hold to some version of divine timelessness. I grant that. But open theists reject divine timelessness and other views of divine supra-temporality that essentially give God atemporal or eternal access to the truth about the whole of creation’s history in a single snap-shot so to speak. So to the extent that your claim that “the point to open theism is that God doesn’t certainly know all historical facts” assumes divine timelessness (as you here admit), it just begs the question against open theists (who don’t share the belief in divine timelessness–by whatever name it’s called). So it’s not really accurate to claim that open theists believe that God doesn’t know all historical facts.

Jason: …both sides [closed and open theists], despite being nominally committed to supernaturalistic theism, have a common tendency to present historical time as a framework within which God is constrained to operate.

Tom: Open theists have more than a tendency to say God operates temporally (exclusively so since creation at least), we absolutely insist upon it. As for traditional non-open theists, I only wish it was true that most believed God operates with our temporal framework. But I’ve met with the “But God is outside time” objection from Arminians (and some Calvinists) too often to think it’s true.

Jason: We’re supposed to be talking about Nature ontologically depending upon God for its existence and operations, not the other way around.

Tom: There’s more here than would be fair to this thread to try to address. I’ll just say that in positing divine temporality, open theists aren’t at all suggesting that Creation is anything but ontologically dependent upon God (who is ontologically dependent only upon himself). The God-world relation is absolutely asymmetrical in this respect. But so far as we can see this has nothing to do with precluding the temporal status of God’s existence and life.

Too much too digest.

Not sure where to go from here. The info is out there for anyone who wants to inform themselves about open theism. I’m sure open theism isn’t a perfect, air-tight theology. No model is. It’s the least problematic I’ve found thus far. But we’re all bailing some water.

Pax,
Tom

Aahh! :sunglasses: yes I am familiar with those principles… Thank you.

I have to say a big thank you to both of you because this debate is opening up areas to me that I haven’t really ever come across but that have a huge impact on some of the brick walls that I hit with the concepts of God and timelessness. I have never come across any Christian yet who would say that God doesn’t sit in a timeless location in an overarching super-reality and who can’t therefore know all future choices exactly.

Funnily enough this has brought to mind conversations with my grandmother years ago who would answer my questions by saying that God does know all future events but chooses not to remember certain stuff at certain times (cute I know - she was 93 when she died back in 2000 and a staunch Plymouth Brethren lady).

Please continue…

Jeff: I have never come across any Christian yet who would say that God doesn’t sit in a timeless location in an overarching super-reality…

Tom: Welcome to the party! Can I get you something? What are you drinkin’?

Jeff: This has brought to mind conversations with my grandmother years ago who would answer my questions by saying that God does know all future events but chooses not to remember certain stuff at certain times (cute I know - she was 93 when she died back in 2000 and a staunch Plymouth Brethren lady).

Tom: VERY interesting! My opinion of the Brethren just went up a notch! (It wasn’t ‘bad’ to begin with though.)

Open theists don’t all adopt exactly the same explanations for just how it is God apprehends the truth about the temporal becoming of the world. Some actually do what your grandma did. They just say God “chooses not to know” some things (in this case what our future free choices are). I understand Christian philosopher Dallas Willard takes this approach. But most open theist thinkers would criticize this move. It’s not “foreknowledge” that’s the problem. It’s “fore-truth” (if you will). The question is who or what determines the truth about what I freely do? I’m not timeless or eternal, so if the truth about what I freely do IS timeless or eternal, then I can’t be the one determining or grounding the truth about what I do—whether God chooses to know that truth or not. What we need to do is ground the truth of what I do in my self-determination. How do “I” (a temporally bound entity) “bring it about” (temporally, by determining my choice) that it’s eternally true that I make the choice in question?

Besides, God “choosing not to know” sounds just a bit suspicious. God would have first to know, or have some way to identify or tag, just those items he doesn’t want to know. But that would mean knowing them at least at some point (which is what this move is designed to avoid). And it would definitely seem to undermine omniscience understood as ‘knowledge of all truths’.

