I believe God knows the future exhaustively, and has complete foreknowledge, with absolute certaintyâincluding all future free will choices by mankindâbecause He is not bound by linear time.
I donât believe divine omniscience is somehow âdynamic,â that is, that God acquires knowledge or learns anything.
God knows everything about everything, everywhere, both within time and spaceâpast, present, and future, and also outside of linear time and spaceâin eternity.
And yet, although God knows everything, we still have free will, and so we each bear some responsibility for our decisions.
I also believe God is perfect and omnipotent, and does not need our help.
In the Scriptures, any example of God changing His mind is an anthropomorphism, illustrating an unlimited being dealing with limited man in a way man can understand (or illustrating man sometimes misunderstanding God).
Open theism, which denies that God is truly omniscient, seems to be growing in popularity, particularly within the New Apostolic Reformationâwith its belief in the global dominionist movement and Kingdom Now theology.
Regarding how God could foresee evil, and yet allow it to happen: God chose to delegate part of His sovereignty to men and angels. But He has disallowed all evil through the finished work of Jesus. Consider this comment, and this discussion.
Does your belief correspond to the Scripture? How would you fit the following into your belief?
The LORD said to me in the days of King Josiah: "Have you seen what she did, that faithless one, Israel, how she went up on every high hill and under every green tree, and there played the whore? And I thought, âAfter she has done all this she will return to me,â but she did not return, and her treacherous sister Judah saw it. (Jeremiah 3:6,7 ESV).
God THOUGHT Israel would return to Him, but she didnât return. If God had KNOWN she wouldnât return, why would he have thought that she would?
Some translations say âGod saidâ rather that âGod thought.â But that doesnât change anything. If God had known Israel wouldnât return to Him, He wouldnât say that she would return. God does not lie.
Amen! Let God be found true though every human being is false and a liar. Romans 3:4a (AMPC).
To reiterate my earlier answer (given above)âwhich is in keeping with my many arguments elsewhere in this forum that God is nonviolent, and was occasionally misunderstood and misrepresented by the prophets themselves (even as He still is by believers today):
If God foreknows that you will eat an apple tomorrow, then it is a necessary truth that you will eat an apple tomorrow.
(The inclusion of the phrase âa necessary truthâ in the premise follows from your claim that âit would be impossible for you to refrain from eating an apple tomorrow.â)
But this premise is false. Just because God foreknows a truth, it does not follow logically that this particular truth He foreknows is a necessary truth, for He foreknows contingent truths, also. Thus, this particular truth He foreknows could, in fact, be a contingent truth. As it turns out, this particular truth depends on the choice of a human and so is indeed a contingent, not a necessary, truth.
Because eating an apple tomorrow is a contingent truth, it could come to pass that the human chose not to eat an apple tomorrow, after all. But if the human chose not to eat an apple tomorrow, then God would have foreknown that contingent truth as well.
Are you serious Paidion⌠surely you jest?? You are on record here on this very forum calling into question the veracity of the likes of Moses and Jeremiah â do I really need to provide quotes â people KNOW what youâve in the past. If you want I will.
Without entering the arena on the Open Theism debate, I will opine that the quote - from wherever it originated - is ingenuous. .
Is there really a difference between âomniscientâ and âTRULYâ omniscient? Doubtful. If as some say, God knows all that can be known, well - that is omniscient âenoughâ imho. To throw that âtrulyâ in there does remind me of the âno true scotsmanâ fallacy.
I donât think that the battle is to be waged on the wording in that quote.
Youâre probably right Dave⌠it brings to mind similar phrases that get bandied around here sometimes, for example, as to what constitutes a true Christian etc â smacks of fallacious condescension all the way.
Even before a word is on my tongue, behold, O Lord, you know it altogether. Psalm 139:4.
I make known the end from the beginning, from ancient times, what is still to come. Isaiah 46:10a.
He said, âLord, you know all things; you know that I love you.â Jesus said, âFeed my sheep." John 21:17b.
For if our heart condemns us, God is greater than our heart, and knows all things. 1 John 3:20.
Davo, as you know, the belief that God is exhaustively omniscient is a particular interpretation of certain scriptures (such as those above), and a commonly held position. (And yes, DaveB, I necessarily put qualifiers on âomniscientâ in this discussion, to emphasize the traditional definition over increasingly popular amended definitions. Why canât open theists be forthright and simply say they donât believe God is omniscient?)
