I realize that Dr. William Lane Craig, a prominent Christian apologist, may not be the most popular thinker/debater among universalists (as he thinks non-believers are subject to eternal punishment). However, I find Craig to be quite sharp in Christianity’s defense, on a host of topics, so, despite his non-universalism, I give him a fair hearing.
I know that WL Craig has debated universalists, Thomas Talbott among them; I can’t remember if Craig’s comments about annihilationism came from one of those debates or elsewhere. However, they are, I think very interesting:
If I remember correctly, Craig wrote/said something to the effect that by holding annihilationism, one can mitigate the severity of God’s wrath (if one cannot stomach the idea of eternal punishment). Yet, Dr. Craig has also admitted that annihilationism is a scriptural non-starter!
Interestingly, as well, Dr. Craig conceded the Pauline teaching of God’s “universal salvific will.” In a recent debate with Calvinist scholar Paul Helm, Craig argued that were only two options given this Pauline teaching: 1) universalism - which is “obviously false” and 2) that something, namely libertarian free will, thwarts God’s universal salvific will (Craig is not an Arm, but a Molinist).
Anyway, I find Dr. Craig’s remarks quite intriguing, especially given his concessions. Apparently, universalism is out-of-bounds for Craig b/c it is, to his mind, scripturally unsustainable, given the teaching of Hell, and philosophically untenable b/c, like Calvinism, universalism is deterministic and would undermine God’s goodness through God’s coercion of human freedom (has Craig considered non-deterministic universalism?). Nevertheless, Craig allows those vexed by the doctrine of Hell an out by offering them annihilationism, though that, as well, is not scripturally sustainable to Craig.
Why arbitrarily prefer annihilationism to universalism, esp. if one affirms the majority of the Pauline teaching on universalism?
Which does Dr. Craig hold higher - the authority of Scripture - or- the logical consistency of a theology?
Why affirm the Pauline teaching of God’s universal salvific will, and then claim univ. is “obviously false”?
Molinists for the purpose of comparison to Calvs and Kaths are the same category as Arminian, which is exactly why WLC is willing to concede God’s universal salvific will. Whereas, strictly speaking, a Calvinist could hold to the middle knowledge of Molinism, which is technically about how God’s omniscience works and not about original persistence or salvific scope. However, the middle knowledge theories of Molinism were developed out of Arminian concern to protect omniscience against the challenges of Calvinistic criticism, so for practical purposes the topic is often found deployed in conjunction with the universal scope of God’s saving will.
I’m not a big fan of middle knowledge, for subtle technical reasons that I’d have to rework up in detail: to put it shortly, I regard it as a broken form of Boethian (and Lewisian) omniscience, which sacrifices actual omniscience to solve a conceptual problem unique to Arminians. (Which in turn is why most Calvs aren’t Molinists: their soteriology doesn’t have that kind of problem, so for them the question is purely whether it offers a superior notion of omniscience.)
A good summary and commentary (from an evangelical universalistic perspective) of WLC’s dispute with Robin Parry and Thomas Talbott over Molinism, can be found in one of the appendices to The Evangelical Universalist (1st or 2nd edition). My own critique would be a little different, but there are a number of overlaps.
Of course, Calvinists say exactly the same thing about St. Paul except the other way around. (I bet Paul Helm did in that debate, too!) There are only two options in Pauline teaching: universalism – which is “obviously false” – and a divine choice to save only some sinners from sin.
Many years ago, when I realized Calvs and Arms were both using the “only two options” arguments against each other, with universalism being one of the options and also being the combination of what they each regarded as the second option, the “trinitarian apologist” side of my brain suddenly sat up and said “this sounds like unitarians and modalists hotly contesting against each other in rejection of what is ‘obviously false’!” That didn’t prove to me universalism was scripturally sound, but it sure looked a lot more suspiciously suggestive (so to speak).
He considers non-deterministic universalism to still violate human free will; whereas he doesn’t think God locking people into having no more choice and/or allowing them to destroy their power of choice, doesn’t violate human free will.
He’s one of those people who complains that even purgatorial universalism would mean sinners aren’t free to have their freedom permanently ruined, and if God doesn’t respect that freedom then God would have to be a tyrant or whatever.