Some open theists loosely say there just aren’t any ‘truths’ out there about future contingencies and leave it at that. Others say there are ‘truths’ about what we’ll freely do but that they’re “impossible to know.” Bill Hasker goes this route. Still others deny the principle of ‘bivalence’ (which says that every proposition is either true or false). They say propositions positing what free agents will do in the future are neither true nor false, so not knowing them doesn’t undermine omniscience since it’s still the case that God knows all “truths.” And lastly others (myself, Boyd, and growing majority we hope) affirm bivalence but expand the scope of future-tense propositions to include truths about what “might and might not” happen.

It gets SO anal and complicated you can’t imagine! Lots of gymnastics. Sometimes you just gotta smile.

Jeff, I recommend Boyd’s God of the Possible. Short and sweet. He’ll lay it out for you nicely, and he does a good job of describing why this is an important practical question about how we live.

Tom

Thanks for another excellent post, Tom, this one on the role of the will in belief, trust, and love. You and I certainly agree–as almost anyone would, I suppose–that simple empirical beliefs, such as the belief that fire can burn and cause terrible pain, are not explicitly chosen. Someone might choose to walk near a fire, or to place a hand on a hot coal, or to experiment with fire in some other way, and relevantly similar choices might play an important role in someone’s discovering the true nature of fire. But once the consequences of such choices are experienced, the resulting belief that fire can burn and cause terrible pain is not itself the product of some further choice, much less of some libertarian free choice. For discovering the truth about something is very different from manufacturing a belief in oneself by an act of will–which is not even psychologically possible in many cases.

We also agree, no doubt, that our religious beliefs are typically a lot more complex than simple empirical beliefs, and the ways in which these more complex beliefs involve the will are more subtle, perhaps, as well. For belief in God, as religious people typically understand it, goes far beyond a mere intellectual assent to the proposition that God exists; it also includes, as you point out yourself, such attitudes as love, trust, and gratitude. As you also point out, the fact that Paul never chose to receive a revelation of the risen Lord hardly entails that he could not have willfully chosen to misinterpret it. So are love, trust, and gratitude any more an explicit matter of will than simple empirical beliefs are? Here is where my own view is probably more radical–more Augustinian, if you will–than many Arminians would accept. As you know, I categorically reject Augustinian theology insofar as it excludes the absolutely clear Pauline statement that God is merciful to all. But I also agree with the Augustinians that faith and the ability to trust in God are in the end gifts from God. In the words of St. Paul: “For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this [the faith] is not your own doing; it is the gift of God—not the result of works, so that no one may boast” (Eph. 2:8-9).

Quite apart from any appeal to authority, moreover, Paul’s view seems to accord perfectly with my own experience as a child. I learned at a very early age, for example, to trust my mother implicitly–not because I decided to trust her, but because I discovered her to be altogether trustworthy. I also learned to love her–not because I decided to love her, but because she first loved me and demonstrated her love in thousands of ways. I have no doubt that certain free choices, if you will, were an important part of the process where¬by I discovered my mother’s true character. For I was just as disobedient and snotty at times as any other child and just as rebellious during my teen years as many others are. But the free choices I made, both the good ones and the bad ones, merely provided my parents with additional opportunities to demonstrate their true character, and at no time in my life could I have freely chosen, so I believe, not to love them or to separate myself from them altogether. There was simply never any motive to spurn the love of someone who always put my own interests first. And similarly for God, our supremely perfect Mother and Father: We learn to love him because he first loved us and will continue to demonstrate throughout all eternity, if necessary, his faithfulness in meeting our true spiritual needs and in satisfying our heart’s desire in the end. Accordingly, our free choices, whichever way they go, merely provide God with additional opportunities to demonstrate his true character and the true nature of his love for us.