And as you know, an anthropomorphism is the attribution of human form or behavior to God. We see anthropomorphisms in Scripture, and yet the belief that God the Father is NOT a human being is universally held by believers.
A commonly proposed explanation that resolves this dilemma (of apparent contradictions in Scripture regarding the true nature of God) is that an infinite God is sometimes anthropomorphized in Scripture in order to make him more understandable to finite humans. (For example, see discussions about this position here, here, and here.)
Individuals worldwide believe in beings with extraordinary mental capacities. An omniscient, or all-knowing, God is embedded in the belief systems of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Armstrong, 1993); in Buddhism, which holds that Guatama Buddha achieved an âenlightenedâ state in which he possessed extraordinary knowledge (Pyysiäinen, 2003); and in Hinduism, which holds that Vishnu is omniscient (Kumar, 1998). Not only are concepts of omniscient beings found in the most widespread religions, âomniâ qualities, such as omniscience, are central to many individualsâ personal conceptualizations of a God (e.g.,Barrett, 1998; Noffke & McFadden, 2001; Spilka, Armatas, & Nussbaum, 1964).
Although such ideas are widely endorsed, they may be particularly difficult for us to fully cognitively represent because they do not accord with our everyday intuitions about human minds that are fallible, subject to ignorance and misperceptions. In the current studies we investigate how children and adults come to represent omniscient beings. These studies help reveal how we come to conceptualize counterintuitive ideas, and shed light on the ontogeny and flexibility of our everyday theory of mind.
âŚTheorists who advocate an âanthropomorphismâ perspective propose that young children have particular difficulty understanding extraordinary mental capacities and tend to conceive of even extraordinary agentsâ minds as human-likeâŚ.
âŚThese results suggest a developmental trajectory of understanding omniscience framed by anthropomorphic, instead of extraordinary, conceptions of knowledge. Young children first understand what it means to have expansive, yet ordinary knowledgeâknowledge about the here-and-now that could be obtained by an ordinary humanâthen later understand what it means to have some extraordinary knowledgeâincluding knowledge that ordinary humans cannot possessâand only much later do they exhibit some understanding of total omniscience.
âŚAs for the epidemiology of these concepts, because anthropomorphic ideas are easily represented (Boyer, 1996; Guthrie, 2001), and because minimally counterintuitive ideas are attention-grabbing and memorable (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer, 2000) notions of human-like-yet-extraordinary minds are arguably easier to remember and transmit, potentially accounting for the ubiquity of these concepts among adults.
Hermano⌠youâve completely avoided what I actually asked. You said and I askedâŚ
I understand how scriptural anthropomorphisms work⌠what you need to answer, i.e., what I asked is â on what textual basis do you claim⌠âGod changing His mindâ is an anthropomorphism? Again, I DONâT need an explanation as to what a biblical anthropomorphism is â I want the textual evidence for your claim.
Whether it does or not, thatâs the nub of the problem, for sure. For me, it is an interesting subject but not a very important one, but the logical aspect is fascinating. I will have a short post a little later discussing the logic.
At bottom, this is not a problem that can be solved by exegesis; it is in a broad sense philosophical/logical.
Here is a short logical argument that is WELL worth 15 minutes of mental energy to try and understand. It is not unassailable, but it is a good first step. I will link to the larger argument which is much more logically rigorous for those that want a really good grasp of the concepts and the history behind them.
(as a prequel to the following 10 steps argument, know that proposition T is : â you will answer the phone tomorrow at 9â.
And use of the word âfatalismâ means : the thesis that infallible foreknowledge of a human act makes the act necessary and hence unfree. If there is a being who knows the entire future infallibly, then no human act is free.
Now to the logical argument.
Basic Argument for Theological Fatalism .
(1) Yesterday God infallibly believed T . [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge]
(2) If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past]
(3) It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T . [1, 2]
(4) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T , then T . [Definition of âinfallibilityâ]
(5) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily ( p â q ), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle]
(6) So it is now-necessary that T . [3,4,5]
(7) If it is now-necessary that T , then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of ânecessaryâ]
(8) Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7]
(9) If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities]
(10) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]
Use logic to disprove logic? That way lies madness.
The actual logic is there for anyone who is interested in pursuing the question in that manner. Which may be, only me Which I totally understand, and Iâm perfectly fine with that.