He hasn’t really thought the matter out very far yet. (In his defense, he usually has other topics to be working on.)
Dr. Craig doesn’t affirm that. He affirms that Paul teaches universal scope of salvation, but not that Paul teaches God’s original persistence to salvific victory. You could put it this way: he affirms Col 1’s scope of salvific reconciliation through the blood of the cross (although I’m not sure he really does affirm even that, since I don’t recall if he includes rebel angels in the scope), but he doesn’t affirm Rom 5’s affirmation that if we are reconciled to God through the blood of Christ how much moreso shall we be saved into His life.
Without the latter (which Calvs affirm in Paul), WLC has no reason to prefer universalism to annihilationism; whereas he thinks Paul does testify (briefly for example at 2 Thess 1:9) to something he thinks the rest of the NT testifies much more often, namely some kind of hopeless punishment or fate for at least some sinners.
Anni fits “some kind of hopelessness”, even if WLC thinks it’s the wrong kind of hopelessness. Universalism wouldn’t even be the wrong kind of hopelessness.
So he isn’t being merely arbitrary to prefer anni to kath. He doesn’t accept Paul’s teaching of half of what’s necessary for kath to work; and does accept Paul teaches some kind of hopeless punishment.
In my experience most non-Kaths will flipflop back and forth between them, though, according to whichever looks at the moment like it will uphold some type of hopeless punishment. (i.e. argue the metaphysical side, and they’ll retreat to scriptural testimony; argue the scriptural side, and they challenge whether the metaphysics are valid. This gets tiresome after a while.) But I don’t recall offhand whether in practice WLC thinks there’s any conflict between them, and I’m pretty sure in theory he thinks there’s no conflict.
I’ve found that most infernalist theologians ASSUME that scripture so “clearly” affirms that there is a Hell and that some certainly suffer ECT there that they summarily dismiss UR with little or no consideration. Tradition reminds me of the hard ground in the parable of the sower. Hard ground is packed down through steady and long-term trodding by others. It becomes so hard that roots will not penetrate it and seeds have no chance of taking root. Either the wind blows the seeds away or the birds of the air pluck them off the top of hard ground before the seeds even have a chance to germinate. Since childhood people open their bibles and see Jesus warning of “Hell” and assume that the translation is correct. To change ones belief on this for many people is virtually impossible this side of judgment. It doesn’t matter to people that scripture does not once specifically name Hell, that Moses did not warn of Hell, that Paul did not warn of Hell, and that Jesus did not warn of Hell but of being cast into Hinnom Valley. They are so solidified in their belief in Hell that they dismiss any evidence to the contrary, and thus consider UR “obviously false”.
why is “kath” an abbreviation for universalism? (If it is really self-evident, then I am just not thinking, then maybe forget about elucidating me )
I think I better understand what Craig affirms thanks to your post. A few lingering questions:
Though most non-universalists I know tend to caricature finite postmortem or purgatorial punishment as a “penalty box”, I think, in a slightly more figurative sense, “hopeless” would aptly apply to eons of purging/refining/deciding, etc. Of course, you wrote that WLC considers choices/states to be locked-in once we die; yet, Luther evidently thought in one or two pastoral letters that the Word wasn’t clear about postmortem second chances, esp. to those who hadn’t been properly evangelized prior to death. Supposing Luther a better student of the Bible than Craig (after all, didn’t Luther translate the entire Bible from Gk/Hb or Latin to German?), shouldn’t WLC, who is primarily an philosopher (?), be more transparent about making these fine exegetical pts to disqualify soteriologies other than his own? (Though maybe his concessions about 50% universalism are this and, to be fair, Luther’s knowledge of the Bible, doesn’t disqualify him for bias either, though it might be a more qualified bias )
I don’t know much about theologians or theologies regarding omniscience - thanks for laying that out. Somewhere I read, that it is a logical fallacy (a species of genetic fallacy/ post hoc, ergo propter hoc?) that foreknowledge requires determinism. Is WLC arguing this?
