[quote=“Origen, post:169, topic:13832, full:true”]
“God is NO (more or) LESS sinful in allowing evil acts than if He had committed the act Himself.”
Thanks Origen, you make a good point that many would say our failure to stop crimes that we could have would mean that we share in responsibility for them, and thus similarly believe God shares in responsibility for evils that God does not intervene in. That makes sense, and if we assume that God is omnipotent concerning all actions, I think it puts the burden on Arminians to explain why creating an existence where God does not stop each evil action is a greater value than creating one where only good acts are allowed. (Of course as you implied above, many of them will argue that an essentially non-interventionary practice of allowing genuine freedom including evil choices is that good.)
I also agree that if God allows such freedom for evils, He properly bears responsibility to make it right. But in the line cited above, I remain confused about apparently describing God’s role in designing a free creation as making him equally responsible (“no less sinful!”) for such acts as the one who chose to do them. That seems tantamount to saying that God then is as sinful as sinners who choose to do the evils. But in your previous note, you affirm that God does not sin in bearing this ‘responsibility’ because he allows it for the greater good.
Again, apart from differing semantics, it appears to me that we are actually saying the same thing. Except, my own sense is that even though human failures to stop a crime means we do culpably share in responsibility for it, I would say the sin of doing the crime is more egregious, rather than “no more sinful” than not intervening. More to the point, agreeing with you that God has good reason not to intervene (and thus did not sin), I would not put it that his choice to do that makes him “no less sinful” than the person choosing to do the evil. Am I missing something here?