For these reasons, I always find it bewildering when someone like Jack Cottrell insists that “every sinner is able to make his own decision of whether to believe or not” [see “The Classical Arminian View of Election,” in Chad Owen Brand (ed.), Perspectives on Election, p. 121]. For even in the case of complex religious beliefs, which no doubt include elements of faith, trust, and love, the role of the will, as I now see it, is essentially this: It determines the conditions under which God can impart the gifts of faith and trust without bypassing our own reasoning processes and without violating our unique personalities. It determines, in other words, how God can respond most appropriately, given the lessons we still need to learn, in finally reconciling us to himself. But this has no bearing at all, so far as I can tell, upon God’s ability to meet the relevant conditions over an indefinite period of time. For one thing, our control over our own choices does not in general extend to their long-term consequences in our lives–which, more often than not, we can neither predict nor control. These consequences are sometimes just the opposite of what we might expect. If I freely act on the false belief or the illusion that I have the skill to ski down a treacherous slope, for example, a fall and a broken leg may, quite unexpectedly, shatter that illusion to pieces; and if, because I have misconstrued the conditions of my own happiness, I repeatedly pursue my perceived interests at the expense of others, I may eventually discover, again quite unexpectedly, the error of my ways. Indeed, because their consequences can be so effective in shattering our illusions and in correcting our misguided judgments, our immoral and destructive choices may sometimes be more useful to God in transforming us than a more virtuous choice might have been.

Anyway, I suspect that so far you will find little to disagree with here. If I am wrong about that, then I’ll look forward to your further clarifications. Otherwise, we can perhaps move to the controversial question of how it is that sin enters into the world. In particular, how are we to account for the near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin? I realize that you, Jason, and Pat, among others, have already made some relevant comments here. But I also invite additional comments from you or anyone else following this thread.

My thanks to all who have contributed to the discussion so far.

-Tom

TomT: As you also point out, the fact that Paul never chose to receive a revelation of the risen Lord hardly entails that he could not have willfully chosen to misinterpret it. So are love, trust, and gratitude any more an explicit matter of will than simple empirical beliefs are?

TomB: You captured it well. That’s the key question.

TomT: Here is where my own view is probably more radical–more Augustinian, if you will–than many Arminians would accept…

TomB: This will likely mean that we each get to the same outcome (UR) via different routes. For you appear to be answering the question (“So are love, trust, and gratitude any more an explicit matter of will than simple empirical beliefs are?”) negatively. I think the role of the will with respect to loving relations is not just another example of empirical belief. I’ll want to argue that God ‘cannot’ get the relationship of love he desires with us if he doesn’t leave us enough room (via ‘epistemic distance’) to determine how we shall relate (what possible meaning we decide to attribute) to the world of our experiences, more precisely, God’s actions toward us.

Let’s take the example you give:

“I learned at a very early age, for example, to trust my mother implicitly–not because I decided to trust her, but because I discovered her to be altogether trustworthy. I also learned to love her–not because I decided to love her, but because she first loved me and demonstrated her love in thousands of ways. I have no doubt that certain free choices, if you will, were an important part of the process whereby I discovered my mother’s true character. For I was just as disobedient and snotty at times as any other child and just as rebellious during my teen years as many others are. But the free choices I made, both the good ones and the bad ones, merely provided my parents with additional opportunities to demonstrate their true character, and at no time in my life could I have freely chosen, so I believe, not to love them or to separate myself from them altogether. There was simply never any motive to spurn the love of someone who always put my own interests first.”

You end by saying “there was never any motive to spurn” your mother’s love, but you had just admitted to having spurnned that love by “free choices” you made to be disobedient and to misrelate to that love. So the fact that you were disobedient and freely chose to misrelate to love appears to make my point, viz., that when it comes to determining ourselves (in love) in relation to others we are inevitably free to do otherwise. However obvious was your mother’s love, you nevertheless found “room enough” (“reason enough”) to misrelate to it. You weren’t temporarily insane or otherwise irrational when you freely chose to misrelate, so it must have been the case that however obvious was your mother’s love on one level, there nevertheless remained a measure of rational “wiggle room” wherein you were capable of misapprehending, misconstruing, and misinterpreting (or whatever the case may be) that love and hence of misrelating to it. Otherwise, how DO you account for the responsible nature of your choice to misrelate to your mother’s love?

TomT: For even in the case of complex religious beliefs, which no doubt include elements of faith, trust, and love, the role of the will, as I now see it, is essentially this: It determines the conditions under which God can impart the gifts of faith and trust without bypassing our own reasoning processes and without violating our unique personalities.