Is annihilationism just as “hopeless” to most universalists as it is to WLC - or - is annihilationism a more merciful soteriology (than say Arm) to most universalists? Does it mean that the most hardened “rebels” won’t have to rebel those eons, eons and eons or does it mean that as soon as we die God will annihilate all those who aren’t in Christ? (or are there many varieties of annihilationism?)
Yes, I agree Sherman, particularly (though perhaps this is beyond the purview of Craig’s philo.debates) I would like to know how considered his scriptural view is on the matter, and how WLC and other “infernalist” theologians deal (or not deal) with matters such as this, esp. when they claim universalism is “obviously false”. For instance, I know many who claim that Hell is obvioulsy Biblical, and furnish me with lists of prooftexts, as if these alone make the case without any consideration of the Bible as a whole, or as weighed against the prooftexts for universalism (or, to be, fair annihilationism).
I recently re-read Charles Williams’s novel War in Heaven. In the final chapter one of the characters asks Prester John, the guardian of the Graal, for annihilation. Prester John replies, “Death you shall have at least. But God only gives, and He has only Himself to give, and He, even He, can give it only in those conditions which are himself. Wait but a few years, and he shall give you the death you desire. But do not grudge too much if you find that death and heaven are one. … The door that opens on annihilation opens only on the annihilation which is God.”
Oh, sorry. Kath == Katholic-ism, i.e. universal-ism.
Only if there was a set period with no hope of getting out early, like going to jail to serve the time with no parole. Most patristic universalists thought this, but I don’t think there’s a set period at all: when the prisoner pays what he owes, then he comes out, and what he owes isn’t hopeless to pay because what he owes is forgiveness and mercy to those who have sinned against him (or to let go of any other sin he’s still fondling).
Re: Luthor, we have some threads around here where that topic was chewed over thoroughly, and I recall the result being rather more theoretical and vague than anything worth appealing to as Luthor’s opinion. i.e., he allowed as a matter of principle that of course God could do something else as a factor of God’s omnipotence (and omnipresence), but he didn’t personally expect it to happen.
Re: WLC being more of a philosopher than an exegetical scholar, well yes, but he’s widely read and knows a lot of apologists, and like all of us he has to gauge what to focus his attentions and personal study on (historical resurrection, kalam cosmological argument, etc.) So, like I’m entirely sure is true of me on many topics, he knows most experts who have studied Topic 1 go with answer A, and what he’s read from them seems valid to him and he thinks the data so far as they give it is accurate to what he himself knows and otherwise trusts they’re giving sufficient and accurate data because that’s what experts are supposed to do. So he has a reasonable and reasonably well-informed belief that answer A is correct.
Now, I can’t even pretend to answer why he doesn’t see that his position violates his free-will provision categorically more than (purgatorial) universalism does (or even some forms of ultra-u), because he is a philosopher who has thought hard on that topic, or near it anyway: that’s the main reason he has become a champion of Molinism. All I can say is that I was in the same boat, too (though for not as long as he has been), once upon a time: free will is super-important if God is love (which I still believe), and central to a proper understanding of theology (which I still believe) and that means God won’t treat people like puppets and merely reprogram them back into line (which I still believe), meaning sooner or later people are going to be punished for their impenitent responsible actions (which I still believe), and that this isn’t going to stop without their repentance and rejection of the sin they’re still in, accepting the salvation of God through cooperation with the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit (which I still believe) – and yet FOR YEARS I didn’t see that final perdition itself violated the same principles by which I was trying to defend final perdition.
My only excuse, such as it is, is that no one ever pointed this out to me. I feel pretty sure someone has pointed this out to WLC before (possibly even me ), but I don’t know for sure (or clearly recall doing it myself), so… {shrug}
The last time I saw him arguing middle-knowledge (which was admittedly several years ago), my understanding of his details was that yes he did think foreknowledge requires determinism, and so was trying to avoid that problem and on the other hand the answer of open theism by appealing to middle-knowledge. I wrote some detailed comments about my problems with this, but I don’t recall where they’re at. I agreed he should avoid deterministic foreknowledge and the non-omniscience of open theism, but his middle knowledge argument (rather drastically oversimplifying) put God in the position of Schroedinger unable to tell if the state of the cat was alive or dead. That isn’t entirely accurate to his argument, but the gist of my criticism was that he wasn’t saving omniscience after all, and the underlying problem was that like the other two positions he was practically treating God as though God was a natural entity within space/time.
Putting it another way, one of the three positions (determinism, open theism, or middle knowledge) would have to be true, and any of them might be true, if Mormonism was true! – but a trinitarian theist, or even a mere supernaturalistic theist, ought to be going for option 4, Boethian/Lewisian omniscience, where God exists outside the spatio-temporal system and so sees/experiences all states of natural facts within that history simultaneously. I know WLC is a Lewis fan, too, but he never (so far as I could tell up to that time) addressed why he wasn’t going with that option.
But then, Boethian omniscience wouldn’t provide him with an answer to Calvinistic challenges about God’s intentions if God already knows the outcome, no moreso than deterministic omniscience. Middle-knowledge kind-of would, without God being limited to probabilistic guesses from knowledge of all possibilities in open theism; but it still ends up limiting God’s knowledge in another way as though God was only a creature within Nature.
To be fair, WLC (and divine middle-knowledge proponents, and open theists for that matter) would definitely answer in part that he’s trying to fit with scriptural testimony to apparent ignorance of YHWH in the OT; and I strongly suspect he would answer that middle-knowledge goes a long way toward explaining Jesus’ capabilities as God Incarnate.
From a Boethian theory, though, the Son Incarnate acts at right angles to all history and so actually “is incarnate” at the level of God’s self-existence for all natural history even though He incarnates through a process within history (due to His own transhistorical action). Meaning most or maybe even all such apparent ignorances in the OT can be explained as behavior by the Son Incarnate acting as the visible YHWH: a point that trinitarian apologists (himself very much included) routinely approach when appealing to the very numerous NT applications of OT YHWH statements to Jesus. Whether middle-knowledge is the best solution for that, or whether this is a factor of the Son receiving whatever the Father chooses to give (which might not be all knowledge on a topic right that moment, especially when the Son is manifesting or incarnating in natural history somewhere thus acting in a limited fashion), or perhaps the two notions combined explain the data, I’m not sure – though I absolutely believe the Son’s receiving from the Father is a factor. (I’m just not sure middle-knowledge is included as a factor or perhaps is how this behavior mentally expresses in the incarnate Son.)
What I am sure of, is that middle-knowledge per se does not apply to God at the level of God’s own self-existence in relation to any not-God reality. It might perhaps explain some of the Son’s behavior within Nature, but it doesn’t and cannot explain God’s choice to act to save sinners from sin when He knows He’s going to certainly fail at it.
I’ll grant there might be ways to explain that in an Arminian fashion which don’t tacitly deny supernaturalistic theism (and thus also ortho-trin), but middle-knowledge (in my own educated estimation as a philosopher ) isn’t it, no moreso than open theism.
(I should perhaps add here that we have several open theist Christian universalists here, but obviously they don’t appeal to this to help solve soteriological problems the way Arms naturally do.)
My general impression is that most universalists would say anni is just as hopeless (because it’s a final destruction of hope of salvation from sin and the sinner coming to do righteousness and to give hope to other people), but more merciful than any kind of eternal conscious torment (Arm or Calv either one).
On this I would disagree strongly about it being more merciful: mercy requires the object of mercy to benefit from the mercy, and by definition the annihilated person would not exist any longer to benefit from the annihilation. Anni would be more merciful to the people who aren’t annihilated, perhaps, assuming God doesn’t just reprogram them to forget the sinner’s existence, or lead them to regard the never-ending suffering of the unrighteous as something to rejoice over. Annihilation literally cannot be more merciful to the annihilated person than any other alternative, because the comparison is a total category error, like asking whether the square root of negative one is less than zero. (Nope it isn’t less, it isn’t greater, it isn’t anything, it’s an imaginary number.)
This is a subtle point, and I don’t blame people for missing it, but it leads to a lot of confusion, and to people being willing to settle for annihilation because they feel like that would be more merciful than ECT. I don’t think I have ever read or heard an annihilationist who didn’t make that a significant appeal.