TomB: I want to make sure I don’t misunderstand you here. If the role of the ‘will’ is to “determine conditions under which God can impart faith” (without objectifying us), then how are you Augustinian? It looks to me as if you here have the ‘will’ freely determining when and how it comes by faith in God, i.e., freely determining whether or not it receives the gift of faith (and salvation). That’s how I’m taking “can” in “…under which God ‘can’ impart faith,” i.e., we determine whether God ‘can’ or ‘cannot’ actually impart his life to us. But surely as an Augustinian here you must mean to say that our ‘will’ determines the conditions under which God “in fact does” impart faith. By “conditions” you don’t mean to say the impartation of faith is “conditional upon” the free exercise of the will. You mean to say the impartation of faith is always given “within the actual conditions of our lives freely determined.” We get to determine what kind of sinners we are, how screwed up we become, how fractured we are, etc., but we’re not free to say “yes” to God (except in the sense that our “yes” is just the effect of an irresistible impartation of faith to us).

Am I following you?

TomT: Otherwise, we can perhaps move to the controversial question of how it is that sin enters into the world. In particular, how are we to account for the near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin?

TomB: We can move on to that. Looks good. I’ll just not that your Augustinian understanding of salvation (though you universalize it unlike him so that eventually God determines all through the gift of faith) will likely turn out to be a kind of dividing fork in the road that takes you to UR one way and me another.

TomB

TomT-

The next question you wanted to move on to is: How are we to account for the near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin?

I have yesterday (the 4th) and today off out here in Iraq, so I’m gorging on online posting since I know things we’ll pick up and I’ll get busy. But maybe I can save us a bit of time (‘cause I know you’ve got so much on your plate) if I go ahead and offer something of an answer to this question. Again, no hurry at all on responding.

But first I want to comment quickly on something I said in my immediately preceding post:

You end by saying “there was never any motive to spurn” your mother’s love, but you had just admitted to having spurnned [sic] that love by ‘free choices’ you made to be disobedient and to misrelate to that love. So the fact that you were disobedient and freely chose to misrelate to love appears to make my point, viz., that when it comes to determining ourselves (in love) in relation to others we are inevitably free to do otherwise. However obvious was your mother’s love, you nevertheless found ‘room enough’ (‘reason enough’) to misrelate to it.

I just wanted to comment on your “motive” to make sure it’s clear that I agree there is never any ‘justification’ or ‘reasoning that justifies’ our misrelating to God, i.e., reasons that make our misrelating the right thing to do—given the full truth of the matter. No perceived reason for misrelating can be THAT kind of motive. However, we can be ‘rationally motivated’ and yet ‘wrong’ (though there are always reasons enough for choosing to act righty). This is precisely what I mean by God’s leaving us ‘room’ to determine ourselves responsibly. God provides us reasons enough to choose rightly, but that same ‘room’ leaves us space enough to construct ‘possible reasons’ for misrelating. Like the original “I will ascend and be like the Most High,” which describes a ‘perceived motivation’ or ‘reason’ to misrelate. The speaker could only think this ‘responsibly’ if he can think it ‘rationally’ and ‘freely’.


On to why evil was inevitable once God chose to create.

Without taking the creation narrative literally, it seems to be the case that evil was already present when God endows human being with the divine image. Evil predates the human fall into sin. So evil per se was already present. Nothing is said to explain this arrangement, so we can only reason back to a plausible explanation, though I think Boyd has a point when he says the Bible isn’t concerned with speculating on such questions, it simply presumes that evil is not of God and that we’re to oppose it as far as we’re able. At the same time, he speculates as much as anyone else in positing a primal fall with Satan (and his cohorts) and the warfare that ensues between God and Satan, a warfare into which humanity was placed and which humanity seems to have been designed to play a part (God tells Adam to go and “subdue” the earth, suggesting that not all is well).

Where angelic beings appear to have been given a measure of freedom in which to determine themselves relative to their created purpose, so were we given a measure of freedom in which to determine ourselves relative to our relationship to God and our created purpose. And freedom implies risk. From my perspective the inevitability of human sin and evil is grounded in the risk entailed in our being free.