There are many varieties: annihilated immediately (though this is rare since there are notable and very clear scriptural testimonies to the resurrection of the evil as well as the good); anni’d at the second coming of Christ or some other time before the general resurrection (also rare for the same reason, even though I don’t think I’ve read an anni who hasn’t appealed to verses as anni which seem to apply to the coming of Christ before the general res); anni’d upon the final judgment of Christ after the resurrection (probably the most common today, and how the “destruction” of the “coming” verses tend to be interpreted); and anni’d after some amount (maybe eons etc.) of punishment after the final judgment (not so common as option 3 but I’ve seen people go that way).
An annihilationist of any category but the first could also believe in post-mortem salvation at any point or points before annihilation, and some do, especially so far as they’re following Lewis. Calvinist annihilationists might argue similarly that only the non-elect are annihilated (perhaps immediately on death), and the elect who aren’t signed up with Christ yet go to purgatory to be saved out of that under various conditions, possibly even after eons of eons of punishment.
So yep, lots of variations. But the most common right now seems to be annihilation after the general res at the final judgment. I’m not sure whether post-mortem salvation options before then are more common right now than no post-mortem salvation, but my shaky impression is not.
I’m enjoying reading your posts. I have a question for you. I frequently see you suggesting the Boethian/Lewis idea of God’s knowledge of free willed acts of creatures (which I used to hold). I am wondering, though, how this gets God outside of time. Could you go into specific detail regarding your beliefs on this matter?
For all I can see, the main problem with Molinism (which I also used to hold) is that it is in effect indistinguishable from determinism. I don’t think it possible to know the free act of a creature before it is made. Where does such knowledge come from? But, according to Lewis’ model, in which God still “responds” to creaturely decisions (see Letters to Malcolm) and “risks” when he creates free creatures (Mere Christianity), God is not immutable. Therefore, God, though his specific nature does not change, is in some way determined by the acts of his creation. Therefore there are certain acts which he would do or would not do based on temporally acting creatures. How, then, can these sequences of acts take place for God unless he is in time? In other words, how can God choose “I shall now have to die when I become incarnate”, a decision which is based on a temporal effect of free creatures, and yet not somehow be within a realm which allows him to change (i.e. time?) I can understand there being a logical sequence to an eternal process (like an eternal footprint would always be logically caused by an eternal foot) - but what I can’t wrap my mind around is how this can take place if one of the objects is in time and the other is not.
Here’s another question. In what way can the entire creation be a “simultaneous glance” in God’s mind, and his acts presumably be made all simultaneously in eternity, if the consequences of said acts (e.g. dying on a cross for sin, answering such and such prayer) come from free creatures which are in time? It seems simply impossible to say that God could “respond” all at once, in our past, present, and future, when each of his responses themselves rely on our acts, which have not yet occurred - LOGICALLY - in his mind. Each free act seems to me to present something to which he must “respond”. And his responses cannot all be simultaneous any more than each of our acts are simultaneous. In a sense, it seems God has to “wait” for us to respond to him for him to respond to us. And what can “wait” mean if it does not mean being in time?
And that’s not to say anything about prophecy. Even if God could know, outside of time, what we “are doing” in the future, I don’t see how he could insert himself “into” the snippet of the present and tell us said future, seeing as his initial, eternal view of the eternally present future did not include such a prophecy since, again logically, it had not yet occurred by my free choice and could not therefore be known at that particular snippet of eternity in which he was interacting with my present.
Maybe I’m not making myself clear. Or perhaps we could just throw the sponge up like Lewis did (in some of his letters) and say there is no way for us to imagine how this non-temporal “responding” of God occurs, since all our thinking about relating and responding happens in time itself.
I’d really enjoy your reaction to these thoughts. (Currently open theist, by the way.)
In other words, thinking about God “responding” only becomes problematic when we cut up his creative acts into independent means to various ends. But, supposing we think of the whole creation as one single, unified act…? Perhaps that removes my difficulty.
Of course, we will may get into all kinds of trouble when we have a lapse in thinking and put God “in time” and assign him individual responses to his creation - but maybe that is only from failing to mentally maintain the idea that ALL creation is simultaneously created, adapted to and responded for eternally. Each of God’s “individual” responses, say to my prayer and yours 10 years ago, are themselves connected to or, better still, part of, his single creative “act and response” dance, as it were, with his creation.
Though I’m well aware of this view, I can make no sense of it whatever. If God exists outside of time and space, how does He act within time and space. And if he “sees” all events simultaneously, then how can he distinguish these events in a temporal sense? Or even be aware of a temporal sequence of events?
Also, if God sees the future, then the future is fixed (or “settled” as Greg Boyd would say), and that fact (if it IS a fact) contradicts the concept of free will (as I have clearly shown elsewhere, or so I believe.)
I don’t understand why annihilationism is as merciless. Isn’t it euthanizing the damned? euthanasia is a debatable good when one is faced with terrible earthly suffering. Yet, what about when one is before suffering of an infinite duration w/ no hope for purpose in it (unless, as some Christians interpret the Bible, the Elect will rejoice at sufferings of the Reprobate - that is, that Heaven requires Hell to exist somehow)?
WLC’s exegesis, or lack thereof, is dissatisfying, because I know he has faulted his opponents for being out of the Word. “Free Will” answers the charge of God being “the author of evil” in Cal; yet, both concepts are in the Bible as much as they are known through experience or reason and require interpretative justifications. These circles tempt me to deism, though deism may be insufficient.
Do (most) annihilationists consider universalists as Christians?
I think WLC said that universalism had been declared a “heresy” by the early church (though “early” being Roman Catholic not original Christians) but I did not understand that reasoning at all, given that all Protestants would be heretics according to the ancient and medieval Church Councils, right? I’ve also heard that Origen’s universalism was condemned for political as much as theological reasons, though WLC admitted Origen was a brilliant early theologian and bible interpreter.
Woosh, lots of potential replies here! Sorry if I end up being delayed on them…
Re: Lewis and Boethius, yes Lewis’ approach has some problems, but those stem from him trying to account for God failing to save some sinners from sin, thus the “risk” language. Back before I was a universalist I understood why he thought he had to include the risk notions but I wasn’t comfortable with how that sat together with the principles of Boethian omniscience. Still, on the balance I reckoned he had to be on the right track ontologically. This was one of those little things where he seemed to completely reverse himself on a topic he clearly taught as being important to supernat-theism or ortho-trin, which importance I agreed with. When I put together his work from another direction and realized it necessarily implied Christian universalism (and in a uniquely strong way), suddenly the few snarls I had found in his theology cleared up. God isn’t risking the final outcome for example.
(To be fair, someone could similarly move to Calvinism from various things Lewis said once they came to believe he was wrong about God’s active scope of salvation from sin. Lewis makes a nice microcosm for how the Arm/Calv/Kath debate over church tradition has proceeded. )
A good for who? Who exists to benefit from the cessation of suffering afterward? Whose condition is supported and improved by the cessation of suffering afterward?
I actually agree that euthanasia can be a good for the person being euthanized, but that’s because I believe the person exists in (at least potentially) a better state afterward.
I would even agree that euthanasia, and possibly annihilation, can be a good for other persons afterward, because they continue to exist afterward in perhaps a qualitatively improved existence.
But annihilation, in the sense proposed and promomted by annis, doesn’t result in the annihilated person existing in a better state afterward. Or a worse state. Or a qualitatively equivalent state. Or in any state of existence at all. That’s the whole point to annihilation. Otherwise annihilationists would be ECT proponents (ultimately worse state after annihilation, or at least no better) or universalists (ultimately better state after annihilation).
True, that’s very annoying. I’ll give him this, though: I don’t think he’s as annoying on that tactic as ECT (or even anni) proponents who take the position that God doesn’t actually punish anyone, sinners merely ‘punish’ themselves while God looks on in sorrow and sighs – and then who complain that universalists who appeal to the scriptures for their position including on God punishing sinners post-mortem aren’t taking their position from the scriptures! Because no one can or ever has feasibly argued (and I’ve never seen anyone even try) that the hands-off-let-them-punish-themselves notion of God is derived exegetically from the scriptures.