So the question I have to face is, why would a loving God run such a risk? That is, why would he create a risky world in which evil’s inevitable corrupting presence would universally pervade all creation if such evil doesn’t play some necessary role in the fulfilling of God’s purposes? And my answer would be: Love is worth the risk. More precisely, the ends to which God purposes us are worth the risks involved in granting us the freedom we require in achieving those ends. It’s NOT about freedom. Never has been. Freedom is just a ‘means’. God doesn’t value freedom for freedom’s sake. He values the beauty and love that we can embody and reflect. Freedom is just the metaphysical price-tag God has to pay to get us to that sort of existing.

So the ‘possibility’ of sin/evil is entailed in the freedom that humanity’s created purposes metaphysically require. But the inevitability isn’t so entailed, per se, in the freedom we’re granted. In other words, God’s purposes require that we be free (and thus ‘possibly’ evil), not that we ‘actually’ become evil. Evil is definitionally opposed to God and God’s purposes. It’s an obstacle to overcome. God’s good purposes are achieved “in spite of” sin, not “through sin’s indirect help” as if evil makes a positive contribution to what is real and beautiful by providing a dark backdrop against which divine and created beauties may now more brightly shine. This might mark a real difference between us.

But having said that, I think God had to know ‘statistically speaking’ that sin would inevitably rise and infect creation. I mean, given time, increased populations, and the societal influences upon individuation, God’s got to know, “Dang, this project is gonna go REALLY bad before it eventually becomes what I want.” But God goes through with it because he knows “what it will become” is worth “however bad it can get” on the way. So eventual sin is inevitable given these factors, but its “actuality” isn’t entailed metaphysically-speaking in the freedom we’re granted the way its “possibility” is entailed in that freedom.

I think you, TomT, want the “damage sin does” to be PART (caps is just emphasis) of the project, part of the PURPOSE for which God creates. You want evil to ‘contribute’ to the explication of divine and created beauty by shaping the form of ‘the beautiful’. Essentially, a marriage can’t be as beautiful and intense an experience of love as it can be unless it experiences the pain of an adulterous affair so that we live to tell the survivor’s story. This is why for you, though God can at any time act upon the human intellect to guarantee compliance (Augustinian regeneration), he doesn’t do so. He backs off and leaves us alone so that creation can go wrong and do the necessary damage and in turn make the required contribution to shaping beautiful outcomes in ways God desires.

Am I following you? If so…

…then this has grave consequences, I think, for our doctrine of a necessary God who “is” love (and you’ve argued in print that “God is love” is a metaphysical description of God [Great paper by the way!]). And some of us would argue that “God is love” (in the case of a ‘necessarily existing’ God) means that God is necessarily and unsurpassably aesthetically satisfied, perfectly ‘satiated’ (as it were) when it comes to loving relationality and intensity of beautiful experience. God’s experience of loving relationality and beauty is as intense as it gets, and it’s THIS experience that constitutes God essentially (and necessarily).

So there’s no lack or weakness or failure in God’s experience of love, and that includes whatever contribution we want to say creation makes to God. I don’t see that it’s the case that creation “improves” upon God’s being or essence (his experience of loving relationality or the intensity of his experience) though I think that’s just what we end up having to admit IF we say contingent evil contributes to the experience of love by shaping the form and diversity of loving expression. If the “shape or form of beautiful experience” per se can be “improved upon” through the contingency of sinful becoming, then (a) the ‘necessity’ that characterizes God’s being can’t have anything to do with KIND of beautiful experience God has of Godself trintarianly-speaking (and that’s hugely problematic for me at least), and (b) we end up attributing a kind of ‘goodness’ to evil, giving it a “capacity to shape the form of love” in ways that increase the intensity and perfection of love’s experience (and that’s hugely problematic for me too). The Greek Fathers got it right on I think when they said evil is “pure privation of the good,” and that’s all it can be. But if it’s privation, then it can’t be the case that it “plays a positive role” in the explication of God’s purposes. It can only get in the way so to speak.

I’m rambling. Sorry!

Tom