(Come to think of it, I’m not sure whether I recall WLC going that way in recent years. But my memory is admittedly fuzzy on that, so I’ll assume until I learn otherwise he still believes in God actually punishing people.)
In my experience, yes, so long as the universalists meet other standard criteria (trinitarian theology, or whatever theology the anni holds; trusts in Christ to save them from their sins; repents of their own sins; etc.) Obviously Christian annis don’t regard the so-called Unitarian Universalists as Christian, which is fair enough, and they naturally confuse us with them by word association. Trinitarian Christian annis might or might not regard real doctrinal unitarian Christ followers (universalist or otherwise) as Christian, depending on picky the anni is (or thinks God is) about what counts as faithful Christianity; but those (few) ‘doctrinal unitarians’ aren’t the UUs either.
Since annis are historically and currently a minority themselves, they can be more charitable toward other Christian minority beliefs as still being in the fold, but naturally it depends on the person. An anni might be super-picky instead about JUST HOW IMPORTANT ANNIHILATION IS TO BEING A TRUE CHRISTIAN, or might be hot to show the majority he’s still a true Christian by sacrificing other minorities so to speak. Neither of those is my personal experience with annis yet in any way, but theoretically it’s possible.
By the medieval Church Councils, yes. By the pre-schism Ecumenical Councils, I’m not sure. I don’t recall any of them being about promoting doctrines that Protestants typically protest.
WLC right about it being declared a heresy by a Pope (in the late 500s), but even Roman Catholic authorities don’t affirm him (or subsequent popes on the topic) having taught infallibly.
WLC is technically wrong about it being declared a heresy at an Ecumenical Council, though it was declared a heresy by an RCC council a few centuries after the EcuCouncils. It was declared a heresy at a local council at the instigation of an Emperor, and the anathema was read at a prelude to an EcuCouncil about ten years later but the formal resolutions of that council, which condemned a number of super-popular Christian universalists for subtly Christology violations (wrongly attributed to those men, as the relevant parties all agreed in the past few decades), did not condemn them for being Christian universalists, despite quoting evidence (supposedly) against their Christological beliefs which included standard universalistic arguments! (Arguments those Christian teachers had been using against pagans and non-trinitarian Christians, no less.)
Obviously an attempt was made at the EcuCouncil to get universalism condemned, or the anathemas wouldn’t have been read at the prelude. But since in the official resolutions the actual universalism arguments were passed over without comment on their universalism (and both teachers, Origen and Theodore of Mopsuestia, as well as Nestorius for that matter, were well known to be universalists, it wasn’t like their opponents wouldn’t have know what they meant by the arguments), the Council didn’t in fact condemn them on those points. Which is why the Eastern Orthodox continued to allow bishops and clergy to hold the belief and even to argue in favor of it so long as they didn’t claim it to be official church teaching. (Also why the Roman Catholic Church soon afterward made a rejection of universal salvation a requirement for Eastern bishops to rejoin communion with Rome.)
Definitely true, and in fact his actual position on Christian universalism (and his arguments thereon) weren’t ever addressed – partly due to the political issues involved, and partly due to the texts not being available in certain regions. Justinian could have studied Origen (and Theodore more recently, and Gregory Nyssus for that matter) whenever he wanted to, but he didn’t, and wasn’t interested in doing so – he was playing political strategy games with the lives and reputations of real people, sacrificing them to keep himself (and his wife) in power. The Latin denouncers didn’t even have that option, so were necessarily working at third and fourth hand.
As an aside, I think it’s kind of amusing (and somewhat heartening) how in the last several years I’ve seen a huge uptick in appeals to Origen being made by non-universalist Christian apologists (whether Catholic or Protestant) on various topics.
I’ll have to get back to the omniscience/free will topic later, probably next week, since I need to finish out some real ‘work’ work today, and will be away from keyboard until Monday most likely.
Some of the issues raised in the discussion in the earlier part of this thread reminded me of why I have issues with (at least some) notions of free will floating around out there. What is it that makes these guys so certain that God thinks our free will is as important as we do?
This is certainly a sticky problem. I think the notion of God existing outside of time is a Platonic idea rather than a biblical one. But it seems both views present problems. I guess I currently think of God as transcending time; not really outside of it, but not limited (in some senses) by it either. After all, if God’s creative power is responsible for the ordering of the universe, then time is a construct that likely somehow has to flow from that. Unless we’re prepared to admit that God is a contingent being, it would seem that there had to be at least some point at which he was fully outside of time, because it hadn’t come into being yet. From a physics perspective; time is a relative construct, the marking of the passage of which is dependent on the point of view of both an object in motion and a static point or observer.
It would seem to me that at a minimum, God experiences time quite differently than we do, as a being of light with no physical form.
I agree. God has to experience time (if it’s an experience to Him) differently from us. We’re in this materialized world, and to us, time only goes in one direction and the future doesn’t exist yet. From a quantum physics point of view, everything exists as a potentiality and whatever we look at comes into existence in a material sense. Until we look at it, it could be anywhere. Once we look, there it is. God sees it all, and He knows the combinations of everything. He sees the whole future in any way it can be, and I feel sure He occasionally interferes with it – yet for the most part, we look here or there and that’s the direction we go.
One year I booked a birthday party for my daughter in a place called “the Maze.” It was horrible. We did her birthday on June 26th because it’s really December 26th and that’s a bad time for a birthday to happen. But June was HOT, and the floor of the maze was white river rocks and the walls were cedar boards. I had determined I would find my way out, but there were so many turnings and I kept turning on the wrong one. The children would scramble under the walls (there was a gap big enough to wiggle through, though not with any dignity). I could go anywhere I liked, take any path I chose, and whichever path I took, there I was. The only problem was that “there” was pretty much nowhere at all. Just another turning that looked exactly like the last. I tried making all right turns, but that didn’t work. Left wasn’t any better. Finally my daughter came along and rescued me, but not without the need for wriggling under several walls. How does this apply? I think that Father knows we can’t get out of the maze without Him. Eventually we’ll start screaming His name, and there He’ll be. It will take longer for some than for others, but in the end, everyone has to relent. There is no other option, and no one is going to be willing to wander in that baking maze forever.
Trying to figure this one out drives me crazy. I now very little about science or the philosophy of time. I can say though that I experience God in the present. When I’m not dwelling on the past or afraid of the future I’m in the now. This is where I feel God.
Suppose time had an actual beginning. If so, this means there was no BEFORE the beginning of time. The very word “before” relates one time to another. So “before the beginning of time” is a self-contradiction. Let b represent the beginning of time. If there was a BEFORE, then b was NOT the beginning of time.
Suppose God was simply THERE at the beginning of time. He didn’t exist before that, for there was no “before”, and thus no existence “before”. Let’s suppose God generated or “begat” His Son at the beginning of time (the early Christians said He was begotten “before all ages”). Then there would never have been a time at which the Son did not exist. The Father preceded Him causally, but not temporally. The begetting of the Son was the first event. Possibly the second event was the creation of the Universe through the Son. Between the first and second event, was the first time period.
Since there was no time before the first time period, this seems to imply that the begetting of the Son did not occur within a time period. Since there was no time period in which this begetting took place.
For if there was any time at all prior to the begetting of the Son, then there was a time at which the Son did not exist (even if it was a jillionth of a second). And that’s what Arius affirmed. He said that there was a time at which the Son did not exist. But I think most of us (myself included) do not believe there was such a time.
So I think you are right, Melchizedek. Not only was the Father outside the first time period, but also the Son. Yet, as the early Christians affirmed, the begetting of the Son was the first of God’s acts.
Thanks Melchizedek. Your statement got me thinking, and it seems that my thinking altered somewhat while writing this post. At the beginning of this post, I thought the Son was begotten exactly at the beginning of time. And I still believe this. But now I see that the begetting didn’t occur within the first time period, and in that sense was “outside of time”.
(I bet Paul Helm did in that debate, too!) There are only two options in Pauline teaching: universalism – which is “obviously false” – and a divine choice to save only some sinners from sin.
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